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This edited collection derived from our need to learn more about the cultural 
heritage of Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous rights to heritage have not been at 
the centre of academic scholarship until quite recently. The UN Expert Mecha-
nism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples decided in 2015 to embark on a study 
on this theme. The University of Lapland organised with the help of the Offfĳice 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights a conference on this topic. Dur-
ing the conference it became clear that important information on In digenous 
cultural heritage has remained rather unexplored or has not been adequately 
linked with specifĳic actors (p.ex. WIPO) or specifĳic issues (p.ex.  free, prior and 
informed consent). Indigenous leaders talked about the  misappropriation of 
their cultural heritage and explained the importance that disrespect of their 
cultural heritage has had on their identity, well-being and development. Ex-
perts in humanities and social sciences explained the intricacies of indigenous 
cultural heritage. Human rights scholars talked about the inability of current 
international law to fully address the injustices towards indigenous commu-
nities. International organisations’ representatives discussed new positive 
developments. The conference became a meeting of complimentary ideas by 
researchers, activists and civil society, a real and genuine discussion about the 
challenges ahead. 
Such wealth of experiences, materials, ideas and knowledge had to be dis-
seminated. It became clear that more work needs to be done on this topic, 
more stones to be uncovered, and more discussion to be had. Multi-discipli-
nary work is especially important in this fĳield. Ideas and knowledge have re-
mained to a large part compartmentalised to the detriment of imaginative 
ways forward. The need to break down borders of disciplines and backgrounds 
is reflected in the multidisciplinary editorial team. We are aware that this col-
lection of essays does not cover all the themes related to the topic. Yet, we feel 
that it is a solid step towards more interaction of ideas and perspectives, led by 
Indigenous voices.
We would like to thank the University of Lapland for the conference which 
started this discussion. We would also like to thank the Unit for Human Rights 
Policy of the Ministry for Foreign Afffairs of Finland for the funding we re-
ceived. Also thanks to the Minority and Indigenous Unit of the Offfĳice of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights for their encouragement and support. 
Many thanks to Lindy Melman for her support and patience and to Jules Gul-
denmund for his excellent editing. Finally, many thanks to all Indigenous indi-
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viduals who allowed us an insight into their concerns and aspirations regard-
ing the protection and development of their cultural heritage. 
 The Editors 
International Instruments on Cultural Heritage: 
Tales of Fragmentation
Alexandra Xanthaki
On 30 September 2016, the UN Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 
A/ HRC/33/L.21 on ‘Cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage’. This 
development highlights the attention that cultural heritage is currently at-
tracting at the international level. The resolution notes the detrimental impact 
that the loss of cultural heritage has for the enjoyment of  cultural rights and 
calls for action. The resolution does not once refer to sub-national groups. Yet, 
in calling for international co-operation in restoring ‘the stolen, looted or traf-
fĳicked  cultural property to its countries of origin’ (para. 4), it puts the issue of 
cultural heritage fĳirmly within the human rights agenda of the United Nations. 
This was not the case until rather recently.
The recent attention that cultural heritage has attracted by the internation-
al human rights law system is of course very welcoming. Talking in specifĳic 
about  tangible heritage, Roger O’Keefe notes: ‘The framing of the conserva-
tion of tangible cultural heritage as a human right reminds us that we seek to 
preserve and protect such heritage not for its own sake but as an indispensable 
element of human flourishing’.1 Indeed, the cultural heritage of individuals as 
well as of sub-national groups is essential for the protection and development 
of their identity. Unfortunately, in far too many parts of the world, cultural her-
itage is under threat. Indigenous art is widely misappropriated and indigenous 
 traditional knowledge is ignored or used without the consent of the groups. 
Historical injustices, such as the brutal removal of indigenous children from 
their families have cut their bond of indigenous peoples with their heritage, 
especially the  intangible parts. The unruly development of projects by trans-
national corporations continuously disregard indigenous spiritual sites and 
indigenous communities of their natural heritage. Also, tourism, often encour-
aged by the state as an important means of resources, lacks the necessary cul-
tural sensitivity and commodifĳies important indigenous sites. And who can 
ignore the destruction of cultural artefacts as a means of retaliation in situ-
ations of ethnic conflict; and the stealing of such artefacts from indigenous 
1 R. O’Keefe, ‘Tangible cultural heritage and international human rights law’ in L.V. Prott, R. 
Redmint-Cooper and S. Urice (eds.), Realising Cultural Heritage Law, Festschrift for Patrick 
O’Keefe (Institute of Art and Law, 2013), 87 at 95. 
© 2017 Alexandra Xanthaki. isbn 978-90-04-34218-7. pp. 1-19
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
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lands. There is an urgent need to protect the cultural heritage of individuals 
and groups; and such protection cannot take place without the involvement 
and implementation of a strong human rights system.
For a long time, heritage was seen as falling outside the domain of human 
rights and more into UNESCO’s domain. It is still widely seen as a matter of 
concern for the states, rather than any sub-national group. Similarly, a ‘right 
to cultural heritage’ as such was not included in any human rights instrument. 
Recently, there has been recognition of ‘the right to  access to cultural herit-
age’ and ‘the right to enjoying the benefĳits of cultural heritage’. The  Faro Con-
vention (2011), for example, recognizes the right of everyone ‘to benefĳit from 
cultural heritage’. The UN Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights 
referred for the fĳirst time in 2011 to a right to cultural heritage. ‘Considering 
access to and enjoyment of cultural heritage as a human right’, she noted, ‘is a 
necessary and complementary approach to the preservation/safeguard of cul-
tural heritage.’2 In a similar way, indigenous cultural heritage was not on the 
radar of international bodies.
One reason why cultural heritage was not explicitly discussed within the 
context of human rights was that it was part of  cultural rights. But then again, 
 cultural rights were a neglected area of international law until very recently. 
Several United Nations bodies have been pivotal in clarifying the scope of 
 cultural rights in general, which has had a direct impact on a better under-
standing of indigenous  cultural rights. Notable is General Comment 25 (50) of 
the  Human Rights Committee which refers to the broad nature of indigenous 
culture; it observes that ‘culture manifests itself in various forms’ and men-
tions indigenous traditional activities such as fĳishing or hunting and the right 
to live in reserves protected by law. The jurisprudence of the UN  Human Rights 
Committee also made a diffference with the Kitok and Lubicon Lake Band cases 
reafffĳirming an understanding of indigenous culture consistent with the indig-
enous views. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial  Discrimination has also used the rather generic prohibition of discrimi-
nation in  religion,  cultural rights, education and  participation in cultural activ-
ities to promote indigenous  cultural rights. Apart from the frequent references 
to indigenous  cultural rights in its Concluding Observations, the Committee 
has issued General Recommendation XXIII (51) that calls for the recognition and 
respect of indigenous distinct cultures, histories, languages and ways of life as 
an enrichment of the State’s cultural identity. The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has in 2009 discussed in depth the meaning of cul-
2 United Nations, Report of the Independent Expert in the fĳield of Cultural Rights, Farida 
Shaheed, UN Doc A/HRC/17/38 of 21 March 2011, para. 2. 
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ture. In 2012, the United Nations turned its attention to indigenous languages 
and cultures and published a report on this topic by the UN Expert Mechanism 
on the Rights of Indigenous peoples ( EMRIP). In 2016,  EMRIP published a re-
port on indigenous cultural heritage. This volume is based on submissions and 
discussions that took place in a conference in Rovaniemi, co-organised by the 
University of Lapland and the Offfĳice of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. 
PART A: THE MEANING OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 
From Cultural Property to Cultural Heritage 
Indigenous rights scholars have welcomed the attention on cultural heritage. 
The term ‘cultural heritage’ has been seen as a good substitute of the term 
‘ cultural property’ which prevailed in earlier documents of international law. 
‘Cultural property’ was associated with the understanding of culture as capital 
and  ownership. The (1954) UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the event of Armed Conflict defĳines  cultural property as: ‘irrespective 
of origin or ownership… movable or immovable property of great importance 
to the cultural heritage of every people’. The restrictiveness of this defĳinition 
is maintained in the (1999) Second Protocol to the Convention, even though its 
preamble emphasises that rules in this area should reflect developments in 
international law. 3 The (1970)  UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting 
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property is more detailed:  cultural property is defĳined as ‘property which, on 
religious or secular grounds, is specifĳically designated by each State as being of 
importance for  archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science’. The 
Convention also includes a very detailed account of objects of  cultural prop-
erty. The (1972)  UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage is the exception to these early instruments, as it 
refers to cultural heritage, instead of  cultural property. 
Indigenous perceptions of culture are quite alien to the concept of culture 
as capital and the link of culture with ownership. Indigenous peoples have al-
ways viewed culture as part of the community: 
3 See para. 4 of the Preamble and article 1.b. of the (1999) Second Protocol to the Hague 
Convention of the 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(1999) 38 International Legal Materials 769-782 at 769.
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No person ‘owns’ or holds as ‘property’ living things. Our Mother Earth 
and our plant and animal relatives are respected sovereign living beings 
with rights of their own in addition to playing an essential role in our 
survival.4
For them, culture signifĳies the continuous relationship between human be-
ings, animals, plants and places with which culture is connected. In this rela-
tionship, economic rights have no place. Indigenous peoples have noted:
culture as ‘property’ (therefore commodities to be exploited freely and 
bought and sold at will) has resulted to disharmony between human be-
ings and the natural world, as well as the current environmental crisis 
threatening all life. This concept is totally incompatible with a traditional 
Indigenous  world view. 5
Even since the early 90s, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
Cultural and Intellectual Property has urged the use of the term ‘indigenous 
cultural heritage’, rather than ‘ cultural property’. She has defĳined ‘cultural her-
itage’ as:
everything that belongs to the distinct identity of a people and is there-
fore theirs to share, if they wish, with other peoples. It includes all of 
those things which international law regards as the creative production 
of human thought and craftsmanship, such as songs, stories, scientifĳic 
knowledge and artworks. It also includes inheritances from the past and 
from nature, such as  human remains, the natural features of the  land-
scape, and naturally-occurring species of plants and animals with which 
a people has long been connected. 6
During the elaboration of the  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, a similar change of terminology was initiated by the UN Secretariat: it was 
4 See International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), IITC Discussion Paper on Biological Di-
versity and Biological Ethics, 30 August 1996, p. 5 (on fĳile with author).
5 See International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), IITC Discussion Paper on Biological Di-
versity and Biological Ethics, 30 August 1996, p. 5 (on fĳile with author).
6 Working paper on the question of the ownership and control of the cultural property of 
indigenous peoples prepared by E.-I. Daes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/34, para. 6.
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suggested that the term cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual ‘property’ 
be replaced by the term ‘heritage’. 7 
‘Cultural heritage’ is also the term used in the  Faro Convention, adopted in 
2005 and put into force in 2009. The convention is very clear about the value of 
heritage. The Preamble emphasises ‘the value and potential of cultural herit-
age’ as ‘a resource for sustainable development and quality of life in a constant-
ly evolving society’. Article 1d also links cultural heritage to the ‘construction 
of a peaceful and democratic society’ and ‘cultural diversity’.8 The Convention 
defĳines cultural heritage as ‘a group of resources inherited from the past which 
people identify, independently of  ownership, as a reflection and expression of 
their constantly evolving values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions. It includes 
all aspects of the  environment resulting from the interaction between people 
and places through time’. 
Although the term ‘cultural heritage’ is gaining quite a momentum in inter-
national human rights fora, including a 2015 UN Study on indigenous cultural 
heritage, a 2016 UN Study on the right to cultural heritage and the  HRC Resolu-
tion A/ HRC/33/L.21 mentioned above, academic scholarship is not united in 
promoting the concept. Some writers have even been negative about the use 
of this term. For example, McCrone has suggested that the start of the heritage 
concept is placed at the post-Fordist economic climate of the US and argues 
that heritage ‘has its roots in the reconstructing of the world economy – a pro-
cess which began in the 1970s’.9 Hence, McCrone links the concept of cultural 
heritage to the marketplace. Harvey responds that irrespective of when its 
protection started, heritage ‘is a product of wider social, cultural, political and 
economic transitions’.10 
7 See Technical review of the United Nations draft declaration on the rights of indigenous 
peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2, para. 16. 
8 Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society 
(2005).
9 D. McCrone, A. Morris and R. Kiely, Scotland – The Brand. The Making of Scottish Heritage, 
Edinburgh: Polygon, 1995, p. 2.
10 D. Harvey, ‘Heritage Pasts and Presents, Temporality, meaning and the scope of heritage 
studies’ (2001) 7(4) International Journal of Heritage Studies 319-338 at 324. 
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Cultural Heritage and Culture
Certainly, cultural heritage is a vague concept.11 Larkham warns us that herit-
age seems to be ‘all things to all people’,12 while Johnson and Thomas main-
tain that heritage is ‘virtually anything by which some kind of link, however 
tenuous or false, may be forged with the past’.13 In her seminal article, Blake 
noted already in 2000 the problems of defĳining cultural heritage for lawyers. In 
particular, the distinction between culture and cultural heritage is not clear at 
all.14 Is this distinction based on time? Is it based on the nature of the elements 
to be protected? 
‘Past’
The time element is one widely identifĳied as an important criterion that dis-
tinguishes culture to cultural heritage. If indeed cultural heritage is ‘everything 
that is considered to be worthy of preserving in culture and that one wants to 
leave to subsequent generations’,15 then what is culture? And if culture is not 
what deserves to be preserved, then why does international law protect cul-
ture? Maybe culture should not be protected but cultural heritage should? Or 
is it that culture has some meaning in the present, whereas cultural heritage 
has more meaning in the past? Yet, this distinction does not seem very precise 
either. Konsa, like Harvey, notes that ‘heritage is far from a fĳixed or objectively 
defĳined phenomenon’.16 But, if cultural heritage is not a fĳixed concept, it is 
then a concept that relates to the present too. Thus, the distinction between 
culture and cultural heritage on the basis of time crumbles. 
Maybe cultural heritage is diffferent to culture because the former signi-
fĳies the artefacts that need to be protected for future generations. Although 
this was the understanding some decades ago, the inclusion of  intangible and 
 natural elements into the meaning of cultural heritage as protected in inter-
11 B. Graham, P. Howard, ‘Introduction: Heritage and Identity’ in B. Graham, P. Howard 
(eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity (Aldershot, Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2008), 1-15.
12 P.J. Larkham ‘heritage as planned and conserved’ in D.T. Herbert (ed.), Heritage, Tourism 
and Society (London: Mansel, 1995), 85. 
13 P. Johnson and B. Thomas, ‘Heritage as Business’ in D.T. Herbert (ed.), Heritage, Tourism 
and Society (London: Mansell, 1995) 170. 
14 J. Blake, ‘On defĳining the Cultural Heritage; 49 (2000) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 61 at 68. 
15 K. Konsa, ‘Heritage as a socio-cultural construct: problems of defĳinition’ 12 (2013) Baltic 
Journal of Art History 125 at 126. 
16 K. Konsa, ‘Heritage as a socio-cultural construct: problems of defĳinition’ 12 (2013) Baltic 
Journal of Art History 125 at 125. 
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national law makes this distinction blurred. Since the early 2000s, intangible 
heritage has rightly become an accepted part of cultural heritage. The 2003 
 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 
has played an important role in this.17 Even though this is a positive develop-
ment, the maintenance of such heritage must be subject to the evolution of 
the contemporary societal processes’.18 In other words, illiberal practices can-
not be preserved in the name of cultural heritage. 
Choice
In addition to the lack of clarity on what is included in ‘cultural heritage’, critics 
also put forward the choice that is involved in the elements that will be viewed 
as cultural heritage. ‘The political aspect of the decision as to what is to be 
preserved for future generations’.19 Charlesworth notes that ‘the defĳinition of 
‘culture’ is a highly political and contentious one – who defĳines ‘culture’, and 
who benefĳits from it?’20 
It is true that usually these choices are being left to the elites of each sec-
tion of the population, either the elites of the community itself or of the elite 
in the state structure. Very often, it is the ‘experts’ who decide what needs to 
be preserved and what not, at times without even consulting and getting the 
agreement of the community. Hortlofff warns us against the recent emphasis 
on preservation and conservation of cultural heritage. Ηe notes that ‘destruc-
tion and loss are not the opposite of heritage but part of its very substance’.21 
According to him, ‘it is not the acts of vandals and iconoclasts that are chal-
lenging sustainable notions of heritage, but the inability of both academic and 
political observers to understand and theorize what heritage does, and what is 
done to it, within the diffferent realities that together make up our one world.’22 
He joins other scholars warning against preserving just for the sake of preser-
vation. The preserved item becomes heritage not because the group thought 
it needed preserving but because it so happened that it was preserved. In any 
case, it has to be recognised that such process, benign as it may be, relates to 
17 J. Blake, ‘Seven Years of Implementing UNESCO’s 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention 
– Honeymoon Period or the “Seven-Year Itch”?’ (2014) 21 International Journal of Cultural 
Property, 291-304. 
18 K. Konsa, 125. 
19 J. Blake, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, at 69. 
20 H. Charlesworth, ‘Cultural Diversity in International Law’ in Human Rights, Faith and Cul-
ture, pp. 35-45 at 35.
21 C. Hortlofff, ‘Can less be more? Heritage in the age of terrorism’ 5 (2006) Public Archaeol-
ogy, 101-109. 
22 C. Hortlofff, Public Heritage at 108. 
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the formation of identity, but also relates to power and authority. In this sense, 
it maintains the centres of power and the powerlessness of the peripheries. It 
maintains the exclusion of the vulnerable communities from deciding on their 
heritage as well as the exclusion of the vulnerable individuals within the com-
munities that have no say in the formation of cultural heritage. Seen in this 
light, the protection of cultural heritage does not lead to the protection of the 
individual’s identity but to the maintenance of inequality and exclusion. 
PART B: COHERENCE
1 Fragmentation of ‘Cultural Heritage’ Research 
It becomes obvious from the discussion above that although international law-
yers have been pushing rather uncritically for the adoption of the term ‘cultural 
heritage’ in international human rights and in particular on indigenous rights, 
scholars in humanities have been problematizing about the concept. Indeed, 
international law debates on the rights of indigenous peoples to their heritage 
are to a large degree focused in legal interpretations of relevant provisions with 
little discussion of the consequences of such rights for global art and artists. At 
the same time, the discourse of cultural heritage in the humanities has tended 
to over-emphasise the authority of knowledge, which is not followed anymore 
by recent standards in international human rights law, that prioritize indig-
enous communities over experts. Clearly, the various disciplines have not been 
‘listening’ to one another, nor have they been bouncing ideas offf each other. A 
closer look within the various disciplines, namely international human rights, 
humanities, ethnography and history, reveals considerable variations in the 
understanding, the evaluation and the priorities on cultural heritage. 
Indeed, one can sense the limited interaction of disciplines in this respect: 
International law has focused on the  fragmentation that exists among its dif-
ferent parts, but the multi-disciplinary fragmentation in the study of specifĳic 
areas, such as cultural heritage, needs also to be addressed.23 One can clearly 
see the downsides of such fragmentation: responses of international law to 
the challenges posed currently in cultural heritage cannot be comprehensive 
unless they consider the politics and history of cultural heritage and acknowl-
23 However, look at A. Jakubowski, ‘A constitutionalised legal order – exploring the role of 
the World Heritage Convention (1972)’ in A. Jakubowski and K. Wierczyńska (eds.), Frag-
mentation vs the Constitutionalisation of International Law (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 
182 at 187.
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edge the tensions between archaeological knowledge and community claims. 
International lawyers can only reach an accurate interpretation of the existing 
law and suggest helpful ways forward, if they take into account the possible 
downsides of every such suggestion.
In all this discussion, indigenous peoples have been mere observers for a 
long time, while experts from various disciplines have been deciding on their 
behalf how to protect their heritage. Their  participation in interpreting and ex-
posing their heritage has been minimal, even though as Jody Joy (2004) has ex-
plained, ‘historic objects are not innately meaningful but become meaningful 
only when they are socially constituted in a particular way’.24 Yet, recently one 
can see evidence of a change. Indigenous peoples are taking initiatives to be 
in control of their heritage. For example, Lanauze, Forbes and Solomon have 
recorded the struggle of Moriori, an indigenous group living in Rekoku (the 
Moriori name for Chatham Islands) to retain and control their heritage.25 After 
centuries of having items of their cultural heritage stolen from their island, 
the Moriori have created ‘a comprehensive cultural database that involves re-
recording archaeological evidence in a way that combines elder knowledge 
and experience,  oral traditions and recollections of past land use and events’.26 
Also important are community-level strategies for protecting indigenous herit-
age, such as ethical guidelines and cultural protocols.27 These initiatives are a 
realisation of the indigenous right to  self-determination and are in sync with 
the current approaches of the humanities as well as the current standards of 
international law on indigenous rights. 
24 C. Hortlofff, ‘Can less be more? Heritage in the age of terrorism’ (2006) 5 Public Archaeol-
ogy 101-109 at 103. 
25 T. Lanauze, S. Forbes and M. Solomon, ‘A practical approach to traditional knowledge and 
indigenous heritage management: A case study of Moriori heritage management prac-
tice’ in S, Subramanian and B. Pisupati (eds.), Traditional knowledge in Policy and Practice 
(United Nations University Press, 2010), p. 327. 
26 Ibid., 330.
27 K. Barrister, ‘Non-Legal instruments for the protection of intangible cultural heritage: Key 
roles for ethical code and community protocols’ in C. Bell and R. Paterson (eds.), Protec-
tion of First Nations Cultural Heritage, Laws, Policy and Reform (University of British Co-
lumbia, 2009) p. 278. 
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2 Fragmentation of International Law Relevant to Indigenous 
Cultural Heritage
Fragmentation specifĳically within international law also afffects indigenous 
rights to their cultural heritage. Fragmentation in international law has been 
defĳined as ‘the profound systemic rupture in the structure of international law, 
reflected in the lack of well-developed and established hierarchies or other 
techniques to deal with normative conflicts and tensions between general in-
ternational law norms and its specialized regimes, as well as between those 
regimes inter se.’28 It has been widely argued that the expansion of interna-
tional law ‘has created problems of harmony between its diffferent branches, 
institutions and norm-systems’.29 Such developments have led to a lack of co-
herence of the various regulatory contexts in international law, which prevent 
the formation and application of shared principles and interpretations across 
international law.30 This compartmentalization and specialization is very ob-
vious in the study of indigenous cultural heritage with detrimental efffects to a 
coherent development of the law. 
International Human Rights Law
There are three main international law systems related to indigenous cultural 
heritage. The most recent one is the international human rights law system. 
The level of protection evolved quite considerably in the last few years. Para-
mount in this system is the  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
as a tool that clarifĳies how general human rights standards apply on indige-
nous cultural heritage. Article 31 UNDRIP explicitly recognises the right of in-
digenous peoples to ‘maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural her-
itage,  traditional knowledge and  traditional cultural expressions, as well as the 
manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures.’ The article specifĳi-
cally includes the following in the manifestations of cultural heritage, knowl-
edge and expressions to be protected: ‘human and genetic resources, seeds, 
medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora,  oral traditions, lit-
28 A. Jakubowski and K. Wierczyńska (eds.), Fragmentation vs the Constitutionalisation of 
International Law (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 1. 
29 Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difffĳiculties Arising from the Diversifĳication and Expansion of International Law’, Report 
Finalized by M. Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682.
30 A. Jakubowski and K. Wierczyńska, above, p. 2, also citing M.A. Young (ed.), Regime Inter-
action in International Law Facing Fragmentation (CUP 2012); N. Krisch, Beyond Constitu-
tionalism. The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP 2010).
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eratures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts.’ 
One can see that the text does not make a clear distinction between  tangible, 
 intangible and  natural heritage, a positive element and diffferent to the ap-
proach of the older UNESCO documents on cultural heritage. Rights related to 
cultural heritage are also recognised in several other parts of the Declaration. 
Article 11 UNDRIP recognises the intangible aspects of cultural heritage: indig-
enous peoples have the right to ‘practice and revitalize their cultural traditions 
and customs’, which includes ‘past, present and future manifestations of their 
cultures’. The text also includes tangible elements: ‘archaeological and histori-
cal sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and perform-
ing arts and literature.’ Article 12 follows the same pattern: it protects the right 
of indigenous peoples ‘to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual 
and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, pro-
tect, and have  access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to 
the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatria-
tion of their  human remains’. Interesting is the recognition of the right to ac-
cess in privacy to sacred sites, as will be discussed below. Article 13 recognises 
indigenous rights to histories, languages,  oral traditions, philosophies, writing 
systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for com-
munities, places and persons.
The above-mentioned provisions in UNDRIP do not create new law. They 
interpret existing binding human rights treaties. They interpret how arti-
cle 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)31 and article 27 ICCPR apply to indigenous peoples’ cultural herit-
age.32 The content of UNDRIP on indigenous cultural heritage is also an ex-
pression of cross-fertilisation of ideas and standards among the various bodies 
of international human rights law. The provisions reflect comments made by 
international human rights bodies and feed back as the basis to comments by 
United Nations bodies. For example, CERD has recently asked questions on 
the efffect of relocation on indigenous cultural heritage,33 whereas the  Human 
Rights Committee had talked about protection of sites of religious or cultural 
31 United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopt-
ed and opened for signature, ratifĳication and accession by General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
32 A. Xanthaki, ‘Indigenous Rights to Culture’ in M. Weller and J. Hofmann (eds.), Commen-
tary on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oxford University Press, 
2017), (forthcoming).
33 UN Doc. CERD/C/LAO/CO/15, para. 18. 
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signifĳicance.34 In its concluding observations for New Zealand, the Commit-
tee has used language very similar to the UNDRIP. The Committee recognised 
‘Māori’s right to conserve, promote and develop their own culture, language 
and cultural heritage,  traditional knowledge and  traditional cultural expres-
sions, and the manifestations of their sciences and cultures.’35 The HR Com-
mittee’s comments in its concluding observations followed discussions on 
indigenous  cultural rights in the case-law, including Apirana Mahuika et al. v. 
New Zealand,36 Ominayak v. Canada, Lansman et al. v. Finland in 199437 and 
1996,38 Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v. France,39 Lovelace v. Canada40 and 
Kitok v. Sweden.41 These comments of the  Human Rights Committee have been 
important in convincing the States of the validity of the UNDRIP related to 
 cultural rights. Cross-fertilisation has also been possible between the universal 
human rights system and the Inter-American system of human rights. Even as 
far back as 1993, the Inter-American Court took into account the customary 
marriage practices of the Saramacan people.42 In 2004, the Court found in the 
Massacre of Plan de Sánchez case that the deaths of the women and elderly, 
who were traditionally the oral transmitters of the Mayan Achí culture, inter-
rupted the passage of cultural knowledge to future generations and the milita-
rization and repression after the massacre resulted in the indigenous peoples’ 
loss of faith in their traditions.43 The prohibition of the indigenous group to 
practice their traditional burial ceremonies because of their relocation was 
deemed a violation of their rights,44 which Guatemala accepted as a violation 
of ‘the freedom to manifest their religious, spiritual, and cultural beliefs’.45 In 
the Bámaca Velásquez case, the court also noted that the funeral ceremonies 
of the Mam ethnic group were ‘something that is traditional in the indigenous 
34 For example UN A/55/40, para. 510 regarding Australia.
35 UN International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding ob-
servations on the fĳifth periodic report of New Zealand, UN Doc. E/C12/NZL/CO/3 (2012) 
para. 26. 
36 A/56/40, Volume I, Annex X, A (Communication No. l 547/1993).
37 CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, Case No. 511/1992.
38 CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995, Case No. 671/1995.
39 CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1, Communication No. 549/1993.
40 A/36/40, Annex 7(G) (1998).
41 A/43/40, Annex 7(G) (1988).
42 Aloeboetoe et al. v Suriname (Reparations) IACtHR Series C 15 (1993); 1-2 IHRR 208 (1993).
43 Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala (Reparations) IACtHR Series C 116 (2004).
44 Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala (Merits), IACtHR Series C 105 (2004), para. 42(30).
45 Ibid., para. 36(4).
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culture’,46 whereas in the Case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname the Court 
ordered Suriname to take all measures ‘to recover promptly the remains of the 
Moiwana community members killed’ by the national army in 1886.47 There-
fore, in fulfĳilling indigenous peoples’  cultural rights, states are now under the 
obligation to act in positive and precise ways in order to recover the remains 
of indigenous members. 
UNESCO Law
Unfortunately, the human rights standards are not reflected in the UNESCO 
conventions. Even though Article 5 of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Di-
versity (2001) noted that the flourishing of cultural diversity requires ‘the full 
implementation of  cultural rights as defĳined in Article 27 of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and in Articles 13 and 15 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, the link between the Convention on the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions and human rights is too generic and vague.48 
One of the main challenges is that UNESCO documents still frame cultural 
heritage in a binary way, either belonging to the state or to the individual. So, 
for example, the (1970)  UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Prop-
erty protects:
(a) Cultural property created by the individual or collective genius of na-
tionals of the State concerned, and  cultural property of importance to 
the State concerned created within the territory of that State by foreign 
nationals or stateless persons resident within such territory; (b)  cultural 
property found within the national territory. 
All these earlier provisions have to be interpreted in the light of UNDRIP. The 
 Convention for the Safeguarding of the  Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003) 
does ensure respect for the intangible cultural heritage of groups; individu-
als are almost an exception to the protection of the convention.49 Also, ac-
46 Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala (Reparations), IACtHR Series C 91 (2002), para. 82. 
47 Case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs), IACHR, Judgment of 15 June 2005, Series C No 124, para. 208.
48 Y. Donders, ‘Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 
Included or Ignored?’ in T. Kono and S. van Uytsel (eds.), The UNESCO Convention on the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Intersentia, 2012), p. 165 at 177 onwards. 
49 A. Meijknecht, ‘The Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, What is its 
Added Value for Minorities and Indigenous Peoples’ in T. Kono and S. van Uytsel (eds.), 
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cording to article 11 of the convention, each State Party shall ‘(b) identify and 
defĳine the various elements of the intangible cultural heritage present in its 
territory, with the  participation of communities, groups, and relevant non-
governmental organisations.’50 Nevertheless, currently communities continue 
to have very little input in identifying the elements constituting cultural herit-
age. For example, it is the state party to the  World Heritage Convention ( WHC) 
that nominates potential heritage sites.51 In this respect, States rely heavily on 
the state narratives, rather the indigenous narratives about specifĳic elements. 
So, often, indigenous peoples have to satisfy the entities that have been un-
dermining their cultural heritage that it is worthy enough to be nominated for 
international protection. Also, in other cases, the indigenous heritage is being 
pushed to be presented and perceived as part of national heritage. In addition, 
indigenous peoples have had minimum input in the conservation, exhibition 
and protection discussions relating to their own cultural heritage. Hence, al-
though States can acquire UNESCO protection and recognition for the indig-
enous sites and elements that exist within their territories, yet they do not have 
any obligation from UNESCO to recognise and protect the link between the 
indigenous heritage and the community. The WHC convention does recognise 
the States’ ‘duty of ensuring the identifĳication, protection, conservation, pres-
entation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural 
heritage’ (Art. 4), but recognises no right of any group to such heritage. In other 
words, there is no strong link between the UNESCO protection, which goes 
mainly towards the state according to state requests and understandings, and 
the human rights obligations that such States have towards the actual own-
ers of the cultural heritage, i.e. indigenous peoples. This has to change and 
relevant UNESCO documents need to be interpreted in the light of UNDRIP.
For example, the 1995 UNDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Objects, created to compliment the 1970 Convention, does recognise the her-
itage of tribal and indigenous communities living in a Contracting State. Al-
though the 1995 Convention puts the State where such heritage comes from in 
charge of such claims against another state and is of no use for heritage taken 
The UNESCO Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Intersentia, 2012), p. 201 
at 214. 
50 Article 11 of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 
(2003). 
51 R. Coombe and J. Turcotte, ‘Indigenous cultural heritage in development and trade: per-
spectives from the dynamics of cultural heritage law and policy’ in C.B. Graber, K. Kupre-
cht and J.C. Lai (eds.), International Trade in Indigenous Cultural heritage: Legal and policy 
issues (Edward Elgar, 2012), 272-305. 
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by the state without the consent of the indigenous community, nevertheless 
it explicitly proclaims that the missing object ‘will be returned’ to the tribal or 
indigenous community to which it belongs. Provisions like this have to take a 
more central stage within UNESCO and have to be implemented. 
There are also other areas where the compartmentalisation of the UNESCO 
protection of cultural heritage and the human rights protection to indigenous 
cultural heritage difffer. One such area is the distinction in UNESCO documents 
between tangible and intangible culture, something that is alien to indigenous 
peoples and is avoided in the UNDRIP. Notable is the (2003) UNESCO Conven-
tion for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, a convention adopted 
while the UNDRIP was at the end of its elaboration and several discussions 
were taking place in the UN on indigenous cultural heritage. In contrast, the 
 WHC has been trying to incorporate cultural and natural elements in heritage. 
This is a big step forward and although there are still issues in the degree to 
which natural heritage is identifĳied and protected, it is a positive development. 
Another such area where  fragmentation is obvious and detrimental to in-
digenous cultural heritage is the UNESCO concept of ‘objects of outstanding 
value’, which goes against the trend of associating heritage to everyday life but 
which also raises further issues about the entity that makes such judgments 
(and it is usually not the indigenous community who is the owner of such 
heritage). The (1972) Convention specifĳically protects objects of outstanding 
or monumental value, and thus excludes large parts of indigenous cultural 
heritage. Even the (1972)  UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage which uses cultural heritage, defĳines cul-
tural heritage as ‘individual artistic works, artefacts and handicrafts; objects 
of religious signifĳicance; music, folklore and design;  archaeology and  human 
remains; sacred and historical sites’. So, for example, it is debatable whether 
human skeletons could be included in the ‘products of archaeological excava-
tions and discoveries’. Also doubtful is the inclusion of  oral history in the Con-
vention; arguably, it can be protected as part of ‘sound, photographic and cine-
matographic archives’. More generally, both the 1972 UNESCO Convention and 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention make no reference to spiritual or religious cri-
teria that might apply in identifying areas of cultural heritage, although these 
are the main criteria for indigenous heritage. These omissions by the Conven-
tion leave many cultural objects open to the possibility of uncontrollable use 
and abuse. An illustrative example is unauthorised fĳilmings of indigenous re-
ligious ceremonies and secret recordings of songs and rituals: the Convention 
protects photographs, fĳilms and sound recordings that have a historical value 
(hence the use of the term ‘archive’), but it is arguable whether indigenous 
peoples have any protection against all unauthorised fĳilmings and recordings.
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Intellectual Property Rights 
In addition, the human rights standards on indigenous cultural heritage have 
not yet penetrated the international regime on  intellectual property rights. The 
 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), enforced in 1993, and the TRIPs agree-
ment, enforced in 1995, take a very diffferent approach to the human rights sys-
tem outlined above, as they encourage the commercialisation of cultural herit-
age and  traditional knowledge. Even though the CBD was the fĳirst convention 
that recognised the value of traditional knowledge, it also promoted the wider 
application of cultural heritage and traditional knowledge and made indig-
enous IP rights subject to national law. CBD, article 8j, reads 
Subject to national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embody-
ing traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the ap-
proval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations 
and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefĳits arising 
from the utilization of such knowledge innovations and practices 
Article 8j attracted invested commercial interests. Further, the TRIPs Agree-
ment promoted a universal scheme that broadened the scope of  intellectual 
property commercially understood that includes cultural heritage such as ge-
netic resources, plant varieties and pharmaceuticals.52 
Essentially the Intellectual Property Rights system views  intellectual prop-
erty rights, including indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage rights, as individual 
rights and focuses on the fĳinancial benefĳits resulting from protecting such 
individual interests.53 WIPO has so far encouraged the commercialisation of 
heritage, has promoted the individualistic understanding of heritage, and has 
adopted a way of looking at cultural heritage which is alien and detrimental to 
indigenous peoples.54 This system clearly collides with the human rights stand-
ards recognised on indigenous cultural heritage. Unfortunately, the IP system 
has a much clearer enforcement mechanism than the human rights system. 
The conflict between the  intellectual property system and the human rights 
52 Helfer 2004, Dutfĳield 2003. 
53 J. Morijn, ‘The place of cultural rights in the WTO system’ in F. Francioni and M. Scheinin 
(eds.), Cultural Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhofff, 2007), p. 285.
54 R. Fan, ‘Evolution of indigenous peoples’ rights and indigenous knowledge debate’ in 
C. Lennox and D. Short (eds.), Handbook of Indigenous Peoples Rights (Routledge, 2016) 
p. 237. 
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standards has been identifĳied by the then Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights even since 2000. In its resolution 2000/7, the 
Sub-Commission identifĳied that the IPR system violates the right of everyone 
to enjoy the benefĳits of scientifĳic progress, the right to food, to health and to 
 self-determination. In 2001, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights specifĳically recognised the conflict and noted that all parties are 
required to observe the human-rights based approach that ‘focuses particu-
larly on the needs of the most disadvantaged and marginalised individuals 
and communities’ including indigenous peoples.55 The Committee, but also 
subsequently the  UN Special Rapporteur in the fĳield of  cultural rights, called 
upon all member states, UN organs and specialised agencies as well as interna-
tional organisations to take efffective measures to implement article 15 ICESCR. 
WIPO has not formally adopted the UNDRIP, which represents an interpreta-
tive tool of article 15 on the right to culture specifĳically for indigenous peoples. 
However, they are in the process of elaborating three draft treaties on genetic 
resources,  traditional  knowledge and folklore and  traditional cultural expres-
sions. These treaties, if adopted, will have a deep impact on bringing together 
the human rights standards on indigenous cultural heritage and IP rights. 
3 Fragmentation within Human Rights Law 
A third place where one can talk about  fragmentation is within the interna-
tional human rights law system, where traditional liberals emphasise the im-
portance of individual rights to cultural expression, whereas scholars working 
on indigenous rights emphasise the importance of collective rights related to 
heritage. A major underpinning in the rights of artists is the protection of their 
right to seek inspiration from anywhere as well as the protection of the fĳinal 
product as one belonging to them. McRobie talks about the ‘symbiotic rela-
tionship’ between the author and the society/societies’56 and notes that litera-
ture may ‘occup[y] a peculiar position of both belonging to a particular group, 
and belonging to humanity as a whole’.57 A lot of artists would say the same 
for other expressions. Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights protects the right of everyone to enjoy the benefĳits 
of scientifĳic progress and its applications and to benefĳit from the moral and 
material interests resulting from scientifĳic production. In the 1950 Agreement 
55 UN CESCR 2006, para. 8. 
56 H.K. McRobie, Literary Freedom, A Cultural Right to Literature (zero books, 2011), p. 50.
57 Ibid., 51. 
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on the Importance of Educational, Scientifĳic and Cultural Materials (the Florence 
Agreement), the Contracting States undertook ‘that they will as far as possible 
‘contribute their common effforts to promote by every means the free circula-
tion of educational, scientifĳic and cultural material, and abolish or reduce any 
restrictions to that free circulation…’.58 Yet, both these rights are at times in 
contrast with indigenous cultural heritage which does not have one creator, 
neither does it allow  access to every single aspect of it. 
The right to the common heritage of mankind is also one that is in conflict 
with the indigenous claims for respect to their specifĳic hidden/sacred heritage. 
There is this widespread understanding that protecting the common heritage 
of mankind is way beyond any individual right or even group right. This does 
not sit well with indigenous claims for respect of their hidden/secret cultural 
sites. For example, in the Finnish side of Saamiland, there are documented 
sacred sites, with specifĳic rules about who should approach the sites and how. 
There are sites used by the whole community, common and shared sacrifĳic-
ing places of multiple households or more personal sites that belonged to the 
families and individuals.59 Yet, for some, complete control of indigenous peo-
ples over their artefacts will result in a renewed tribalism and a further aliena-
tion of indigenous peoples from the mainstream as lack of access will mean 
lack of understanding and respect of non-indigenous populations towards the 
 indigenous knowledge system and cultural heritage. Therefore, several authors 
have defended the need for openness, which exhibitions of indigenous her-
itage in international museums allegedly encourage. In contrast, Macmillan 
condemns the insistence of museums to keep indigenous artefacts in the name 
of the right to the common culture of mankind as ‘a kind of  appropriation of 
cultural heritage through a discourse that claims their heritage as the patri-
mony of humankind – some sort of global patrimony’.60
Certainly, such claims, claims of individual artists for the protection of their 
rights, claims of indigenous peoples and claims for access to the common her-
itage of mankind have to be developed consistently and coherently; and dis-
cussed together rather than in parallel ways. Blake rightly notes that ‘much 
58 A. Vrdoljak, ‘Self-Determination and Cultural Rights’ in F. Francioni and M. Scheinin 
(eds.), Cultural Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhofff, 2008), 41. 
59 A. Xanthaki, L. Heinämäki, A.-M. Magga, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Customary Rights and Sa-
cred Sites of Sámi’ in L. Heinämäki and T. Herrmann (eds.), Sacred Artic: Experiencing and 
Protecting Sacred Sites of Sámi and other Arctic Indigenous Peoples (Springer, 2017), 65-82.
60 F. Macmillan, ‘The Protection of Cultural Heritage: Common Heritage of Humankind, 
National Cultural “Patrimony” or Private Property?’ (2013) 64(3) Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 351.
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work is also needed to understand better the content and nature of these rights 
and the need to consider several distinct areas of international law if we wish 
to resolve these questions’.61 
Conclusions
This chapter argues that the current recognition of indigenous cultural herit-
age must penetrate all areas of international law. Therefore, UNESCO docu-
ments must be interpreted in line with the provisions of the  UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. WIPO instruments must fĳind a way to be 
in sync with the standards on indigenous cultural heritage as recently devel-
oped. It is imperative that the standards of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples are recognised and implemented by international law 
bodies. This will ensure a coherent development of the law but also, and most 
importantly, the efffective protection of indigenous peoples and their cultural 
heritage. 
This chapter also argues that the debate on indigenous cultural heritage 
needs to break the existing  fragmentation in order to encourage looking at is-
sues holistically. Discussions on the role of the elites, both state and community 
ones, in deciding which parts of the indigenous past are cultural heritage; and 
on the limited role of indigenous women and youth in the decision-making; as 
well as on the efffects of complete control of communities over their heritage 
can only be welcome. The methodologies of the humanities on the concept, 
history and politics of cultural heritage are invaluable in adding context and 
depth when balancing conflicting rights and interests, but all discussions need 
to support and follow the indigenous viewpoints and voices on the issues.
61 J. Blake, Exploring cultural rights and cultural diversity (Institute of Art and the Law, 2014) 
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Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights, and Cultural 
Heritage: Towards a Right to Cultural Integrity 
Jérémie Gilbert 
Introduction
In recent years, indigenous peoples’ human rights have greatly evolved at the 
international level. This has notably included the adoption of the United Na-
tions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007, but 
also a very robust jurisprudence emerging from international human rights 
monitoring bodies and regional human rights institutions. The protection of 
cultural heritage constitutes an important aspect of such developments. Across 
the globe, indigenous peoples’ representatives have made it clear that the pro-
tection and recognition of their cultural heritage is an essential element of 
their survival as distinct peoples. The word often attached to cultural heritage 
for indigenous peoples is ‘holistic’ as cultural heritage encompasses traditional 
practices in a broad sense, including for example language, art, music, dance, 
song, but also sacred sites, traditional territories, the use of  natural resources, 
including bio-cultural heritage and traditional food production systems such 
as rotational farming, shifting cultivation, pastoralism, artisanal fĳisheries and 
other forms of access to natural sources.1 Many indigenous peoples have thus 
highlighted how their cultural heritage needs to be apprehended in a holistic 
and inter-generational manner based on common material and spiritual val-
ues influenced by their  environment. 
For many indigenous peoples, the challenge has been to make their holis-
tic approach to cultural heritage fĳitting within the international legal regime 
governing cultural heritage. Under international law, a multitude of legal re-
gimes exist to protect cultural heritage. This notably includes the protection 
of ‘ intangible’, ‘ tangible’, ‘ natural’ heritage, but also the division between in-
tellectual, immaterial, and material protection of the cultural heritage.2 This 
1 See: Study by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ‘Promotion and 
protection of the rights of indigenous peoples with respect to their cultural heritage’, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2015/2 (2015).
2 See: C. Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Routledge, 2010); 
J. Blake, ‘On Defĳining the Cultural Heritage’, 49 (1) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 61-85 (2000); L. Lixinski, Intangible Cultural Heritage in International Law (Ox-
© 2017 Jérémie Gilbert. isbn 978-90-04-34218-7. pp. 20-38
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overall complex legal regime, which is based on a cross-competency between 
several international organisations, often leads to a  fragmentation between a 
multitude of legal frameworks, which ultimately do not adequately embody 
the holistic cultural heritage of indigenous peoples.3 The system notably fails 
to recognise that, for indigenous peoples, cultural heritage is holistic and en-
compasses their spiritual, economic, and social connections to their lands and 
territories. 
The present chapter proposes to examine to what extent human rights law 
could offfer a comprehensive and holistic approach to the protection of the cul-
tural heritage of indigenous peoples, notably in avoiding the clusters between 
‘intangible’, ‘tangible’, ‘natural’ and intellectual heritage that is developed un-
der international law. It explores how the nascent development of the ‘right 
to cultural integrity’ could support such comprehensive approach to cultural 
heritage. The right to cultural integrity, which has been put forward by several 
human rights institutions and advocates,4 could support a much more holistic 
approach to the protection of cultural heritage as it is based on the recogni-
tion that cultural heritage includes indigenous peoples’ rights to culture,  re-
ligion, health, development and  natural resources. While references to a right 
to cultural integrity have increasingly been used by international and regional 
human rights bodies as well as civil society actors and academic circles, there 
is nonetheless a lack of analysis on the content and legal grounding of such 
a right to cultural integrity. This chapter aims at analysing the emergence of 
such a right and its relevance to the protection of indigenous peoples’ cultural 
heritage. 
ford University Press, 2013); St. Disko and H. Tugendhat (eds.), Indigenous Peoples and the 
World Heritage Convention (IWGIA and Forest Peoples Programme, Nov. 2014).
3 See: Study by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ‘Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples with Respect to Their Cultural Herit-
age’, UN Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2015/2 (2015); and A. Xanthaki, ‘Culture’ in J. Hohmann and 
M. Weller (eds.), The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary 
(OUP, forthcoming).
4 See: J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (OU, 2004), pp. 134-141; F MacKay, 
‘Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself – Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights and the 
World Bank’s Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples’, 17 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 
527 (2001-2002); J. Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move 
toward the Multicultural State’, 21 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 13 (2004); Asia Pacifĳic Forum of 
National Human Rights Institutions and the Offfĳice of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: A Manual for National Human Rights Institutions (United Nations, August 2013); 
and see references in section 2 below. 
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To undertake such analysis, the chapter will fĳirst examine how the right to 
cultural integrity could place itself within the overall human rights-based ap-
proach to cultural heritage (section 1). Based on such overview, it will then 
examine how the right to cultural integrity has been developed within the ju-
risprudence of regional human rights institutions (section 2). The chapter will 
then examine how the right to cultural integrity also fĳinds echoes in the legal 
framework regarding protection of indigenous peoples against genocide, and 
notably how the debates which have surrounded the issue of  cultural genocide 
have included a reference to the protection the cultural integrity of indigenous 
peoples (section 3). Finally, it will focus on the protection of cultural practices 
developed under human rights law and how such protection includes the in-
tegrity of indigenous cultural heritage (section 4). 
1 Cultural Heritage, Cultural Rights and Indigenous Peoples: 
An Overview
The aim of this short section is not to offfer a comprehensive review of all the 
human rights norms that are relevant for the protection of indigenous peoples’ 
cultural heritage, but to provide a short overview of the main legal avenues 
available for indigenous peoples when it comes to cultural heritage protec-
tion.5 As demonstrated by the study undertaken by the UN Expert Mechanism 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ( EMRIP) in 2015 on cultural heritage, hu-
man rights law addresses cultural heritage under various instruments.6 While 
cultural heritage is not directly mentioned in the core human rights treaties, 
 cultural rights form an important and overarching right proclaimed in most 
human rights instruments. A number of provisions in international human 
rights instruments constitute the legal basis for a right of  access to and en-
joyment of cultural heritage.7 This notably includes the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (art. 27), the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
5 For a comprehensive analysis on human rights law, indigenous peoples and cultural her-
itage, see chapter XX in this book; and M. Langfĳield, W. Logan, and M. Nic Craith (eds.), 
Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights: Intersections in Theory and Practice (Rout-
ledge, 2009).
6 Study by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ‘Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples with Respect to Their Cultural Heritage’, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2015/2 (2015).
7 See: Report of the independent expert in the fĳield of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/17/38 (2011).
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and Cultural Rights (art. 15), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (art. 27), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art. 29). All 
these provisions focusing on  cultural rights have been interpreted to support 
indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage. 
Moreover, the more specifĳic instruments dedicated to indigenous peoples’ 
rights also put a strong emphasis on  cultural rights and cultural heritage. Sev-
eral articles of the UNDRIP are directly relevant to the cultural heritage of in-
digenous peoples, including protection of the tangible heritage, traditions and 
customs of indigenous peoples (art. 11); the spiritual and religious traditions 
and customs of indigenous cultures (art. 12); their intangible heritage (art. 13); 
their right to uphold the dignity and diversity of their cultures and languages 
in relation to education and public information (arts. 14 and 15). The Declara-
tion upholds the rights of indigenous peoples to develop their own culture and 
customs; to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; not to be subjected 
to destruction of their culture or to discrimination on the ground of their cul-
ture; and to redress mechanisms for action that deprives them of their cultural 
values. 
The International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention (No. 169) contains several provisions relating to the cultural herit-
age of indigenous peoples. Governments are notably required to respect and 
safeguard the cultural and traditional values of indigenous peoples and (art. 
13) and their use and management of the land and  natural resources (arts. 14 
and 15), and to ensure that the traditional activities of indigenous peoples are 
strengthened and promoted (art. 23). It is also worth noting that the right of 
peoples to  self-determination, proclaimed in the International Covenants and 
the UNDRIP, protects the right of peoples to freely pursue their cultural devel-
opment and to dispose of their natural wealth and resources, which has a clear 
link with cultural heritage. 
Overall, all these norms and instruments support diffferent aspects of in-
digenous peoples’  cultural rights that are relevant to their cultural heritage. 
This includes the right to take part in cultural life, the right to enjoy one’s own 
culture, and the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural 
heritage. As summarised in a document produced by the Offfĳice of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights, indigenous  cultural rights include the fol-
lowing rights:
– The right to maintain and strengthen their distinct cultural institu-
tions; 
– The right to belong to an indigenous community or nation in ac-
cordance with the customs of the community or nation concerned; 
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– The right to practice, revitalize and transmit their cultural tradi-
tions and customs;
– The right to control their education systems and institutions pro-
viding education in their own languages;
– The right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional 
structures, customs, spirituality, traditions and juridical systems;
– The right to maintain, control and develop their cultural heritage 
and  traditional knowledge;
– The right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction 
of their culture.8
Taken as a whole, human rights law offfers a wide-ranging approach to  cultural 
rights for indigenous peoples addressing many aspects of cultural heritage. 
However, one may wonder if this complex layer of various instruments and 
norms does not in itself represent an overly convoluted and segregated ap-
proach to cultural heritage. Indeed, for indigenous peoples, claiming the pro-
tection of their cultural heritage involves using several aspects of human rights 
law, which are not always interrelated and connected to cultural heritage. For 
example, for indigenous peoples claiming the protection of their cultural her-
itage might involve invoking their right to freedom of  religion, their right to 
land and  natural resources, their right to development, their right to food, and 
their  cultural rights. All these rights form part of their cultural heritage but are 
scattered across the human rights legal framework. There is no right in itself 
that is capturing the holistic approach necessary to protect cultural heritage. 
Whilst the UNDRIP does contain a specifĳic article dedicated to cultural herit-
age, in general any claim to cultural heritage has to be based on a series of 
diffferent norms that are disseminated across various instruments. From that 
perspective, the proposal to focus on a right to cultural integrity might offfer a 
more holistic and comprehensive approach to cultural heritage. 
As noted earlier, we have recently witnessed the emergence of what has 
been labelled as a ‘right to cultural integrity’ for indigenous peoples.9 While 
the right to cultural integrity does not appear in any of the international hu-
8 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Manual for Na-
tional Human Rights Institutions (Asia Pacifĳic Forum of National Human Rights Institu-
tions and the Offfĳice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 
2013), p. 13.
9 See report from the former UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights stating: 
‘[t]his duty is a corollary of a myriad of universally accepted human rights, including the 
right to cultural integrity, the right to equality and the right to property (...).’ Report of 
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man rights treaties, it refers to a bundle of diffferent human rights such as rights 
to culture, subsistence, livelihood,  religion and heritage.10 The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) refers to a ‘collective right to cultural 
integrity’ encompassing many diffferent essential elements of indigenous peo-
ples cultural heritage.11 As such it offfers a promising way to adopt a much more 
holistic approach to cultural heritage by including  cultural rights, the right to 
freedom of religion, the right to health, and the right to development under 
the same umbrella. 
Legally speaking, references to the need to respect the integrity of indig-
enous peoples are made in article 8 (2) of the UNDRIP which prohibits any 
action ‘which has the aim or efffect of depriving them of their integrity as dis-
tinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities.’ Likewise, Article 
2 of the  ILO Convention 169 states: ‘Governments shall have the responsibility 
for developing, with the  participation of the peoples concerned, coordinated 
and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee 
respect for their integrity.’ The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has also alluded to the need to protect the cultural integrity of indig-
enous peoples. For example, in its 2014 concluding observations regarding the 
situation in Guatemala, the committee has urged the government to ensure 
that measures are put in place to ‘preserve the cultural integrity’ of indigenous 
peoples in the context of exploration and exploitation of mining resources 
and hydrocarbons located on indigenous territories.12 Both former and pre-
sent Special Rapporteurs on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have often made 
specifĳic references to the need to protect the cultural integrity of indigenous 
peoples.13 The Special Rapporteur on the right to food has also mentioned the 
need to respect the cultural integrity of indigenous peoples in his 2012 report 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, James Anaya. UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, July 15, 2009, para. 41.
10 See: J. Gilbert, ‘Custodians of the land: Indigenous peoples, human rights and cultural 
integrity’, in W. Logan, M. Nic Craith, M. Langfĳield (eds.), Cultural Diversity, Heritage and 
Human Rights Intersections in Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2009).
11 IACHR, ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural 
Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2009) 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09 at para. 57; see also paras. 205-6, and n. 647.
12 See: Concluding Observations: Guatemala, UN Doc. E/C.12/GTM/CO/3, at para. 7.
13 See for examples: Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the 
rights of indigenous peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, UN Doc. A/69/267 (2014), paras. 16, 18 
and 29; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms of indigenous people, S. James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/9 (2008), para. 22; 
Report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental free-
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which followed his visit to Canada.14 It is also worth noting that one of the 
main objectives of the Second Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples is to 
promote the full and efffective  participation of indigenous peoples in ‘decisions 
which directly or indirectly afffect their cultural integrity.’15 Nonetheless, it is 
mainly within the jurisprudence of the regional human rights institutions that 
such concept of cultural integrity is the most strongly reflected upon, and has 
been emerging. 
2 Regional Human Rights Institutions and Cultural Integrity
Regional human rights institutions, and notably the  African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights ( ACHPR) and the  Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights ( IACtHR) have made several references to the indigenous peoples’ right 
to cultural integrity. The Inter-American Court has notably emphasized that 
the close relationship between indigenous peoples and their lands must be 
recognized and understood as the fundamental base of their culture, spiritual 
life, integrity, economic survival and cultural preservation.16 Based on such a 
holistic approach to indigenous peoples’ relationship with their lands and ter-
ritories, the Court has often made references to the need to protect the cultural 
integrity of indigenous peoples.17 For example, in a case against Suriname, an 
indigenous community had specifĳically made the claim that the government 
had violated their right to cultural integrity. The Court received the argument 
highlighting that ‘in order for the culture to preserve its very identity and integ-
rity, [indigenous peoples]… must maintain a fluid and multidimensional rela-
tionship with their ancestral lands.’18 The Court clearly implied the importance 
of considering the integrity of indigenous peoples’ cultures, which includes a 
doms of indigenous people, James Anaya, Situation of indigenous peoples in Australia, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/15/37/Add.4 (2010), paras. 4, 13, 16, 28, 44, 65, 72.
14 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Visit to Canada, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/50/Add.1, 25 
December 2012, para. 62. 
15 Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, UN Doc. A/RES/59/174; 
and Report of the Secretary-General, Mid-term Assessment, UN Doc. A/65/166. 
16 I/A Court H.R, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, judgement of 17 June 2005 
(Series C, No. 125) para. 51.
17 See: I/A Court H.R., Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Merits, 
Reparations and Costs) Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125, paras. 147 and 203; 
Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí and the Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano v. 
Panama, Ser. C No. 284, para. 143.
18 I/A Court H.R, Moiwana Village Case, at paras. 101, 102-3.
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strong connection with their lands, territories, and their  natural resources. The 
Inter-American Commission has also often referred to the need to protect and 
respect the ‘socio-cultural integrity’ of indigenous peoples.19 For example, the 
Commission has noted that: ‘extractive concessions in indigenous territories, 
in having the potential of causing ecological damage, endanger the economic 
interests, survival, and cultural integrity of the indigenous communities and 
their members (…).’20 Overall, both the Inter-American Court and Commis-
sion have made several references to the need to protect the integrity of indig-
enous peoples’ cultures, highlighting how this concept of integrity is relevant 
in ensuring a holistic approach to indigenous peoples’ rights. 
One the clearest judicial expressions of the right to cultural integrity and its 
content comes from the 2010 decision of the  African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights in the Endorois case against Kenya.21 In this case, the En-
dorois, an indigenous pastoralist community, claimed that  access to their an-
cestral territory ‘in addition to securing subsistence and livelihood, is seen as 
sacred, being inextricably linked to the cultural integrity of the community and 
its traditional way of life.’22 As highlighted in their pleadings, access to their 
traditional lands relates to ‘health, livelihood,  religion and culture’, as they ‘are 
all intimately connected with their traditional land, as grazing lands, sacred 
religious sites and plants used for traditional medicine are all situated around 
the shores of Lake Bogoria.’23 Lake Bogoria, which has been inscribed to the 
 World Heritage List,24 is part of the traditional territory of the Endorois and 
constitutes an essential element of their cultural heritage. They argued that 
by removing them from their land, and not allowing access to this important 
19 IACHR, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.102, Doc. 9 rev. 1, 26 February 1999, Chapter IX, para. 37. IACHR, Report on the Situation 
of Human Rights in Brazil, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.97, Doc. 29 rev. 1, September 29, 1997, 
para. 47.
20 IACHR, ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural 
Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2009) 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09 at para. 206.
21 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Centre for Minority Rights Develop-
ment (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare 
Council v. Kenya, Communication 276/2003 (2010).
22 Ibid., para. 16, emphasis added.
23 Ibid., para. 16.
24 On this issue, see: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on 
the Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the Context of the World Heritage Con-
vention and the Designation of Lake Bogoria as a World Heritage site, November 2011 in 
Banjul, The Gambia.
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site, the government had violated their fundamental right to cultural integrity. 
There is no specifĳic provision in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights referring to a ‘right to cultural integrity’. Instead the Endorois claimed 
that their removal meant a violation of their right to practice their own reli-
gion (Article 8), their right to culture (Article 17) and their right to access  natu-
ral resources (Article 21). They nonetheless put forward the argument that all 
these rights were to be regarded as part of their right to cultural integrity. 
The Endorois argued that the decision to remove them from their tradition-
al territories was directly afffecting their right to religious freedom. Access to 
Lake Bogoria plays an important role in the spiritual tradition of the Endorois, 
as it is a place of an annual ritual and at the centre of other important places 
of worship for the community. The Endorois contended that their disposses-
sion amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the African Charter which states: 
‘Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be 
guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures 
restricting the exercise of these freedoms.’ They claimed that their spiritual be-
liefs and ceremonial practices attached to the land constitute a religion. They 
highlighted that an indigenous group whose spiritual belief is intimately tied 
to the land requires special protection that should fall under the protection of 
freedom to practice a religion. By not allowing them to access their ancestral 
spiritual sites, the Government had violated their right to practice their reli-
gion. 
The African Commission did recognise that the concerned territory was a 
signifĳicant spiritual place for the community on the basis that the Endorois 
regularly hold religious ceremonies at several spiritual sites situated around 
Lake Bogoria, and that their ancestors are buried near the Lake. The Commis-
sion acknowledged that ‘religion is often linked to land, cultural beliefs and 
practices, and that freedom to worship and engage in such ceremonial acts is 
at the centre of the freedom of religion.’25 Taking into consideration the  Hu-
man Rights Committee’s General Comments on religion,26 as well as its own 
jurisprudence,27 the Commission accepted that the Endorois’ spiritual beliefs 
and ceremonial practices constitute a  religion under the African Charter. The 
African Commission found that the restriction imposed on the Endorois to 
25 Ibid., para. 166.
26 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\ GEN\1\ Rev.1 (1994).
27 See Free Legal Assistance Group v. Zaire, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 
Comm. No. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (1995).
29Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights, and Cultur al Heritage
practice their religion was a signifĳicant restriction to their freedom of religion 
that was not justifĳied by any signifĳicant public security interest or other justi-
fĳication. The Commission concluded that Kenya had violated Article 8 of the 
African Charter since their forced eviction from their ancestral land ‘interfered 
with the Endorois’ right to religious freedom and removed them from the sa-
cred grounds essential to the practice of their religion, and rendered it virtu-
ally impossible for the Community to maintain religious practices central to 
their culture and religion.’28 This recognition that access to a territory is part of 
the freedom to practice their  religion for indigenous peoples is an important 
statement at the international level, since little jurisprudence exists on such a 
correlation.29 
The spiritual attachment to their territory was only one part of the Endor-
ois’ claim that their displacement was violating their right to cultural integrity. 
The second focus was on  cultural rights. The community contended that their 
eviction from their ancestral lands was a violation of their right to enjoy their 
own culture, protected under the African Charter in Article 17 (2) which states: 
‘Every individual may freely, take part in the cultural life of his community.’ 
They argued that ‘Article 17 extends to the protection of indigenous cultures 
and ways of life’ and that by encroaching on their land rights, the government 
had committed a violation of their  cultural rights.30 The issue was to defĳine 
whether access to a territory could be regarded as part of the cultural life of 
the community. The Commission found that the Government had violated 
the Endorois’ right to take part in the cultural life of their community, and 
highlighted that in general States have an obligation to ensure that the access 
of indigenous communities to their traditional territories is protected under 
Article 17 of the African Charter as constituting  cultural rights. The Commis-
sion concluded that the Government had ‘denied the community access to 
an integrated system of beliefs, values, norms, mores, traditions and artefacts 
closely linked to access to the Lake.’31 This broader approach to  cultural rights 
28 Ibid., para. 173.
29 For references, see: J. Briones, ‘We Want to Believe Too: The IRFA and Indigenous Peoples’ 
Right to Freedom of Religion’; 8 U. C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 0 (2002); N.I. Goduka and J.E. 
Kunnie (eds.), Indigenous Peoples’ Wisdom and Power: Afffĳirming Our Knowledge Through 
Narratives (Ashgate, 2006); J.L. Cox, From Primitive to Indigenous: The Academic Study 
of Indigenous Religions (Ashgate, 2007); P.P. Arnold and A. Grodzins Gold (eds.), Sacred 
Landscapes and Cultural Politics: Planting a Tree (Ashgate, 2001).
30 Endorois Decision, supra note 21, para. 115.
31 Ibid., para. 250.
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integrates the indigenous peoples’ claim that  cultural rights are part of their 
way of life, which includes access to land central to their own culture. 
Another important aspect of the Endorois decision was the connection be-
tween  cultural rights and access to  natural resources. One of the arguments 
put forward by the community was that by restricting the access to their natu-
ral resources, the government was not respecting the cultural heritage of the 
Endorois, which includes the use of these resources. The land around Lake Bo-
goria is a fertile soil and rich in salt licks providing great support to the cattle, 
which represent an important aspect of the pastoralist way of life of the com-
munity. The lack of access to these specifĳic lands, the water and the salt licks 
resulted in serious loss of cattle for the Endorois. Beyond the economic aspect 
of the restriction, one of the arguments put forward by the community was 
that this infringement was disrupting their pastoralist way of life, an important 
element of their cultural heritage, and therefore encroaching on their right to 
cultural integrity. In the view of the Commission, this restriction constituted a 
violation of the community’s  cultural rights since ‘by forcing the community 
to live on semi-arid lands without access to medicinal salt licks and other vital 
resources for the health of their livestock, the Respondent State have [sic] cre-
ated a major threat to the Endorois pastoralist way of life.’32 For the African 
Commission, this constituted a violation of Article 21 of the African Charter 
which states that ‘all peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural re-
sources.’ In fĳinding a violation of Article 21, the Commission did acknowledge 
that the right to freely dispose of natural resources is of crucial importance to 
indigenous peoples and their way of life.33 On this issue, the decision is based 
on the rationale that access to natural resources is a fundamental aspect of 
cultural heritage of the concerned indigenous community. While not directly 
mentioning cultural heritage, the Commission made a clear link between in-
digenous peoples’ rights to use natural resources found on their ancestral ter-
ritories and their cultural way of life. From this perspective it represents an 
important connection between a traditional way of using natural resources 
(in this case salt licks) and the cultural heritage of a community. The vehicle 
used by the Commission to make such connection between natural resources 
and cultural heritage was the reference to the right to cultural integrity of the 
community. 
32 Endorois Decision, supra note 21, para. 251.
33 On the correlation between cultural rights and access to natural resources, see also: Social 
and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic, and Social Rights/Nigeria, 
Communication No. 155/96.
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This decision of the African Commission clearly supports the recognition of 
a ‘right to cultural integrity’ for indigenous peoples. It shows how the diffferent 
rights that are relevant to indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage, in this case 
 religion, culture and  natural resources should be considered under the same 
umbrella of cultural integrity rather than divided and clustered into diffferent 
rights. This decision embraced the evolution towards the afffĳirmation of a right 
to cultural integrity, developing its own approach to the meaning and content 
of such a right. The decision indicates that the right to cultural integrity is now 
to be considered part of the Commission’s jurisprudence based on freedom of 
religion (Article 8), right to culture (Article 17), and access to natural resources 
(Article 21). This marks an important evolution towards a holistic approach 
to the recognition of indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage. The right to cul-
tural integrity fully integrates the holistic approach that indigenous peoples 
have with their cultural heritage, which is rooted in their spiritual, cultural, 
economic and social norms, and which is central to the integrity and survival 
of their culture.
3 From Cultural Genocide to Cultural Integrity 
Another important aspect of the development of a right to cultural integrity, 
relates to the debates that took place around the issue of  cultural genocide. 
Many indigenous peoples have highlighted that their cultural heritage is es-
sential for their survival as a people, indeed physical survival is connected to 
their cultural survival as distinct people. The importance of protecting indig-
enous peoples against the threat of cultural annihilation was at the heart of 
one of the debates that dominated the 22-year long process that fĳinally led to 
the adoption of the UNDRIP. An important debate focused on the inclusion of 
 cultural genocide within the text of the Declaration.34 
Cultural genocide broadly refers to ‘the extermination of a culture that does 
not involve physical extermination of its people.’35 Cultural genocide is based 
on the idea that a group can be destroyed by targeted attacks on its capacity 
34 See: S. Mako, ‘Cultural Genocide and Key International Instruments: Framing the Indig-
enous Experience’, 19 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2012) 175-194; 
and J. Gilbert, ‘Perspectives on Cultural Genocide: From Criminal Law to Cultural Diver-
sity’, in M. de Guzman and D. Amann (eds.), Arcs of Global Justice; Essays in Honor of Wil-
liam A. Schabas (Oxford University Press, 2016).
35 K. Jonassohn and F. Chalk, ‘A Typology of Genocide and some Implications for the Hu-
man Rights Agenda’ in I. Wallimann, M.N. Dobkowski, R.L. Rubenstein (eds), Genocide 
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to preserve and transmit its own specifĳic culture which would then disappear. 
The destruction of indigenous peoples’ cultures can take many forms, includ-
ing forced relocation, removal of children from their communities, invasion 
of their lands, aggressive assimilationist policies, or restriction to  access to 
their traditional means of livelihoods. The need to protect indigenous peo-
ples against cultural attacks against them did represent an important aspect 
of the drafting of the UNDRIP. The proposal was to include a strong protec-
tion against  cultural genocide, with notably the aim of preserving the cultural 
integrity of indigenous peoples. In an earlier draft of the Declaration submit-
ted in 1994 to the former Commission on Human Rights, a specifĳic article was 
dedicated to the crime of  cultural genocide stating: 
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right not to be 
subjected to ethnocide and  cultural genocide, including prevention of 
and redress for any action which has the aim or efffect of depriving them 
of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic 
identities (…).36 
During the drafting process, several indigenous representatives had notably 
highlighted that their removal from their traditional territories and the loss of 
access to their cultural heritage often amounted to  cultural genocide, as the 
practice of dispossession, forced relocation or population transfer amounted 
to the destruction of their community.37 However, the reference to  cultural 
genocide led to serious debates when it reached States’ representatives. Some 
of the member States, including the United States, Norway, New Zealand and 
Canada, called for the use of an alternative language noting that  cultural geno-
cide was not defĳined under international law.38 This debate went back to ear-
lier discussions during the drafting of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, when  cultural genocide was 
and the Modern Age: Etiology and case studies of Mass Death (Syracuse University Press, 
1987), p. 11.
36 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, Article 7.
37 See: UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98, p. 18.
38 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Indigenous Issues: Report of the 
Working Group Established in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolu-
tion 1995/32 , UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92, 2003.
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rejected from the text of the convention.39 Ultimately, the draft article on  cul-
tural genocide was removed from the text.40
Instead, the adopted text afffĳirms that indigenous peoples have ‘the right not 
to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.’ Article 
7(2) asserts that ‘indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in free-
dom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any 
act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing chil-
dren of the group to another group.’ But  cultural genocide as such was rejected. 
Despite the rejection of  cultural genocide, the Declaration still makes refer-
ence to cultural attacks against indigenous peoples, since Article 8 states: ‘in-
digenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced 
assimilation or destruction of their culture.’ Getting into more details, the text 
adds that States shall provide efffective mechanisms for prevention of, and re-
dress for: ‘any action which has the aim or efffect of depriving them of their in-
tegrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities (…).’41 
This reference to integrity as distinct peoples puts the emphasis on the need to 
ensure the survival of indigenous peoples, not only physically but also as cul-
tural entities. It is signifĳicant as, despite the rejection of  cultural genocide from 
the text of the Declaration, it does put the emphasis on the need to consider 
all attacks against indigenous peoples, and not only physical, which have the 
efffect of touching on the integrity of their cultural structures and heritage. As 
noted by Vrdoljak, in providing a clear statement against assimilation and cul-
tural destruction, this article straddles ‘the divide between the international 
crime of genocide and positive human rights related to culture and cultural 
heritage.’42 
39 See: W. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 
2009).
40 See: J.M. Hohmann, ‘The UNDRIP and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Existence, Cul-
tural Integrity and Identity, and Non-Assimilation’, in Oxford Commentaries on Interna-
tional Law – A Commentary on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (OUP, Forthcoming 2016).
41 UNDRIP, article 8 (2), emphasis added.
42 A. Vrdoljak, ‘Reparations for Cultural Loss’, in F. Lenzerini (ed.), Reparations for Indig-
enous Peoples: International & Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2008), 
p. 209.
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4 Cultural Integrity and Traditional Cultural Practices 
As noted earlier, an important avenue of protection for the cultural heritage 
of indigenous peoples comes under the minority rights approach to cultural 
practices developed under article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR). This article provides for the right of members 
of minorities to enjoy their own culture, practice their own  religion and use 
their own language. This article has been interpreted to be particularly protect-
ing the traditional way of life of indigenous peoples. The connection between 
 cultural rights and indigenous peoples constitutes one of the strong features 
of the  Human Rights Committee’s (HRC)  interpretation of article 27 of the IC-
CPR. In an often-quoted general comment on article 27 the HRC  stated: 
With regard to the exercise of the  cultural rights protected under article 
27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, 
including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resourc-
es, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include 
such traditional activities as fĳishing or hunting and the right to live in 
reserves protected by law.43 
The strong connection between  cultural rights, and notably cultural practices 
from indigenous peoples, has been reiterated in several concluding observa-
tions and individual communications of the Committee.44 There have been 
many individual complaints throughout the 1990s, and some of these individu-
al decisions such as Ominayak v Canada,45 Lansman v Finland,46 and Lovelace 
v Canada47 have become key elements of the international jurisprudence and 
doctrine regarding the connection between  cultural rights and a traditional 
way of life. Under this approach, any traditional activity that is forming an es-
sential element of indigenous peoples’ culture should be protected. The main 
approach of the Committee has been to ensure the right of indigenous peoples 
43 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Article 27 (Fiftieth session, 1994), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 38 (1994), para. 7.
44 See: Indigenous Peoples and United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies: A Compilation 
of Treaty Body Jurisprudence Volume (Forest Peoples Programme).
45 UN Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev. 1, Communication No. 549/1993.
46 UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, Case No 511/1992.
47 A/36/40, Annex 7(G) (1998).
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to maintain and practice traditional activities which form part of their cultural 
heritage. 
One of the difffĳiculties for the HRC was  to determine the meaning of ‘an ac-
tivity forming an essential element of indigenous peoples’ culture’. Two main 
issues have been raised before the Committee regarding the meaning of a tra-
ditional activity. The fĳirst relates to defĳining whether activities that have an 
economical aspect could qualify as cultural practices. For example in a case 
relating  reindeer herding by the Sami populations in Sweden, one of the argu-
ments developed by the government was that reindeer herding was more an 
economic, rather than a purely cultural activity. On this point the HRC  con-
cluded that: ‘the regulation of an economic activity is normally a matter for the 
State alone. However, where that activity is an essential element in the culture 
of an ethnic community, its application to an individual may fall under article 
27 of the Covenant.’48 This was later confĳirmed in other cases in which the HRC 
re- afffĳirmed that economic activities may come within the ambit of article 27, 
if they are an essential element of the culture of an indigenous community, 
including for example fĳishing, herding, and hunting. 
The other issue that was raised before the Committee relates to the defĳini-
tion of the meaning of a ‘traditional’ activity. Indeed, some of the States have 
raised the fact that some of the activities undertaken by indigenous peoples 
were not ‘traditional’ anymore as they were using modern technology. For ex-
ample, this was raised regarding the use of skidoos and helicopters by reindeer 
herders, or nets for fĳishing. On this issue, in a case concerning Sami commu-
nities in Finland, the HRC  highlighted: ‘that the authors may have adapted 
their methods of reindeer herding over the years and practice it with the help 
of modern technology does not prevent them from invoking article 27 of the 
Covenant.’49 Likewise, in a case concerning fĳisheries in New Zealand, the HRC 
re- afffĳirmed ‘that article 27 does not only protect traditional means of livelihood 
of minorities, but allows also for adaptation of those means to the modern way 
of life and ensuing technology.’50 In adopting such an approach the Commit-
tee highlighted that the notion of culture, as protected under article 27, is not 
static; while it does protect traditional cultural practices, these practices may 
have nevertheless evolved over the centuries. Importantly, avoiding the danger 
48 Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988), para. 
9.2.
49 Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 
(1994), para. 9.3.
50 Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/70/D/547/1993 (2000), para. 9.4 
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of adopting a very rigid, or ‘frozen’ approach to the meaning of cultural activi-
ties, the committee has consistently been highlighting that indigenous peoples 
who adapt their methods of traditional activities over the years and practice 
it with the help of modern technology are not prevented from invoking in-
ternational covenant protections.51 As described by the Australian Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders Social Justice Commissioner: ‘[T]he right to enjoy a 
culture is not ‘frozen’ at some point in time when culture was supposedly ‘pure’ 
or ‘traditional’. The enjoyment of culture should not be falsely restricted as a 
result of anachronistic notions of the ‘ authenticity’ of the culture.’52 
In adopting a ‘non-frozen’ approach to cultural practices, the HRC has 
 touched on the debate relating to the ‘ authenticity’ of a cultural practice. The 
notion of ‘ authenticity’ is a term often used in cultural heritage studies, but 
also by  museum curators or the tourism industry.53 It refers to the idea of an 
‘authentic’ culture rather than a ‘modern’ form of culture, meaning a culture 
which has not been afffected or ‘contaminated’ by the outside and modern 
world.54 Hence  authenticity is quite a rigid approach to culture as it evaluates 
a culture from a static perspective. In rejecting such an approach based on 
‘ authenticity’ of cultural practices, the HRC has  instead highlighted that the 
integrity of indigenous peoples’ practices should be respected. As such, human 
rights law has clearly balanced towards an approach favouring the integrity of 
indigenous peoples’ cultural practices rather than putting too much emphasis 
on so-called  authenticity. This approach is extremely important as it highlights 
that human rights law is able to support traditional activities as part of cultural 
heritage in a modern sense, an approach respecting the integrity of indigenous 
peoples’ cultural heritage. Protecting indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage has 
to be intertemporal, not fĳixed in the past, but allowing contemporary expres-
sion of cultural practices to be recognised as such. This not only rejects a tradi-
tional approach which was often focusing too much on protecting the material 
and immaterial heritage of the past,55 it also supports the claim made by many 
indigenous advocates to the right to re-vitalize their cultural heritage.
51 Ilmari Lansman et al. v. Finland. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994) at [9.3].
52 Report of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Social Justice Commissioner to the 
Attorney General, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Na-
tive Title Report 2000. 
53 See: A J McIntosh, R C Prentice, ‘Afffĳirming authenticity: Consuming cultural heritage’, 
26(3) Annals of tourism research 589-612 (1999); R. Handler, ‘Authenticity’, 2(1) Anthropol-
ogy today 2-4 (1986).
54 See: E. Cohen, ‘Authenticity and commoditization in tourism’ 15.3. Annals of tourism re-
search 371-386 (1988).
55 L. Smith, Uses of Heritage (London: Routledge 2006), p. 17. 
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Conclusion
The legal framework protecting cultural heritage for indigenous peoples 
is fragmented into a multitude of diffferent approaches, making the holistic 
approach to cultural heritage for indigenous peoples difffĳicult to apprehend. 
The right to cultural integrity captures such a holistic approach by being a 
composite right which incorporates all the diffferent norms that are relevant 
to protect indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage. As stated earlier, although 
this right is not strictly speaking integrated into international human rights 
norms, in recent years it has been used as a legal concept encapsulating all 
the diffferent aspects that are essential to indigenous peoples’  cultural rights. 
The afffĳirmation of the right to cultural integrity involves the recognition that 
culture for indigenous peoples is much more than the traditional expression 
of culture, as it also embraces the social and spiritual values embedded in their 
territorial connections. As demonstrated by the African Commission’s deci-
sion in the Endorois case, the right to cultural integrity formally recognises 
the connection between  access to ancestral territories and freedom of  religion, 
 cultural rights, and the right to access  natural resources. The Inter-American 
Court and Commission have both put the emphasis on the need for States to 
recognise and protect indigenous peoples’ cultural integrity, highlighting the 
importance to embrace a comprehensive and holistic approach to indigenous 
peoples’  cultural rights. In terms of law making, the American Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted in 2016 includes a specifĳic article on 
the right to cultural integrity. It states: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to 
their own cultural identity and integrity and to their cultural heritage, both 
 tangible and  intangible, including historic and ancestral heritage; and to the 
protection, preservation, maintenance, and development of that cultural her-
itage for their collective continuity and that of their members and so as to 
transmit that heritage to future generations.’56 This article connecting cultural 
integrity and cultural heritage makes an important contribution towards the 
fĳirm establishment of a holistic approach to cultural heritage protection. It is 
true that such developments towards the afffĳirmation of a right to cultural in-
tegrity are mainly emerging from regional human rights institutions, but when 
it comes to indigenous peoples’ rights, regional institutions, and notably the 
Inter-American Commission and Court, have often paved the way for further 
development of international law. Moreover, as highlighted in this chapter, the 
56 Organization of American States (OAS), American Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples, adopted at the third plenary session, held on June 15, 2016, AG/RES. 2888 
(XLVI-O/16), Article XXIII.
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notion of integrity and the need to ensure indigenous peoples’ rights to both 
their physical and cultural integrity is also integrated in the UNDRIP. Like-
wise, the comprehensive approach of the HRC to  indigenous peoples’  cultural 
rights relies on the important notion of respecting the integrity of indigenous 
peoples’ culture rather than focusing on its so-called  authenticity. All these 
markers are indicating the slow maturing of a right to cultural integrity, which 
would support a much more cohesive and holistic approach to cultural herit-
age. The emergence of the concept of a right to cultural integrity supports a 
new normative approach to cultural heritage by offfering a holistic approach 
to the meaning and content of  cultural rights, notably relying on the spiritual, 
tangible, intangible, and  natural aspects of cultural heritage. It is innovative in 
the sense that it supports a holistic approach to cultural heritage, something 
that is still missing in the international legal architecture. 
 Indigenous Cultural Heritage in the 
Implementation of UNESCO’s  World Heritage 




A substantial part of the 2015 study by the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (‘ EMRIP’) on the promotion and protection of the rights 
of indigenous peoples with respect to their cultural heritage 1 is dedicated to 
a discussion of  UNESCO’s 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (‘World Heritage Convention’, or ‘the 
Convention’). The study also contains several important recommendations on 
World Heritage, aimed at ensuring that the implementation of the Conven-
tion is consistent with the  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(‘UNDRIP’) and that the protection of World Heritage sites ‘does not under-
mine indigenous peoples’ relationship with their traditional lands, territories 
and resources, their livelihoods and their rights to protect, exercise and de-
velop their cultural heritage and expressions’.2 Related recommendations of 
 EMRIP are contained in its 2011 Study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision-making,3 and a 2012 proposal adopted on the occasion 
of the Convention’s 40th anniversary. 4 The other two UN mechanisms with 
specifĳic mandates concerning indigenous peoples, the  Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues (‘UNPFII’) and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples, have also issued a number of recommendations on World 
Heritage in recent years. 5
1 UN Doc A/HRC/30/53.
2 Ibid, annex, para. 27.
3 UN Doc A/HRC/18/42, annex, para. 38.
4 EMRIP, Report on its fĳifth session (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/21/52, 7 (Proposal 9). 
5 See, e.g., UNPFII, Report on the tenth session (2011) UN Doc E/2011/43, paras. 40-42; 
UNPFII, Report on the twelfth session (2013) UN Doc. E/2013/43, para. 23; Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya (2012) UN Doc 
© 2017 Stefan Disko. isbn 978-90-04-34218-7. pp. 39-77
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The reason for the growing attention paid by the three UN mechanisms 
to the  World Heritage Convention are the repeated concerns raised by indig-
enous peoples about violations of their rights in the implementation of the 
Convention and a lack of regard for their cultural heritage, livelihoods and val-
ues in the nomination and protection of World Heritage sites. Considering the 
increasingly large number of World Heritage sites that are fully or partially lo-
cated within the traditional territories of indigenous peoples,6 the importance 
and urgency of this matter is evident. 
The engagement of the three mechanisms with the World Heritage Con-
vention is all the more important given that the Convention is not only the 
most widely known and ratifĳied, but also the most influential international 
standard-setting instrument in the fĳield of heritage. Although its application 
is limited to a relatively narrow range of heritage, namely immovable,  tangi-
ble heritage of ‘ outstanding universal value’ (i.e. World Heritage sites), it has 
shaped current understandings of heritage and contemporary practices of her-
itage management to a greater extent than any other international instrument. 
A main reason for this can be seen in the Convention’s claim to the universality 
of the values it seeks to protect.7 Because of this claim, it has been necessary 
for the World Heritage Committee (‘WHC’, or ‘the Committee’), the Conven-
tion’s governing body, 8 to constantly adapt and redefĳine the notion of ‘herit-
age’ under the Convention, in order to accommodate diffferent peoples’ under-
standings and values and protect the Convention’s credibility as an instrument 
A/67/301, paras. 33-42; Letter of the Special Rapporteur, James Anaya, to the World Herit-
age Committee (18 November 2013) OTH 10/2013, UN Doc A/HRC/25/74, 127.
6 Establishing an exact number of the indigenous sites is difffĳicult. The author estimates 
that there are around a hundred such sites. Additionally, a large number of indigenous 
sites are included on States Parties’ tentative lists of potential World Heritage sites in 
their territories. See <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list> and <http://whc.unesco.org/en/ten-
tativelists>.
7 As proclaimed in articles 1 and 2 defĳining the scope of the Convention, but also in several 
other places including the Preamble. 
8 The WHC is an intergovernmental body consisting of 21 States Parties to the Convention. 
Established ‘within’ UNESCO according to the Convention (art 8.1), the WHC is assisted 
by UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre, which functions as its secretariat. The WHC also 
has three offfĳicial advisory bodies, all of whom are mentioned in the Convention text (arts 
8, 13, 14): the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the International 
Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the International Centre for the Study 
of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM). On the roles of the 
Advisory Bodies, see Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Herit-
age Convention (2015) Doc WHC.15/01, paras. 30-37.
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equally representative of all the peoples and cultures of the world. This process 
‘has had a profound efffect on global practices of heritage management… and 
on contemporary defĳinitions of heritage’, as Rodney Harrison notes. 9
Some of the strongest criticism over the years of the concept of heritage 
embodied in the Convention has come from indigenous peoples and has re-
lated to its separation of  natural and cultural heritage and its focus on  tangible 
aspects at the expense of  intangible aspects. As emphasized in  EMRIP’s study 
on cultural heritage, ‘for indigenous peoples, cultural heritage is holistic and 
encompasses their spiritual, economic and social connections to their lands 
and territories’. 10 Therefore, ‘[h]eritage policies, programmes and activities af-
fecting indigenous peoples should be based on full recognition of the insepara-
bility of natural and cultural heritage, and the deep-seated interconnectedness 
of intangible cultural heritage and tangible cultural and natural heritage.’11 The 
criticism voiced by indigenous peoples has signifĳicantly contributed to some 
important developments in the implementation of the notion of ‘cultural her-
itage’ under the Convention. 12 However, as will be discussed in more detail be-
low, these developments have not been adequate for ensuring that indigenous 
cultural values are consistently and adequately taken into account in the desig-
nation and management of World Heritage sites, and have therefore not been 
efffective in resolving indigenous peoples’ concerns.
Nevertheless, the World Heritage Convention can be, and in some cases 
has undoubtedly been, an important tool for the promotion and protection of 
the rights of indigenous peoples with respect to their cultural heritage. World 
Heritage sites can help indigenous peoples protect their lands, territories and 
resources, and the associated cultural heritage, from development pressures 
such as extractive industry activities or threats posed by major infrastructure 
projects. Also, the international attention and oversight resulting from  World 
9 R Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches (Routledge 2013) 116.
10 Study on cultural heritage (n 1) para. 24. Accordingly, there is ‘strong recognition within 
international human rights law and jurisprudence that cultural rights for indigenous peo-
ples entail rights to land and natural resources, and that there is an obligation to protect 
the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples through recognition of their rights to own, 
control and manage their ancestral territories’. J Gilbert, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Heritage 
and Human Rights’ in S Disko and H Tugendhat (eds), World Heritage Sites and Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights (IWGIA 2014) 55, 58.
11 Study on cultural heritage (n 1), annex, para. 6. Similarly, E-I Daes, ‘Study on the protec-
tion of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous peoples’ (1993) UN Doc E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28, paras. 31, 164.
12 See Harrison (n 9) 118-39; K Whitby-Last, ‘Article 1: Cultural Landscapes’ in F Francioni 
(ed), The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary (OUP 2008) 51, 59.
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Heritage listing can potentially be used to encourage improved  indigenous  par-
ticipation in decision-making processes, enhanced  benefĳit-sharing, or redress 
for past violations of indigenous rights.13 Moreover, due to its prominence and 
influence the  World Heritage Convention has the potential to play an impor-
tant role in promoting respect for indigenous rights in heritage sites and con-
servation practice more generally. As noted by the IUCN14 World Conserva-
tion Congress, the Convention ‘can and has played a leadership role in setting 
standards for protected areas as a whole and… World Heritage sites with their 
high visibility and public scrutiny have the potential to act as “flagships” for 
good governance in protected areas’.15
It is clear, however, that the Convention’s potential to contribute to the pro-
motion of respect for indigenous rights is largely not being realized. On the 
contrary, the protection of World Heritage has in many cases aggravated or 
consolidated indigenous peoples’ loss of control over their lands and resourc-
es, led to restrictions on traditional land-use practices, and undermined their 
livelihoods. In many World Heritage sites, indigenous peoples are primarily 
considered as threats, or potential threats, to conservation objectives. For the 
Convention to play a consistently positive role for indigenous peoples, several 
serious shortcomings in its implementation need to be rectifĳied. These short-
comings include, among other things, the diffferentiation between natural and 
cultural heritage in World Heritage sites incorporating indigenous peoples’ ter-
ritories; a highly problematic application of the concept of ‘ outstanding uni-
versal value’ (‘ OUV’); and a lack of regulations and appropriate mechanisms 
to ensure the meaningful participation of indigenous peoples in Convention 
processes afffecting them.
13 See, e.g., WHC Decisions 39 COM 7B.5 (2015), para. 5 (Lake Bogoria National Reserve, Ken-
ya); 37 COM 7B.30 (2013), para. 8b (Talamanca Range-La Amistad Reserves/National Park, 
Costa Rica/Panama); 35 COM 7B.34 (2011), para. 4d (Manu National Park, Peru); 33 COM 
7B.9 (2009), para. 7 (Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tanzania); 35 COM 12E (2011), paras. 
15e, 15f (generally).
14 The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is the world’s oldest and larg-
est global environmental network, with more than 1,300 government and non-govern-
mental member organizations. Its highest decision-making body is its members’ assem-
bly, the quadrennial ‘World Conservation Congress’. IUCN functions as the WHC’s offfĳicial 
advisory body on natural heritage (see n 8).
15 IUCN World Conservation Congress, ‘Implementation of the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the context of the UNESCO World Heritage Con-
vention’ Res. 5.047 (Jeju 2012) preamble.
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Problematic Separation of Natural and Cultural Heritage
The  World Heritage Convention is remarkable in that it establishes a common 
regime for the protection of natural and cultural heritage, and is widely cel-
ebrated for its ‘unprecedented recognition of the close link between culture 
and nature’.16 In fact, UNESCO considers this the most signifĳicant feature of 
the Convention:
The most signifĳicant feature of the 1972 World Heritage Convention is 
that it links together in a single document the concepts of nature conser-
vation and the preservation of cultural properties. The Convention recog-
nizes the way in which people interact with nature, and the fundamental 
need to preserve the balance between the two.17
These ideas are also reflected in the offfĳicial emblem of the Convention (Figure 
1), which symbolizes the interdependence of cultural and natural heritage. 
While the central square is meant to represent the results of human skill and 
inspiration, the circle represents nature, ‘the two being intimately linked’.18 
The emblem was adopted by the WHC in 1978 and is supposed to ‘symbolize 
for future generations the principles embodied in the Convention’ and 
‘conve[y] the essential objectives of the Convention’.19
However, the experiences of many indige-
nous peoples with World Heritage sites estab-
lished in their territories stand in sharp con-
trast to these ideas and objectives and throw 
into question the ways in which the Conven-
tion is being implemented. Despite its recog-
nition of the interdependence of cultural and 
natural heritage, the WHC maintains a sepa-
ration between ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ World 
Heritage sites which is highly problematic in 
the context of many sites, and in particular 
those within indigenous peoples’ territories. 
16 F Francioni, ‘Introduction’ in Francioni (n 12) 3, 5.
17 UNESCO, ‘The World Heritage Convention’ <http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention> ac-
cessed 21 April 2015.
18 UNESCO, Report on the second session of the WHC (Washington D.C., 1978) CC-78/
CONF.010/10 Rev, para. 51. 
19 Ibid, para. 53. Also see Operational Guidelines 2015 (n 8) para. 258.
figure 1 World Heritage 
Emblem
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The vast majority of World Heritage sites in indigenous peoples’ territories are 
listed as natural sites, without any recognition of associated indigenous herit-
age values in the justifĳication for inscription and in contrast to indigenous peo-
ples’ holistic view of their heritage. This lack of respect for indigenous peoples’ 
own values attached to their lands, territories and resources not only raises 
serious questions regarding the validity of the meanings attributed to the re-
spective sites by UNESCO, but can also have signifĳicant adverse efffects on the 
livelihoods, living cultural heritage and well-being of the indigenous peoples 
concerned. Indigenous peoples have therefore repeatedly pointed to the need 
for concerted action by the WHC to  ensure that due recognition and attention 
is given to indigenous values in the nomination, declaration and management 
of World Heritage sites. 20
The Concept of Heritage in the Convention 
The underlying reason for the WHC’s diffferentiation between cultural and 
natural World Heritage sites lies in the text of the  World Heritage Convention 
itself, more concretely, the defĳinition of heritage contained in the Convention. 
The Convention establishes a rigid distinction between cultural and natural 
heritage by defĳining them separately, in Articles 1 and 2 respectively. Thus, ‘the 
architecture of the Convention perpetuates the dichotomy between cultural 
and natural heritage’, as Kathryn Whitby-Last notes.21 
In accordance with Article 11(2) of the Convention, the  World Heritage List 
is comprised of sites that fall within the defĳinitions of Articles 1 or 2 and which 
the WHC ‘considers as having  outstanding universal value in terms of such cri-
teria as it shall have established’. One of the fĳirst tasks completed by the WHC, 
at its fĳirst session in 1977, was the adoption of two separate sets of criteria for 
the determination of  OUV: six criteria related to cultural heritage (i-vi) and 
four criteria related to natural heritage (i-iv).22 On this basis, the Committee 
maintains its distinction between cultural and natural World Heritage sites, 
the classifĳication of a given site depending on the criteria under which it is 
inscribed on the World Heritage List or nominated for inscription. Although 
there is a possibility for sites to be listed as ‘mixed’ cultural and natural heritage 
sites, this can only happen when they satisfy both cultural and natural criteria 
20 See, e.g., the 2000/2001 proposal by indigenous peoples that a ‘World Heritage Indigenous 
Peoples Council of Experts (WHIPCOE)’ be established as a consultative body to the 
Committee. UNESCO, Report on the Proposed WHIPCOE (2001) WHC-2001/CONF.205/
WEB.3.
21 Whitby-Last (n 12) 59.
22 UNESCO, Report on the fĳirst session of the WHC (Paris, 1977) CC-77/CONF.001/9.
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of  OUV. 23 The number of mixed sites on the  World Heritage List is therefore 
very small – as of the writing of this chapter, only 32 out of 1,031 World Heritage 
sites were listed as mixed sites. In any case, inscription as a mixed site does not 
necessarily reflect a recognition of a symbiosis or interplay between cultural 
and natural values; the recognized cultural and natural attributes may have 
only tangential links and may not readily coincide in spatial terms. 24
It is important to note, however, that the separation between culture and 
nature in the Convention’s defĳinition of heritage is not absolute. Most sig-
nifĳicantly, the defĳinition of cultural heritage in Article 1 includes a reference 
to ‘combined works of nature and man… which are of  outstanding universal 
value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of 
view’. As will be further discussed below, this provision provides an important 
basis for the recognition of interrelationships between culture and nature in 
the context of cultural (or mixed) World Heritage sites.
Effforts to Bridge the Divide
There have been various attempts by the WHC to bridge the divide between 
nature and culture and enable a recognition of nature-culture interlinkages 
in the implementation of the Convention. Most signifĳicantly, in 1977, when 
the Committee adopted the initial criteria for the determination of  OUV, it in-
cluded a reference to ‘man’s interaction with his natural  environment’ into the 
criteria for natural sites (natural criterion ii), as well as a reference to ‘excep-
tional combinations of natural and cultural elements’ (natural criterion iii).25 
These references were invoked in the context of the nomination and inscrip-
tion of some of the indigenous sites listed as natural World Heritage sites in 
23 Operational Guidelines 2015 (n 8) para. 46. When nominations of mixed sites are evalu-
ated, the cultural and natural values are assessed separately, ‘almost as if one would be 
looking at two diffferent nominations’. L Leitão and T Badman, ‘Opportunities for Integra-
tion of Cultural and Natural Heritage Perspectives under the World Heritage Convention: 
Towards Connected Practice’ in K Taylor, A St Clair and NJ Mitchell (eds), Conserving Cul-
tural Landscapes: Challenges and New Directions (Routledge 2015) 75, 82.
24 UNESCO, ‘Reflections on processes for mixed nominations’ (2014) WHC-14/38.COM/9B, 
para. 20. Moreover, ‘management [of cultural and natural values] may be undertaken 
separately and through distinct agencies and it is not unusual to fĳind separate manage-
ment plans in place’. PB Larsen and G Wijesuriya, ‘Nature-culture interlinkages in World 
Heritage: Bridging the gap’ (2015) 75 World Heritage 4, 10.
25 See Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention 
(1977) CC-77/CONF.001/8 Rev, 4.
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the 1980s, such as Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park (Australia) or Manu National 
Park (Peru). 26
In 1992, the WHC made  some modifĳications to the cultural criteria to ac-
commodate the listing of ‘cultural  landscapes’.27 In addition, a document 
containing guidance on defĳinitions and categories of cultural landscapes was 
annexed to the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World 
Heritage Convention (‘Operational Guidelines’, or ‘the Guidelines’).28 This doc-
ument clarifĳies that ‘cultural landscapes… represent the “combined works of 
nature and of man” designated in Article 1 of the Convention’ and distinguishes 
between three categories of cultural landscapes: designed, organically evolved 
and associative cultural landscapes.29 Inscription of the latter on the  World 
Heritage List is ‘justifĳiable by virtue of the powerful religious, artistic or cultur-
al associations of the  natural element rather than material cultural evidence, 
which may be insignifĳicant or even absent’. The inclusion of the category of as-
sociative cultural landscapes is noteworthy as it represents an important move 
towards the recognition of  intangible values in the context of the World Herit-
age Convention. It has facilitated a better recognition of the cultural and spir-
itual values indigenous peoples attach to their lands and territories in some 
World Heritage sites, such as Tongariro National Park (New Zealand), Uluṟu-
Kata Tjuṯa National Park and, more recently,  Pimachiowin Aki (Canada).30
The introduction of the cultural landscapes concept had some serious draw-
backs, however. Ironically, it has in some ways contributed to deepening the 
divide between culture and nature in the implementation of the Convention. 
First, it can be argued that the concept of cultural landscapes ‘actually contin-
ues to reinforce this dualism [of culture and nature] through its maintenance 
26 For details, see R Layton and S Titchen, ‘Uluru: An Outstanding Australian Aboriginal 
Cultural Landscape’ in B von Droste, H Plachter and M Rössler (eds), Cultural Landscapes 
of Universal Value – Components of a Global Strategy (Gustav Fischer 1995) 174, 176; D Rod-
riguez and C Feather, ‘A Refuge for People and Biodiversity: The Case of Manu National 
Park, South-East Peru’ in Disko and Tugendhat (n 10) 459, 467.
27 C Cameron and M Rössler, Many Voices, One Vision: The Early Years of the World Heritage 
Convention (Ashgate 2013) 67-68; Leitão and Badman (n 23) 78.
28 The Operational Guidelines were initially issued in 1977 and are periodically revised by 
the WHC to reflect new concepts, knowledge or experiences. All historic versions of the 
Guidelines are available at <http://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines>. The current version 
was adopted in July 2015 (Doc WHC.15/01). 
29 Operational Guidelines 2015, annex 3.
30 A revised proposal was considered by the Committee in 2016 but decision was deferred 
after Ontario's Pikangikum First Nation withdrew its support. In January 2017, another 
proposal for recognition of a smaller area as World heritage Site was submitted.
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of the separation of “cultural” and “natural” landscapes – in other words, the 
“really natural” landscapes are separated from the “cultural” ones’, as Harrison 
notes.31 This conclusion is supported by the fact that cultural landscapes are 
treated as cultural sites and inscribed on the  World Heritage List under cultural 
criteria only. Second, and more signifĳicantly, concurrent with the introduction 
of the cultural landscapes category, the WHC deleted  the references to ‘man’s 
interaction with his natural  environment’ and ‘exceptional combinations of 
natural and cultural elements’ from the text of the natural criteria, based on 
the consideration that these phrases were inconsistent with the legal defĳini-
tion of natural heritage in Article 2 of the Convention.32 
These deletions have made it even more difffĳicult, if not impossible, to ac-
knowledge indigenous peoples’ relationship with their lands, territories and 
resources when defĳining the  OUV of natural World Heritage sites33 and may 
well have contributed to a denial and curtailment of indigenous peoples’ rights 
to their lands and resources in the designation and management of some natu-
ral World Heritage sites. As Robert Layton and Sarah Titchen remarked in 1995:
We deplore the deletion of references to human agency from the natural 
heritage criteria. The deletions appear to revive the outmoded concept 
of wilderness areas purifĳied of human action... We fear that in promot-
ing the idea of wholly natural  landscapes, UNESCO may inadvertently 
deny the continuing traditional use of the  natural resources contained 
within World Heritage properties by indigenous peoples and unwittingly 
collude in the displacement of indigenous peoples from areas included 
in the World Heritage List.34
31 Harrison (n 9) 206. Similarly, Whitby-Last (n 12) 61.
32 Whitby-Last (n 12) 57.
33 It should be noted that in the context of mixed sites, the WHC has recently sometimes re-
ferred to cultural and spiritual aspects, human interaction with nature and local people’s 
traditional way of life in the justifĳications for natural criteria. See the OUV Statements for 
the Ecosystem and Relict Cultural Landscape of Lopé-Okanda (Gabon), Ancient Maya 
City and Protected Tropical Forests of Calakmul (Mexico), and Trang An Landscape 
Complex (Viet Nam). An interesting approach is used in the 2015 revised nomination 
of Pimachiowin Aki (also a mixed site), where the justifĳication for natural criteria men-
tions sustainable hunting and trapping by Anishinaabeg as part of ecologically essential 
predator-prey interactions. <http://www.pimachiowinaki.org/sites/default/fĳiles/docs/
Pim_Aki_Dossier_2015_tk301_LR%20Jun%209.pdf> accessed 15 October 2015. One case of 
a natural site inscribed after 1992 where spiritual aspects are mentioned in the justifĳica-
tion for criteria is Mount Kenya National Park/Natural Forest (Kenya).
34 Layton and Titchen (n 26) 179-80.
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In the late 1990s, the continued lack of recognition of the links between culture 
and nature and interactions between people and the  environment in many 
World Heritage sites, especially natural sites, was a central focus of the discus-
sions at two important UNESCO expert meetings held at the Parc national de 
la Vanoise, France (1996) and in Amsterdam (1998). 35 One of the recommenda-
tions that came out of these meetings was to reinsert the reference to ‘human 
interaction with the environment’ into natural criterion ii, 36 but this recom-
mendation was subsequently discarded by the WHC due to strong opposition 
from its advisory body on natural heritage, IUCN, who insisted that this was 
‘essentially a “natural” criterion’. 37 A proposal to add a reference to ‘exception-
al… spiritual importance’ to natural criterion iii38 was also not accepted. The 
Committee did accept a suggestion of the Vanoise meeting, however, to add a 
provision to the Operational Guidelines recognizing that:
… no area is totally pristine and that all natural areas are in a dynamic 
state, and to some extent involve contact with people. Human activities, 
including those of traditional societies and local communities, often oc-
cur in natural areas. These activities may be consistent with the Outstand-
ing Universal Value of the area where they are ecologically sustainable.39
Additionally, the WHC took up a recommendation of the two expert meet-
ings to merge the six cultural and four natural criteria into a unifĳied set of ten 
criteria (i-x), ‘to better reflect… the nature/culture continuum’.40 This was lit-
tle more than a renumbering procedure though, as it did not entail any real 
35 UNESCO, ‘Report of the expert Meeting on Evaluation of general principles and criteria 
for nominations of natural World Heritage sites (Parc national de la Vanoise, France, 22-24 
March 1996)’ (1996) WHC-96/CONF.202/INF.9; ‘Report of the World Heritage Global Strat-
egy Natural and Cultural Heritage Expert Meeting, 25-29 March 1998, Theatre Institute, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands’ (1998) WHC-98/CONF.203/INF.7.
36 Amsterdam report (n 35) 11-13.
37 UNESCO, ‘Revision of the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World 
Heritage Convention’ (1999) WHC-99/CONF.204/10, annex I, annex III; ‘Report of the In-
ternational Expert Meeting on the Revision of the Operational Guidelines for the Imple-
mentation of the World Heritage Convention (Canterbury, UK, 10-14 April 2000)’ (2000) 
WHC-2000/CONF.204/INF.10, 20-21. There are signs that IUCN may be reconsidering this 
position. See Leitão and Badman (n 23) 88.
38 Amsterdam report (n 35) 13; Doc WHC-99/CONF.204/10 (n 37) annex III.
39 Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 90. Compare the Vanoise report (n 35) 3.
40 WHC Decision 6 EXT.COM 5.1 (2003) annex, para. 3.2.a); UNESCO, Report on the twenty-
third session of the WHC (Marrakesh, 1999) WHC-99/CONF.209/22, 39.
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integration among the criteria. The Committee maintained the distinction 
between cultural and natural criteria and continues to diffferentiate between 
‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ World Heritage sites depending on the criteria under 
which a site is nominated or inscribed. 41 Sites nominated under criteria i-vi 
are considered cultural sites and evaluated by ICOMOS,42 whereas sites nomi-
nated under criteria vii-x are considered natural sites and evaluated by IUCN. 
Therefore, ‘[d]espite the unifĳied set of criteria, the World Heritage system con-
tinues to operate as if nothing has changed’, as Christina Cameron notes.43 
The WHC’s Advisory Bodies on cultural heritage, ICOMOS and ICCROM,44 
already remarked in 1999 that:
the amalgamation of the 10 criteria in one consolidated list falls short of 
the potential which exists to fuse consideration of cultural and natural 
values within individual criteria. While adoption of such an approach 
would radically alter the evaluative framework used by the Committee 
41 The WHC therefore did not follow the ‘consolidated view’ of its three Advisory Bodies 
that the criteria should be merged ‘into a single list of ten criteria… with a consequential 
focus on areas inscribed as “World Heritage sites”, rather than as World Heritage cultural 
and/or natural sites’. Amsterdam report (n 35) 4. IUCN also stated that it ‘consider[ed] 
the four categories of World Heritage (natural, cultural, mixed and cultural landscape) 
as confusing and undermining the uniqueness of the Convention’. Ibid. Similarly, Vanoise 
report (n 35) para. 2(d).
42 The International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) is an international non-
governmental organisation and expert network dedicated to the conservation of monu-
ments, building complexes and sites. Its main focus and expertise lies in the conservation 
of architectural and archaeological heritage. ICOMOS is one of the three formal advisory 
bodies to the WHC (see n 8). In this capacity, ICOMOS is responsible for the evaluation 
of all cultural sites nominated for World Heritage listing (including cultural landscapes, 
which are evaluated by ICOMOS in consultation with IUCN). The main purpose of these 
evaluations is to make recommendations to the WHC on whether nominated sites meet 
the standard of OUV. Nominations of mixed sites are evaluated jointly by ICOMOS and 
IUCN. Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 146.
43 C Cameron, ‘Entre chien et loup: World Heritage Cultural Landscapes on the Fortieth An-
niversary of the World Heritage Convention’ in Taylor, St Clair and Mitchell (n 23) 61, 70.
44 The International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural 
Property (ICCROM) is an international intergovernmental organization created in 1959 at 
the proposal of UNESCO’s General Conference. Dedicated to the conservation of cultural 
heritage worldwide, it has today 132 Member States (as of 2015). As an offfĳicial advisory 
body to the WHC (compare n 8), it assists the WHC in monitoring the state of conserva-
tion of cultural World Heritage sites, training for cultural heritage and capacity-building. 
Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 33.
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since its beginnings, it is nevertheless a logical outcome of a commit-
ment to bring together treatment of cultural and natural heritage within 
the Committee’s work.45
In 2013, the inadequacy of the existing criteria for recognizing nature-culture 
interlinkages again became a focus of the deliberations of the WHC due to dif-
fĳiculties encountered in the context of the nomination of  Pimachiowin Aki as 
a mixed site, a collaborative efffort of fĳive First Nations and two Canadian pro-
vincial governments. In its evaluation of the nomination, ICOMOS criticized 
that:
the recognition of both cultural and natural aspects in one property still 
needs in efffect two nominations, one for cultural criteria and one for 
natural criteria, each of which is evaluated separately and each of which 
can be accepted without reference to the other. Although cultural and 
natural criteria have been merged, their use has not. Currently there is no 
way for properties to demonstrate within the current wording of the cri-
teria, either that cultural systems are necessary to sustain the outstand-
ing value of nature in a property, or that nature is imbued with cultural 
value in a property to a degree that is exceptional.46
Recognizing that the Pimachiowin Aki nomination had raised ‘fundamental 
questions in terms of how the indissoluble bonds that exist in some places 
between culture and nature can be recognized on the  World Heritage List’, the 
WHC at its 37th session in Phnom Penh requested the World Heritage Cen-
tre and the Advisory Bodies to prepare a joint report containing ‘options for 
changes to the criteria and/or to the Advisory Body evaluation process to ad-
dress this issue’.47 However, the respective report and the ensuing discussion 
remained exclusively focused on mixed site nominations, i.e. nominations of 
sites where natural as well as cultural elements are thought to be of  OUV. A 
discussion on changes to the criteria did not occur because IUCN and ICOMOS 
submitted that there was ‘no evidence that the wording of the criteria created 
difffĳiculties for the evaluation of mixed sites’, saying that the problems were 
45 Doc WHC-99/CONF.204/10 (n 37) annex II, para. 1.
46 ICOMOS, ‘Evaluations of Nominations of Cultural and Mixed Properties’ (2013) WHC-
13/37.COM/INF.8B1, 45.
47 WHC Decision 37 COM 8B.19 (2013).
51ich and uNESCO’s  World Heritage Con vention
rather due to shortcomings in the evaluation process, in particular a lack of 
shared decision-making between the Advisory Bodies.48
Therefore, the problem remains that an appropriate recognition of indig-
enous peoples’ relationship with the  environment, and interconnections be-
tween nature and culture, is only possible in cultural sites or mixed sites, when 
at least some aspects of the indigenous culture are assessed to be of  OUV in 
their own right. However, due to the questionable ways in which the concept 
of  OUV is interpreted and applied, and the frequent exclusion of indigenous 
peoples from the processes by which the  OUV of sites is determined, this is not 
a realistic possibility in the context of many sites. In natural sites, which ac-
count for the majority of indigenous sites inscribed on the World Heritage List, 
cultural values do not form part of the  OUV, preventing a proper recognition 
of indigenous values.
Problematic Application of the Concept of ‘Outstanding 
Universal Value’
The concept of  OUV is of central importance in the implementation of the 
World  Heritage Convention, its purpose being the establishment of ‘an efffec-
tive system of collective protection of the cultural and natural heritage of  out-
standing universal value’.49 The determination by the WHC that a site is of  OUV 
is the main prerequisite for its inscription on the  World Heritage List and after 
inscription the focus of conservation strategies and site management must 
be on the protection of those aspects that have been recognized as part of its 
 OUV. According to the Operational Guidelines, the Statement of  OUV adopted 
by the WHC at the time of listing provides ‘the basis for the future protection 
and management of the property’, and each World Heritage site should have 
‘an appropriate management plan or other documented management system 
which must specify how the Outstanding Universal Value of a property should 
48 See UNESCO, ‘Progress report on the reflection on processes for mixed nominations’ 
(2015) WHC-15/39.COM/9B, paras. 4-6. Also see Doc WHC-14/38.COM/9B (n 24). Despite 
the special relevance of this issue for indigenous peoples, there was no opportunity for 
them to participate in this discussion, although the Special Rapporteur James Anaya had 
emphasized ‘the importance of consulting with indigenous peoples throughout the en-
tirety of such a review process in order to address indigenous peoples’ rights, interests 
and concerns’. Letter to the WHC (n 5).
49 World Heritage Convention, preamble.
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be preserved’.50 Protection and management of World Heritage sites ‘should 
ensure that their Outstanding Universal Value… [is] sustained or enhanced 
over time’.51 Moreover, States must ensure that human use within World Herit-
age sites ‘does not impact adversely on the Outstanding Universal Value’.52 
From this it is obvious that the question which values are recognized as part 
of a site’s  OUV, and which ones are not, can have major ramifĳications for indig-
enous peoples living within or near a World Heritage site, and the protection 
of their rights.  OUV afffects management priorities and frameworks, and if the 
recognized  OUV of a site does not reflect or coincide with the values attached 
to the site by indigenous peoples, this can lead to restrictions and prohibitions 
on their traditional land use activities and thus have signifĳicant consequences 
for their lives, livelihoods, cultures and well-being. 
Considering these potentially signifĳicant implications, questions arise as to 
how the concept of  OUV is defĳined, and under what circumstances indigenous 
peoples’ interpretations may be reflected and their cultural and spiritual val-
ues and traditional practices recognized, if the indigenous peoples so desire. 
Closely related questions are by whom and through what processes the  OUV 
of World Heritage sites is determined, and what mechanisms and possibilities 
exist for indigenous peoples to efffectively participate in these processes and 
decisions.
Defĳining and Determining Outstanding Universal Value
Despite the fundamental importance of the concept of ‘Outstanding Universal 
Value’ for the implementation of the World  Heritage Convention, no explicit 
defĳinition of the term is contained in the Convention. It is clear from the Con-
vention’s travaux préparatoires that the concept was introduced into the text 
of the Convention ‘to limit its application to the protection of a select list of the 
most important cultural and natural heritage places in the world’; 53 however, 
the drafters of the Convention deliberately left the defĳinition of  OUV to the 
50 Operational Guidelines 2015, paras. 108, 155.
51 Ibid, para. 96.
52 Ibid, para. 119.
53 S Titchen, ‘On the construction of “outstanding universal value”: Some comments on the 
implementation of the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention’ (1996) 1 Conservation 
and Management of Archaeological Sites 235, 236-37. The Operational Guidelines 2015 
state that the Convention is ‘not intended to ensure the protection of all properties of 
great interest, importance or value, but only for a select list of the most outstanding of 
these from an international viewpoint’ (para. 52).
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WHC.54 Therefore, the concrete  meaning of the concept is largely shaped by 
the practice of the WHC, as reflected in the Operational Guidelines and in par-
ticular the criteria for the determination of OUV . Since these have undergone 
several signifĳicant changes over the years and may continue to be revised in 
the future, it can be seen as ‘an evolving concept’.55 The ability to change and 
modify the criteria ‘accommodates the mutability of the concept of heritage 
value or signifĳicance’56 and provides some flexibility in the types of sites that 
can be included in the  World Heritage List.
Since 2005, the Operational Guidelines contain a paragraph defĳining OUV 
as ‘cultural and/or natural signifĳicance which is so exceptional as to transcend 
national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future 
generations of all humanity.’57 More important in practice, however, are the 
ten criteria for the assessment of OUV , at least one of which a site must meet 
to be included on the World Heritage List. The criteria that are most often used 
to recognize living cultural values of indigenous peoples (criteria iii, v and vi) 
require sites to ‘bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tra-
dition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared’ (criterion 
iii), ‘be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or 
sea-use which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction 
with the  environment…’ (criterion v), or to ‘be directly or tangibly associated 
with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and 
literary works of outstanding universal signifĳicance’ (criterion vi).58 Addition-
ally, to be deemed of OUV , sites must meet the conditions of integrity59 and/or 
54 See arts 11(2) and 11(5) of the Convention, according to which the WHC shall defĳine the 
criteria by which the OUV of World Heritage sites will be identifĳied.
55 C Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Routledge 2010) 233. 
56 Titchen (n 53) 236-37.
57 Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 49.
58 Ibid, para. 77.
59 Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 78. Integrity is a ‘measure of the wholeness and intact-
ness of the natural or cultural heritage and its attributes’. Ibid, para. 88. For details on the 
conditions of integrity, see ibid, paras. 87-95.
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 authenticity60 (the latter only in the case of cultural properties), and have an 
adequate protection and management system to ensure their safeguarding.61 
A key factor in defĳining the OUV of individual World Heritage sites is the 
process by which sites are inscribed on the  World Heritage List. While the fĳinal 
decision whether to inscribe a site or not rests with the WHC, sites can only 
be listed  following a formal nomination by the State Party in whose territory 
they are located.62 The nomination documents submitted by the States Parties 
are ‘the primary basis on which the Committee considers the inscription of 
the properties on the World Heritage List’.63 They must include a ‘proposed 
Statement of Outstanding Universal Value… mak[ing] clear why the property 
is considered to merit inscription on the World Heritage List’ and ‘indicate the 
World Heritage criteria… under which the property is proposed, together with 
a clearly stated argument for the use of each criterion’.64 States Parties are en-
couraged to involve indigenous peoples, local communities and other stake-
holders in preparing the nominations. However, as will be discussed in more 
detail below, this is not a mandatory requirement.65 
Once submitted, nominations are evaluated by the WHC’s Advisory Bodies 
IUCN and/or ICOMOS, who present their views to the Committee on whether 
the nominated site meets the criteria under which inscription is proposed by 
the State Party, and on whether the site should be listed or not. The Advisory 
Bodies can also recommend that the State Party be asked to re-nominate the 
site under diffferent criteria. If the Advisory Bodies recommend an inscription, 
they present an updated draft of the OUV Statement to the Committee. On 
this basis, the Committee then makes an independent decision whether or not 
60 Ibid, para. 78. The demand to pass the test of authenticity can be understood as the re-
quirement to be genuine, i.e., ‘the nominated resource should be truly what it is claimed 
to be’. J Jokilehto and J King, ‘Authenticity and Integrity’ <http://whc.unesco.org/en/
events/443> accessed 22 November 2015. For details on the conditions of authenticity, see 
Operational Guidelines 2015, paras. 79-86 and annex 4 (Nara Document on Authenticity).
61 Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 78. For details on this requirement, see ibid, paras. 96-
119. Note that the Guidelines since 1999 explicitly acknowledge that traditional protection 
and management can be adequate to ensure the safeguarding of both cultural and natu-
ral World Heritage sites (para. 97).
62 According to art 3 of the Convention, ‘[i]t is for each State Party to this Convention to 
identify and delineate the diffferent properties situated on its territory’ that may fall under 
the protection regime of the Convention. Moreover, art 11(3) stipulates that ‘[t]he inclu-
sion of a property in the World Heritage List requires the consent of the State concerned’.
63 Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 120.
64 Ibid, para. 132(3). 
65 Ibid, para. 123.
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to inscribe the site, and under which criteria. 66 Formerly the Committee oc-
casionally inscribed sites under diffferent criteria than those proposed by the 
State Party;67 however, under the current Guidelines the application of new 
criteria requires a resubmission of the nomination and the consent of the State 
Party.
It follows from the above that indigenous values will only be recognized as 
part of a World Heritage site’s OUV  with the consent of the State Party con-
cerned. It is the States that decide which sites in their territories are proposed 
for listing, which elements, attributes and values are highlighted in the nomi-
nation documents, and under which criteria inscription is proposed. Addition-
ally, for indigenous cultural values to be recognized, the WHC must conclude 
– taking into  account the expert advice provided by IUCN and ICOMOS – that 
they are signifĳicant enough in their own right to fulfĳill the World Heritage cri-
teria, including the requirements of integrity and  authenticity.
‘Universal’ Values Versus Indigenous Values
There are a number of World Heritage sites that were listed in recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage and whose OUV  is therefore, fully or in 
part, based on indigenous heritage. (To what extent the OUV  reflects indig-
enous peoples’ own understandings of that heritage is a separate question.) 
Many of these sites are marked by the presence of historic material evidence 
of indigenous culture such as rock art (e.g. Kakadu National Park, Tsodilo), 
architectural features (Taos Pueblo, Machu Picchu), or monumental artifacts 
(SGang Gwaay, Rapa Nui). This is a reflection of the fact that the World Herit-
age Convention was inspired by a ‘European-inspired monumentalist vision of 
cultural heritage which isolated its physical dimensions from its-non-physical 
ones’68 and favored – at least initially – the inscription of built and archaeo-
logical heritage. However, in the 1990s two important decisions of the WHC 
led to an expanded notion of cultural heritage in the implementation of the 
Convention and thus facilitated the listing of other kinds of indigenous her-
itage: the introduction of the cultural  landscapes category in 1992, and the 
66 The WHC is obviously not bound to follow the recommendations of IUCN and ICOMOS. 
In recent years, there has been an increasing trend toward divergence between the Com-
mittee decisions and the recommendations of its Advisory Bodies. See L Meskell, ‘UN-
ESCO’s World Heritage Convention at 40: Challenging the Economic and Political Order 
of International Heritage Conservation’ (2013) 54(4) Current Anthropology 483, 486.
67 See, e.g., J Jokilehto, What is OUV? Defĳining the Outstanding Universal Value of Cultural 
World Heritage Properties (ICOMOS 2008) 79-89.
68 A Yusuf, ‘Article 1 – Defĳinition of Cultural Heritage’ in Francioni (n 12) 23, 29.
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adoption of the ‘Global Strategy for a Balanced, Representative and Credible 
World Heritage List’ in 1994. These developments have resulted in a stronger 
emphasis on living culture and  intangible heritage, and have aided the recog-
nition of indigenous peoples’ spiritual and physical relationships with their 
lands, territories and resources when the OUV  of cultural (or mixed) World 
Heritage sites is defĳined.69 They have for instance enabled the recognition of 
Māori cultural and spiritual values associated with Tongariro National Park, 
Anangu values related to Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park, Nama pastoralism in 
the Richtersveld Cultural and Botanical Landscape (South Africa) and Saami 
 reindeer herding in the Laponian Area (Sweden).70
However, the fact remains that in the vast majority of World Heritage sites 
traditionally owned, inhabited or used by indigenous peoples, the OUV  does 
not encompass indigenous cultural values, and in many cases the OUV  State-
ments adopted by the WHC do not even mention the  existence of the indig-
enous peoples. What is more, in some OUV  Statements the indigenous peoples 
are identifĳied as current or potential threats to the OUV.71 The OUV of those 
sites therefore not only does not coincide with the indigenous heritage values, 
but conflicts with them in signifĳicant ways and may even be harmful to their 
protection. As noted by  EMRIP: 
The establishment of World Heritage sites, or other forms of protected 
areas can have a negative impact on indigenous peoples because, often, 
their ancestral rights over their lands and territories are not respected or 
protected. In many nature-protected areas, including areas inscribed on 
the World Heritage List, narrow restrictions are imposed on traditional 
69 See ibid, 31-37; and Harrison (n 9) 114-39.
70 The case of the Laponian Area shows that the recognition of indigenous cultural values 
as part of a site’s OUV not only ensures a continued consideration of those values in con-
servation strategies, but can also greatly assist indigenous peoples in their effforts to gain a 
greater role in local decision-making processes and site management. See C Green, ‘Man-
ging Laponia: A World Heritage Site as Arena for Sami Ethno-Politics in Sweden’ (2009) 47 
Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology.
71 See e.g. the OUV Statement for the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, WHC Decision 34 
COM 8B.13 (2010) para. 4. There are also some cases where indigenous peoples have been 
‘physically removed from protected areas as a way of justifying inscription of an area on 
the World Heritage list as a place of natural importance devoid of what is perceived as 
the negative impact of local inhabitants’. S Titchen, ‘Indigenous peoples and cultural and 
natural World Heritage sites’ (Panel presentation, New York, 15 May 2002) <http://www.
dialoguebetweennations.com/n2n/pfĳii/english/SarahTitchen.htm> accessed 22 Septem-
ber 2015.
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practices and activities, such as hunting, gathering, farming or animal 
husbandry, in violation of the cultural and subsistence rights of indig-
enous peoples. To be included on the  World Heritage List, sites must be of 
“ outstanding universal value”, a concept which can lead to management 
frameworks that prioritize the protection of those heritage aspects at the 
expense of the land rights of indigenous peoples. As a result, the protec-
tion of world heritage can undermine indigenous peoples’ relationship 
with their traditional lands, territories and resources, as well as their live-
lihoods and cultural heritage, especially in sites where the natural values 
are deemed to be of  outstanding universal value but the cultural values 
of indigenous peoples are not taken into account.72
The reasons for the common lack of recognition of indigenous peoples’ val-
ues, perspectives and cultural heritage when the OUV of sites is defĳined are 
diverse. In most cases, the indigenous values are already ignored in the nomi-
nations submitted by States. The main reason often lies in the fact that the 
relevant States Parties have no political or economic interest to include indig-
enous heritage in their nominations, and the indigenous peoples concerned 
have no legal standing or voice at the domestic level that would ensure their 
meaningful involvement in the preparation of the nominations. Some govern-
ment agencies and conservation organizations involved in the preparation of 
nominations may also be opposed to a recognition of indigenous values as this 
could enhance the role of indigenous peoples in site management and reduce 
their own authority. At the same time, recognition of only the natural values of 
a site may provide a convenient means to justify the imposition of restrictions 
on indigenous peoples’ livelihoods and further deprive them of rights to lands 
and resources. 73 
But even if States have the best intentions, there are signifĳicant practical 
and fĳinancial reasons why they may choose to disregard indigenous values in 
preparing nominations. In particular, they may prefer to nominate nature-pro-
72 Study on cultural heritage (n 1) para. 55.
73 See e.g. the case of Lake Bogoria National Reserve where the Kenyan Government appears 
to be using the World Heritage status as a pretext for not restituting the land to the En-
dorois people as required by the landmark 2009 decision of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in the ‘Endorois’ case (Communication 276/2003). Endorois 
Welfare Council, Statement at the 39th session of the WHC (Bonn, 2015) <http://whc.
unesco.org/en/sessions/39com/records> (File: Jul 1, 2015 – 9:30 AM, at 1:41:16) accessed 15 
October 2015. Also see K Sing’Oei, ‘Ignoring Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: The Case of Lake 
Bogoria’s Designation as a UNESCO World Heritage Site’ in Disko and Tugendhat (n 10) 
163, 171.
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tected areas as natural rather than mixed sites because mixed nominations are 
considered too complex. 74 It is in many ways easier to gain recognition as a 
natural site than as a mixed site, because natural and cultural values are evalu-
ated separately (by IUCN and ICOMOS respectively) and a successful nomina-
tion as a mixed site normally requires a positive assessment of both Advisory 
Bodies. While a State’s decision not to nominate a site for its indigenous values 
may of course be based on a realistic assessment that such an efffort would 
likely not be successful under the existing regulations and criteria, there can be 
no doubt that many natural World Heritage sites hold indigenous values that 
would have fulfĳilled the cultural criteria at the time of inscription. A notewor-
thy example is the Sangha Trinational (Cameroon/Central African Republic/
Congo), which was nominated and subsequently inscribed under natural cri-
teria alone although the WHC and IUCN had explicitly encouraged a mixed 
nomination due to the evident signifĳicance of the ‘rich indigenous cultural 
heritage of the area’.75 In the case of the Okapi Wildlife Reserve, a natural site 
in Congo, the WHC at the time of inscription in 1996 noted ‘the importance of 
the pygmy population living at the site and the interaction between traditional 
people and nature’ and encouraged the State Party to ‘consider nomination 
also under cultural criteria in the future’,76 however, until today the site has not 
been renominated. 
Conversely, there are also several sites that were inscribed only for their 
natural or archaeological values by the WHC although they had also been 
 nominated for their indigenous heritage values. A case in point is  Purnululu 
National Park (Australia), listed as a natural site in 2003 after having been pro-
posed as a mixed site and living Aboriginal cultural  landscape. The reason for 
this was that ICOMOS, while agreeing that Purnululu possesses outstanding 
cultural values, raised several questions concerning the integrity,  authenticity 
and ‘viability’ of those values. Issues raised in this connection included the 
fact that traditional land-use practices had been interrupted and dislocated 
due to the impact of European settlers, the fact that the traditional owners no 
longer lived in the site, and the small number of  traditional knowledge holders. 
ICOMOS recommended that the nomination be deferred and Australia asked 
74 Larsen and Wijesuriya (n 24) 10; K Buckley and T Badman, ‘Nature+Culture and World 
Heritage: why it matters!’ in Ch Cameron and J Herrmann (eds), Exploring the Cultural 
Value of Nature: a World Heritage Context (Proceedings of Round Table, Université de 
Montréal, 12-14 March 2014) 105, 116.
75 WHC Decision 35 COM 8B.4 (2011) para. 2d.
76 UNESCO, Report on the twentieth session of the WHC (Merida, 1996) WHC-96/
CONF.201/21, 60.
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to improve the Park’s management framework with a view to ‘sustaining tra-
ditional Aboriginal communities in the Park’ and maintaining the  intangible 
cultural heritage associated with the  landscape.77 However, rather than defer-
ring the entire nomination as recommended by ICOMOS, the WHC deferred 
only the cultural part and inscribed Purnululu under natural criteria. Some 
hope that Purnululu’s indigenous values may eventually be recognized can be 
found in the fact that the Committee explicitly noted ‘the outstanding univer-
sal cultural and natural value’ of the Park when listing it and in 2008 requested 
Australia to ‘pursue the on-going consideration of indigenous cultural values 
of the property’.78 
A less hopeful case is that of the  Ngorongoro Conservation Area (‘NCA’) in 
Tanzania, a multiple land-use area excised from Serengeti National Park in 
1959 to provide a home for Maasai pastoralists who were being evicted from 
the Serengeti. Listed as a natural site in 1979, it was in 2009 re-nominated un-
der cultural criteria for its signifĳicance as an archaeological site and Maasai 
cultural landscape. However, while the WHC approved the inscription as an ar-
chaeological site, it rejected recognition as a Maasai landscape due to a highly 
negative evaluation by ICOMOS, which held that the Maasai values did not 
satisfy the conditions of integrity and  authenticity and were neither ‘unique’ 
nor ‘exceptional’ enough to be of OUV:
 The Maasai are described in the nomination dossier as pastoralists and 
nomads who move around with their animals in search of grazing grounds 
and water sources… [T]he reality is now that the much larger community 
of Maasai… presently inhabit a number of densely populated villages and 
only a small percentage spend part of the year in isolated ‘bomas’... The 
largely settled communities now rely for food on agricultural produce 
as well as on resources from their animals… The Maasai, although ex-
tremely interesting in terms of their cultural traditions, are therefore, in 
ICOMOS’s view, neither a unique nor an exceptional testimony to such 
pastoralist traditions… [T]heir distinctive pastoralism within the Con-
servation area has now been signifĳicantly changed into agro-pastoralism 
through the impact of population growth and other factors… ICOMOS 
does not consider that at the present time the conditions of integrity and 
 authenticity have been met for the Maasai pastoral landscape. 79
77 ICOMOS, Evaluations of Cultural Properties 2003, WHC-03/27COM/INF.8A, 7.
78 Decisions 27 COM 8C.11 (2003) and 32 COM 7B.8 (2008). 
79 ICOMOS, 2010 Evaluations of Cultural Properties, WHC-10/34.COM/INF.8B1, 65-69. It is a 
bitter irony that the changes in the pastoralists’ lives which ICOMOS considers are com-
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The listing of the NCA for its natural and archaeological values, but not its 
indigenous values, has led to a signifĳicant rearrangement of management pri-
orities and undermined the multiple land-use philosophy at the expense of the 
Maasai residents, who have been subjected to a host of restrictions on their 
livelihood activities as a result of World Heritage status and the involvement 
of UNESCO, IUCN and ICOMOS. The recent inscription as an archaeological 
site has in efffect sidelined the already marginalized Maasai community even 
further in the NCA’s decision-making processes. 80
The questionable requirement by which indigenous peoples’ relationship 
with their ancestral lands and resources has to be ‘exceptional’ in order to form 
an integral part of a World Heritage site’s recognized value, is also a key issue 
in the (ongoing) mixed site nomination of  Pimachiowin Aki. The cultural part 
of the nomination was deferred in 2013 because ICOMOS found that the rela-
tionship between the Anishinaabeg and the land in the nominated area was 
‘not unique and persists in many places associated with indigenous peoples in 
North America and other parts of the world’, and that it had not been demon-
strated ‘how this strong association… can be seen to be exceptional – in other 
words of wider importance than to the Anishinaabeg themselves’.81 Since ICO-
MOS considered, however, that Pimachiowin Aki might have the potential to 
demonstrate OUV  for its cultural values, it recommended that Canada be giv-
en an opportunity to explore, together with ICOMOS, ‘whether there is a way 
that the spiritual relationship with nature that has persisted for generations 
between the Anishinaabe First Nations and Pimachiowin Aki, might be con-
sidered exceptional’.82 The resolution of this issue is complicated by the fact 
that the Anishinaabeg have emphasized, out of respect for other indigenous 
peoples, that they ‘do not wish to see their property as being “exceptional” as 
they did not want to make judgements about the relationships of other First 
Nations’ with their lands and thus make comparisons’.83
promising the authenticity and integrity of the ‘pastoral landscape’ are in many ways the 
result of restrictions imposed by conservation measures, such as the fact that the Maasai 
‘no longer live and move across the whole Conservation Area’. Ibid, 65.
80 W Olenasha, ‘A World Heritage Site in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area: Whose World? 
Whose Heritage?’ in Disko and Tugendhat (n 10) 189.
81 ICOMOS, 2013 Evaluations of Nominations of Cultural and Mixed Properties, WHC-13/37.
COM/INF.8B1, 39.
82 Ibid, 46.
83 Ibid, 39. 
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Whatever the outcome of this case,84 the need for indigenous peoples to 
claim and demonstrate that their connection to land is exceptional and ‘supe-
rior’ to that of other indigenous peoples in order for it to be recognized as part 
of a World Heritage site’s OUV,  is seen as highly inappropriate – even ‘insulting’ 
– by some indigenous representatives.85 Indigenous representatives have also 
raised the fundamental question how the heritage values ascribed to the an-
cestral territory of an indigenous people can be considered as ‘universal’ if they 
are not inclusive and respectful of the indigenous people’s own values and per-
spectives and may even run counter to those values. For instance, the Maasai 
lawyer William Olenasha has recently remarked in relation to the ‘World Herit-
age’ status of the NCA:
The local communities’ disenfranchisement and marginalization from 
decision-making processes begs the questions of whose world and 
whose heritage are being safeguarded and protected under this label, 
and whether the concept of ‘mankind as a whole’ that is embedded in 
the World Heritage Convention includes the pastoralists living in the 
 Ngorongoro Conservation Area.86
Similar questions have been posed by indigenous representatives and others 
on many occasions throughout the history of the Convention and present a 
problem which UNESCO is forced to address if it wants to protect the Conven-
tion’s credibility as an instrument representing the interest of ‘all the peoples 
of the world’87 and its own credibility as an organization committed to cultural 
84 In its 2015 revised nomination, Canada referred to the connection between Anishinaabeg 
and their land as a ‘compelling example of the inseparability of an indigenous culture 
and its local environment that can inspire people around the world’ and describes Pima-
chiowin Aki as ‘an exceptional expression of the cultural tradition of Ji-ganawendamang 
Gidakiiminaan [‘Keeping the Land’]’. 'As mentioned earlier, decision was deferred after 
Ontario's Pikangikum First Nation withdrew its support and in January 2017, Canada sub-
mitted a new proposal for recognition of a smaller area as World heritage Site.
85 See R Feneley, ‘Indigenous leaders told of “insulting” UN rule on World Heritage listing’, Syd-
ney Morning Herald (28 May 2013) <http://www.smh.com.au/national/indigenous-leaders-
told-of-insulting-un-rule-on-world-heritage-listing-20130527-2n7ac.html> accessed 1 Octo-
ber 2015; or S Titchen, ‘On the construction of outstanding universal value’ (DPhil thesis, 
Australian National University 1995) 245.
86 Olenasha (n 80) 217. Similarly, Sing’Oei (n 73) 181 in relation to Lake Bogoria National 
Reserve.
87 World Heritage Convention, preamble.
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diversity, equality and mutual understanding and respect of peoples.88 From 
UNESCO’s records it is clear that the WHC has long been aware of this neces-
sity. For instance, the seminal Nara Document on Authenticity, adopted at a 
UNESCO conference in 1994, refers to the WHC’s desire to ‘accord full respect 
to the social and cultural values of all societies, in examining the  outstand-
ing universal value of cultural properties proposed for the  World Heritage List’ 
and recognizes that ‘[c]ultural heritage diversity… demands respect for other 
cultures and all aspects of their belief systems’.89 Moreover, noting that ‘judge-
ments about values attributed to cultural properties… may difffer from culture 
to culture’, the Nara Document underlines that ‘the respect due to all cultures 
requires that heritage properties must be considered and judged within the 
cultural contexts to which they belong’.90 Also noteworthy is a 2005 UNESCO 
expert meeting on the concept of OUV in Kazan, Russia, which emphasized 
that ‘[t]he identifĳication of  outstanding universal value of a site needs wide 
 participation by stakeholders including local communities and indigenous 
people’.91 Following this meeting, the WHC adopted a decision recognizing 
that OUV ‘is a concept that shall embrace all cultures, regions and peoples, 
and does not ignore difffering cultural interpretations of  outstanding universal 
value because they originate from minorities, indigenous groups and/or local 
peoples’.92 It instructed the World Heritage Centre and the Advisory Bodies to 
create guidance manuals on the concept and application of OUV,  emphasizing 
that the manuals should ‘[s]pecifĳically include the utilization of, or note the 
obvious omission of the values of minorities, indigenous and/or local peoples’ 
in past Committee decisions.93
Despite these insights, intentions and effforts, however, indigenous peo-
ples’ perspectives and values continue to be routinely ignored when the OUV 
of  World Heritage sites is defĳined, as many recent nominations and listings 
88 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientifĳic and Cultural Organization 
(adopted 16 November 1945, entered into force 4 November 1946) 4 UNTS 275, preamble 
and art 1.
89 Nara Document on Authenticity, paras. 2, 6. Reproduced in Operational Guidelines 2015, 
annex 4.
90 Para. 11. Similarly, Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 81. While the Nara Document only 
relates to cultural properties, it logically follows that the judgment whether a property 
is treated as a ‘cultural’ or ‘natural’ property would likewise need to be made within the 
cultural context to which it belongs.
91 UNESCO, ‘Recommendations of the Expert meeting on OUV’ (Kazan, Russian Federation, 
6-10 April 2005). Contained in Doc WHC-05/29.COM/9, 3, para. 7k.
92 Decision 30 COM 9 (2006) para. 3.
93 Ibid, para. 7e.
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show.94 There is no reason to believe that this situation will change unless the 
dichotomy between nature and culture is fĳinally overcome and signifĳicant ad-
aptations are made to the way OUV is  defĳined and determined. A key question 
that needs to be asked in this regard is whether it is appropriate to base the 
decision whether or not to give recognition to the values indigenous peoples 
themselves attach to their ancestral territories on such concepts as ‘exception-
ality’, ‘ authenticity’ and ‘integrity’. Put diffferently, when establishing the OUV 
of  World Heritage sites, is it appropriate to disregard or discount the values of 
indigenous peoples who have occupied and nurtured those places for centu-
ries (unless it is the genuine will of the indigenous peoples themselves)? Who 
should be defĳining the values of World Heritage sites located in indigenous 
peoples’ ancestral territories and deciding which criteria are applied? 
Under the current regulations the OUV of  a World Heritage site is defĳined 
through a process involving the relevant State Party (i.e. the government agen-
cies who prepare the nomination), the Advisory Bodies IUCN and/or ICOMOS 
(i.e. international heritage experts), and the government delegates in the WHC 
(nowadays predominantly career  diplomats).95 Whether and to what extent 
afffected indigenous peoples are involved in this process is completely at the 
discretion of the nominating States. Despite the United Nations’ commitments 
to ensuring  participation of indigenous peoples on issues afffecting them,96 the 
involvement of afffected indigenous peoples in the nomination of World Herit-
age sites is not a mandatory requirement under the Operational Guidelines. 
Due to the lack of recognition and respect for indigenous peoples’ rights in 
many countries, this means in practice that they are often excluded.
94 Recent examples include, among others, the Sangha Trinational, the Ngorongoro Con-
servation Area, the Okavango Delta (Botswana), and the Kaeng Krachan Forest Complex 
(Thailand).
95 Meskell (n 66) 485; C Brumann, ‘Shifting tides of world-making in the UNESCO World 
Heritage Convention: cosmopolitanisms colliding’ (2014) 37(12) Ethnic and Racial Studies 
2176, 2185-88. 
96 See, in particular arts 18, 19, 41, 42 of the UNDRIP and the outcome document of the 2014 
World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/69/2, paras. 3, 20, 33, 40. UNESCO’s Me-
dium-Term Strategy 2014-2021 states that the Organization will implement the UNDRIP 
‘across all relevant programme areas’. Doc 37 C/4 (2014) para. 20.
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Lack of Regulations to Ensure Meaningful Participation of 
Indigenous Peoples in Decision-Making Processes under the World 
Heritage  Convention
Not surprisingly considering its date of adoption, the text of the World Herit-
age Convention ‘does not give any recognition to indigenous peoples’ rights 
over cultural and natural heritage’.97 Even though the Preamble recognizes 
that cultural and natural heritage belongs to ‘peoples’ rather than States, the 
Convention grants States ultimate control over determining which heritage 
sites on their territories may fall under the Convention’s regime and entrusts 
them with all responsibilities concerning the nomination, management and 
protection of World Heritage sites. ‘Little to no mention is made of commu-
nity involvement in protecting heritage, and… in determining what their her-
itage actually is’, as Lucas Lixinski notes; peoples and local communities ‘are 
assumed to be fairly represented by States’ in the Convention’s processes. 98 
The only reference to communities in the Convention text is a provision 
according to which each State Party ‘shall endeavor, in so far as possible, and 
as appropriate for each country… to adopt a general policy which aims to give 
the cultural and natural heritage a function in the life of the community’.99 
The Convention also calls on States to develop educational and information 
programmes in order to ‘strengthen appreciation and respect by their peoples 
of [World Heritage sites]’ and to ‘keep the public broadly informed of the dan-
gers threatening this heritage and of activities carried on in pursuance of this 
Convention’.100 The rationale for these provisions is not a recognition of the 
need to involve local populations in decisions afffecting them, but the consid-
eration that their engagement is to some extent necessary to ensure an efffec-
tive conservation of World Heritage. This is underscored by the fact that the 
Convention does not establish an active role for afffected peoples and com-
munities in its processes, but mentions them only as passive recipients of in-
formation and policies. This lack of a role for local communities contrasts with 
97 International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ‘Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Final Report’ (Sofĳia Conference 2012) 17.
98 L Lixinski, ‘Heritage for Whom? Individuals’ and Communities’ Roles in International 
Cultural Heritage Law’ in Federico Lenzerini and AF Vrdoljak (eds), International Law 
for Common Goods: Normative Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture and Nature (Hart 
Publishing 2014) 193, 196.
99 Art 5(a).
100 Art 27.
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the important role given to experts, which is central to the operation of the 
instrument. 101
While the WHC has over the years increasingly recognized the importance 
of involving local communities in the protection of World Heritage sites, and 
included several references to local communities (and more recently also to in-
digenous peoples) in the Operational Guidelines, their involvement continues 
to be largely seen as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. This is be-
cause ‘the communities at World Heritage sites and their destinies are not the 
Convention rationale’ as Christoph Brumann writes. ‘Instead, it is the physical 
conservation of the sites and the buildings, natural features, or wildlife found 
on them… [P]resent-day local populations often come in only as a disturbing 
factor… It is then protection “from,” rather than “for,” the communities that 
moves to the forefront’.102 Even in the case of cultural  landscapes, where the 
ongoing interaction of local communities with the  landscape is often the pri-
mary reason for World Heritage listing, ‘the manuals and programmatic texts 
prepared by the World Heritage Center and ICOMOS… focus on communities 
most of all as a tool. It is important to involve them, but they are construed 
neither as the supreme experts about the sites nor their rightful owners.’103 
The fĳirst time that references to local communities appeared in the Opera-
tional Guidelines was in 1994, when a new sentence was included in the sec-
tion on the nomination process stating that ‘Participation of local people in 
the nomination process is essential to make them feel a shared responsibility 
101 See Lixinski (n 98) 196-97. Besides the key role assigned to the expert advisory bodies 
IUCN, ICOMOS and ICCROM, several provisions in the Convention express an expecta-
tion that States discharge their duty of protecting World Heritage sites under their ju-
risdiction with the active assistance of scientifĳic and technical experts (preamble; arts 
4, 5, 22, 24). Indigenous peoples’ representatives have repeatedly criticized the expertise 
provided under the Convention as inadequate for the safeguarding of indigenous herit-
age, and called on the WHC to create an indigenous advisory mechanism to complement 
the other expert groups. See, e.g., the much-discussed, unsuccessful 2000 ‘WHIPCOE’ pro-
posal (n 20); and the more recent ‘Call to Action’ of the International Expert Workshop 
on the World Heritage Convention and Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen, 2012), para. 4, 
available at <http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_fĳiles_news_fĳiles/0678_Call_to_Action_plus_An-
nexes.pdf> accessed 21 October 2015.
102 C Brumann, ‘Community as Myth and Reality in the UNESCO World Heritage Conven-
tion’ in N Adell and others (eds), Between Imagined Communities and Communities of 




with the State Party in the maintenance of the site.’104 Additionally, the fol-
lowing sentence was added concerning the nomination of cultural landscapes: 
‘The nominations [of cultural landscapes] should be prepared in collaboration 
with and the full approval of local communities.’105 Both of these provisions 
can still be found in the current version of the Guidelines.106 Most other ref-
erences to local communities in the Guidelines were added during a major 
revision in 2005, including the following provision, which can be seen as the 
central provision on community participation:
States Parties to the Convention are encouraged to ensure the participa-
tion of a wide variety of stakeholders, including site managers, local and 
regional governments, local communities, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and other interested parties and partners in the identifĳica-
tion, nomination and protection of World Heritage properties.107 
Also since 2005, the Guidelines state that local communities and other stake-
holders can be ‘partners’ in the protection and conservation of World Herit-
age, and encourage a ‘partnership approach’ to nomination, management and 
monitoring as a signifĳicant contribution to the protection of World Heritage 
sites.108 Moreover, ‘increas[ing] the participation of local and national popu-
lations in the protection and presentation of heritage’ and ‘enhanc[ing] the 
function of World Heritage in the life of the community’ were included as of-
fĳicial objectives (in a new section on ‘Encouraging support for the World Herit-
age  Convention’).109 Since 2008, the Guidelines also contain the following Stra-
tegic Objective: ‘Enhance the role of Communities in the implementation of 
the World Heritage Convention’.110
The problem with these provisions is that they do not create procedural ob-
ligations for States. Apart from the nomination process for cultural  landscapes, 
no diffferentiation is made between the participation of local communities and 
the  participation of NGOs, private organizations and other interested parties. 
104 Operational Guidelines 1994, WHC/2/Revised, para. 14.
105 Ibid, para. 41.
106 Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 123 (with slight modifĳications); and annex 3, para. 12.
107 Operational Guidelines 2005, WHC. 05/2, para. 12. Similarly, para. 64 (in relation to the 
preparation of Tentative Lists) and para. 123 (preparation of nominations).
108 Operational Guidelines 2015, paras. 39, 40.
109 Ibid, para. 211.
110 Ibid, para. 26. This fĳifth Strategic Objective (‘fĳifth C’) was adopted in recognition of ‘the 
critical importance of involving indigenous, traditional and local communities in the im-
plementation of the Convention’. See WHC Decisions 31 COM 13A, 13B (2007).
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The fact that some stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples, have a right 
to be involved in the processes concerned, whereas others do not, is completely 
ignored. In the end it continues to be at the discretion of States to what extent 
they involve local communities and indigenous peoples in decisions regard-
ing the nomination and protection of World Heritage sites. The same can be 
said with regard to the Advisory Bodies, who are in no way obliged to involve 
or consult with local communities when evaluating nominations or monitor-
ing the state of conservation of listed sites. While IUCN’s own procedure for 
the evaluation of nominations entails on-site  consultations with stakeholders 
and the examination of written comments from NGOs, local communities and 
indigenous peoples, the procedure adopted by ICOMOS highlights consulta-
tions with the nominating State Party, site managers, specialist academics and 
research institutes, but makes no mention of consultations with local commu-
nities and indigenous peoples.111
Given these inadequacies and shortcomings, it is no surprise that indige-
nous peoples continue to voice concerns about violations of their  participa-
tory rights in the processes of the World Heritage  Convention. The recurrent 
violations have increasingly drawn the attention of international human rights 
bodies and mechanisms in recent years, most notably the  African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘ ACHPR’), the  UNPFII, the  EMRIP and the 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Since the adoption of 
the UNDRIP in 2007, all of these have repeatedly urged UNESCO and the WHC 
to take corrective action and align the  implementation of the Convention with 
the UNDRIP. 112 For instance,  EMRIP has issued the following advice to the 
Committee, drawing attention to the obligations of UN agencies, intergovern-
mental organizations and States under Articles 41 and 42 of the UNDRIP:113
robust procedures and mechanisms should be established to ensure that 
indigenous peoples are adequately consulted and involved in the man-
111 See Operational Guidelines 2015, annex 6 (Evaluation procedures of the Advisory Bodies 
for nominations). There are also signifĳicant concerns regarding the transparency of the 
Advisory Bodies’ evaluation processes. For instance, the ICOMOS procedure states that 
the dates and programs of on-site missions ‘are agreed in consultation with States Parties, 
who are requested to ensure that ICOMOS evaluation missions are given a low profĳile so 
far as the media are concerned’. Ibid.
112 For details, see S Disko, H Tugendhat and L García-Alix, ‘Introduction’ in Disko and Tu-
gendhat (n 10) 3; EMRIP, Study on cultural heritage (n 1) paras. 38-41.
113 Arts 41 and 42 of the UNDRIP establish a special obligation of UN agencies and intergov-
ernmental organizations to implement the provisions of the UNDRIP and establish ways 
and means of ensuring the participation of indigenous peoples on issues afffecting them.
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agement and protection of World Heritage sites, and that their  free, prior 
and informed consent is obtained when their territories are being nomi-
nated and inscribed as World Heritage sites...114 
 EMRIP therefore encouraged the Committee to establish a process to elabo-
rate, with the full and efffective  participation of indigenous peoples, changes 
to the Operational Guidelines and other appropriate measures to ensure that 
the implementation of the World Heritage  Convention is consistent with the 
UNDRIP and that indigenous peoples can efffectively participate in decision-
making processes afffecting them.115 Similar recommendations have been 
made by the other two UN mechanisms on indigenous issues,116 the  ACHPR, 117 
the 2012 IUCN World Conservation Congress 118 and the 2014 IUCN World Parks 
Congress. 119 The need for revising the Operational Guidelines to ensure respect 
for indigenous rights in World Heritage processes has also repeatedly been 
stressed by indigenous peoples themselves, for instance in the Alta Outcome 
Document120 and in a ‘Call to Action’ adopted by an international expert work-
shop on the World Heritage Convention and indigenous peoples held in Co-
penhagen in 2012 during the Convention’s 40th anniversary. 121
While the WHC has so far not established an adequate,  participatory pro-
cess for reviewing and revising the Guidelines in cooperation with indigenous 
peoples, UNESCO has become increasingly responsive to indigenous peoples’ 
concerns and there have been some effforts by the World Heritage Centre to-
wards aligning the implementation of the World Heritage Convention with the 
114 EMRIP, Report on its fĳifth session (n 4) 7. Similarly, Study on cultural heritage (n 1), paras. 
35, 45 and annex, para. 30.
115 Ibid.
116 See n 5.
117 Resolution 197, Protection of indigenous peoples’ rights in the context of the World Herit-
age Convention and the designation of Lake Bogoria as a World Heritage site (2011).
118 Resolution 5.047, Implementation of the UNDRIP in the context of the UNESCO World 
Heritage Convention.
119 The Promise of Sydney: Innovative Approaches for Change, <http://worldparkscongress.
org/about/promise_of_sydney_innovative_approaches.html> accessed 21 October 2015. 
See in particular Recommendation 5 under the World Heritage theme, and Recommen-
dation 8 under Stream 7: Respecting indigenous and traditional knowledge and culture.
120 Outcome Document of the Global Indigenous Preparatory Conference for the World Con-
ference on Indigenous Peoples, Alta, Norway, 10-12 June 2013, UN Doc A/67/994, Theme 2, 
para. 9. 
121 Copenhagen Call to Action (n 101), para. 1. For the report of the expert workshop, see 
<http://whc.unesco.org/document/122252> accessed 21 October 2015.
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UNDRIP.122 Due to these effforts, the WHC at its 39th session in July 2015 in 
Bonn for the fĳirst time included references to indigenous peoples in the Opera-
tional Guidelines. The Guidelines now mention indigenous peoples among the 
list of potential ‘partners’ in the protection of World Heritage, and encourage 
States to obtain their  free, prior and informed consent (‘ FPIC’) when nominat-
ing World Heritage sites:
Participation in the nomination process of local communities, indig-
enous peoples, governmental, non-governmental and private organiza-
tions and other stakeholders is essential to enable them to have a shared 
responsibility with the State Party in the maintenance of the property. 
States Parties are encouraged to prepare nominations with the widest 
possible  participation of stakeholders and to demonstrate, as appropri-
ate, that the  free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples has 
been obtained, through, inter alia making the nominations publically 
available in appropriate languages and public  consultations and hear-
ings.123 
The adoption of this provision is a positive step towards enhancing respect for 
the  participatory rights of indigenous peoples in the context of World Heritage 
nominations. However, involving afffected indigenous peoples in the prepara-
tion of nominations and obtaining their  FPIC is still not obligatory for States 
but merely recommended practice, and from the discussions at the WHC’s 
39th session it is clear that there are signifĳicant reservations within the Com-
mittee about making this a mandatory requirement. 124 The session also clearly 
demonstrated that the Committee will presently not insist on the consent of 
indigenous peoples: in the case of the nomination of the Kaeng Krachan Forest 
Complex (Thailand), it explicitly voted against requesting Thailand to obtain 
the  FPIC of the Karen communities living within the area, although the Offfĳice 
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and local NGOs had raised 
122 Disko, Tugendhat and García-Alix (n 112) 32-33.
123 Operational Guidelines 2015, para. 123.
124 Endorois Welfare Council, Saami Council and IWGIA, ‘Joint statement on indigenous 
rights and World Heritage’, EMRIP, 8th session, 22 July 2015, available at <http://www.iw-
gia.org/news/search-news?news_id=1234> accessed 23 October 2015. Several States even 
contested the very concept of ‘indigenous peoples’, including some States that have en-
dorsed the UNDRIP such as France, Mali or Senegal. For the French position, also see 
UNESCO, ‘States Parties’ comments to the Draft Policy for the integration of a Sustainable 
Development Perspective into the Processes of the World Heritage Convention’ (2015), 
WHC-15/20.GA/13, 8-9.
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concerns about serious conflicts between conservation authorities and the Ka-
ren.125 The Committee also decided against adopting a rule to make all nomi-
nations publically accessible once UNESCO receives them.126 Therefore, un-
less States Parties publish the nomination documents voluntarily, they are not 
accessible to afffected communities or the public at large before sites are listed. 
Indigenous peoples and human rights organizations have repeatedly criticized 
this remarkable lack of transparency as inconsistent with indigenous peoples’ 
right to  FPIC, as well as State obligations to ensure public participation in en-
vironmental decision-making. 127
Hope that the WHC will eventually adopt guidelines making  respect for 
indigenous peoples’  participatory rights mandatory in Convention processes 
derives from UNESCO’s awareness of its obligations to implement the UNDRIP 
and to establish ways and means of ensuring the participation of indigenous 
peoples on issues afffecting them. The organization is currently in the process 
of developing a house-wide policy on engaging with indigenous peoples,128 
and although this policy will not be directly binding on the WHC (as a largely 
autonomous intergovernmental treaty body), the WHC has decided to re-ex-
amine the role of indigenous peoples in Convention processes following the 
adoption of this policy.129 Moreover, the General Assembly of the States Par-
ties to the World Heritage Convention in November 2015 adopted a Policy for 
the integration of a sustainable development perspective into the processes 
of the World Heritage  Convention (prepared at the request of the WHC under 
the guidance of the World Heritage Centre), which underlines that recognizing 
indigenous rights is at the heart of sustainable development and calls on States 
Parties to ensure the efffective  participation and  FPIC of indigenous peoples 
125 The draft decision prepared by IUCN therefore requested Thailand to ‘achieve a consen-
sus of support for the nomination that is fully consistent with the principle of FPIC’. This 
sentence was deleted at the request of Viet Nam, whose delegate stated that ‘we are here 
at a prestigious Committee of culture and heritage, we are not in Geneva on the Human 
Rights Council’. Only one Member State (Portugal) spoke up against this notion. Ibid.
126 Endorois Welfare Council, Saami Council and IWGIA (n 124).
127 E.g. EMRIP, Study on cultural heritage (n 1) para. 51; IWGIA and others, ‘Joint Submission 
on the lack of implementation of the UNDRIP in the context of UNESCO’s World Heritage 
Convention’ (2012) <http://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/fĳiles/publication/2012/05/
joint-submission-unpfĳii.pdf> accessed 23 October 2015.
128 See UNESCO, ‘Report on the achievement of the goal and objectives of the Second In-
ternational Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples’ (2014) <http://www.un.org/esa/
socdev/unpfĳii/documents/2014/unesco.pdf> accessed 23 October 2015.
129 Decisions 39 COM 11 (2015) para. 10; 37 COM 12.II (2013) para. 7.
71ich and uNESCO’s  World Heritage Con vention
where World Heritage processes afffect them.130 Over the next few years, the 
Centre and the Advisory Bodies are supposed to develop proposals for specifĳic 
changes to the Operational Guidelines to translate the principles of the policy 
into specifĳic operational procedures.131
Conclusion
The adoption of the UNDRIP, which all UN agencies and intergovernmental 
organizations are required to promote and apply in their work, has resulted 
in greatly increased attention to the recurring violations of indigenous peo-
ples’ rights in the nomination, declaration and management of World Heritage 
sites. Cases such as the 2011 World Heritage listing of Lake Bogoria National Re-
serve without the  FPIC of the Endorois people, only two years after a landmark 
ruling of the  ACHPR afffĳirming the traditional  ownership rights of the Endorois 
over Lake Bogoria, have attracted the notice of human rights bodies and the 
international conservation community alike,132 and highlighted the urgent 
need for measures to ensure that the implementation of the World Heritage 
 Convention is consistent with the UNDRIP. Much of this discussion, including 
the advocacy of indigenous peoples themselves,133 has focused on the need for 
appropriate regulations and mechanisms to be put in place to ensure the efffec-
tive  participation of indigenous peoples in relevant decision-making processes 
under the Convention. As a result of this, the WHC in July 2015 inserted refer-
ences to indigenous peoples into two paragraphs of the Operational Guide-
lines dealing with stakeholder participation, including a reference to the  FPIC 
of indigenous peoples in the context of World Heritage nominations. While 
these provisions are couched in non-obligatory language and the involvement 
of indigenous peoples continues to be left at the discretion of States, it can be 
hoped that the forthcoming UNESCO policy on indigenous peoples and the 
Convention’s new sustainable development policy will eventually lead to the 
adoption of regulations making respect for indigenous peoples’  participatory 
rights, including their right to  FPIC, a mandatory requirement in World Herit-
age decision-making processes.
130 Doc WHC-15/20.GA/INF.13, paras. 21-22. The policy was adopted by Resolution 20 GA 13 of 
the twentieth General Assembly.
131 General Assembly Res 20 GA 13, para. 8; WHC Decision 39 COM 5D (2015), para. 10.
132 See e.g. ACHPR res 197 (n 117); World Conservation Congress res 5.047 (n 118).
133 E.g. IWGIA and others (n 127).
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The existence of such regulations would no doubt go a long way in making 
the World Heritage  Convention more meaningful for indigenous peoples and 
in preventing the most serious violations of their human rights, especially at 
the nomination stage when the influence and leverage of the WHC and its Ad-
visory Bodies are greatest. However, for the Convention to play a consistently 
positive role for indigenous peoples and the protection of their cultural herit-
age and rights, additional measures are needed. In particular, measures must 
be taken to ensure that indigenous peoples’ own views and interpretations 
of their cultural and natural heritage can be, and are, consistently respected, 
recognized and reflected when the OUV of  World Heritage sites in indigenous 
territories is defĳined.
Of fundamental importance in this regard is a reassessment by the WHC of 
the way the concept of ‘heritage’ is interpreted in the implementation of the 
Convention. As EMRIP has noted, the Convention’s categorization of heritage 
into ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ heritage is inappropriate in the case of indigenous 
peoples, for whom ‘cultural and natural values are inseparably interwoven 
and should be managed and protected in a holistic manner’.134 Considering 
that most World Heritage sites in indigenous peoples’ territories are classifĳied 
as purely ‘natural’ sites, in disregard of their cultural, spiritual and economic 
signifĳicance for the indigenous peoples concerned, it is clear that there is an 
urgent need for a renewed discussion – in which indigenous representatives 
should be centrally involved – on how the Convention’s separation between 
nature and culture can be overcome, so that interconnections are consistently 
recognized.135 The urgent necessity of action in this regard is also highlight-
ed in the ‘Promise of Sydney’ agreed at the 2014 IUCN World Parks Congress, 
which includes the following recommendation/target:
By 2020 the conceptual and management gap between natural and cul-
tural World Heritage Site designations is eliminated, and a comprehen-
sive approach taken towards the conservation of natural and biocultural 
heritage and knowledge systems in all designated sites.136 
134 Study on cultural heritage (n 1) para. 8 and annex, para. 7.
135 Representatives of UNESCO and the Advisory Bodies have repeatedly noted the need for 
a rethink in this area in recent years. See, e.g., K Rao, ‘Editorial’ (2015) 75 World Heritage 1; 
Leitão and Badman (n 23) 87-88; Larsen and Wijesuriya (n 24) 13; Buckley and Badman 
(n 74).
136 Promise of Sydney, Innovative Approaches for Change (n 119), Respecting indigenous and 
traditional knowledge and culture, Recommendation 7.
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This recommendation revives the suggestion of the 1996 and 1998 UNESCO 
expert meetings at la Vanoise and Amsterdam that the distinction between 
‘cultural’, ‘natural’ and ‘mixed’ sites be abandoned in favor of a unifĳied identity 
for all World Heritage sites, a suggestion that was at the time supported by all 
three Advisory Bodies and should now be revisited.137 The WHC should also 
reconsider the recommendation made at the Amsterdam meeting that refer-
ences to links between people and nature be reinserted into the text of the 
natural criteria (now criteria vii-x).138 As the Director of IUCN’s World Herit-
age Programme, Tim Badman has recently remarked, with the deletion of the 
references to human interaction with the  environment and combinations of 
cultural and natural elements from the natural criteria in 1992, ‘something was 
lost in terms of potential for the World Heritage  Convention to bring together 
integrated practice from both “nature” and “culture” and has not yet been fully 
regained. It is now time to resume this discussion...’.139 
Perhaps most important for ensuring that OUV  adequately and consistently 
reflects indigenous peoples’ own values and interpretations of World Heritage 
sites in their territories, however, is a reassessment by the WHC of the way 
the concept of OUV is  interpreted and applied. Under the existing regulations, 
indigenous cultural values are routinely brushed aside and disregarded when 
they are deemed as not ‘exceptional’, ‘unique’, ‘intact’ or ‘authentic’ enough by 
government agencies, ICOMOS and/or the WHC. Consequentially, the values 
and priorities of heritage experts, bureaucrats and academic specialists as-
sume greater importance than – and in many ways replace and undermine – 
the values attached to the sites by the traditional owners and custodians, who 
have inhabited, shaped and protected the respective areas for generations and 
whose lives and cultures are inextricably connected to them. To remedy this 
situation, EMRIP has offfered the following advice to the WHC:
The  World Heritage Committee should adopt  changes to the criteria and 
regulations for the assessment of ‘ outstanding universal value’ so as to 
ensure that the values assigned to World Heritage sites by indigenous 
137 See n 41. Leitão and Badman also note that this suggestion remains valid. Leitão and Bad-
man (n 23) 87.
138 See n 36.
139 Leitão and Badman (n 23) 88. Elsewhere Badman has noted: ‘If such a proposal was made 
today – to eliminate people from nature in the World Heritage criteria – it would be out of 
tune with nature conservation practice, and there would not be support for such a move 
within IUCN.’ Buckley and Badman (n 74) 114.
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peoples are fully and consistently recognized as part of their  outstanding 
universal value.140 
Similarly, the Promise of Sydney recommends:
The World Heritage  Convention should fully and consistently recognize 
Indigenous Peoples’ cultural values as universal, and develop methods 
for recognition and support for the interconnectedness of natural, cul-
tural, social, and spiritual signifĳicance of World Heritage sites, including 
natural and cultural sites and cultural  landscapes.141 
These recommendations are not meant to suggest that all heritage sites in in-
digenous peoples’ territories should be considered as having OUV and do not 
challenge the idea of the  World Heritage List as a select list and the preroga-
tive of the WHC to make the fĳinal judgment on whether a given  site merits 
inscription or not. What they do challenge, however, is the authority of the 
WHC, States and the Advisory Bodies to redefĳine, reinterpret and reinvent the 
signifĳicance of the indigenous heritage sites that are inscribed on the List with-
out respecting the views of the indigenous peoples, and at the expense of their 
livelihoods and rights to protect, exercise and develop their cultural heritage 
and expressions. The existing requirement by which indigenous peoples’ cul-
tural and spiritual relationship with their lands and  natural resources must be 
shown to be ‘exceptional’ or ‘unique’ in order to be recognized as an integral 
part of a World Heritage site’s OUV is  inappropriate and not compatible with 
the WHC’s stated desire to ‘accord full respect to the social and cultural values 
of all societies’ and respect the ‘cultural contexts to which [heritage proper-
ties] belong’.142 To be consistent with these principles, the focus should be 
on fĳinding ways to recognize and reflect indigenous peoples’ own values and 
interpretations of their heritage sites, not on comparative analyses regarding 
their signifĳicance in a global context. Nor should the conditions of ‘integrity’ 
and ‘ authenticity’ provide a justifĳication for not respecting indigenous peoples’ 
perspectives when the OUV of  World Heritage sites in their territories is de-
fĳined – all the more so as the interpretation of these concepts by the WHC, 
140 Study on cultural heritage (n 1) annex, para. 29.
141 Promise of Sydney, Innovative Approaches for Change (n 119), World Heritage theme, Rec-
ommendation 6.
142 Operational Guidelines 2015, annex 4 (Nara Document on Authenticity) paras. 2, 11.
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the Advisory Bodies and States Parties is  often incompatible with indigenous 
understandings.143
An in-depth discussion of the interpretation and application of the con-
cepts of integrity and  authenticity in the implementation of the World Her-
itage  Convention is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is evident, however, 
that the practice of assessing the integrity of a  landscape’s natural values in 
isolation from the integrity and  authenticity of associated indigenous cultural 
values is highly inadequate considering that for indigenous peoples these val-
ues are inseparably interwoven. 144 To be meaningful for indigenous peoples 
and compatible with their perspectives, the notion of integrity would need to 
reinforce and protect indigenous peoples’ relationship with their territories, 
their rights to their land and resources and the roles and responsibilities of 
traditional owners and custodians, no matter whether a site is classifĳied as a 
cultural, natural or mixed site. In other words, it would need to be consistent 
with and reinforce indigenous peoples’ right to cultural integrity.145 However, 
the reality is that the notion of integrity is frequently used to justify the im-
position of restrictions on indigenous peoples’ traditional land use activities 
and then serves to undermine their rights in World Heritage sites, in particular 
those listed as natural sites.
The application of the concept of  authenticity to indigenous heritage is 
also often not consistent with indigenous peoples’ own perspectives. Despite 
the WHC’s endorsement of the Nara Document on Authenticity, it continues 
to be heavily influenced by Western notions, which ‘require that indigenous 
people must match a perceived ideal of indigenousness that is ahistorical, un-
143 The Native Hawaiian lawyer Mililani Trask has remarked that ‘UNESCO and its afffĳiliates 
IUCN, ICOMOS and ICCROM, impose their own interpretations of “outstanding univer-
sal value”, “integrity” and “authenticity” rather than ensuring that the cultural values of 
Indigenous people are included and addressed.’ Quoted in the report of the Copenhagen 
expert workshop (n 121) 12.
144 As Andrews and Buggey note in relation to Aboriginal cultural landscapes in Canada: 
‘Aboriginal cultural landscapes are expressions of a worldview that… regards humans as 
an integral part of the land, inseparable from its animals, plants and spirits… Consid-
erations of wholeness or intactness, the defĳining conditions of integrity…, must situate 
within this cultural context.’ T Andrews and S Buggey, ‘Authenticity in Aboriginal Cultural 
Landscapes’ (2008) 39(2-3) APT Bulletin 63, 68. 
145 The right of indigenous peoples to cultural integrity ‘refers to a bundle of inter-related 
human rights such as rights to culture, subsistence, livelihood, and religion, which all 
support the protection of land rights as an important aspect of the cultural survival of 
indigenous peoples’. See Gilbert (n 10) 59.
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changing, and pure from foreign influences’.146 For indigenous peoples their 
lands and territories are not relics but living cultural  landscapes (as well as 
economic, spiritual and social landscapes) in which dynamic change is inher-
ent and integral to the cultural value. ‘Any test of  authenticity, therefore, must 
recognize, expect and endorse change’, as Thomas Andrews and Susan Buggey 
emphasize.147 This corresponds with the interpretation of indigenous peoples’ 
right to the enjoyment of their own culture in international human rights law, 
which is based on a recognition that:
The right to enjoy a culture is not ‘frozen’ at some point in time when the 
culture was supposedly ‘pure’ or ‘traditional’. The enjoyment of culture 
should not be falsely restricted as a result of anachronistic notions of the 
‘ authenticity’ of the culture.148 
In 2011, a broad coalition of indigenous and human rights organizations sub-
mitted a joint statement to both the WHC and the  UNPFII in which they ex-
pressed concern that the concepts of OUV,  integrity and  authenticity are ‘in-
terpreted and applied in ways that are disrespectful of Indigenous peoples and 
their cultures, inconsiderate of their circumstances and needs, preclude cul-
tural adaptations and changes, and serve to undermine their human rights’.149 
Indigenous representatives have repeatedly called on the WHC to proactively 
engage with indigenous peoples in order to fĳind a solution to these issues. For 
146 Andrews and Buggey (n 144), 69. See for example the case of the Ngorongoro Conserva-
tion Area (text to n 79).
147 Ibid, 70. Also see Australia ICOMOS, ‘The Asia-Pacifĳic Regional Workshop on Associative 
Cultural Landscapes: Report’ (1995) Doc WHC-95/CONF.203/INF.9, 12, where it is under-
lined that authenticity ‘must not exclude cultural continuity through change, which may 
introduce new ways of relating to and caring for the place’ and ‘may mean the mainte-
nance of a continuing association between the people and the place, however it may be 
expressed through time’.
148 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report 2000 
(Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 2001) 58. For details see J Gilbert, 
‘Custodians of the land: Indigenous peoples, human rights and cultural integrity’ in M 
Langfĳield, W Logan and MN Craig (eds), Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights 
(Routledge 2010) 31, 37-38.
149 Endorois Welfare Council and others, ‘Joint Statement on continuous violations of the 
principle of free, prior and informed consent in the context of UNESCO’s World Herit-
age Convention’ (2011) <http://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/fĳiles/publication/2012/04/
joint-statement-indigenous-organizations-unesco-2.pdf> accessed 23 November 2015, fn 13.
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instance, the indigenous participants at the 2012 expert workshop on the World 
Heritage  Convention and indigenous peoples in Copenhagen recommended:
[C]omprehensive amendments to the Operational Guidelines are… nec-
essary for enabling the World Heritage Convention to become an instru-
ment that appropriately reflects and embraces the worldviews, values 
and heritage of Indigenous peoples, on an equal footing and with the 
same emphasis as it reflects and embraces the worldviews, values and 
heritage of the other peoples of the world. To achieve these ends, the 
Guidelines must be carefully reviewed, through an open and transparent 
process with the full and efffective  participation of Indigenous peoples.150
Additionally, the WHC should undertake a comprehensive review of the  World 
Heritage List to identify the sites incorporating indigenous peoples’ tradition-
al territories and reassess, together with the indigenous peoples concerned, 
whether their OUV  adequately reflects indigenous perspectives and whether 
their management frameworks are adequate for the safeguarding of indige-
nous heritage and in line with international standards regarding indigenous 
rights. Considering UNESCO’s mission and its commitments to human rights, 
cultural diversity and cultural pluralism, it is obvious that addressing these 
questions is important not only for the credibility of the World Heritage Con-
vention, but also for the credibility of UNESCO as a whole.
150 Copenhagen Call to Action (n 101), annex 3, p. 1.
Towards Sámi Self-determination over Their 
Cultural Heritage: The UNESCO World Heritage 
Site of  Laponia in Northern Sweden
Leena Heinämäki, Thora Herrmann and Carina Green
1 Introduction
The World Heritage Site of  Laponia is a 9,400 square kilometer area, situated just 
above the Arctic Circle in the north of Sweden (Fig 1). The area obtained its World 
Heritage status in 1996. Stretching to the Norwegian border, the area consists of 
the national parks Stora Sjö fallet/Stuor Muorkke, Sarek, Padjelanta/Badjelánnda, 
and Muttos/Muddus and the nature reserves Sjaunja/Sjávnja and Stubba (Fig. 1). 
Figure 1 Location of  Laponia UNESCO World Heritage Site.
Cartography: Marc Girard, Université de Montréal, 2015
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Both the natural qualities of the area and the local Sámi  reindeer herding cul-
ture are included in the justifĳication for the status of this site as a World Herit-
age area. Seven  samebys1 have parts of their lands inside the World Heritage 
area: Bá ste, Unna tjerusj, Sirges, Jå kkå kaska tjiellde, Tuorpon, Luokta-Mavas, and 
Gä llivare skogssameby. Two others, Slakka and Udtja, only use small segments 
of land within the borders of  Laponia for grazing their reindeer at certain peri-
ods of the year. No-one lives within the World Heritage area permanently, but 
each summer many reindeer herding families move up to the mountains to be 
close to the reindeer grazing on the summer pastures.
In 1972,  UNESCO adopted the Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage,2 or The  World Heritage Convention,3 as it 
is commonly called, in order to identify, safeguard, protect, and preserve natu-
ral areas and cultural sites that are unique from a global perspective.4 Accord-
ing to UNESCO, World Heritage sites “belong to all the peoples of the world, 
irrespective of the territory on which they are located” (UNESCO, World Herit-
age Centre).5 Sites may be nominated on the basis of natural, cultural or mixed 
criteria.  Laponia was nominated in both categories, and was offfĳicially selected 
as a mixed World Heritage site under the natural criteria (i), (ii) and (iii) and 
under the cultural criteria (iii) and (v).  Laponia has a unique management or-
ganisation called Laponiatjuottjudus. The organisation has a strong Sámi influ-
ence and consists of representatives from the local Sámi  samebys, the regional 
and local authorities and the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. 
During the past twenty years, international law relating to Indigenous Peo-
ples’ human rights has gone through a profound transformation. Not only new 
instruments, such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples6 (UNDRIP) and the  Convention on Biological Diversity7 (CBD) 
1 The sameby (the literate translation being Sámi Village) is an economic association for 
a group of reindeer herders that jointly use a certain geographical area. For the histori-
cal background and juridical and structural organization of the samebys, see also Beach 
1981:360-393.
2 http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/ (accessed on 12 November 2015).
3 UNESCO World Heritage List : http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ (accessed on 12 November 
2015).
4 UNESCO, World Heritage Information Kit, UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2008, Paris.
5 UNESCO, World Heritage Centre : http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/ (accessed on 12 No-
vember 2015).
6 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 7 September 2007, 
Sixty-fĳirst Session, A/61/L.67. 
7 The Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 De-
cember 1993, 1760 UNTS 79. 
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expand the recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ rights; national constitutions 
and legislation have also widened the enforceability of Indigenous Peoples’ 
rights to an unparallelled degree. Meanwhile, far-reaching decisions of treaty 
bodies, national courts and regional human rights bodies have demonstrated 
judicial willingness to interpret and apply Indigenous Peoples’ human rights 
in an expansive fashion. This includes recognition of rights to their lands, tra-
ditional territories,  natural resources, cultural heritage and, most importantly, 
self-determination.8
This chapter, fĳirst, looks at the recent developments of the Indigenous Peo-
ples’ right to self-determination as it relates to their cultural and natural her-
itage. Indigenous Peoples’ self-determination is inherently connected to the 
rights of Indigenous Peoples to their lands and traditional territories, natural 
resources, culture, cultural heritage and “way of life”, as well as to  self-identi-
fĳication and to  participation in decision-making processes afffecting them.9 In 
the context of world heritage, an important element of the right to self-deter-
mination is the right of Indigenous Peoples to manage, for their own benefĳit, 
their own cultural and natural resources.10
After discussing international legal developments towards the recognition 
of the right of Indigenous Peoples to  self-determination, we will take a clos-
er look at the extent to which the structures of  co-management of  Laponia’s 
World Heritage translate to Sámi control over their tradional lands. On what 
grounds is  Laponia to be preserved, and what were the elements in need of 
“preservation” and “conservation” in  Laponia? We will examine how one could 
possibly preserve a “living culture” such as the local Sámi  reindeer herding 
culture, and conserve a “living  landscape” such as reindeer pastures that were 
part of the justifĳication for the designation of  Laponia. We will analyse what 
place is given to the Indigenous Peoples who have rights of  ownership,  access 
or use to these sites in the diffferent strands of activities related to heritage 
management. More specifĳically, the crucial question addressed in this chapter 
is: Are the local Sámi involved in the designation process and management/
protection of their heritage site and if so, at what level? Since it was situated 
on their traditional territory and the actual justifĳication was based on both the 
nature and the local Sámi reindeer herding culture, one would assume that 
they would play a vital role in the local discussions on how best to manage this 
8 See, Tobin, B, Indigenous peoples, Customary Laws and Human Rights – Why Living Law 
Matters, (Routledge, New York 2014), 1.
9 Tobin, at 33.
10 EMRIP 2011, Final Report of the study on Indigenous Peoples and the right to participate 
in decision-making. UN Doc.A/HRC/18/42, Annex, para. 18.
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newly achieved status of the area. The chapter aims to view how influential 
the local Sámi have been in the appointment work, and whether governance, 
policy and management practices draw upon and integrate indigenous con-
servation practices and State conservation practice in safeguarding this area. 
The  participation of Indigenous Peoples in environmental management is 
inherently linked to their right to self-determination.11 We will explore whether 
and to what extent the engagement of Indigenous communities in managing 
World Heritage sites is in line with their right of self-determination. More spe-
cifĳically, we will analyse to what extent  Laponia’s  co-management reflects the 
Sámi people’s right to self-determination, especially concerning their  tangible 
and  intangible cultural heritage and natural ressources, which are inseparable 
since culture and lands and its resources cannot be viewed as two separate 
entities in the case of Indigenous Peoples. 
Through the analysis of the  Laponia World Heritage area in Norrbotten, 
Sweden, this chapter argues that the nomination of  Laponia as a UNESCO 
World Heritage site and the establishment of the  co-management of the site 
have been active processes for the Sámi community aimed at (re)gaining con-
trol over their cultural and natural heritage and the associated cultural  land-
scape they have been using for generations. Control over their cultural heritage 
and traditional territories is a crucial component of Indigenous Peoples’ right 
to  self-determination. 
2 Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Cultural Heritage
Although framing their claims within the language of human rights, Indige-
nous Peoples’ effforts to protect their cultural heritage have been drawn into 
the realm of cultural and  intellectual property rights. Tobin notes that apply-
ing the concept of “ cultural property” to aspects of Indigenous Peoples’ tan-
gible and intangible culture is highly controversial for a number of reasons, 
including the inherent diffference of legal approach between  customary law 
and positive legal regimes.12 These include conflicts related to perceptions on 
11 Li, TM, ‘Locating Indigenous Environmental Knowledge in Indonesia’, in R Ellen, P Parkes 
and A Bicker (eds.), Indigenous Environmental Knowledge and its Transformations. Critical 
Anthropological Perspectives. (Routledge, New York 2000) 144.
12 Tobin, B, ’Redefĳining Perspectives in the Search for Protection of Traditional Knowledge: 
A Case Study from Peru’, Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law, (2001), 10(1): 47-64.
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individual versus collective rights,13 as well as gaps between property  owner-
ship versus stewardship responsibilities.14 
Barsh, opposing the property rights approach, argues that it leads to a dis-
tortion of the very nature of indigenous cultures, and of the relationship be-
tween Indigenous Peoples and their lands.15 According to Barsh, this is due to 
an artifĳicial distinction in Western thought between nature and culture reflect-
ed in the assumption that cultural and  intellectual property can be completely 
detached from the  landscapes in which they arose.16 This fails to recognize that 
land and knowledge are so closely interlinked that the use of property-based 
terms such as “land tenure” completely distort indigenous conceptions of law.17 
This conflict has led many authors to prefer the concept of cultural heritage.18
Daes, using the term “collective heritage” of Indigenous Peoples,19 covering 
both their cultural and  intellectual property, defĳines “heritage” as: “everything 
that belongs to the distinct identity of a people and which is theirs to share, if 
they wish, with other peoples. It includes all those things, which international 
law regards as the creative production of human thought and craftsmanship, 
such as songs, stories, scientifĳic knowledge and artworks. It also includes in-
heritances from the past and from nature, such as  human remains, the natural 
features of the  landscape, and naturally occurring species of plants and ani-
mals with which a people has long been connected.”20 Janke, in her research 
on Indigenous Peoples’ cultural and  intellectual property in Australia, sets a 
more comprehensive list of heritage rights, which includes rights to: “own, 
control and defĳine what constitutes Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Prop-
erty and/or Indigenous heritage; have protection based on  self-determination; 
13 Tsosie, R, ‘Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American Genetic Resources and 
the Concept of Harm’, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, (Fall 2007): 396-411, 397-398.
14 Coombie, RJ (2009), ‘The Expanding Purview of Cultural Properties and their Politics’, 
Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences (2009) 2: 293-412.
15 Barsh, RL, ‘How Do You Patent A Landscape? The Perils of Dichotomizing Cultural and 
Intellectual Property’, International Journal of Cultural Property (1999) 8(1):14-47, 15.
16 Ibid., 16.
17 Ibid., 20.
18 Coombie (2009), supra note 14; Janke, T (1999); Our Culture: Our Future – Report on Aus-
tralian Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights (Michael Frankel & Co, Sydney 
1999); Prott, L and O´Keefe, P (1992), ‘“Cultural Heritage” or “Cultural Property”’, Interna-
tional Journal of Cultural Property, 1(2): 307-320.
19 Daes, EI (1993), Discrimination Againsta Indigenous Peoples: Study on the Protection of the 
cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28, UNCHR, 
Geneva, para. 23.
20 Ibid., para. 24.
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be recognized as guardians and interpreters of their culture; collective  own-
ership of cultural and  intellectual property rights; authorize or refuse rights 
for commercial use in accordance with their own  customary law; require prior 
informed consent for  access and use; and maintain secrecy over Indigenous 
knowledge and other cultural resources.”21
As rightly pointed out by Tobin, it is nowadays a commonplace to see the 
term cultural heritage utilized as an umbrella term to cover all aspects of in-
digenous culture, including  traditional knowledge,  traditional cultural ex-
pressions as well as their intellectual and  cultural property.22 Tsosie, however, 
distinguishes  cultural property, which she defĳines as: “items that are part of 
the cultural heritage of a tribal government or native people and which are 
signifĳicant to the native nation’s survival as a distinctive people and culture 
from commercial products, which are items intentionally manufactured and 
created by native artists for the purpose of economic development.”23 
Tsosie’s distinction may be relevant in terms of emphasizing the economic 
development aspect. If we acknowledge, however, Indigenous Peoples’ right 
to self-determination regarding their cultural heritage, the economic develop-
ment naturally also falls into this framework. In this respect, the recent study 
of the United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
( EMRIP) related to the promotion and protection of their cultural heritage24 
rightly emphasizes the principle of self-determination in defĳining the cultural 
heritage. It states that “Indigenous Peoples’ cultural heritage includes  tangible 
and  intangible manifestations of their ways of life,  world views, achievements 
and creativity, and should be considered an expression of their  self-determina-
tion and their spiritual and physical relationships with their lands, territories 
and resources.”25 
Legal and administrative measures adopted to secure Indigenous cultural 
heritage include full property rights,  sui generis regimes,  co-management 
systems and the establishment of obligations to consult and/or seek prior in-
formed consent from Indigenous Peoples for access to, holding of or use of 
21 Janke (1999), supra note 18, 47-48.
22 Tobin, supra note 8, 147.
23 Tsosie, R, ‘An Argument for Indigenous Governance of Cultural Property’, in CB Graber, K 
Kuprecht and JC Lai, International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage: Legal and Policy 
Issues (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2012), 237.
24 UN Human Rights Council, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Study 
and advice on the promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples with respect 
to their cultural heritage, A/HRC/EMPRIP/2015/2. 
25 Ibid., para. 7.
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elements of aspects of their cultural heritage.26 Both  co-management and  con-
sultation including  free, prior and informed consent, can be seen as important 
steps towards the actualization of Indigenous Peoples’ self-determination, as 
will be discussed below. This is not to say that many indigenous peoples might 
want to go beyond  co-management, aiming rather for full  autonomy or  self-
government over their lands and internal matters. Free, prior and informed 
consent is currently an evolving principle in international law that is still all 
too often interpreted as “a genuine attempt to reach an agreement” rather than 
a right to say no to developments that are against the wishes of Indigenous 
Peoples.27 
2.1 Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Self-determination over Their 
Cultural Heritage
It has become a common point that the right of Indigenous Peoples to self-de-
termination is a fundamental human right, upon which the subsequent rights 
of Indigenous Peoples depend. For centuries, Indigenous Peoples have been 
resisting the colonial powers and national authorities and have repeatedly 
framed this resistance in the form of a demand for self-determination. It has 
been said that for Indigenous Peoples, recognition of their right to self-deter-
mination does not amount to the grant of new rights; rather, it is the recovery 
of rights denied by states that have assumed power over their afffairs; whether 
states acting as colonial powers, settlers and other post-colonial state authori-
ties or states that deny the existence of Indigenous Peoples in their territories. 
Indigenous Peoples view the struggle for self-determination as fĳirst and fore-
most a struggle for recovery of their ancestral sovereign rights.28
The realization of the right of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination can 
take a variety of forms. Shin Imai has suggested four categories of  self-deter-
mination: sovereignty and self-government, self-management and self-admin-
26 Tobin, supra note 8, 146; See also, Carpenter, K A, Katyal, S and Riley, A, ‘In Defense of 
Property’. Yale Law Journal 118 (2009), 1022-125.
27 See, an analysis of the indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior and informed consent in L 
Heinämäki ‘Global Context – Arctic Importance: Free, Prior and Informed Consent – An 
Emerging Paradigm in International Law Related to Indigenous Peoples’ in TM Herrmann 
and T Martin (eds.) Indigenous Peoples’ Governance of Land and Protected Territories in the 
Arctic (Springer 2016) 209-240; L Heinämäki ‘The Rapidly evolving International Status 
of Indigenous Peoples: The Example of the Sami People in Finland’ in C Allard and S 
Funderug Skogvang (eds.), Indigenous Rights in Scandinavia (Ashgate 2015) 189-204.
28 Tobin, supra note 8, 33.
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istration,  co-management and joint management, and  participation in public 
government.29 He explains:
[t]he ‘sovereigty and  self-government’ option leads to more  autonomy for 
the Indigenous community to control its own social, economic and polit-
ical development. The ‘self-management and self-administration’ option 
leads to greater control of local afffairs and the delivery of services within 
a larger settler government legislative framework. The ‘ co-management 
and joint management’ model institutionalizes  indigenous participation 
in the management of lands and resources. The ‘participation in public 
government’ option provides a means to influence the policies of the set-
tler government through Indigenous-specifĳic institutions.30
In this chapter, we aim to have a particular look at the  co-management as-
pect of self-determination. We do not necessarily hold the view that  co-man-
agement exhausts the applications of self-determination, but rather see it as 
an important fĳirst step towards it. The fundamental question of the general 
right of Indigenous Peoples to  self-determination in international law falls be-
yond the scope of this chapter, but has been discussed extensively in the legal 
literature.31 Rather, this chapter aims to look at particular aspects related to 
29 Imai, S, ’Indigenous Self-Determination and the State’, in BJ Richardson, S Imai and K 
McNeil (eds.), Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2009) 292-306.
30 Ibid., 292.
31 See generally, J Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2004); E-IA Daes, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to “Self-Determina-
tion” in the Contemporary World Order’ in D Clark and R Williamson (eds.), Self-Deter-
mination: International Perspectives (Houndmills, MacMillan Press, 1996) 47; A Xanthaki, 
Indigenous Rights and UN Standards: Self-determination, Culture, Land (CUP, 2010); P 
Thornberry, Indigenous rights in international law (Machester University Press, 2002); M 
Davis, ‘Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1; T Koi-
vurova, ‘From high hopes to disillusionment: Indigenous Peoples’ struggle to (re)gain their 
right to self-determination’ (2008) 15 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
1; T Koivurova, ‘Alkuperäiskansojen itsemääräämisoikeus kansainvälisessä oikeudessa’ 
[‘The right of selfdetermination of Indigenous Peoples in international law’] in M Aarto 
and M Vartiainen (eds.), Oikeus kansainvälisessä maailmassa [Law in a changing world] 
(Edita Publishing Oy, Lapin yliopiston oikeustieteiden tiedekunta (Faculty of Law at the 
University of Lapland), 2008) 249; LS Vars, The Sámi People’s Right to Self-determination 
(University of Tromsö, 2009); GS Alfredsson, ‘The Greenlanders and their human rights 
choices’ in M Bergsmo (ed.), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden (Lei-
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self-determination such as control of Indigenous Peoples over their lands, and, 
related to this, the evolving right to  free, prior and informed consent as articu-
lated in international instruments, and as actualized in cultural heritage mat-
ters, including our case study of the  Laponia World Heritage area. 
3 UNDRIP and the Draft Nordic Sámi Convention
As pointed out by Tobin, Indigenous Peoples’ rights to  self-determination and 
cultural survival are both dependent upon and threatened by natural resource 
use. On the one hand, Indigenous Peoples’ daily subsistence, development, 
spiritual and cultural well-being is interwined with the natural  environment 
and biodiversity. On the other hand, natural resource exploitation is the single 
biggest threat to their territorial and cultural integrity and in some cases to 
their very existence. Efffective and sensitive control of resource use is, there-
fore, crucial for the realization of their human rights and the protection of 
their territorial, environmental and cultural integrity and enjoyment of their 
cultural heritage and way of life.32
Regarding the  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN-
DRIP), it has become a commonplace to state that the instrument did not es-
tablish any new rights for Indigenous Peoples but rather codifĳied the existing 
rights.33 However, according to the present authors, this does not do justice to 
the ambitious Declaration which celebrates a paradigm shift: not only does 
it explicitly recognise, for the fĳirst time, the right to self-determination of In-
digenous Peoples, but it also guarantees stronger  participatory rights than any 
earlier instrument, including the  free, prior and informed consent ( FPIC) in re-
lation to decision-making concerning  natural resources and other crucial mat-
den, Martinus Nijhofff Publishers, 2003) 453; GS Alfredsson, ‘Minorities, Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples, and Peoples: Defĳinitions of Terms as a Matter of International Law’ in N 
Ghanea and A Xanthaki (eds.), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination (Leiden, Marti-
nus Nijhofff Publishers, 2005) 163; M Åhren, The Saami traditional dress and beauty pag-
eants: Indigenous Peoples’ rights of ownership and self-determination over their cultures, 
Avhandling leverert for graden Philosophiae Doctor I rettsvitenskap (Thesis supplied for 
the degree of Philosophiae Doctor of Law) (2010) (unpublished).
32 Tobin, supra note 8, 120.
33 The Ministry of Justice of Finland has also noted that the UN Declaration does not estab-
lish new rights. See, Government Bill: Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle itsenäisten maiden 
alkuperäis- ja heimokansoja koskevan yleissopimuksen hyväksymisestä sekä laiksi yleis-
sopimuksen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta (20 May 
2014).
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ters.34 Although the UNDRIP is not strictly a legally binding instrument,35 hu-
man rights monitoring bodies have already started to apply it as a legal source 
and as a basis for the rights of Indigenous Peoples.36 However, the national 
implementation of UNDRIP will be a challenging process, especially in rela-
tion to issues where states should give up their interests in indigenous peoples’ 
traditional lands and related  natural resources. 
The right to  self-determination, as understood in the UNDRIP, does not af-
ford Indigenous Peoples total freedom to determine their political status, since 
it is also concerned with protection of the territorial integrity of sovereign 
states.37 Fitzmaurice states that: “the defĳinition of self-determination in the 
Declaration is considered a compromise between the aspirations of Indige-
nous Peoples and the reluctance of States to grant a broadly understood right 
to self-determination.”38 Thus, according to the UNDRIP, self-determination 
does not entail the right to secession. However, the UNDRIP does recognize 
full self-determination in terms of the economic, social and cultural devel-
opment of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration guarantees the right to self-
determination in internal and local matters, including the protection of In-
digenous Peoples’ cultural heritage.39 Article 31 of UNDRIP recognises, in very 
clear terms, the Indigenous Peoples’ right to  tangible and  intangible heritage, 
34 See Articles 3, 19 and 32 of the UNDRIP. 
35 The binding or semi-binding nature of the Declaration is widely discussed amongst in-
ternational lawyers. It has been argued, at least partly, to already express customary inter-
national law or at least generally accepted principles related to Indigenous Peoples. See, 
Anaya, J, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/68/317 
(14 August 2013) 16-18 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/427/10/PDF/
N1342710.pdf?OpenElement. (accessed 20 August 2015). See also, International Law Asso-
ciation (ILA), 75th conference, resolution No 5/2102, para. 2 (5 August 2012); International 
Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Final Report (2012).
36 See, Saramaka People v Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 28 
November 2007, Series C, No 172. The Supreme Court of Belize made a decision relating to 
the rights of the Maya community to their lands and resources, applying the Declaration. 
Aurelio Cal v Attorney-General of Belize Claim 121/2007 (18 October 2007) Supreme Court 
of Belize http://www.elaw.org/node/1620 (accessed 19 January 2014). 
37 See UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub2AC.4/1992/3 Add 1 (1992) 5. See Article 46 of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which explicitly protects the territorial integrity of 
states.
38 See Fitzmaurice, M, ‘The New Developments Regarding the Saami Peoples of the North’ 
(2009) 16 Journal on Minority and Group Rights 67-156, 151. See generally, Allen, S and Xan-
thaki, A (eds.), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart 
Publishing 2011).
39 Article 4.
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and obliges states to take efffective measures to recognize and protect the exer-
cise of this right.40 
In addition, efffective and meaningful  participation – the  right to consulta-
tion or even  FPIC with respect to land and resource use and other important 
matters, such as participation in international decision-making – plays a key 
role in the determination of economic, social and cultural development, in-
cluding the maintenance and protection of cultural heritage. 
The right to  FPIC has been seen as a part of the “new” understanding of  self-
determination of Indigenous Peoples. However, to what degree the  FPIC works 
as intended and how it works in practice, and how it afffects local communities 
are issues that are not yet well documented. 
Efffective realization of Indigenous Peoples’ rights to self-determination is 
closely linked to their right of  self-identifĳication, as well as to their involve-
ment in decision-making processes and implementation of requirements for 
their  free, prior and informed consent under international human rights law.41 
Self-determination also entails recognition of the inextricable link between 
Indigenous Peoples’ human rights and the protection of their natural  environ-
ment and their cultural and economic way of life. 
It is important to note that the UN  Human Rights Committee has applied 
Article 1 of ICCPR (the right of peoples to self-determination) on Indigenous 
Peoples in several concluding observations to States’ reports.42 On the 2009 re-
40 Article 31 of UNDRIP.
41 Doyle, C and Carino, J, ‘Making Free, Prior and Informed Consent a Reality: Indigenous 
Peoples and the Extractive Sector’, PIPLinks and Middlesex University School of Law 
2013, available at www.piplinks.org/system/fĳiles/Consortium+FPIC+report+-+May+2013+-
+web+version.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014), at 7.
42 Article 40 of the CCPR requires States Parties to submit reports on measures taken to 
give efffect to the rights defĳined therein. An initial report is to be submitted one year af-
ter the state ratifĳies the CCPR, and further reports are required periodically (normally 
every fĳive years). State reports and the Concluding Observations of the UN Human 
Rights Committee, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/hrc/hrcs.htm (accessed 5 
March 2007). See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Canada 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (1999). Explicit references to either Article 1 or to the no-
tion of self-determination have also been made in the Committee’s Concluding Obser-
vations on Mexico, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.109 (1999); Norway, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add.112 (1999); Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/69/Aus (2000); Denmark, UN Doc. CCPR/
CO/70/DNK (2000); Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (2002); Finland, UN Doc. CCPR/
CO/82/FIN (2004); Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5 (2005); and the United States, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 (2006); It should be noted that also the Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights has applied Article 1 on Indigenous Peoples. See, for 
instance, CESCR Concluding Observations on the Russian Federation, UN doc. E/C.12/1/
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port by Sweden, the Committee expressed its concern about the limited extent 
to which the Sámi Parliament may participate in the decision-making process 
on issues afffecting land and traditional activities of the Sámi people, explicitly 
referring to the right to  self-determination and the right to culture and  partici-
pation.43 The Committee addressed a key component regarding the Sámi peo-
ple’s self-determination over their cultural heritage by requesting that the State 
party should take further steps to involve the Sámi in the decisions concern-
ing the natural  environment and necessary means of subsitence for the Sámi 
people.44 Without a real possibility to influence the decision-making related 
to traditional lands and means of subsistence, the Sámi cannot participate in 
the maintenance of their cultural heritage. The Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Racial  Discrimination (CERD) has also made an important statement 
concerning Indigenous Peoples’  free, prior and informed consent in relation 
to the Sámi in Sweden. In 2013, the Committee recommended that Sweden 
adopt legislation and take other measures to ensure respect for the right of 
Sámi communities to offfer  free, prior and informed consent whenever their 
rights may be afffected by projects, including extraction of  natural resources, 
carried out in their traditional territories.45
The concerns and the recommendations of the two international human 
rights monitoring bodies are justifĳied. Regarding Sámi rights in Swedish leg-
islation, it should be noted that the Swedish Constitution, and in particular 
the Instrument of Government Chapter 1, section 2, mentions the Sámi as a 
people since the overhaul of the Act in 2010. Before that, the Sámi were only 
mentioned as an ethnic minority. The provision, however, creates goals for the 
public and cannot be evoked by persons before courts. It states: “The opportu-
nities of the Sámi people and ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to pre-
Add.94, 2003, paras. 11,39., http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.1.Add.94.
En?Opendocument (accessed 19 January 2007). See also CESCR General Comment No. 15, 
on the Right to Water (ICESCR Arts. 11,12) UN doc. E(C.12/2002/11, at para. 7, http://www.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm (accessed 17 January 2007). According 
the Committee, Article 1, which guarantees peoples’ rights, cannot be used in individual 
communications because the Optional Protocol provides a procedure under which indi-
viduals may claim that their individual rights have been violated. Lubicon Lake Band v. 
Canada, supra note 124, para. 32.1.
43 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Sweden, CCPR/C/SWE/
CO/6, 7 May 2009, para. 20. Referred articles are 1,25 and 27 of the CCPR.
44 Ibid., para. 20.
45 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination, Concluding Observations on Sweden, 
CERD/C/SWE/CO/19-21, 23 September 2013, para. 17.
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serve and develop a cultural and social life of their own shall be promoted”.46 
However, as explained by Allard, despite the constitutional protection of Sámi 
culture and way of life, there exist no specifĳic Sámi courts, nor are there spe-
cifĳic procedures laid down related to Sámi matters.47
Sweden, along with Finland and Norway are currently negotiating a Nordic 
Sámi Convention, which would, when accepted, create an extensive improve-
ment of the legal situation of the Sámi in all the Nordic countries. On October 
2005, the Expert Group, nominated by the governments of Finland, Norway 
and Sweden and respected Sámi Parliaments, presented a  draft Nordic Saami 
Convention.48 The Draft Convention, from the outset, makes the Sámi people 
a legal subject and recognizes their right to  self-determination.49 The acknowl-
edgment of this right fundamentally changes their status of an indigenous 
people, by making them active actors alongside states, at least in matters that 
directly concern them.50
46 Instrument of Government, 1974, ch. 1 s. 2 para. 5. See an English version of the Act at 
http://www.riksdagen.se/en/How-the-Riksdag-works/Democracy/The-Constitution/
The-Instrument-ofGovernment/ (accessed 13 March 2014). 
47 Allard, C, Legal Pluralism and the Sámi: an Indigenous People in Europe, Conference Pro-
ceedings, Indigenous Peoples’ Sovereignty and the Limits of Judicial and Legal Pluralism : 
American Tribes, Canadian First Nations and Scandinavian Sami, Compared Roberto 
Toniatti and Jens Woelk (eds.), International Conference Trento, 24-25 October 2013, 49-
60, available at http://www.jupls.eu/images/ebook%20JPs%20-%202014.pdf (accessed 27 
December 2015).
48 See an analysis of the Draft Convention, Timo Koivurova, ‘The Draft Nordic Saami Con-
vention: Nations Working Together’, International Community Law Review 10 (2008), 279-
293. See also, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The New Developments Regarding the Saami People 
of the North’, Journal on Minority and Group Rights 16 (2009), 67-156. 
49 According to the Convention, the Sámi people is the indigenous people of Finland, Nor-
way and Sweden. The Sámi thus constitutes one people, living across the national bor-
ders. The Expert Group were researching the possibility to include the Russian Federation 
and Sámi people that live in the Russia, but concluded, with the regrets, that it would be 
too complicated to agree on a strong and efffective Sámi Convention if the negotiations 
should have also included the Russian Federation. See Mathias Åhren, in M Åhren et al. 
(eds.), “The Nordic Sami Convention: International Human Rights, Self-Determination 
and other Central Provisions”, 3 Gáldu Cala – Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights 8, 
2007, 13.
50 See an analysis of the self-determination articles of the Draft Nordic Sami Convention, 
Leena Heinämäki, ‘The Nordic Saami Convention: The Right of a People to Control Issues 
of Importance to Them’, in N Bankes and T Koivurova (eds.), The Proposed Nordic Saami 
Convention, National and International Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights, (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2013), 125-147.
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One key aspect of the self -determination closely connected to the manage-
ment of cultural heritage is the decision-making power related to  natural re-
sources. Article 36 of the Draft Convention states that: “before public authori-
ties, based on law, grant a permit for prospecting or extraction of minerals or 
other sub-surface resources, or make decisions concerning utilization of other 
natural resources within such land or water areas that are owned or used by 
the Sámi, negotiations shall be held with the afffected Sámi, as well as with 
the Sámi parliament, when the matter is such that it falls within Article 16” 
(matters of major importance). Additionally, Article 36 notes that: “permits 
for prospecting or extraction of natural resources shall not be granted if the 
activity would make it impossible or substantially more difffĳicult for the Sámi 
to continue to utilize the areas concerned, and this utilization is essential to 
the Sámi culture, unless so consented by the Sámi parliament and the afffected 
Sámi.” This article creates a strong basis for the Sámi to safeguard their cultural 
heritage. Although their traditional lands and people’s interaction with the 
lands can be seen as the foundation and expressions and of Indigenous Peo-
ples’ cultural heritage, there might be places of signifĳicant importance, such as 
cultural heritage sites, that can be safeguarded and managed only in line with 
Indigenous Peoples’ self-determination when  free, prior and informed consent 
of Indigenous Peoples is applied.
In this respect, the Draft Nordic Sámi Convention would strengthen the 
commitments created by UNDRIP in relation to  FPIC. Article 32 of UNDRIP 
requires the consent of Indigenous Peoples prior to approval of any project 
afffecting their lands or territories. Additionally, Article 19 requires the consent 
of Indigenous Peoples before adopting and implementing legislative or ad-
ministrative measures that may afffect them. In the Sámi homeland region (in 
all Nordic countries), this could mean that Sámi parliaments’ views should be 
taken into account in all the relevant decision-making that directly afffects the 
Sámi as an indigenous people, such as cultural heritage. This would set a frame 
for a strong protection of Sámi people’s cultural heritage, if the Convention 
will be ratifĳied. 
Importantly, specifĳically related to the cultural heritage, the Draft Conven-
tion states that the states “shall respect the right of the Sámi people to manage 
its  traditional knowledge and its  traditional cultural expressions while striv-
ing to ensure that the Sámi are able to preserve, develop and pass these on 
to future generations”.51 Traditional knowledge has been defĳined to mean the 
skills and knowledge of flora, fauna and other natural resources and the ways 
to manage these. Moreover, Sámi cultural heritage is protected via Article 32. 
51 Art. 31.
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For the Sámi, the cultural landscape has a special meaning, since they have 
used the  environment for generations and thus have created strong connec-
tions with their environment. It is this cultural environment which the Sámi 
have grown into and thus perceive as theirs, and which also consolidates their 
identity as Sámi.52 This broad understanding of cultural heritage, including 
cultural landscape, “shall be protected by law and shall be cared for by the 
country’s Sámi parliament or by cultural institutions in cooperation with the 
Sámi parliament.”53
Negotiations of the Draft Nordic Sámi Convention have been set to be fĳinal-
ized by the end of 2016. Time will show whether the three Nordic countries and 
respective Sámi parliaments will ratify this ambitious instrument. This being 
the case, the protection of the Sámi people’s rights would meet the required 
standards of the UNDRIP and general international law. In some respects, 
however, these standards may to some extent already be fulfĳilled in some par-
ticular cases, as will be discussed below.
4  Laponia World Heritage Area 
 Laponia obtained its World Heritage status during the UNESCO paradigm 
shift that took place during the late 90s in heritage conservation, which shifted 
emphasis from the preservation of only lost cultural traditions to the inclu-
sion of living cultures and values.54 In 1992, the  World Heritage Convention 
became the fĳirst international legal instrument to recognize and protect living 
 landscapes, when discussions within UNESCO to expand it to include also the 
protection of  intangible values led to the introduction of a new category called 
Cultural Landscape, which works parallel to the purely natural or cultural crite-
ria. Cultural Landscape bridges the traditonal nature-culture dichotomy in the 
heritage conservation fĳield by comprising elements of what the World Herit-
age Convention defĳines as both Nature and Culture. As Rössler rightly stated: 
52 See an analaysis, Koivurova. T, ‘The Draft for a Nordic Saami Convention’, European Year-
book of Minority Issues Vol 6, 2006/7: 103-136, 122-123.
53 Art. 32(1), Draft Convention.
54 ÅN Dahlström, Negotiating Wilderness in a Cultural Landscape. Predators and Saami Rein-
deer Herding in the Laponian World Heritage Area (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis (Upp-
sala Studies in Cultural Anthropology no 32), 2003 Uppsala). p. 230, in  : Carina Green, 
Managing Laponia: A World Heritage as arena for Sámi ethno-politics in Sweden, (2009, 
Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology 47. 221 pp. Upp-
sala. ISBN 978-91-554-7656-4), 79.
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“Cultural Landscapes are at the interface between  nature and culture,  tangible 
and  intangible heritage, biological and cultural diversity – they represent a 
closely woven net of relationships, the essence of culture and people’s iden-
tity. Cultural landscapes are a focus of protected areas in a larger ecosystem 
context, and they are a symbol of the growing recognition of the fundamental 
links between local communities and their heritage, humankind and its natu-
ral  environment.” 55 
The recognition of living landscapes mirrors the increasing emphasis 
placed on the interconnection between culture and nature, and on the intrin-
sic people-place relationships. As such, the category of Cultural Landscape has 
given increased recognition of the various forms of indigenous knowledge that 
shape  landscapes, and the continuing living relationship between Indigenous 
Peoples with surrounding natural enviroment, including the latter’s spiritual, 
social and identity-shaping values.56 In the case of  Laponia, the area is not pro-
tected as a Cultural Landscape by UNESCO but as a mixed site; both cultural 
and natural criteria has played a crucial role in establishing the  co-manage-
ment of the area with strong Sámi governance.
Although UNESCO itself has no powers to enforce the  World Heritage Con-
vention, it is, however, possible for UNESCO to exert pressure on the states par-
ties to respect agreements. It is in this arena that local communities can seek 
support for their aspirations or rights concerns concerning a World Heritage 
identifĳication, nomination or establishment. This direct connection between 
local people who are afffected by, or responsible for the protected area or site, 
and the international community proved to be substantial for the local Sámi 
in  Laponia. With the implementation of a World Heritage nomination, peo-
ple living in or close to the protected sites have the possibility of building a 
stronger position vis-à -vis governmental authorities, a position that the local 
Sámi people in the case of  Laponia have not had before, due to colonial history.
4.1 The Process Leading Up to the Nomination of  Laponia
 Laponia gained its World Heritage status in 1996, but the story of how  Laponia 
came to be begins much earlier. Already in the 1980s the Swedish government 
55 Mechthild Rössler,‘World Heritage cultural landscapes: A UNESCO flagship programme 
1992-2006’ (2006), 31(4) Landscape Research, 334.
56 Thomas Schaaf and Mechthild Rössler ‘Sacred Natural Sites, Cultural Landscapes and UN-
ESCO’s Action’ in Bas Verschuuren, Robert Wild, Jefffrey A McNeely, and Gonzalo Oviedo 
(eds.), Sacred Natural Sites Conserving Nature & Culture, (Earthscan 2010) 161-170; Chris-
tina Cameron, and Mechthild Rössler ‘World Heritage and Indigenous Peoples. The evolu-
tion of an important relationship’ (2012), 62 World Heritage Review, 44-49.
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sought to nominate a World Heritage site in the area that is today  Laponia. 
This was the nature reserve of Sjávnja (today part of  Laponia) and the idea was 
to nominate the site only based on natural criteria. However, the  World Her-
itage Committee did not accept this fĳirst application. According to the advi-
sory body, IUCN, the area was not unique enough to meet the standards of the 
 World Heritage list. The Swedish government was recommended to revise the 
idea and to go for a larger area.57 During this time, local  participation in nature 
and culture management was being highlighted in many international arenas. 
As part of this debate, Indigenous Peoples’ participation in the management of 
World Heritage sites that afffected them had become an important issue within 
the World Heritage organization and also among indigenous and nature con-
servation groups.58 Other World Heritage sites, such as Tongariro National Park 
in New Zealand, were adjusting their World Heritage status and incorporating 
criteria that acknowledged the local indigenous groups’ cultural and spiritual 
links to these sites. In other words, when both the Sámi Parliament in Sweden 
and several governmental ministries and agencies raised the idea of including 
a Sámi cultural aspect in the new revised nomination, it came as no surprise. 
Up until this point, the local Sámi had not been involved in the World Herit-
age plans on any substantial level but once the idea of including the Sámi cul-
tural aspect in the application was suggested, the local Sámi started to become 
more directly involved in the process. Representatives from the nine  samebys 
with grazing lands inside the borders of the proposed site were now involved 
in discussions on how to proceed with the application. However, there was a 
general feeling that they often were pulling the short straw and that their will 
to be active in the process was not sufffĳiciently acknowledged. And there was 
already at this stage some mistrust and mutual suspicion between the  samebys 
and the state agencies.59 This led many to talk about the “colonial structures” 
at work within the Swedish bureaucracy, and see the Laponian process as an 
illustration of this. 
A lot of work and efffort was put into preparing the application as far as the 
natural criteria were concerned. Now, the cultural part had to be added to the 
application text. The assignment of doing this was given to the head of the 
Sámi  museum in Jokkmokk, but they had only about three months to fĳinish 
57 Dahlström, supra note 252.
58 Carina Green, Managing Laponia: A World Heritage as arena for Sámi ethno-politics in Swe-
den, (2009), Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology 47. 
221 pp. Uppsala. ISBN 978-91-554-7656-4), 80fff.
59 Green, supra note 59, 107fff.
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the work before the application had to be submitted.60 The short amount of 
time spent on preparing the (Sámi) cultural part of the application in contrast 
to the amount of time that went into formulating the justifĳications for meet-
ing the natural part has been bought up by the local Sámi. There was a general 
feeling that less time and resources were spent on articulating the Sámi cul-
tural interests than the pure ecological importance of the area. The Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and the County Administration of 
Norrbotten had been in charge of much of the process at this stage, as the 
agencies responsible for the nature conservation management in Sweden. This 
disproportionate emphasis on the “culture” vis-à-vis the “nature” in the appli-
cation was therefore also linked to the disproportionate power between Swed-
ish agencies (the State) and Sámi interests. This imbalance would continue to 
influence the negotiations concerning the management of  Laponia, once the 
site was established.61 However, a management philosophy that does not take 
into account indigenous peoples’ (i.e. Sámi) narratives, spiritual values and 
knowledge that are intrinsically connected to the  landscape, fails to ensure an 
adequate preservation of this world heritage site. 
4.2 How is  Laponia to be Managed? 
After its inclusion in the  World Heritage list in 1996, a number of local actor-
groups got together to discuss the alternatives for managing the site. Because 
 Laponia consists of already well-established national parks and nature re-
serves, there were regulations and directives on how to conduct the conserva-
tion management in place. The regulations for the parks also included changes 
for the reindeer herders in the parks. But the safeguarding and protection of 
the cultural criteria in the area was something new, and a fact that had to be 
taken into account. Although all agreed that the importance of Sámi  reindeer 
herding culture had to be recognized, opinions varied as to the extent and the 
manner in which Sami reindeer herding culture should be promoted. By that 
time the representatives from the  samebys had recognized the potential of the 
World Heritage status in terms of increasing Sámi influence of the manage-
ment of the area and of starting a process of decolonization of the bureau-
cratic structures. After all, in other areas around the world, diffferent forms of 
joint management between state authorities and Indigenous Peoples were be-
coming rather widespread. 
60 Green, supra note 59, 103.
61 Green ‘The Laponian World Heritage area. Conflict and collaboration in Swedish Sápmi’ 
in S Disko H Tugendfeld (eds.), World Heritage and Indigenous Peoples’ rights, IWGIA, Co-
penhagen (2014): 90. 
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In spite of genuine effforts among the local stakeholders to cooperate, it 
soon became clear that there were diffferences in opinions that were difffĳicult 
to bridge. The Sámi representatives were fĳirm in their belief that they had to 
be equal partners in the negotiations with the other stakeholders and that 
they were to have a strong say in the future management of  Laponia. They 
stressed the importance of a change to the current conservation management 
regime, something that was not a priority of the other partners.62 It was not 
long before this fĳirst attempt at negotiations broke down. From then onwards, 
the stakeholders that engaged in the future of  Laponia formed into three ma-
jor groups: the country Administration of Norrbotten, the two municipalities 
of Jokkmokk and Gällivare, and the local  samebys. However, very little co-
operation was possible at this stage due to the diffferences in goals and pri-
oritizations. From the  samebys side, it was then that they collectively started 
a more formal collaboration among themselves. They formed an association 
called “Mijá Ednam” that was to act as the platform for  Laponia-related mat-
ters and where they could develop an internal discussion on their aims and 
the objectives of the World Heritage site, and also produced a proposal for a 
management plan for the area.63 Many of the representatives of the  samebys 
recognized that  Laponia was an arena where many important issues related 
to self -determination and control of the management of the traditional lands 
came to the surface: they managed it for generations, and therefore also should 
be a part in the new management.
In the Mijá Ednam-proposal the  samebys argued for indigenous control 
over the future management of  Laponia. They asked for the majority of seats 
in a future management board. The other actors rejected this idea. The County 
Administration stated that they had a mandate from the Government to be 
responsible for the protection and management of these areas, and that they 
could not give that mandate away without a new governmental decree. How-
ever, more unofffĳicially, there were also other reasons behind the refusal to dis-
cuss the Sámi claim for majority seats. In essence, the sentiments among many 
of the politicians and state offfĳicials of the agencies were that the local Sámi 
were not ready for such a responsibility and that they would close offf large 
parts of the mountain areas for non- sameby members.64 
But the  samebys would not drop the claim of achieving majority seats on a 
future board of management. In fact, they decided not to enter into any nego-
62 Green supra note 59, 111fff.; Green, supra note 62, 91f.
63 Michael Teilus and Karin Lindahl, Mijá ednam – samebyarnas laponiaprogram (Sameb-
yarnas Kansli 2000), Jokkmokk.
64 Green, supra note 59, 129.
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tiations with the other actors before they approved this claim. A long period of 
non-communication between the  samebys and the other actors followed. Dur-
ing this time, the  samebys turned to the international community for encour-
agement. They were in contact with UNESCO to express their predicaments 
and they continued to look for good examples of progressive  co-management 
projects in other areas and seek support in international conventions and 
guidelines. The Sámi representatives also articulated their position and iden-
tity as an indigenous people in relation to the other actors.65 
The  samebys had a common strategy not to enter into negotiations before 
the demand for majority seats on a future board of management were met 
and to always “speak with one voice”.66 Disagreements and discussions were 
held within the group. They also were meticulous to put their propositions and 
written intentions within a framework that can only be described as “correct 
bureaucratically”. They would use a language and a format that would be eas-
ily recognizable as being inside the dominant discourse. In this way, the state 
agencies could not dismiss the statements and suggestions. They were recog-
nized as professional and correct, but spoke of a wish to take on more respon-
sibility for the traditional lands and to work for a transformation of the current 
“Swedish” conservation management practice.67 
4.3 Agreeing on a Management Structure
Given the locked positions, it was something of a surprise to many when the 
table suddenly turned and the involved actors announced that they had agreed 
to start negotiations and go forward to create a new and progressive manage-
ment plan for  Laponia.68 In the fall of 2005, the representatives of the  samebys 
were called to a meeting by the County Governor to discuss the future manage-
ment of  Laponia. Now there was commitment from the state agencies’ side to 
fĳind ways to implement the idea of Sámi majority on a management board. 
The new round of discussions resulted in a proposal that was sent to the gov-
ernment in 2006 on how to go forward with the organization structure, signed 
by all three-actor groups. In this proposal a management plan was outlined 
that relied on the importance of the  reindeer herding practice of the area, 
and that allowed a strong Sámi responsibility and control.69 The government 
commissioned a delegation consisting of representatives from the local actor 
65 Green, supra note 59, 152fff.
66 Green, supra note 59, 147fff.
67 Green, supra note 59, 164fff.
68 Green, supra note 59, 207fff.
69 Green, supra note 62, 95.
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groups and from SEPA to set up a new management organization. In June 2011, 
the government gave its formal approval of the new management regime to be 
established.70 
In hindsight it seems that the years of disagreement and polarized positions 
ended surprisingly suddenly. To many of the representatives involved in the 
process, this new turn of events was quite unanticipated, but also encouraging 
and positive. It is difffĳicult to pinpoint one simple explanation for this develop-
ment. Several circumstances contributed to break the dead-lock.71 Perhaps the 
most important factor was time. Many years had by now passed since the in-
scription of  Laponia and there was a general feeling, not least among the state 
agencies (both nationally and locally/regionally) that the management issue 
concerning  Laponia had to be solved. The question was also frequently dis-
cussed within World Heritage circles, even if not offfĳicially so. Internationally, 
diffferent forms of  co-management schemes were beginning to be increasingly 
common in regards to conservation on traditional indigenous lands, and this 
was also a fact that influenced the general attitude in society and among state 
offfĳicials and politicians. Another important factor is that new people entered 
into the actor groups during these years. This meant that some of the personal 
conflicts that had been established early on in the process were now conse-
quentially phased out. It is important here also to emphasise the importance 
of the Sámi strategy, their persistence and determination to push for a Sámi 
majority on a future management board and to stay unifĳied. Needless to say, 
there had been many diffferent opinions and aspirations linked to the World 
Heritage appointment, but the Sámi representatives had a conscious strategy 
to “speak with one voice” before the other actors in order to be recognized as a 
convincing and legitimate counterpart in the negotiations. 
4.4 Laponiatjuottjudus
Many of the claims that the representatives from the  samebys fought for dur-
ing the years of conflict and non-dialogue have in the end been included in 
the current management plan and organization.72 There is a clear emphasis 
on the protection of Sámi cultural values and on the importance of providing 
conditions for a thriving  reindeer herding industry to continue. The protection 
of natural values is equally important, but not treated as something entirely 
separate from the protection of a living cultural  landscape. The area is viewed 
70 Ministry of Environment 2011, Ny Förvaltningsorganisation för världsarvet Laponia. Press 
Release, 16 June 2011. http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/8149/a/170963. 
71 Green, supra note 59, 209; Green, supra note 62, 96.
72 Laponiatjuottjudus, Laponia,Tjuottjudusplána – Management plan 2012.
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as an arena where sustainable development and change is welcome, as long as 
the cultural and environmental sustainability is not jeopardized. An important 
standpoint is to include the Sámi language(s) in all forms of written documen-
tation and presentation. Consequently, the new management organization 
also goes under a Sámi name: Laponiatjuottjudus. 
The board is made up of nine permanent members, 5 of whom are appointed 
by the local  samebys. The other 4 consists of two representatives from the local 
municipalities of Jokkmokk and Gällivare, 1 representative from the County 
Administration of Norrbotten and 1 from SEPA. The Sámi have the majority 
seats, they also hold the chair. Decisions are, however, to be taken according 
to the principle of consensus, something that has meant that the importance 
of majority seats have been reduced. To the Sámi representatives, it is still an 
important circumstance that signals the leading role of the Sámi community.73 
At present, the chair of the board is held by one of the Sámi representatives. 
In many ways the new management plan has many things in common with 
many other offfĳicial documents of this sort, but in many ways it is unique. It 
difffers from other ‘conventional’ documents by partly using a form and lan-
guage that includes Sámi views and ways of organizing and working. Laponi-
atjuottjudus thus becomes a platform from where a Sámi inspired manage-
ment based on traditional and local knowledge can be developed, but still very 
much within normative bureaucratic structures.74 An open dialogue with the 
surrounding local society is an outspoken aspiration for the new management 
organization. Local input is assured by the arrangement or public delibera-
tions – rádedibme – held regularly. 
The management plan focuses on applying a holistic perspective where the 
importance of ensuring the integrity of the World Heritage criteria needs to be 
combined with a sustainable development of the area. Both modern technolo-
gies and  traditional knowledge are imperative aspects to incorporate when 
practicing and developing the management of the site.75 The management 
plan also includes an emphasis on management as a process, which needs to 
be revised, improved and made flexible.  Laponia is thus seen as an arena for 
learning (searvelatnja) for all involved actors. 
One important factor in the management plan is the recognition to not only 
protect the material heritage of the area. In the  Laponia World Heritage Area, 
73 Green, supra note 62, 33.
74 Carina Green, and Jan Turtinen ‘Indigenous Peoples and world heritage sites: Normative 
heritage discourses and possibilities for change‘ Proceedings of the International indig-
enous development research conference, Ngä Pae o te Mä ramatanga, 2014: 64.
75 Laponiatjuttjudus, ibid.
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sacred sites where antlers and other items were placed as offferings, such as the 
Stá lojå hkå sacrifĳicial site, reflect the importance of reindeer for the local Sámi 
people.76  Laponia also includes many graves and the names of mountains, 
lakes and marshes, that bear witness to the way local Sámi people understood 
the  landscape, life and death. These immaterial (intellectual and spiritual) val-
ues are equally important to consider. Stories, memories and knowledge are 
continuously being recorded and highlighted with the agreement of the lo-
cal communities. Here, the reintegration of the Sámi language(s) is one vital 
component77 along with customary laws. Perhaps the most important change 
inherent in the new management organization is on an operative level. The 
current stafff deliberately work towards implementing local structures and ar-
ticulating Sámi conservation perspectives and aspirations. This includes a ho-
listic management perspective where both material and immaterial values are 
protected. There is a closer relationship between the rangers that work out in 
the fĳield and local  sameby members (and other locals) than was the case be-
fore, which creates important possibilities for local participation and dialogue. 
In short,  Laponia has gone from being an arena where disagreement and 
lack of communication was prominent to being an area where collaboration 
and strengthened relationships between the indigenous people and the state 
agencies is evolving. For the Sámi representatives, being engaged in the de-
velopment of the World Heritage site was all along linked to the idea of more 
influence and control in general.
Today, the local Sámi peple feel responsible for  Laponia, they are involved 
and take  ownership of  Laponia management. When new steps are taken in the 
management process, local Sámi communities call the Management board to 
be informed. There is real  participation in place, which leads to quicker deci-
sion-making. Meetings between  samebys and authorities now sometimes take 
place in the  Laponia offfĳices, which makes establishing contacts with authori-
ties easier for local communities.
There are still tricky issues addressed on the board where the diffferent rep-
resentatives voice diverse opinions. And there are still diffferences in perspec-
tives on how to organise and structure conservation management and how to 
carry it out practically. At times, the involved Sámi have felt that Sámi initia-
tives and ways of conducting things are not being acknowledged, or seen as a 
correct way, by some of the other actors. In other words, notwithstanding the 
76 Swedish National Heritage Board, Swedish National Commission for UNESCO, Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency, World Heritage Sites in Sweden, 2014: 12.
77 Green, supra note 62, 97.
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progress made, there is still a feeling that there is room for improvement as far 
as the de-colonization of current bureaucratic structures is concerned.78 
A major future challenge ensuring that Sámi engagement in managing 
 Laponia is in line with the right of self -determination lies in the recognition of 
Sámi toponymes: getting Sámi place names accepted on maps, on road signs 
and other signalization panels is still an unsolved issue. Another future task for 
strengthening  Laponia management is to widen local  participation beyond the 
nine Sámi communities, which use land within  Laponia, and to involve local 
people from the town of Jokkmokk, a centre of Sámi culture in Lapland. And 
fĳinally, there is a need for Laponiatjuottjudus, which is still a project, to become 
a real organisation. The funding accorded to  Laponia however is small for the 
amount of work that lies ahead (i.e., priority list every year).
Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the importance of  Laponia as a 
platform for Sámi  revitalization and as a milestone in the process of regaining 
control over the management of their traditional lands. Neither should one 
underestimate its importance as a milestone for a new form of nature conser-
vation management that has the possibility to inspire governance structures 
not only in indigenous circles, but beyond. 
Conclusion 
There is a growing consensus that Indigenous Peoples should be able to man-
age or at least participate in the management of their cultural heritage. Yet, 
there is also a large gap between the rhetoric on the international level and the 
actual political practices on a national and regional level. The UNESCO  World 
Heritage Convention is one model that can, in the best case, assist Indigenous 
Peoples to (re)-gain their self-determination over their cultural heritage. Al-
though the UNESCO framework has met great difffĳiculties in fully recognizing 
the unique features of Indigenous Peoples’ cultural heritage and their involve-
ment in the nomination process of the heritage sites, our case study of  Laponia 
has illustrated that if the skillful and active strategical planning of Indigenous 
Peoples is met with the willingness of the related State to advance Indigenous 
Peoples’ rights and participation, it is possible to create a satisfactory outcome. 
Based on voluntary guidelines and arrangements, similar  co-management 
78 Carina Green, and Jan Turtinen ‘Indigenous peoples and World Heritage sites – contested 
management regimes in Australia, New Zealand and Sweden’ in L Elenius, C Allard, C 
Sandström (eds.), Sámi Customary Rights in Modern Landscapes, Ashgate, London. (forth-
coming). 
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models have recently been successfully created in other places in the world 
(e.g., Canada).79
Without recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ self-determination, their cul-
tural heritage cannot be protected in a satisfactory way. As long as Indigenous 
Peoples are seen as objects of protection, rather than legal subjects, their fun-
damental views, philosophies and knowledge remains unacknowledged. The 
establishment of the  Laponia World Heritage area, as shown in this chapter, 
led to a restructuring of the relations between the local Sámi community and 
the local authorities.
The unique  co-management body put in place in  Laponia, Laponiatjuot-
tjudus, links to the profound shift that has occurred during the last decades 
in the way in which Indigenous Peoples’ rights are viewed, culminating in the 
adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including 
its direct embrace of Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-determination. From the 
point of view of protection of Indigenous Peoples’ cultural heritage, their right 
to self-determination is a vital component. As stated by  EMRIP, Indigenous 
Peoples’ cultural heritage should be considered as an expression of their self -
determination and their spiritual and physical relationships with their lands, 
territories and resources.80 What Indigenous Peoples’ self-determination does 
or should mean in practice, is, however, far from clear and lacks any compre-
hensive understanding within the international community. It is possible, any-
how, to identify some areas that are indisputable, at least in the sense of “the 
best efffort.” Indigenous Peoples’ right to efffectively participate in the decision-
making concerning matters that are directly related to their cultural core, such 
as traditional, nature-based livelihoods, is a widely accepted norm within the 
human rights framework. Although the right to efffective  participation origi-
nally became accepted as a part of Indigenous Peoples’ right to a distinct cul-
79 See for example: Thora Herrmann, Leena Heinämäki, Cindy Morin ‘Protecting Sacred 
Sites, Maintaining Cultural Heritage, and Sharing Power: Co-management of the SGang 
Gwaay UNESCO World Heritage Site in Canada’, in L Elenius, C Allard, C Sandström (eds.), 
Sámi Customary Rights in Modern Landscapes, Ashgate, London. (forthcoming).
80 UN Human Rights Council, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Study 
and advice on the promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples with respect 
to their cultural heritage, A/HRC/EMPRIP/2015/2 (para. 7).
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ture81 or collective property,82 through a recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ 
right to self -determination, the duty of the states or state agencies to consult 
with Indigenous Peoples has been transformed into an obligation to seek 
Indigenous Peoples’  free, prior and informed consent for actions that have 
large-scale and far-reaching impacts on Indigenous Peoples’ cultures and 
traditional lands (such as creation of protected areas).83 
81 Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984; 
Kitokv. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988); Lubicon 
Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984; I. Läns-
man et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 
(1994).
82 I/A Court H.R., Case of the YakyeAxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Repa-
rations and Costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125, paras. 131, 135, 137. I/A 
Court H.R., Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Rep-
arations and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, paras. 118, 121.I/A 
Court H.R., Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala.Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of November 19, 2004. Series C No. 116, par. 85. I/A Court H.R., Case of the 
Mayagna (Sumo) AwasTingni Community v. Nicaragua. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 79, para. 149. IACHR, Arguments before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of YakyeAxa v. Paraguay. Cited in: 
I/A Court H.R., Case of the YakyeAxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Repa-
rations and Costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125, par. 120(j). IACHR, Argu-
ments before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Sawhoyamaxa 
v. Paraguay. Cited in: I/A Court H.R., Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community 
v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 
146, para. 113(a).
83 Poma Poma v. Peru, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1457/2006, Doc. 
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 of 27 March 2009; I/A Court H.R., Case of the Saramaka Peo-
ple v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 
November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, para. 95. See the analysis by Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, Indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights over their ancestral 
lands and natural resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 56/09, 30 December 2009, 67-68.
On Transfer of Sámi Traditional Knowledge: 
 Scientification, Traditionalization, Secrecy, 
and Equality*
Elina Helander-Renvall and Inkeri Markkula
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate how Sámi  traditional knowledge is ar-
ticulated and transferred, especially as part of research activities. As a starting 
point, we will discuss traditional knowledge and its various understandings. 
Further on, we will trace and address some of the concerns that Sámi have 
in relation to how their reality is researched and described. Special attention 
will be paid to the secrecy surrounding some Sámi traditions and some knowl-
edge in the context of conducting research on such issues; the scientifĳication 
of Sámi knowledge; the traditionalization (actualization) of various traditions; 
and the need for equality between scientifĳic and traditional knowledge. 
Traditional knowledge ( TK) has many defĳinitions. Traditional knowledge 
may be defĳined as knowledge that has a long historical and cultural continu-
ity, having been passed down through generations, as Berkes has noted.1 In 
the book on traditional knowledge by Porsanger and Guttorm2 the concept 
 árbediehtu (inherited knowledge, a Northern Sámi word) is used to refer to 
Sámi knowledge. They state that  árbediehtu is ‘the collective wisdom and skills 
of the Sámi people used to enhance their livelihood for centuries. It has been 
* We would like to thank Regional Council of Lapland, European Regional Development 
Fund, and University of Lapland for the fĳinancial support for the project Traditional Eco-
logical Knowledge in the Sami Homeland Region of Finland which was conducted at the 
Arctic Centre, Rovaniemi during 1.1.2014-30.4.2015. The general aim of this project was to 
promote the status of Sami traditional ecological knowledge through support to the Sami 
craftswomen. www.arcticcentre.org.
1 Berkes, F. 1993. Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Practice. In: Inglis, J. (ed.). Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge; Concepts and Cases. Ottawa: Canadian Museum of Nature and the 
International Development Research Centre, 1-9; Berkes, F. 2012. Sacred Ecology. Philadel-
phia: Taylor and Francis.
2 Porsanger, J. and Guttorm, G. 2011. Building up the Field Study and Research on Sami Tra-
ditional Knowledge (Arbediehtu). In: Porsanger, J. and Guttorm, G. (eds.). Working with 
Traditional Knowledge: Communities, Institutions, Information Systems, Law and Ethics. 
Diedut 1/11: 13-57.
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passed down from generation to generation both orally and through work and 
practical experience. Through this continuity, the concept of  árbediehtu ties 
the past, present and future together’.3 In a more limited sense, Traditional 
 ecological knowledge (TEK) refers to cumulative knowledge of the local  en-
vironment and ecosystems and the ways how to use and manage them. It is 
knowledge held by Indigenous Peoples or local communities, encompassing 
language, naming and classifĳication systems, resource use practices, rituals, 
spirituality and worldview. 
Helander-Renvall and Markkula have emphasized the signifĳicance of eco-
logical understanding as a central aspect of Sámi  traditional knowledge.4 We 
think that transmission of traditional knowledge is particularly important: the 
focus should not be in the fĳirst place on ‘getting information’.5
Currently, there is great concern about the worldwide decrease of tradition-
al lifestyles and related knowledge. The knowledge, which is no longer used, 
documented or passed on from one generation to the next, will disappear. Tra-
ditional knowledge is part of  intangible cultural heritage, which, according to 
UNESCO, contains  oral traditions, practices and knowledge concerning nature 
and the universe, and knowledge and skills on how to make traditional handi-
crafts.6 Therefore, transfer of traditional knowledge is central in the preserva-
tion of indigenous cultural heritage.
Accordingly, TEK is increasingly valued alongside scientifĳic knowledge in 
research and conservation effforts especially in Arctic areas, where climate 
change signifĳicantly impacts on the traditional livelihoods of Indigenous Peo-
ples. Traditional knowledge is currently also used in  revitalization processes, 
embodied in the production of cultural continuity. Studies integrating TEK 
and scientifĳic knowledge in the Arctic region are numerous.7 Many of these 
3 Ibid. 18. 
4 Helander-Renvall, E. and Markkula, I. 2011. Luonnon monimuotoisuus ja saamelaiset. Bi-
ologista monimuotoisuutta koskevan yleissopimuksen artikla 8( j):n toimeenpanoa tukeva 
selvitys Suomen saamelaisalueella [Biodiversity and Sami people. Investigation to support 
the implementation of Convention on Biodiversity article 8 (j) in Sami domicile region 
in Finland] Suomen ympäristö 12. Helsinki: Suomen ympäristöministeriö; Markkula, I. 
and Helander-Renvall, E. 2014. Ekologisen Perinnetiedon Käsikirja [Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge Handbook] Arktisen keskuksen tiedotteita 59. Rovaniemi: Lapin yliopisto.
5 Nadasdy, P. 1999. The politics of TEK. Power and the ‘integration’ of knowledge. In: Arctic 
Anthropology 36 (1-2): 1-18.
6 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003.
7 Bogoslovskaya, L. 2003. The Bowhead whale offf Chukotka: integration of scientifĳic and 
traditional knowledge. In: McCartney, A.P. (ed.). Indigenous Ways to the Present. Native 
Whaling in the Western Arctic. Edmonton and Salt Lake City: Canadian Circumpolar Insti-
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studies research the local adaptation to climate and environmental change. 
The potential of TEK in climate change research and adaptation to environ-
mental changes has indeed been acknowledged in diffferent studies and re-
ports, including the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and assessment reports 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).8 The fourth IPCC 
report noted that indigenous knowledge is an invaluable basis for developing 
adaptation and natural resource management strategies in response to envi-
ronmental and other forms of change, and the fĳifth IPCC report states that 
indigenous, local, and traditional forms of knowledge are a major resource for 
adapting to climate change.9 Natural resource dependent communities, har-
boring Indigenous peoples, have a long history of adapting to highly variable 
and changing social and ecological conditions. The usefulness of indigenous 
knowledge is already now important for climate research and many inquiries 
lean on indigenous knowledge.10 
The value of  traditional knowledge was fĳirst acknowledged internation-
ally in the (1992) UN  Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Article 8(j) of 
the convention obliges the State parties to respect, preserve and maintain the 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities 
that embody traditional lifestyles relevant to the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the ap-
proval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and 
tute and University of Utah Press, 209-254; ACIA 2005. Impact of a Warming Arctic: Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Krupnik, I.I. and Ray, 
G.C. 2007. Pacifĳic walruses, indigenous hunters, and climate change: bridging scientifĳic 
and indigenous knowledge. In: Deep Sea Research 54: 2946-2957; Magga, O.H., Mathiesen, 
S.D., Corell, R.W., Oskal, A. 2009. Reindeer Herding, Traditional Knowledge and Adapta-
tion to Climate Change and Loss of Grazing Land. Ealat project report. Alta: Fagtrykk Idé 
AS; Krupnik, I., Aporta, C., Gearheard, S., Laidler, G.J., Kielsen Holm, L. (eds.). 2010. SIKU: 
Knowing Our Ice Documenting Inuit Sea Ice Knowledge and Use.Springer; Weatherhead, 
E., Gearheard, S. and Barry, R.G. 2010. Changes in weather persistence: Insight from Inuit 
knowledge. In: Global Environmental Change 20: 523-528.
8 ACIA 2005; IPCC 2007. Climate change 2007. Synthesis report; IPCC 2014. Climate Change: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution 
of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change.
9 IPCC 2007; 2014.
10 Lambert, L. 2003. From ‘Savages’ to Scientists: Mainstream Science Moves Toward Recog-
nizing Traditional Knowledge. In: Tribal College Journal of American Indian Higher Educa-
tion 15(1): 11-12; McGregor, D. 2006. Traditional Ecological Knowledge. In: Ideas: the Arts 
and Science Review 3(1). Online.
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practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefĳits arising from the 
utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices. 
As the value of TEK has been recognized by scientists, it is often collected 
and integrated in studies in order to fĳill gaps in knowledge about species distri-
butions or behavior, to collect observations of changes in climate, or to under-
stand traditional management practices and how these contribute to resource 
conservation.11 However, if the studies into which TEK is integrated have quan-
tity-oriented objectives, this may lead researchers to code, categorize and ty-
pologize the narratives of TEK holders.12 That can result in a simplifĳied picture 
of TEK. Gearheard et al. have paid attention to the diffferent implications of 
knowledge.13 For example, for Inuit following the traditional lifestyle, knowing 
the sea ice means that one gets good food and has freedom, as sea ice is the 
base for hunting and traveling.
This knowledge, gathered through generations and shared with others in 
the community, is evolving and living knowledge. Moreover, if TEK is coded 
and simplifĳied, links and connections between nature, traditions and cultural 
identity may be lost. For example Sakakibara has studied how sea ice, sea ice 
loss, cultural identity, human-animal relations and drumming traditions of 
Inupiaq are all connected.14 
Critical Voices
In the context of Arctic research, the following defĳinition of TEK by Berkes 
is commonly used: ‘TEK is a cumulative body of knowledge and beliefs, 
handed down through generations by cultural transmission, about the rela-
tionship of living beings (including humans) with one another and with their 
11 Shackerofff, J.M. and Campbell, L.M. 2007. Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Conserva-
tion Research: Problems and Prospects for their Constructive Engagement. In: Conserva-
tion & Society 5: 343-360.
12 Agrawal, A. 2002. Indigenous knowledge and the politics of classifĳication. In: Internation-
al Social Science Journal 54(173): 287-297.
13 Gearheard, S.F., Kielsen, Holm, L., Huntington, H., Leavitt, J.M., Mahoney, A.R., Opie, M., 
Oshima, T. Sanguya, J. (eds.). 2013. The Meaning of Ice. People and sea ice in three Arctic 
communities. Hanover and New Hampshire: International Polar Institute Press.
14 Sakakibara, C. 2008. ‘Our home is drowning’: Iñupiat storytelling and climate change in 
Point Hope. In: Alaska.Geographical Review 98: 456-475; Sakakibara C. 2009. ‘No Whale, 
No Music’: Iñupiaq drumming and global warming. In: Polar Record 45: 289-303; Sakak-
ibara C. 2010. Into the whaling cycle: Cetaceousness and climate change among the Inu-
piat of Arctic. In: Alaska. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 100: 1003-1012.
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 environment’.15 For Indigenous Peoples themselves, however, TEK is much 
more than a ‘body of knowledge’. McGregor has emphasized that ‘body of 
knowledge’ can be considered as something that is separate from the people 
who hold and practice this knowledge, which is not the case with indigenous 
knowledge.16 Moreover, the defĳinition conceptualizes TEK as a set of proce-
dural  ecological knowledge, for example the knowledge of animal behavior or 
plant distributions.17 Consequently, a ‘body of knowledge’ can take on a par-
ticular meaning and express itself as decontextualized and fragmented. TEK 
is dynamic and complex and connects biophysical and social processes. All 
this validates the notion of TEK as indigenous knowledge that is rooted in rela-
tionships and participations.18 As stated by Cruikshank,  traditional knowledge 
is produced and expressed in human encounters, not encapsulated in closed 
traditions.19 It is also an aspect of spiritual existence and connection to land.20 
It must also be stressed that traditional knowledge is closely connected to lo-
cal practices, subsistence activities and survival possibilities; in that sense it 
is very vulnerable, especially if regarded and used as a commodity.21 What is 
more, many researchers avoid using the concept ‘traditional’ because the term 
is seen as contrary to change. They prefer the term ‘indigenous’. 22 Similarly, 
Kuokkanen explains: ‘talking about “traditional” ways of life or “traditional” 
culture can suggest racist notions of a frozen culture giving rise to false views 
15 Berkes 1993:3.
16 McGregor, D. 2004a. Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Sustainable Development: To-
wards Coexistence. In: Blaser, M., Feit, H. A., Mc Rae, G. (eds.). In the Way of Development. 
London: Zed Books, 72-91; McGregor, D. 2004b. Coming Full Circle. Indigenous knowl-
edge, Environment, and our future. In: American Indian Quaterly 28(3-4): 358-410.
17 Casimirri, G. 2003. Problems with integrating traditional ecological knowledge into con-
temporary resource management. XII World Forestry Congress, Quebec City, Canada 
2003. 
18 see: Wilson, S. 2008. Research Is Ceremony. Indigenous Research Methods. Halifax and 
Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.
19 Cruikshank, J. 2005. Do Glaciers Listen? Local Knowledge, Colonial Encounters, and Social 
Imagination. Vancouver: UBC Press, 4.
20 Helander-Renvall, E. 2014. Relationships between Sámi reindeer herders, lands, and rein-
deer. In: Marvin, G. and McHugh, S. (eds.). Routledge Handbook of Human-Animal Studies. 
London and New York: Routledge, 246-258.
21 Helander, E. 1999. Sami subsistence activities. Spatial aspects and structuration. In: Acta 
Borealia, A Nordic Journal of Circumpolar Societies 16(2): 7-25.
22 Porsanger, J. 2011. The Problematisation of the Dichotomy of Modernity and Tradition in 
Indigenous and Sami contexts. In: Porsanger, J. and Guttorm, G. (eds.). Working with Tradi-
tional Knowledge: Communities, Institutions, Information Systems, Law and Ethics. Diedut 
1/11: 225-252.
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of  authenticity and “traditional practices”. This, for its part, denies develop-
ment and change in indigenous cultures’.23 
Increasing use of  traditional knowledge including TEK in research has in-
deed raised many questions and debates as traditional knowledge is an am-
biguous term, as explained above. The ACIA-report, for example, notes the dif-
fĳiculties in defĳining TEK.24 In addition to the above, scientists have also been 
criticized for their treatment of TEK as mere data or facts, leaving many as-
pects of TEK, such as spirituality and ecological relationships, unexplored.25 
This might be because holistic aspects of traditional knowledge can be con-
fusing from a scientifĳic perspective. Berkes admits that TEK is more than just 
information: it describes the spiritual relationship Indigenous Peoples share 
with the land, and is a process of gathering knowledge and conclusion draw-
ing.26 In reality, the concept ‘traditional knowledge’ refers not only to informa-
tion or facts but also to ways of knowing.27 These ways of knowing are based 
on holistic aspects of indigenous knowledge. Holistic knowledge is relational 
and, as indicated above, it is strongly rooted in spiritual, cultural and ecological 
elements of a community’s life. These, and similar notions, defĳinitely expand 
the understanding of the concept. 
According to the Assembly of First Nations, indigenous knowledge consists 
of four interlinked components:
1. creation stories and cosmologies which explain the origins of the earth 
and its people;
2. codes of ritual and behavior that govern peoples’ relationships with the 
earth;
3. practices and seasonal patterns of resource utilization and management 
that have evolved as expressions of these relationships;
4. body of factual knowledge that has accumulated in connection with 
these practices.28
23 Kuokkanen, R. 2000. Towards an ‘Indigenous Paradigm’ from a Sami Perspective. In: The 
Canadian Journal of Native Studies 20(2): 411-436.
24 ACIA 2005: 64.
25 Nadasdy 1999; Casimirri 2003.
26 Berkes 2012.
27 Ibid: 8.
28 AFN, Assembly of First Nations, Environment Division. 1995. The Feasibility of Represent-
ing Traditional Indigenous Knowledge in Cartographic, Pictorial or Textual Forms. Draft 
Final Report. 
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The two last components are the types of  traditional knowledge which are in 
all likelihood most extensively documented by scientists during recent years. 
Numerous studies which integrate TEK and scientifĳic knowledge report Indig-
enous Peoples’ observations and knowledge regarding, for example, animal 
behavior and migration patterns, traditional weather forecast and changes in 
sea ice and weather.29 Furthermore, there are several studies which focus on 
indigenous classifĳication and knowledge systems.30 In the ACIA report, TEK 
is considered to include changes and efffects of climate warming observed by 
Arctic Indigenous Peoples, and their perceptions of climate impacts, such as 
the efffects on everyday life, land and water use, diet, and social and cultural 
activities.31 In the context of ACIA, TEK contains observations and, in addition, 
also the meanings and consequences of climate change. 
McGregor writes about sources of indigenous knowledge acquisition, iden-
tifying three categories: 1. traditional knowledge, which is passed on from 
generation to generation; 2. empirical knowledge, which is gained through 
observation; and 3. revealed knowledge, which is acquired through spiritual 
means and regarded as a gift.32 This list is certainly not complete, but useful 
for our discussion. Empirical knowledge is today frequently used in studies of 
29 Bogoslovskaya 2003; George, J.C., Braund, S., Brower Jr., H., Nicholson, C., O’Hara, T. 2003. 
Some observations on the influence of environmental conditions on the success of hunt-
ing Bowhead whales offf Barrow, Alaska. In: McCartney, A.P. (ed.), Indigenous Ways to the 
Present. Native Whaling in the Western Arctic. Edmonton and Salt Lake City: Canadian Cir-
cumpolar Institute and University of Utah Press, 255-275; Krupnik and Ray 2007; Gagnon, 
C. and Berteaux, D. 2009. Integrating Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Ecological 
Science: a Question of Scale. In: Ecology and Society 14 (2):19, online; Weatherhead et al. 
2010; Gearheard, S., Pocernich, M., Stewart, R., Sanguya, J., Huntington, H. 2010. Linking 
Inuit knowledge and meteorological station observations to understand changing wind 
patterns at Clyde River, Nunavut. In: Climatic Change 100(2): 239-242; Krupnik et al. 2010.
30 Roturier, S. and Roue, M. 2009. Of forest, snow and lichen: Sami reindeer herders’ knowl-
edge of winter pastures in northern Sweden. In: Forest ecology and management 258: 
1960–1967; Krupnik et al. 2010. Riseth, J. Å., Tømmervik H., Helander-Renvall, E., Labba, 
N., Johansson, C., Malnes, E., Bjerke, J.V., Jonsson, C., Pohjola, V., Sarri, L-E., Schanche, A., 
Callaghan, T.V. 2011. Sámi traditional ecological knowledge as a guide to science: snow, 
ice and reindeer pasture facing climate change. In: Polar Record 47: 202-217; Roturier, S. 
2011. Sami herders’ classifĳication system of reindeer winter pastures – A contribution to 
adapt forest management to reindeer herding in northern Sweden. In: Rangifer 31: 61-69; 
Roturier 2011. Eira, I.M.G., Jaedicke, C., Magga, O.H., Maynard, J.G., Vikhamar-Schuler, D., 
Mathiesen, S.D. 2013. Traditional Sá mi snow terminology and physical snow classifĳication 
– Two ways of knowing. In: Cold Regions Science and Technology 85: 117-130. 
31 ACIA 2005.
32 McGregor 2006.
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TEK and indigenous knowledge, especially in those related to climate change. 
To give an example, Climatic Change – an academic journal, published a spe-
cial issue on Indigenous Peoples’ knowledge of climate and weather in 2010. 
The special issue’s articles discussed the local and indigenous knowledge in 
diffferent parts of the world, regarding seasonal patterns of precipitation and 
temperature; local traditional climate indicators; observations of meteorologi-
cal events; changes in wind patterns including variability, speed and direction; 
the use of indigenous knowledge and meteorological forecasts in traditional 
farming and local seasonal calendars including changes in behavior of animals 
and plants.33 
Documenting indigenous observations of climate change, species distribu-
tions and behavior, or indigenous ways in resource conservation can work to-
wards to a greater nature conservation effforts, and can as a matter of fact result 
in local and indigenous voices be heard. Mainstream recognition of TEK has 
indeed to a certain extent led to the strengthening of indigenous voices and 
challenged the hegemony of western science.34 However, the selection process 
resulting from the study design and researchers expectations has an efffect on 
what kind of TEK is documented and presented to a wider audience. 
Within this context, one needs to be aware of the importance of documen-
tation of Sámi  traditional knowledge. Laila. S. Vars explains: ‘Documentation 
of Sámi knowledge is the most urgent issue facing us today… Sámi traditional 
knowledge encompasses the beliefs, practices, innovations, arts, music, liveli-
hoods, spirituality, and other forms of cultural experience and expression that 
belong to the Sámi’.35 Documentation is important as there is a risk that Sámi 
traditional knowledge fades away. In addition, it is important as part of various 
cultural, legal and political processes, for instance, in the context of discourses 
regarding land rights.36 
It is wise to be aware of research conducted in indigenous societies, as much 
of it results in texts that will become well-known and provide students and 
those working with indigenous issues with facts and standpoints. Keep in 
33 See: Green, D. and Raygorodetsky, G. 2010. Indigenous knowledge of a changing climate. 
In: Climatic Change 100: 239-242, and references therein.
34 See: Shackerofff and Campbell 2007.
35 Vars, L. S. 2008. The Sámis Should Share Knowledge With Indigenous Peoples. Available at: 
http://www.galdu.org/web/index.php?odas=3370&giella1=eng (accessed 5.7.2015).
36 Helander-Renvall, E. 2013. On Customary Law Among the Saami People. In: Bankes, N. and 
Koivurova, T. (eds.). The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention. National and International 
Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
281-291.
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mind that mainstream research procedure is normally carried out using main-
stream reasoning and methodology. Various research activities, ‘while they 
draw on indigenous cultural knowledge, are imagined, conceptualized, and 
carried out within the theoretical and methodological frameworks of Anglo-
European forms of research, reasoning, and interpreting’.37 Whatever the case 
may be though, many Indigenous People resent that their knowledge would 
go through some kind of scientifĳication or scientifĳic validation, that would in 
the long run change the looks and contents of their knowledge.38 The scien-
tifĳication may lead to knowledge that is not contextual and open-ended: such 
knowledge would lack many of Indigenous Peoples’ relevant aspects.39
For example, one can fĳind many cases in the  reindeer herding community 
which show that the excessively rigid mainstream ordering of reality may cre-
ate problems for herding. The reindeer herding community is a flexible social 
and economic unit.40 Herding is very much dependent on Sámi conceptual 
understanding and terminology that is developed and used in reindeer herd-
ing.41 Overall, the flexibility of Sámi thoughts and order allows for flexible rein-
deer herding depending on various variables, such as weather fluctuations and 
adaptable pasture use; in other words, flexibility gives herders possibilities to 
cope with uncertainty and maintain resilience.42 Similarly, one would need to 
practice flexibility also in research and management as part of epistemological 
thinking and analysis. If the Sámi ways are restricted through reindeer herding 
legislation or otherwise in a way that restricts their flexibility too much, the 
consequences could become very harmful for the herding society. ‘Adaptation 
is a flexible process, not a fact’, as Bjerkli has noted.43 
37 Gegeo, D.W. and Watson-Gegeo, K.A. 2001: ‘How we know’: Kwara‘ae rural villagers doing 
indigenous epistemology. In: The Contemporary Pacifĳic 13: 55-88.
38 Helander-Renvall, E. 2011. Traditional Knowledge and Participatory Research – Barriers 
and Openings. Paper. ARKTIS seminar, Arctic Centre, Rovaniemi April 4-5, 2011. 
39 Smith L.T. 2012. Decolonizing Methodologies. Research and Indigenous Peoples. London: 
Zed books. Wilson 2008.
40 Pehrson R. N. 1964. The Bilateral Network of Social Relations in Könkämä Lapp Distict. Oslo: 
Samiske samlinger 7. 
41 Eira, R.B.M. 2012. Using Traditional Knowledge in Unpredictable Critical Events in Reindeer 
Husbandry. The case of Sámi reindeer husbandry in Western Finnmark, Norway and Nenets 
reindeer husbandry on Yamal peninsula, Yamal-Nenets AO, Russia. Master thesis. Tromsø: 
University of Tromsø; Eira et al. 2013.
42 Gaup Eira, I.M. 2012. The Silent Language of Snow. Sámi traditional knowledge of snow in 
times of climate change. Tromsø: Universitetet i Tromsø, 5.
43 Bjerkli, B. 1996. Land Use, Traditionalism and Rights. In: Acta Borealia 13(1): 3- 21.
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In Sámi  reindeer herding we can see that herding practices are partly linked 
to knowledge as ‘a set of improvisational capacities called forth by the needs 
of the moment’.44 After all, indigenous knowledge ‘is the way of living within 
contexts of flux, paradox, and tension’.45 It goes without saying that the main-
stream society wants to fĳix too alterable activities and strategies of the Sámi 
people for more strict management and control. The challenges of Arctic rein-
deer herding are: the interface between reindeer herders’  traditional knowl-
edge and modern understanding of ecology, economy, sociology, land use, and 
management. At the same time, if we are looking at specifĳically the land use 
rights of Sámi people, then, there is a need to codify the customs and  custom-
ary rules through which one can afffĳirm the existence of earlier land use and 
thus the continuity of certain valued rights and customs. 
Still, we are in the presence of positive changes as more and more projects 
impacting indigenous communities are carried out with the active  participa-
tion of Indigenous Peoples. What is more, with the  help of time, indigenous 
societies will educate their own students and teach them  indigenous meth-
odologies. In a general way, this is an essential and urgent task for educational 
institutions. Within the domain of indigenous research, there are several ele-
ments regarding methods of indigenous projects. Smith has confĳirmed that 
most progressive among  indigenous methodologies are those which are based 
on indigenous worldviews and research paradigms.46 The aim of such knowl-
edge methods is not to reject western theories and methods, but rather to fo-
cus on indigenous concerns and perspectives.47
Equal Treatment of Various Knowledge Systems
TEK is increasingly incorporated into the negotiation and implementation of 
international agreements, decision-making processes and land-use planning. 
In Canada, for example, TEK is a required part of various  environmental im-
pact assessments.48 When TEK is integrated into science and used in decision-
44 Richards, P. 1993. Cultivation: knowledge or performance? In: An Anthropological Critique 
of Development: The Growth of Ignorance. New York: Routledge, 61-78.
45 Battiste, M. and Henderson, J. 2000. Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Heritage. Saska-
toon Sk: Purich Publishing, 42.
46 Smith 2012.
47 Ibid. 
48 Usher, P.J. 2000. Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Environmental Assessment and 
Management. In: Arctic 3: 183-193.
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making, power relations between diffferent actors, such as Aboriginal people 
and states, impact on the processes. In some cases, western experts accept only 
certain types of information. What is more, Indigenous People feel that their 
knowledge is too often required to fĳit into an existing framework of western 
ideas.49 Many think that diverse knowledge systems should be acknowledged 
and treated as equal to non-indigenous.50 Novel approaches for the inclusion 
of diverse knowledge systems have been unraveled. They include dual based 
evidence and knowledge co-production. The dual based evidence is an ap-
proach where science and other knowledge systems are validated in parallel 
using separate protocols. Co-production of knowledge is a process where re-
search questions are formulated after co-operation between indigenous and 
western scientists, and collaborative methods are used for data gathering.51 
These approaches require that indigenous knowledge be recognized as a disci-
pline or methodology in its own right.
Integration of TEK into decision-making processes, scientifĳic programs and 
studies is often done through a validation process. This is based on the idea 
that indigenous knowledge can only benefĳit societies, if it has gone through 
scientifĳic validation, while science remains the gatekeeper of knowledge.52 
Again, validation processes have an impact on how TEK is understood, pre-
sented and documented. However, novel approaches to TEK integration, such 
as the co-production of knowledge, require science to be reflected on itself as 
a cultural practice. 
There are diffferent types of knowledge validation designs:
– Empirical validation: if it works, it is good;
– Moral validation: why are things done in a certain way;
– Cultural validation: is the knowledge in accordance with the given world-
view;
– Technical validation: if the right tools and devices are used in the experi-
mentation, the result is true; 
49 See: Nadasdy 1999; McGregor 2004a, 2004b.
50 Helander-Renvall 2011; Tengö, M., Malmer P., Borras, B., C ariňo, C., Cariňo , J., Gonzales, 
T., Ishizawa, J., Kvarnström, M., Masardule, O., Morales, A., Nobrega, M., Schultz, M., Soto 
Martinnez, R, Vizina, Y. (eds.). 2012. Dialogue workshop on Knowledge for the 21st Centu-
ry: Indigenous knowledge, traditional knowledge, science and connecting diverse knowl-
edge systems. Usdub, Guna Yala, Panama, 10-13 April 2012. Workshop Report. Stockholm: 
Stockholm Resilience Centre, 15.
51 Armitage, D., Berkes, F., Dale, A., Kocho-Schellenberg, E., Patton, E. 2011. Co-management 
and the co-production of knowledge: Learning to adapt in Canada’s Arctic. In: Global En-
vironmental Change 21: 995-1004; Tengö et al. 2012: 15-16.
52 Tengö et al. 2012: 15.
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– Procedural validation: validation comes from the protocols which are previ-
ously tried and which have worked.53
The last two types are those on which scientifĳic experimental knowledge is 
built.54 This goes against the traditional model. For validation of  traditional 
knowledge, cultural and moral aspects are central. In consequence, when TEK 
and scientifĳic knowledge are integrated and TEK is validated, it is important to 
ask, whose perception of validation is used and whose knowledge counts, and 
in which context.55 
It should be noted that indigenous communities may also use traditional 
knowledge in combination with western science. For example, Sámi reindeer 
herders combine both types of knowledge tradition in decision-making pro-
cesses and when responding to unpredictable weather events.56 In this con-
text, scientifĳic information is evaluated from an indigenous perspective. So, 
the consideration is whether the given knowledge is useful from a communi-
ty’s point of view. Simpson asks the following question as she ponders the role 
of traditional knowledge in relation to western science: ‘How can researchers 
become allies with Aboriginal Peoples who are advancing their interests?’57 
She notes: ‘Researchers need to examine their internal  environment. They 
need to critically examine and challenge their own biases and assumptions, 
and most of all, they need to listen to the numerous Aboriginal voices already 
present in the literature’.58
It is already suggested earlier that TEK is not solely information or data; it 
is for example also the life TEK holders are living, it is much more than an 
observation, it is something you do, and the way you do it.59 Partly because 
of its intricate nature, there are challenges in the transfer of TEK in research 
and documentation. Krupnik and Ray noted ‘bottlenecks’ in knowledge trans-
fer in studies integrating TEK with science.60 These bottlenecks include the 
following: 1. scientists regard TEK as data, and document only the type of TEK 
which is valuable to their own research, for example observations regarding 
53 Tengö et al. 2012: 15-16.
54 Tengö et al. 2012: 21-23.
55 Ibid.
56 Eira 2012: 74.
57 Simpson, L. 1999. The construction of traditional ecological knowledge: issues, implications 
and insights. A thesis. Faculty of Graduate Studies. Winnipeg, Manitoba: University of 
Manitoba, 95.
58 Ibid: 96.
59 See: McGregor 2004a; 2004b.
60 Krupnik and Ray 2007.
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animal behavior and weather patterns, or changes in the local  environment; 
2. TEK holders are willing to share only part of their knowledge. For example, 
knowledge which is regarded as sacred, is not fully shared. This may have as a 
result that those components of TEK which are relevant to scientists and those 
knowledge parts that TEK holders are willing to share, will in due time consti-
tute offfĳicial TEK. This authenticated TEK is then acknowledged and used fur-
ther in other situations, such as in land use planning or other decision-making 
processes. These components of TEK will be documented and preserved, while 
many other knowledge parts, those difffĳicult to document for various reasons, 
will be excluded from studies, databases and various epistemological displays. 
Another challenge in documenting TEK is constant change. All cultures 
change. TEK is living and evolving knowledge. When TEK is documented, 
it easily becomes ‘frozen’ in time. However, TEK includes both old and new 
knowledge and its continuity is rooted in the past. When discussing traditions 
(here ‘tradition’ is considered to include TEK), also the stability of these tradi-
tions should be taken into account.61 Today in Arctic regions, the temporality 
of TEK is partly determined by the climate warming: Arctic nature is changing 
fast and therefore knowledge founded on it changes at the same rate. In the era 
of climate change, it might even be that indigenous knowledge, which is based 
on constant observations, changes faster than scientifĳic knowledge.62 Smith 
has noted that ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ are interpretive terms, and ‘new’ can take 
on symbolic value as ‘traditional’.63
Silence and Secrecy Surrounding Traditional Knowledge
Many Native Americans and Indigenous People elsewhere use silence as a 
natural and integrative part of their daily communication. Basso writes about 
the function of silence among the Apache people who in social communica-
tion use silence as a legitimate way of dealing with people.64 On some occa-
sions, such as meeting strangers or meeting someone who has lost a loved one, 
one is expected to be silent. Aboriginal people in Australia are comfortable 
61 Noyes, D. 2009. Tradition: Three Traditions. In: Journal of Folklore Research: An Interna-
tional Journal of Folklore and Ethnomusicology 46. 233-268. 
62 See Krupnik and Ray 2007 on Inuit hunter’s knowledge.
63 Smith, M.E. 1982. The Process of Sociocultural Continuity. Current Anthropology 23: 
127-141. 
64 Basso, K. H. 1972. ‘To Give Up Words’: Silence in Western Apache Culture. In: South West-
ern Journal of Anthropology 26(3): 213-230.
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with staying silent during long periods of time.65 Often, silence is preferred; 
for example, in learning situations one is expected to take in information by 
remaining quiet. In this chapter, however, instead of looking at silence as re-
lated to intercommunication, we will outline some aspects of secrecy in the 
Sámi society, mainly in the context of research procedures regarding tradition 
and traditional knowledge. There is secrecy, and the use and maintenance of 
it depends largely on the fact that certain knowledge has defĳinite substantial 
values and other aspects (e.g. spiritual, ecological, identity-related, ethical, 
economic, etc.) linked to it. Secrecy is part of the traditional Sámi way of inter-
action. Therefore secrecy is a frequent tool of communication for Sámi in the 
present-day contexts as well. 
Tacit knowledge is something we know but cannot put it into words. Such 
unvoiced knowing is tacit to such a degree that it is difffĳicult to document or 
transfer to others by verbalizing it. In this sense, ‘we know more than we can 
tell’.66 Much of the Sámi traditional knowledge is learned through a person’s 
own observations, experiences, practices and activities within a variety of 
contexts, and by imitating knowledge holders such as one’s own parents. This 
knowledge is without doubt linked to or based on tacit understandings and 
may not be easily explained and visible to others because it is not formally 
constituted as explicit knowledge expressed for instance through words. It is 
striking that, in many cases, the holders of traditional Sámi knowledge are not 
willing to share their knowledge. In this way, tacit knowledge as part of tradi-
tions is maintained and culturally disconnected from external view. Naturally, 
this may lead people from outside the Sámi society to think that Sámi are de-
liberately silent when asked questions. 
Another reason for this secretiveness of Sámi relates to the risk that out-
siders misappropriate their traditional knowledge, as soon as this knowledge 
becomes oral or published in print, and therefore measures are taken locally 
to prevent the flow of information from the traditional knowledge holders to 
non-members of a Sámi community. As a matter of fact, there is no adequate 
legislation protecting the heritage of Indigenous Peoples from external exploi-
tation: their cultural heritage is considered  public domain. As a result, parts of 
 traditional knowledge become endangered. McGregor writes: ‘While people 
did (and do) share knowledge and while such knowledge changes over time, 
there are often very specifĳic rules that govern this process of knowledge ac-
quisition and transmission. It has never been a trivial matter. In contempo-
65 Walsh, M. 1991. Conversational styles and intercultural communication: An example from 
northern Australia. In: Australian Journal of Communication 18 (1): 1-12.
66 Cf. Polanyi, M. 1966. The Tacit Dimension. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 4-5.
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rary times, however, the rules around knowledge acquisition and sharing have 
changed, and it has become necessary to protect our knowledge’.67
The lack of legal protection of the cultural heritage including its epistemo-
logical components may have negative impacts on the documentation, trans-
fer and maintenance of traditional knowledge. A recent project, the aim of 
which was to give support to traditional  ecological knowledge of Sámi crafts-
women in Enontekiö in Western Lapland, made apparent that those working 
with Sámi  handicraft and participating in the project limited access to their 
knowledge in concrete communication situations within the project. This oc-
curred even if the researcher interacting with these knowledge holders was 
originally from the same area. The main reason for not answering fully the 
questions and sharing traditional knowledge was obviously because issues 
of  intellectual property rights and pattern and design  ownership of the par-
ticipating craftswomen. They felt that there was not enough protection in the 
Finnish legislation for the Sámi handicraft and traditional understandings gov-
erning it.68 Consequently, there seemed to exist a need to regulate the access 
to their knowledge as secrecy is an efffective tool in protection of  traditional 
knowledge. Let us not forget that their handicraft items and knowledge have 
commercial value which can be lost if people from outside the local handicraft 
community know the same things as the members of that community. 
Furthermore, in many parts of the Arctic, TEK and  TK have been heav-
ily politicized and used for instance in resource management, environmental 
movement and climate change argumentation. Many contradictory premises, 
propositions and assessments regarding traditional knowledge may make In-
digenous People concerned when asked about their knowledge. Actually, they 
are to some extent also concerned about the rationality and monopoly of sci-
entists, cultural specialists, and administrators.
Knowledge of  healing and some other aspects of spirituality have not been 
part of public information among the Sámi. Generally speaking, knowledge 
of healers and practitioners of shamanism belongs to the spiritual reality, and 
such knowledge is a constituent of sacred epistemology of truths, manifest-
ing itself through subtle spiritual experiences and practices. Accurate  healing 
knowledge is normally revealed only to some specifĳic individuals of the com-
munity. Hætta writes how  healing knowledge of Sámi is maintained and used 
67 McGregor 2006.
68 Helander-Renvall, E., Alakärppä, I., Markkula, I., Labba, M. 2015. Ekologinen perinnetieto 
Suomen saamelaisalueella. Hankkeen loppuraportti [Traditional ecological knowledge in 
Sami homeland region in Finland. Project fĳinal report] Arctic Centre, University of Lap-
land.
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by chosen individuals, those who ‘know more than others’.69 Those who know 
are often reluctant to talk openly about their insights. This is because  heal-
ing knowledge is handed down from parents to their children, and those who 
become knowledge holders are specifĳically advised not to reveal their skills to 
cultural outsiders because it may result in loss of power to heal.70 Also, Sexton 
and Stabbursvik underline that Sámi healers hesitate to talk about their  heal-
ing experience because it is regarded as an inner experiential knowledge, and 
according to the same conviction, one should not openly talk about it.71
These examples highlight that some members of a local community can 
actually become excluded from parts of  traditional knowledge. However, the 
secrecy is negotiable to some extent. As Hætta explains: The border between 
what is held in secret and what uninitiated people get insight into is not fĳixed 
[…] Even if there is a general norm against claiming to have  healing abilities, 
there are researchers and journalists who have actually gotten insight into rela-
tively deep information about traditional  healing practices. This line between 
the secret and the open can be stretched both ways and how much the knowl-
edge holders are willing to reveal about these things seems to be dependent 
on, among other things: the local tradition, who is asking, and the person who 
is asked’.72 
Locations of sacred places are additional examples of information to which 
outsiders do not necessarily have access.73 Documentation of sacred sites of 
Sámi is a good example of how concepts of secrecy and protection should be 
taken into account when collecting TEK. Within the Sámi homeland region, lo-
cations of sacred sites are widely documented and registered in databases. The 
aim of these databases is to protect the sites. However, opinions among Sámi 
are contradictory. Some feel that a sacred place loses its value or might perish if 
exposed, especially if the site becomes a tourist attraction. Therefore, the best 
way to protect the sites is to keep the locations secret. As claimed by Norberg 
69 Hætta, A.K. 2010. Secret Knowledge. The management and transformation of traditional 
healing knowledge in the Marka Sámi villages. Master thesis. Tromsø: University of Trom-
sø, 48-49.
70 See Hætta 2010: 48-49.
71 Sexton, R. and Buljo Stabbursvik, E. A. 2010. Healing in the Sámi North. Culture, Medicine 
and Psychology 34(4): 571-589.
72 Hætta 2010: 71.
73 Hætta 2010; Äikäs, T. 2013. ‘Kelle se tieto kuuluu, ni sillä se on.’ Osallistava GIS Pohjois-
Suomen pyhien paikkojen sijaintietoon liittyvien näkemysten kartoituksessa. [The one 
knowledge belongs to, has it. Participatory GIS in documenting views on localizing sacred 
sites in Northern Finland] Master thesis. Oulu: University of Oulu. http://herkules.oulu.fĳi/
thesis/nbnfĳioulu-201306011417.pdf.
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and Fossum, it is possible to make the cultural heritage the group’s own by 
keeping it secret.74 Others argue that it is not possible to protect sacred sites or 
take them into account in land-use planning, if their locations are not known. 
Also, if knowledge regarding the locations and meanings of sacred sites is not 
passed on to younger generations, and is not registered, secrecy may lead to 
loss of sacred knowledge.75
In the Sámi contexts, in particular, registration of sacred  sieidi is controver-
sial.76 Sieidi are for instance sacred rocks, clifffs and wooden objects to which 
Sámi earlier regularly used to make offferings. They are located in places such 
as islands and mountain slopes or in places where people hunt and fĳish, and 
where reindeer migrate. According to a Finnish archaeologist, Antti Lahelma, 
in Northern Finland, there are approximately 100 ‘sieidi’ sacred sites.77 Their 
exact number is however difffĳicult to estimate or count. To some extent even 
today, Sámi continue to have contact with these revelatory places.78 Sacred 
places are still in use. Äikäs writes that, at sacred sites, among the fĳindings of 
post-1950s, there are for instance coins, candles, personal objects, quartzite, 
cigarettes and alcohol.79 In Finland, the National Board of Antiquities main-
tains a database of antiquities, including many sacred Sámi sieidi. There is 
open access to this information. Traditionally among the Sámi, there have been 
strict rules about the use and  access rights of sacred sieidi. Currently, there is 
no exact reliable information regarding these issues. Many questions are open, 
such as who should have the right to visit sieidi rocks, how much information 
should be revealed about them and whether everything should be kept hidden.
As a general rule, it can be claimed that dealing with secrecy and its norms 
can require that a researcher is an active member of the community he or she 
is studying, and that he or she has a relevant knowledge-based and experi-
ence-related position within the community: what would be shared would 
be knowledge learned by living in the local community and through being 
74 Norberg, E., and Fossum, B. 2011. Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Landscape. In: Por-
sanger, J. and Guttorm, G. (eds.). Working with Traditional Knowledge: Communities, Insti-
tutions, Information Systems, Law and Ethics. Diedut 1/11: 193-223, 207.
75 Äikäs 2013: 28-33.
76 Norberg and Fossum 2011.
77 Lahelma, A. 2008. A Touch of Red: Archaelogical and Ethnographic Approaches to Interpret-
ing Finnish Rock Paintings. Vaasa: Waasa Graphics Oy. 127.
78 Helander-Renvall 2014: 249-250.
79 Äikäs, T. 2012. Archaeology of sieidi stones. Excavating sacred places. In: The Diversity of 
Sacred Lands in Europe. Proceedings of the Third Workshop of the Delos Initiative. Inari/
Aanaar, Finland, 1-3 July 2010. IUCN and Metsähallitus, 47-57.
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involved in the local livelihood activities, such as herding and  handicraft.80 
Simpson describes her traditional knowledge as internal environment: ‘Anishi-
naabe knowledge is part of my internal environment, it is part of who I am 
and it comes to me through relationships with family, Elders, spiritual lead-
ers, and interactions with the spiritual to world.’81 For older Sámi people, it is 
challenging to distribute their knowledge to younger Sámi, if these two groups 
do not share those experiences, values and knowledge components that are 
necessary for grasping fully the contents of traditional knowledge.82 Similarly, 
many aspects of  traditional knowledge can be challenging or even impossible 
to describe to a cultural outsider: ‘If you were born by the sea ice, played as a 
child on the sea ice, raised a family on your own by the sea ice, depend on it, 
work with it, think and dreamed about it, day in and day out – how do you 
describe such an integral part of your life, something exotic to most people but 
so familiar to you?’83
Eira who has conducted climate studies in  reindeer herding discusses the 
researcher’s position and its impact on collecting TEK.84 According to her own 
experience, TEK holders are usually eager to talk to a researcher who originates 
from the community. Eira has pointed out though that an insider researcher 
may not be able to ask as detailed and descriptive questions as an outsider re-
searcher.85 Some parts of TEK can be so familiar and self-evident to an insider 
that information is actually left out from the documentation or study. On the 
other hand, an insider may be able to discover the key facts and hidden reali-
80 Helander 1999; Jernsletten, J. 2010. Bissie dajve. Relasjoner mellom folk og landskap i Voen-
gel-Njaarke sïjte [Relations between people and landscape in Voengel-Njaarke village]. 
Avhandling levert for graden Philosophiae Doctor [Ph.D. Dissertation. Tromsö: University 
of Tromso]. Tromsö: Universitetet i Tromsö; Jernsletten, J. 2000. Dovletje Jirreden. Kontesk-
tuell verdi formidling i et sørsamisk miljø [Contextual mediation within a Southern Sami 
environment.]. Hovedfagsoppgave I Religionshistorie [Master´s degree in theological his-
tory]. Tromsø: Universitetet i Tromsø.
81 Simpson, L. 2001. Aboriginal peoples and knowledge: decolonizing our processes. In: The 
Canadian Journal of Native studies 21(1): 137-148. 
82 Cf. Dunfĳjeld Aagård, M. 1989. Symbolinnhold i Sørsamisk Ornamentikk [Symbol contents 
in Southern Sami Ornaments]. Hovedfag i duodji. Oslo: Statens Lærerhøgskole i forming 
[Master´s degree in Handicraft. Oslo: State Teacher College in Design], 154-155; Jernsletten 
2010: 123-126; Norberg and Fossum 2011.
83 Gearheard et al. 2013: xxxiii.
84 Eira 2012: 15.
85 Eira 2012: 14-16.
122 Hel a nder-Ren vall a nd Markkul a
ties of a culture.86 Also, as we have seen for instance in the context of a project 
among the Sámi in Enontekiö, a researcher’s ethnic or local background does 
not necessarily guarantee favorable interview conditions. Other factors may 
strongly influence these situations. For instance, Eira’s comments are about 
climate research. It is obvious, that in relation to some specifĳic topics, people 
are more willing to share and hand out their  traditional knowledge openly to 
others. 
Traditionalization
It has become common to state that traditions refer to those customs and be-
liefs that are handed down from previous generations. Within the Sámi culture 
there are features which are indeed regarded as traditions. They include the 
Sámi language; reindeer herding,  handicraft and other traditional occupations; 
relationship to land; worldview; and cultural expressions, such as songs, sto-
ries, myths, and symbols. Sámi traditions constitute practices, understandings, 
features and particularities that continue to be important for the survival of 
the Sámi as a people. 
A tradition should not be defĳined mainly in terms of boundedness, given-
ness or essence. Hymes chooses the term ‘traditionalization’ to purge the con-
cept of tradition of its static, naturalistic implications’:87 ‘But what constitutes 
‘tradition’ to a people is ever-changing. Culture is not static, nor is it frozen in 
objectifĳied moments in time’.88 
In order to protect and guarantee continuity to culture, traditions are re-
interpreted and recreated, and as we have seen above, for the same reason, 
they may also become disarticulated and kept secret. Change has always been 
there: in this sense, a tradition is an adaptive and selective process of continu-
ity and transformation. We can see this clearly in relation to the Sámi  reindeer 
herding terminology. There are words in Sámi that are several thousands of 
years old, and they originally describe circumstances related to the hunting of 
wild reindeer. But their meaning is now diffferent, and the old words are used in 
86 Menzies, C. R. 2001. Reflections on research with, for, and among indigenous peoples. In: 
Canadian Journal of Native Education. 25(1): 19-36.
87 Hymes, D. 1975. Folklore’s Nature and the Sun’s Myth. In: Journal of American Folklore 88: 
345-69; Handler, R. and Linnekin, J. 1984. Tradition, Genuine or Spurious. In: The Journal 
of American Folklore 385: 273-290.
88 Trask, H. K.1991. Natives and Anthropologists: The Colonial Struggle. In: The Contempo-
rary Pacifĳic 3(1): 159-167.
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diffferent contexts, as the ways of harvesting reindeer have changed. In the sim-
ilar way, the Sámi relationship to land and the rules governing this relationship 
have been maintained even if the land  ownership and usage have changed.89
Tradition can be understood as a symbolic process that both presupposes 
past symbolisms and creatively reinterprets them.90 Cocq considers tradition 
as a basic cultural process which has the political and cultural power to in-
fluence various issues of a society.91 In other words, there may exist political 
claims behind the use and labeling of traditions and traditional practices. All 
this validates the argument that traditionalization can have a signifĳicant im-
pact on the ways TEK is presented and maintained, as traditionalization is a 
process which involves reinterpreting and through which people select valued 
aspects from the past for cultural articulation and custodianship in the pre-
sent.92 Traditionalization is a self-conscious scheme or act which presupposes 
actors and agents.93
In this context, it is interesting to get a glimpse of how Indigenous People 
disarticulate certain traditions and remove them from public display as part 
of their postcolonial strategy. One example is the removal of the Iroquois 
Ga:goh:sah, false face masks from most of the museums of North America.94 
The masks are important for the wellbeing and overall strength of the Iroquois 
people. Accordingly, the masks, symbolize the increasing importance of  tradi-
tional knowledge and the need to maintain its spiritual and epistemological 
paradigm (e.g. secrecy) for the empowerment and  autonomy of Indigenous 
People and their culture. The act of removal of these masks from public dis-
play, and the usage of them in native ceremonials shows that the masks are a 
living tradition: ‘they can be read as attempts to return to earlier traditions that 
turn out not, after all, to be lost’.95 
In some cases, modern traditionalization activities are lifted up to the level 
of institutions and political organizations, where they can get and offfer moral, 
fĳinancial and legislative support. Simultaneously, some traditions and know-
89 Helander 1999; Helander-Renvall 2013.
90 Handler and Linnekin 1984.
91 Cocq, C. 2014. Traditionalisation for revitalisation: Tradition as a concept and practice in 
contemporary Sámi contexts. In: Folklore: Electronic Journal of Folklore 57/14: 79-100.
92 Mould, T. 2005. The Paradox of Traditionalization: Negotiating the Past in Choctaw Pro-
phetic Discourse. In: Journal of Folklore Research 42(3):  255-294.
93 Handler and Linnekin 1984: 287.
94 Phillips, R. B. 2004. Disappearing Acts: Traditions of Exposure, Traditions of Enclosure, 
and Iroquois Masks. In: M. Phillips and G. Schochet (eds.). Questions of Tradition. Toronto, 
Bufffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 56-87. 
95 Phillips 2004.
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ing linked to them become known far beyond local contexts, a development 
which reinforces the meanings of the original and transformed traditions as 
unique, grounded and worth keeping.96 In this manner, as Kuutma states: ‘Ob-
jects and elements of previous cultural experience are transformed into herit-
age as fragments that are decontextualised, in order to recontextualise them 
in a novel situation of representation that transforms them into national or 
ethnic symbols’.97 Kuutma mentions Sámi traditional music, yoik, as an exam-
ple of traditionalization, which when lifted up communicates Sámi heritage, 
identity and cultural knowing both in the Sámi society and outwards towards 
international spheres. Traditions and  traditional knowledge are in this sense 
used in cultural  revitalization.98 Propelled into the Sámi cultural life are many 
new modes of expressions (e.g. theatre, fĳilm, modern pop music, advanced 
information technology, festivals, innovative Sámi clothing, ideas from social 
media), which after a while are or will become entangled with traditions.
Already in the Sámi cultural and political programs of the early 1970s and 
1980s, there were certain cultural features that became stronger: as offfĳicial core 
cultural values have since then been proclaimed, among others, the Sámi lan-
guage, history and origins, and traditional livelihoods. It is obvious that tradi-
tions worth traditionalization and support are selected from the main cultural 
categories of the Sámi people. It is worth keeping in mind that they are or have 
been living traditions, not invented fabrications. One of their tasks, as already 
explained, is to efffectuate and present continuity.
However, the role of traditions as identity marker is important as well. Sámi 
 handicraft,  duodji is an example on traditionalization, as  duodji is a powerful 
identity marker and generator of many traditions, such as language, social rela-
tionships, knowledge of nature,  customary rules, production techniques, aes-
thetic understanding, just to mention a few. Duodji skills and experiences are 
passed on from generation to generation through practice: teaching and learn-
ing may take place for instance when several generations make handicraft to-
gether. On the other hand, currently some craftspersons also take courses to 
learn from other knowledge holders or teachers, and some learning takes place 
through formal education. Ways of  duodji have changed in Sámi society in line 
with changes in society as a whole. Dunfĳjeld Aagård has described how old 
Sámi patterns and symbols have survived in the Southern Sámi handicraft tra-
dition and how these representations are reproduced and reinterpreted in the 
96 Cf. Handler and Linnekin 1984.
97 Kuutma, K. 2006. Changing Codifĳied Symbols of Identity. In: FF Network for the folklore 
fellows 31:7-11.
98 Cf. Berkes 2012:35.
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present.99 These activities have taken place for various reasons through ‘a prac-
tical selection’.100 It is important to understand that some traditions just keep 
living on. For example, Sámi sacred symbols are persistent, as Dunfĳjeld Aagård 
has shown. What has changed is how symbols are interpreted, and the con-
texts in which they are articulated or grounded, as we already have explained 
regarding the  reindeer herding language.
Misuse of Sámi handicraft by the non-Sámi in tourism industry is common 
in Finland. Cheap mass-produced Lapland items are regarded by many Sámi as 
a threat to genuine Sámi handicraft. Especially the Sámi handicraft organiza-
tion Sámi Duodji and Sámi cultural workers, have been actively criticizing this 
type of  appropriation. Today, it is challenging to work as a full-time craftsper-
son, for example due to the income tax which creates further obstacles for the 
survival of  traditional knowledge. Furthermore, many areas where materials 
have earlier been gathered for  handicraft, are now open to external land-use 
activities causing additional problems. Be that as it may, in many ways,  duodji 
is one of those cultural occupations that have gone through a traditionaliza-
tion process: it has become a powerful cultural and political force. Many of 
 duodji’s elements have been selected and reintegrated into the current Sámi 
society. TEK gets a new and varied meaning due these types of actualizations. 
Regarding the political sphere ‘[t]he recognition of Indigenous Knowledge 
coincides with the increasing assertion by Indigenous people of their rights and 
the recognition of these rights by the international community’, as McGregor 
explains.101 However, it needs to be emphasized that traditionalization does 
not mean that things taking place are only or mainly political: ‘a dynamic tradi-
tion includes many diverse activities’.102 Harris has written an article on tempo-
ralities of traditions, in which she counts three diffferent moments or options 
which describe ‘how tradition may be conceptualized’.103 Harris mentions the 
modernist moment, the structuralist moment and the postmodern moment. 
Hawaiian Lilikala Kame’eleihiwa contributes with indigenous temporality, in 
which time has no straight direction.104 Trask explains: ‘In our language, the 
past (ka wa mamua) is the time in front or before; the future (ka wa mahope) is 
99 Dunfĳjeld Aagård 1989.
100 Cliffford, J. 2004. Traditional futures. In: M. Phillips and Schochet, G. (eds.). Questions of 
Tradition. Toronto, Bufffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 152-168.
101 McGregor 2004: 389.
102 Cliffford 2004.
103 Harris, O. 1996. The temporalities of tradition. Reflections on a changing anthropology. In: 
V. Hubinger (ed.) Grasping the changing worlds. London: Routledge, 1-16.
104 Lilikala Kame’eleihiwa 1986.
126 Hel a nder-Ren vall a nd Markkul a
the time that comes after’. 105 Here diffferent western temporalities are blurred, 
and accordingly: ‘Loyalty to a traditional past is, in practice, a way ahead, a 
distinct path in the present’.106 Thus, traditions continue to live and flourish in 
many temporalities, places and ways. 
In some cases, Sámi people bring back old traditions. One example is a 
project of Sámi Duodji called in Sámi ‘Láhppon duojit’ (Vanished  handicraft), 
the aim of which is to seek time-worn handicraft objects in the museums for 
reproduction, reintroducing simultaneously old knowledge linked to them.107 
In some other cases, Sámi have developed their handicraft to attune into the 
modern society. One example is the náhppi, a wooden reindeer milking ves-
sel. Reindeer milking in most Sámi areas has been abandoned. The original 
milking bowls were produced by men and their form was round and deep and 
the handle was shaped for holding the vessel while milking a reindeer doe. 
The milking bowl is still in use, albeit with a diffferent style and purpose.108 It 
is reintroduced to fĳit as a bowl in a modern household to place sugar, plants, 
and other objects into it or as a home decoration. Furthermore, the náhppi 
has been transformed into a piece of art and beyond that also into a commod-
ity. Accordingly, it is used in the context of commercial activity as a souvenir 
or a collector item. In fact, today’s Sámi handicraft is to a certain extent pro-
duced for trade. As the use of náhppi has been changed, it is now constructed 
in a slightly altered way. For example, the handle is diffferent as the bowl is 
no longer used for milking and does not need a strong and particular handle 
to support the milking activity. Worth mentioning is that these days there are 
bowls made also by women. 
A central point here is that the decoration of náhppi has become more im-
portant than earlier, whereas tradition-based understanding of the náhppi’s 
quality has been kept as one of its main criteria. But náhppi are handmade in 
the manner of old times. Thus, one still needs to know how to bring about a 
wooden object: what kind of material is needed and what is the technique of 
production. Consequently, TEK continues to be linked to the production of 
náhppi. 
In the Sámi society there are several institutions that keep an eye on Sámi 
handicraft. The Sámi  duodji association was established in 1975 to promote the 
105 Trask 1991: 164.
106 Cliffford 2004: 156.
107 Inarilainen. 2014. Kadonneen saamelaiskäsityön jäljillä [In search of disappeared Sami 
handicraft]. In: Inarilainen [Inari local newspaper] 10.12.2014. 
108 Guttorm, G. 2014. Náhppi, a ladle for milking reindeer. http://senc.hum.helsinki.fĳi/wiki/
Náhppi.
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interests of the Sámi craftsmen, to strengthen the position of handicraft and 
to monitor the commercial activities related to crafts. It gives advice, arranges 
exhibitions and helps to sell handicraft products. Sámi  duodji  trademark is a 
brand name that was established in 1980s. In Finland, the Sámi  duodji organi-
zation manages the handicraft trademark. The use of the trademark indicates 
to a buyer that a handicraft object is a genuine Sámi artifact and the producer 
of the object is a Sámi. The trademark also reveals the viability of Sámi handi-
craft activity and knowing. By the power of the trademark, the quality of Sámi 
handicraft traditions have been maintained and even improved. There are cer-
tain criteria linked to the right to use the Sámi handicraft trademark. In this 
way, the Sámi handicraft association as the managing organization is able to 
select and interpret certain works and workings, and bring handicraft tradi-
tions from the past to the present. 
In line with Sámi Duodji’s understandings, there are persons within the Sámi 
society who regard themselves as guardians of traditions.109 In the context of 
 duodji, these persons are willing to accept and sustain the rules and ways of 
the Sámi society, and they give their contribution to the effforts of protecting 
and maintaining the traditions. However, many of them also make innovative 
experiments, even if such activities can be kept vague. Sámi clothing is espe-
cially much discussed within the Sámi cultural circles:  gákti, the national dress, 
giving continuity to the Sámi identity, is a very important group marker. The 
making, style, use, customs, and social meaning of gákti turn in discussions 
and practices into a very complex issue whereby many understandings come 
together, coexist and compete. What is more, there are handicraft workers who 
are not willing to fully adopt the Sámi society’s traditional discourse as such. 
Functioning in the borderland between the modern and the traditional can 
be a blessing for them in some ways, and force and help them to be more alert 
and reflective in terms of innovation, skills,  traditional knowledge, and ethnic 
identity.110
109 Magga, S-M. 2010. Vapauden rajat ja ulottuvuudet. Kirjoittamattomat säännöt duodjin ja 
saamelaisen muotoilun mahdollisuuksina ja rajoittajina [Limits and dimensions of free-
dom. Unwritten rules in duodji and Sami desing] Master thesis. Oulu: Oulun yliopisto. 
110 Cf. Magga 2010: 71; see also the interviews of a Sami handicraft person, Jenni Laiti, in Sami 
media, Sápmi 29.1.2015.
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Concluding Remarks
As argued above, there are parts in  traditional knowledge ( TK) that are not 
easy to get a hold of. There is tacit and secret knowledge. On the other hand, it 
seems, that there is lots of information about traditions and traditional knowl-
edge to which local people, researchers and others get efffortlessly access. Re-
searchers who collect and study traditional knowledge, impact the ways such 
knowledge is presented and transferred. If traditional knowing is removed 
from its natural ground, a living life, it may become scientifĳically rationalized 
and transformed into a ‘body of data’, which may be rather inflexible from an 
Indigenous vantage point. Researchers may consider TK only as data, and as 
consequence document only the type of TK which is valuable to their own re-
search. Furthermore, we have been urging that TK needs to be acknowledged 
as a knowledge system equal to mainstream science. In addition, there is rea-
son to support the indigenous strivings to protect TK through legislation as 
it is strongly endangered. What is more, researchers educated in mainstream 
institutions need to reflect on their own theoretical assumptions and method-
ological tools. Indigenous traditional knowledge may help to update western 
science into a wider and deeper understanding of reality for the better future.
The actualization (traditionalization) of specifĳic traditions and ways of 
knowing, seems also to be for Indigenous People a way to manage their knowl-
edge. Traditionalization is a cultural process, in which people choose valued 
aspects from the past for attention in the present. When a tradition is used in 
cultural  revitalization, the traditionalization process is central. Various actual-
izations take place on diffferent levels of the Sámi society. We have described 
Sámi  handicraft,  duodji, to exemplify issues regarding traditionalization. Sámi 
handicraft has been developed into a central Sámi identity marker, modern 
cultural activity, and commercial enterprise. Furthermore,  duodji as organ-
izing unit of various activities related to handicraft has consciously selected 
some components to safeguard and give support to, whereby the knowledge 
linked to it has gained a renewed meaning. Maintenance and delivery of tacit 
and secret knowledge are embedded in this selection approach. 
The reflections in this article hopefully show that continuity and change, 
traditions and modernity, are not necessarily opposite powers: in Sámi soci-
ety they take place simultaneously, in contesting and incorporating ways. They 
are not linear either: there does not necessarily exist a straight road from the 
past into the present or future regarding traditions and traditional knowl-
edge. Tradition is not a wholesale return to past ways either. It is a question 
of maintenance, continuous development, multi-dimensional orientation, ac-
tion, reaction, interpretation, reinterpretation, articulation, rearticulation and 
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disarticulation. In conclusion, there is a need to study and manage traditional 
knowledge in new ways and with respect in order to elaborate how to make 
traditional knowledge more adaptable, accepted and accessible for the future 
generations. Traditions and  traditional knowledge play a signifĳicant role in em-
powerment of Indigenous People. 




This chapter attempts to draw an analogy between the  terra nullius doctrine 
and its efffects on indigenous peoples’ capacity to control their traditional ter-
ritories, and the notion of a so-called  public domain and its impact on who can 
 access indigenous peoples’ respective cultural heritages.
To what extent indigenous peoples2 have established rights over land 
through inhabitation and traditional use has been a concern of international 
law since its inception. It is generally held that the roots of the contemporary 
international legal system can be traced back to the second half of the 1600s. 
The international normative order that then gradually emerged did not only 
support the colonization of indigenous territories. It was indeed developed 
largely for facilitating European imperialism. Section 2 explains how the Euro-
pean states invoked the principle of state sovereignty to proclaim the so-called 
 terra nullius doctrine law, a theory that professed that indigenous peoples – 
due to the nature of their cultures – can hold no rights over land. Since the 
classical international legal system did not embrace human rights norms that 
could place checks and balances on the exercise of sovereignty, it was from 
an international legal perspective unproblematic that states invoked the  terra 
nullius doctrine in order to make legal claims to indigenous territories.
Section 3 articulates, however, how matters changed when, following the es-
tablishment of the United Nations, human rights, including the right to equal-
ity, were integrated into the international legal system. This development chal-
1 This chapter draws from a smaller part of a doctoral dissertation defended by the author 
in 2010 at The Arctic University of Norway – UiT, titled The Saami Traditional Dress and 
Beauty Pageants–Indigenous Peoples’ Ownership and Self-Determination Over their Cul-
tures. The chapter further borrows from another work by the author; Indigenous Peoples’ 
Status in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2016).
2 To be precise, indigenous property rights over land most often vest with indigenous com-
munities within an indigenous people, rather than with the people as such. See further 
Åhrén, ibid. Section 9.1. For consistency, this chapter nonetheless employs the term ‘peo-
ples’ throughout.
© 2017 Mattias Åhrén. isbn 978-90-04-34218-7. pp. 130-148
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lenged the authority of the  terra nullius doctrine, and required a re-evaluation 
of whether indigenous peoples per se lack capacity to hold property rights over 
territories traditionally used.
Sections 4-7 focus on indigenous  intellectual property (similar) rights 
(IPRs), or perhaps rather on the lack thereof. The Sections place a particular 
focus on whether an analogy can be drawn from recent developments within 
the sphere of indigenous land rights, i.e. they survey whether these develop-
ments are, or should be, translatable into the sphere of indigenous peoples’ 
potential rights over their creativity. Section 4 sketches the basic contours of 
the  intellectual property (IP) system. In particular, the section explains how IP 
protection, generally speaking, does not extend to works (i) that are not sufffĳi-
ciently new/original, (ii) anonymous, and (iii) from an IP perspective old. Sec-
tion 5 proceeds to articulate the basic characteristics of indigenous creativity, 
while Section 6 subsequently explores the compatibility between (i) the core 
features of IP, and (ii) the characteristics of indigenous creativity. Finally, Sec-
tion 7 addresses the question posed by the title, i.e. it compares the efffects of 
 terra nullius doctrine on indigenous peoples with those of the notion of a  pub-
lic domain, viewed through the prism of the right to equality. 
2 Classical International Law’s Position on Indigenous Land Rights 
– The Terra Nullius Doctrine
2.1 Generally on the Terra Nullius Doctrine
It is generally submitted that the seed to the international legal system we 
know today was planted in Europe in the post-Westphalian era. Resting heav-
ily on its constitutional principle – that of state sovereignty – the international 
legal order that now took form not only supported colonization of indigenous 
lands, but was actually created for the precise purpose of facilitating and legal-
izing European control over foreign territories.3 The European realms unilater-
ally declared, as was their sovereign right to do, that under international law 
indigenous peoples – due to the very nature of their societies – lack capacity to 
hold rights over land. In other words, the European sovereigns declared indig-
3 W Kymlicka, ‘Beyond the Indigenous/Minority Dichotomy?’, in S Allen and A Xanthaki 
(eds.), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publish-
ing, 2011) 183; J Crawford and M Koskenniemi, International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 15; G Simpson, ‘International law in diplomatic history’, in Crawford and Ko-
skenniemi, ibid. 27. 
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enous territories  terra nullius, i.e although factually inhabited, empty for legal 
and political purposes.4 
The  terra nullius doctrine has two elements. The fĳirst relates to a popula-
tion’s capacity to hold political, or sovereign, rights over a territory, the second 
to its capability of establishing private rights to land. Here, it is the second 
element that is relevant. It professes that to establish private rights over land, 
one must improve on, or add value, to it. British philosopher John Locke is 
often associated with this line of thought. According to him, uncultivated land 
cannot constitute property. Man must transform such land into valuable and 
productive property in order to claim rights thereto. Concepts such as ‘uncul-
tivated’, ‘improve upon’, and ‘add value to’ are, however, clearly not terms of 
art. They are culturally relative, i.e. they only acquire meaning in a particular 
cultural context. Proponents of the  terra nullius doctrine were, however, ig-
norant to this fact. Locke held that only such lands had been improved upon, 
and thus constituted property, that were used for European style agrarian prac-
tices. Lands used in other, less ‘civilised’ (i.e. non-European) manners were, by 
defĳinition, ‘uncultivated’, and their inhabitants as a consequence uncivilized, 
incapable of holding rights.5 
In summary, the European realms invoked the principle of sovereignty to 
proclaim the  terra nullius doctrine law. Putting the norm they had thus cre-
ated into action, they subsequently unilaterally determined that indigenous 
peoples could hold no rights to land as their land uses were ‘uncivilized’, i.e. 
not sufffĳiciently ‘European’. One can say that international law of the era pro-
fessed a ‘dynamic of diffference’ to justify denying indigenous peoples rights 
over land.6
4 While terra nullius with time became the term for a legally and politically empty terri-
tory, Andrew Fitmaurice points to that initially the term was employed to describe ter-
ritories that were not only politically, but in fact literally, uninhabited, most often in a 
Polar context. See A Fitzmaurice, ‘Discovery, Conquest, and Occupation of Territory’, in B 
Fassbender and A Peters (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law 
(2012) 9-11. Still, since terra nullius seemingly is the general term of choice, this chapter 
will employ it as well. 
5 J Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) 72; L Obregón Tarazona, ‘The Civilized and the Uncivilized’, in Fassbender and 
Peters (n 4) 2, 7; Fitzmaurice (n 4) 8; J Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under Inter-
national Law (Transnational Publishers, 2007) 3, 24-26; P Fitzpatrick, ‘Terminal Legality: 
Imperialism and the (De)composition of Law’, in D E Kirby and C Coleborne (eds.), Law, 
History Colonialism, The Reach of Empire (Manchester University Press, 2001) 14.
6 A Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law’ [1999] Harvard International Law Journal 40 24-28.
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2.2 Further on the ‘Dynamic of Diffference’
More specifĳically, the ‘dynamic of diffference’ argument consisted of two main 
elements.
First, generally speaking, indigenous cultures aspire to leave few marks on 
lands used. Clearly, this feature of indigenous cultures sits badly with the Lock-
ean understanding of value-adding. As seen, John Locke and his contemporary 
scholars (and sovereigns) defĳined valuable land – and thus property – in terms 
of European style agrarian lands. In other words, improving on the land was – 
by defĳinition – an exercise of substantially altering the land compared with its 
natural state. Through their practices, indigenous peoples had, on their part, in 
the minds of the Europeans not altered the land in any legally relevant manner. 
That indigenous peoples treasured the land in its natural stage lacked impor-
tance. As mentioned, Locke and his colleagues were blind to cultural relativ-
ism in that sense. 
As to the second part of the ‘dynamic of diffference’ formula, indigenous 
cultures normally orient around the collective, rather than around individual 
members of the group, in manners western cultures, generally speaking, are 
alien to.7 Thus, indigenous lands and  natural resources are commonly com-
munally used, and lands and natural resources are also perceived to vest with 
the collective,8 insofar the people think of lands in terms of rights at all. Also 
this aspect of indigenous land uses squares badly with the Western/European 
idea of land uses and rights. As Western/European cultures are more individ-
ual-centric, rights to land are largely perceived to vest with individuals, or at 
least with identifĳiable groups thereof.9 As a consequence, when the Europeans 
observed indigenous communal land uses and failed to associate particular in-
digenous individuals with particular land areas, it, in their view, allowed them 
to infer that no private rights attached to the land.
To conclude, the method used for maintaining that indigenous land uses 
can per se not result in private rights to land was one of diffferentiation be-
tween cultures. The European sovereigns took upon themselves to unilaterally 
7 S Von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
528.
8 J Gibson, Community Resources (Ashgate Publishing, 2005) 15-19, 29-30, 104.
9 Some might question this assertion with reference to commons. Still, it would appear 
incorrect to refer to commons as recognition of collective property rights over territories. 
Rather, commons can probably, generally speaking, be better described as areas to which 
no private title apply. With regard to commons see, generally, B H Weston and D Bollier, 
Green Governance; Ecological Survival, Human Rights, and the Law of the Commons (2014); 
P Linebaugh, The Magna Carta Manifesto (UC Press, 2009).
134 Åhrén
declare that international law provides that their way of using land results in 
property rights, while land uses not sufffĳiciently similar to their own practices, 
common to indigenous cultures, do not. 
3 Rejection of the Terra Nullius Doctrine
3.1 The Emergence of the Right to Equality
As seen, under classical international law, who could hold private rights over 
land was from an international legal perspective largely a political issue. States 
invoked their sovereign right to ‘subjectively’ determine who could be eligible 
for such rights and who could not, without it being a concern to international 
law. 
During this era, human rights simply did not form part of the international 
legal system.10 Only following the establishment of the United Nations did 
human rights become an integral part of the international legal system in 
earnest.11 Within the contemporary human rights normative order that now 
gradually took form, everyone’s equal value was from the outset considered a 
cardinal principle and norm. Consequently, international law came to outlaw 
practices that discriminate based on among other reasons racial, cultural, and 
ethnic background. The right to equality appears in the Bill of Rights in a man-
ner that underscores the principal importance of the right,12 something that is 
further emphasized by the fact that an entire human rights treaty – the Con-
vention on the Elimination of Racial  Discrimination (CERD) – was devoted to 
the right.
Thus, in sharp contrast to its classical counterpart, the contemporary in-
ternational normative order now came to call for equal treatment in absence 
10 See M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 55; 
A Cassese, International Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 2005) 23-24. That said, 
one might note in passing that already during the classical era, scholars in Europe devel-
oped civil rights theories that with time became an integral part of liberalism (A Eide, 
‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’, in A Eide, C Krause, and A Rosas 
(eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – A textbook (2nd edn., Martinus Nijhofff Pub-
lishers, 2001) 12-13). For considerable time, however, these theories by and large remained 
precisely theories, rather than forming part of the international normative order (Ko-
skenniemi, ibid. 55). 
11 Cassese (n 10) 143.
12 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), arts 2, 7; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, arts 2.2, 26; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, art 2.2.
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of objectively justifĳiable reasons for diffferentiation. Seemingly, the emergence 
of such a norm should create obstacles for states wishing to maintain that in-
digenous peoples – simply by the nature of their cultural practices – lack the 
capacity to hold rights over land. The difffĳiculties associated with pursuing such 
a line of argument becomes even more apparent if one considers the nature of 
the right to property.
3.2 The Nature of the Right to Property
As the right to equality, the right to property was incorporated into the con-
temporary human rights system at its inception. It for instance appears in 
UDHR Article 17 and CERD Article 5 (d) (v). 
It follows from the manner in which the right has been articulated in the 
mentioned and other human rights instruments that the right to property 
known to international law is not a right to be provided with property. Rather, 
it is a right to acquire property on equal basis with others, and, once property 
has been thus acquired, a right not to be arbitrarily deprived of the same.13 In-
ternational law hence largely accepts any domestic position as to what extent 
matter can be subject to private property rights – provided that the law is non-
discriminatory. In other words, the right to property is at its core a particular 
aspect of the right to equality. 
3.3 Implications for Indigenous Communities’ Possibilities to Establish 
Property Rights over Land
As the above alludes to, the inclusion of the right to equality into the interna-
tional normative order, and its intrinsic connection to the right to property, 
should reasonably render it difffĳicult for states to maintain that certain seg-
ments of society, simply by the very nature of their cultures, lack the capacity 
to establish property rights over land. On the face of it, the right to equality 
is simply incompatible with a position that leaves states free to unilaterally 
decide that indigenous peoples’, but not other peoples’, lands are  terra nullius. 
Consequently, following the incorporation of the right to equality into in-
ternational law, domestic and regional human rights courts and institutions 
commenced to formally fĳirmly reject the  terra nullius doctrine as inherently 
discriminatory.14 It became generally accepted that indigenous peoples’ tradi-
13 Compare R Lillich, ‘Global Protection of Human Rights’, in T Meron (ed.), Human Rights 
in International law: Legal and Policy Issues (Clarendon Press, 1984 (reprint 1992)); C 
Krause, ‘The Right to Property’, in Eide, Kause, and Rosas (n 10) 191-2. 
14 For an elaboration on the rejection of the terra nullius doctrine, see further Åhrén (n 1) 
Section 8.3, with references.
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tional land uses in accordance with their own cultural practices do carry the 
capacity to establish property rights. The key word here is ‘traditional’. 
The signifĳicance of the qualifĳier ‘traditional’ becomes clear if one examines 
to what extent indigenous peoples, at this point in time, managed to convert 
the mentioned formal recognition into acknowledgement in practice of prop-
erty rights over territories traditionally used. Because even with the emergence 
of the right to equality as a fundamental international norm, indigenous peo-
ples continued to experience great difffĳiculties when seeking to have property 
rights over land realized. The reason is to be found in how the right to equality 
was understood when it emerged as an international norm. 
At the time of its incorporation into the human rights system, the right to 
non-discrimination only provided for formal equality. It was sufffĳicient (indeed 
expected) that the state provided one educational system, one set of health 
care service etc., if only all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic and cultural 
background, had equal access to such services. In short, the right to non-dis-
crimination only called for equal treatment of equally situations. 
The applicability of this principal understanding of property was not limit-
ed to spheres such as education. It also extended to property right law and pol-
icy. Although states were no longer allowed to have property laws and policies 
in place that formally excluded indigenous cultures from establishing property 
rights over land, a right to non-discrimination that merely calls for equality in 
law still does not require states to accustom property rights laws and policies 
so to provide indigenous peoples with factual equality when it comes to the ca-
pacity to establish such rights through traditional use. The diffference between 
equality in law and in fact can be illustrated with a practical example. When 
the right to non-discrimination merely calls for equal treatment of equal situ-
ations, it is non-discrimination if a Scandinavian farmer and an indigenous 
Sami reindeer herder have equal opportunities to establish property rights 
over land through purchasing a cattle-herd, place that herd within a fence, and 
allow it to graze there for a relevant time period. With this understanding of 
equality, Scandinavian jurisdictions need not extend property right protection 
to land uses that are not ‘sufffĳiciently similar’ to those that are common to the 
majority culture. 
More recently, however, the right to equality has evolved to take on a second 
facet. The right no longer only provides that equal cases be treated equally. In 
addition, those with a diffferent background compared with the majority popu-
lation are entitled to treatment accustomed to their cultural identity.15 This 
evolved understanding of equality has a profound impact on indigenous peo-
15 Åhrén (n 1) Section 6.3, with references.
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ples’ possibilities to have property rights over land recognized. Now, domestic 
jurisdictions may no longer employ property laws and policies derived only 
from land uses common to the majority culture. Rather, such laws and poli-
cies must recognize that if a group has historically used a land area in manners 
common and traditional to its particular culture, this results in property rights. 
This new norm can be illustrated by returning to the Sami  reindeer herding 
example. Now, it is no longer non-discrimination if a Sami reindeer herder has 
merely the same possibility to establish property right over land through en-
gaging in Scandinavian style agrarian practices as a farmer of Scandinavian de-
cent. Rather, it is equality if the Sami reindeer herder has the same opportunity 
to establish a property right over land through practicing nomadic reindeer 
herding in the Sami traditional manner as a Scandinavian farmer has through 
stationary farming.16
The question then becomes, what relevance, if any, does, or should, this de-
velopment within the sphere of land rights have on indigenous peoples’ rights 
over their creativity? 
4 Generally on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)
4.1 The Origin of and Basic Nature of IPRs
IP is no modern invention. For instance, already in 1474 the Republic of Ven-
ice protected a technique for glass-making particular to the republic from the 
use of others,17 arguably an early form of  patent. As to the other IP element 
of central relevance here,  copyright, the notion that printed works should be 
subject to legal protection emerged essentially in tandem with the invention 
of the printing press.18 The world’s fĳirst  copyright act, the Statute of Anne, was 
subsequently enacted in Britain in 1709, followed a few decades later by the 
fĳirst proposal for an international treaty on  copyright protection.19 As to the 
history of national legislation pertaining to patents, the fĳirst domestic patent 
16 Numerous international legal sources afffĳirm that the articulated new understanding of 
equality forms part of international law, as well as that it has the described impact on in-
digenous peoples’ property rights over lands and natural resources. See Åhrén (n 1) Chap-
ters 7 and 8, with references.
17 G Dutfĳield and U Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar, 2008) 6, 
106; By (author) World Intellectual Property Organization, Introduction to Intellectual 
Property, Theory and Practice (1997) 17.
18 By (author) (n 17) 23; G Gregory Letterman, Basics of International Intellectual Property 
Law (Transnational Publishers, 2001) 259; Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 66.
19 Von Lewinski (n 7) 13-14; By (author) (n 17) 24; Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 68.
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act was arguably the English Statute of Monopolies of 1624. Some time later, 
both France and the United States adopted their fĳirst national  patent laws al-
most immediately after their respective revolutions.20 The fĳirst international 
patent treaty – the Paris Convention – was subsequently adopted in 1883.21In 
the present day, IP has been broadly defĳined as legal rights which result from 
human intellectual creativity.22 However, regardless how one defĳines ‘IP’, such 
property is by no means a term of art. There is nothing inherent or manda-
tory that prescribes what forms of human creativity, if any, should be subject 
to rights. On the contrary, to ascribe rights to creativity is a purely subjective 
decision by a lawmaker. IP does not ‘occur naturally’. Rather, it exists only if ex-
plicitly provided for by law.23 Dutfĳield’s and Suthersanen’s observation that the 
term (although not necessarily the concept) actually lacks meaning in its own 
right and is thus, despite attempts to the contrary, in fact objectively undefĳin-
able can therefore be described as an apt one.24 
Already at this point, it is pertinent to underscore that instantly during 
the era when liberals formulated the  terra nullius doctrine and the European 
sovereigns rendered it law, the notion that creativity – as land and  natural re-
sources – should be subject to individual monopoly rights was not only en-
tertained but also practiced. Moreover, as with indigenous territories, it was 
up to the sovereign to decide who was bestowed with rights over creativity. 
In its inherently subjective nature, IP resembles the  terra nullius doctrine. As 
20 By (author) (n 17) 18-19; Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 106-07.
21 Letterman (n 18) 170.
22 By (author) (n 17) 3.
23 Letterman (n 18) 2-3. It falls outside the scope of this chapter to discuss why, against the 
backdrop of the just stated, norms have been created that extend legal protection to hu-
man creativity. For discussions of the most common arguments for (and against) the ex-
istence of IP, see, generally, ibid. 165-73, 256-65; Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 51-60, 
109-112; Gibson (n 8) 85-89; more generally, P Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property 
(Ashgate Publishing, 1996). 
24 See Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 6, 13-16, 18, 48, 78, and compare also Gibson (n 8) 129. 
This feature of the IP system carries an additional implication. It means that this chap-
ter’s presentation of the general contours and features of this system must necessarily be 
an oversimplifĳication. The fact that there is no, and indeed cannot be, any universally ap-
plicable defĳinition of IP implies that each jurisdiction may, and does, defĳine IP diffferently. 
To present the IP system in a generalized and simplifĳied manner is, however, not a prob-
lem for the present chapter, as its ambition is precisely to measure this system’s basic and 
general features and elements–and in particular the notion of a public domain–against 
recent developments within the sphere of indigenous land and natural resource rights. 
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touched upon, the chapter returns to this similarity between the two catego-
ries of rights below.
4.2 The General Elements and Features of IPRs
It is common to divide IP into two broad categories; ‘industrial property’ and 
‘copyrights’. While the subject of  copyright protection should be self-explan-
atory, it might be worth pointing out that the former category includes IP 
mechanisms such as patents and trademarks.25 Copyright, patents, and trade-
marks are generally considered the three most central IP tools. Of these, copy-
rights and patents are the ones most often discussed in an indigenous rights 
context,26 and are also the main focus of this chapter. Very briefly, the basic 
features of these two IP-mechanisms can be described as follows.
Copyrights largely relate to artistic expressions,27 such as music, paintings, 
and clothing. However, not all such creations are copyrightable; rather, only 
new, or original, creations enjoy  copyright protection.28 In other words, the 
creation must be sufffĳiciently dissimilar to already existing works. If a work 
meets the originality criterion and thus is copyrightable, put simply, and set-
ting certain exceptions aside, a  copyright awards the creator with an exclusive 
right to make copies of the work and make those available to the general pub-
lic, and/or to perform or recite the work.29 If a work is copyrightable,  copy-
right protection does, however, like most IPRs, not last in perpetuity.30 From 
the point in time when a work is made publically available, such protection 
normally expires in a number of years defĳined by domestic law following the 
passing away of the creator of the work.31 
25 By (author) (n 17) 3.
26 See Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 13. That said, one might perhaps discern a trend 
among scholars to direct increased attention to trademarks as a IP tool that could poten-
tially protect indigenous creativity. See, generally, D Zografos, Intellectual Property and 
Traditional Cultural Expressions (Edward Elgar, 2010) 50-103.
27 By (author) (n 17) 5.
28 Megan M Carpenter, ‘Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples: Adapting Copy-
right Law to the Needs of a Global Community’ [2004] Yale Human Rights Law & Devel-
opment Law Journal, Vol 7 69; By (author) (n 17) 9, 256; Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 
79-80.
29 Von Lewinski (n 7) 55; Letterman (n 18) 2-3, 257-8; By (author) (n 17) 5.
30 Letterman (n 18) 8-9.
31 A Sterling, World Copyright Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 193-194; Dutfĳield and Suther-
sanen (n 17) 8, 79-80, 97; Letterman (n 18) 257-58.
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For its part, patents provide, similar to copyrights, the inventor with a sole 
right to utilize her or his invention in ways he or she see fĳit.32 However, as with 
copyrights, only inventions that are new, or novel, i.e. sufffĳiciently dissimilar 
compared with already existing inventions, can be the subject to  patent pro-
tection.33 Further, patent protection too, is time-limited. It is normally valid 
for 20 years following the fĳiling for registration, with the possibility to fĳile for 
subsequent protection for an additional 20-year period.34
In addition, both  copyright and patent protection only extend to works that 
can be attributed to an individual creator or, alternatively, to an identifĳiable 
number of creators.35 
4.3 Conclusions as to the Basic Contours of IPRs – The Notion of a 
So- called Public Domain
We have thus established that IP is not a term of art. The lawmaker determines 
what forms of human creativity, if any, are worthy of legal protection based on 
political choice. Creativity that the lawmaker decides should not be protected 
– either not at all or after a certain time-period – is from an IP perspective 
considered to fall into the so called  public domain, and thus free for everyone 
to use, also against the creator’s will. The fact that IP law is as much about de-
ciding what should not be protected as about what should be implies that the 
notion of a public domain is integral to the IP system.36
As further described, when determining the scope of IP protection – and as 
a consequence at the same time conversely that of the public domain – law-
makers have (in addition to deciding that certain forms of creativity should not 
be protectable per se) generally held that creativity with certain characteristics 
shall be disqualifĳied from IP protection. First, generally speaking, IPRs do not 
lend themselves to anonymous works. IP-protection presupposes an identifĳi-
able creator or group of creators where the membership is known. Second, IP-
protection does not extend to creativity that is not sufffĳiciently original or novel 
– as measured against already existing and known human creativity. Or to put 
it diffferently, one may not receive IP protection with regard to works that have 
32 Letterman (n 18) 166.
33 Carpenter (n 28) 69; Letterman (n 18) 5, 9, 165.
34 Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 112-13, 128; Letterman (n 18) 166.
35 David Lea, Property Rights, Indigenous Peoples and the Developing World: Issues From Abo-
riginal Entitlement to Intellectual Ownership Rights (Martinus Nijhofff Publishers, 2008) 
263; Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 12.
36 A Chander and M Sunder, ‘The Romance of the Public Domain’ [2004] California Law 
Review, Vol 92 1340; Letterman (n 18) 257.
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not sufffĳiciently ‘improved upon’, i.e. are not sufffĳiciently dissimilar compared 
with, the bulk of already existing creativity. Finally, even if a work did at a time 
qualify for IP-protection, the protection will normally expire following the 
passing of a certain time-period. As a consequence, central elements of a par-
ticular culture will in all likelihood most often not enjoy IP-protection today, 
since one can expect such elements to be ‘old’, for IP purposes.
The question then becomes, how well do the articulated basic contours of 
IPRs match the characteristics of indigenous creativity?
5 The General Characteristics of Indigenous Creativity
Indigenous creativity tends to be a result of continued reworking of already 
available and known material. Generally speaking, it is marked by a dynam-
ic interplay between old and new, evolving at ‘slow pace’. As a consequence, 
indigenous ‘new’ collective creativity often contains substantial elements of 
already existing and from an IP perspective already disseminated ‘works’,37 
with relatively marginal additions being made at any given time. Innovation is 
restricted, as faithful reproduction of the indigenous people’s culture is often 
important. Art can be viewed as a means to communicate history, culture etc. 
wherefore the artist is bound by respect for the tradition and is not given free 
rain for inspiration, sometimes to the extent that it is not even possible to dis-
cern a ‘new work’ from the existing bulk of cultural elements springing from 
the indigenous people in question.38 
That said, it should be underlined that the above is a general description of 
indigenous creativity, perhaps even overly so. Clearly, there are examples of in-
digenous individuals creating matter that might be inspired by the individual’s 
37 The same knowledge of for instance the properties of a plant, and also other forms of 
creativity, can of course be generated by more than one indigenous people independent 
of one another when the same plant or other properties are found in several indigenos 
territories. Legal issues pertaining to such ‘shared’ knowledge or expressions is, however, 
outside the scope of this chapter. 
38 T Kongolo, Unsettled International Intellectual Property Issues (Kluver Law International, 
2008) 42; Carpenter (n 28) 54, 69-70; T Cottier and M Panizzon, ‘A New Generation of IPR 
for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge in PGR for Food, Agricultural, Pharmaceuti-
cal Uses’, in S Biber-Klemm and T Cottier (eds.), Rights to Plant Genetic Resources and 
Traditional Knowledge: Basic Issues and Perspectives (CABI, 2006) 216; Von Lewinski (n 7) 
529-30; A Lucas-Schloetter, ‘Folklore’, in S Von Levinski (ed.), Indigenous Heritage and In-
tellectual Property: Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (2nd ed, Kluver 
Law International, 2008) 384-85.
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cultural background, but which are still distinctly diffferent from already exist-
ing ‘works’ in that culture.
Further, as mentioned, indigenous cultures tend to place signifĳicant empha-
sis on the collective, in a manner and to an extent not usually found within 
other societies. This aspect of indigenous cultures and societies is no less pre-
sent within the sphere of creativity. As seen, indigenous authorship and in-
novations can, generally speaking, be said to have a collective dimension, in 
the sense that the individual creator normally build on and remains true to the 
pre-existing culture. Against this background, it is only natural that indigenous 
peoples, including the individual author, often view elements of their creativ-
ity to vest with the collective, rather than with individual members thereof.39 
As Michael Blakney observes, with reference to the cultures of the Aboriginal 
peoples of Australia, ‘if the beliefs and practices of Australian indigenous peo-
ples are any guide, authorship may reside in pre-human creator ancestors… 
[a]uthorship is replaced by a concept of interpretation through initiation.’40 
As a consequence of these aspects of indigenous creativity it might be dif-
fĳicult, indeed impossible, to attribute elements of an indigenous culture to one 
or more identifĳiable individuals within the group. Indeed, since individual au-
thorship tends to be of limited relevance to indigenous cultures where creativ-
ity is often distinguished by it being attributable to the community,41 elements 
of such peoples’ creativity are not uncommonly of anonymous origin, i.e. the 
individual creator/s is/are unknown. 
6 Compatibility between the Basic Features of IP and the 
Characteristics of Indigenous Creativity
If one compares the basic features of IPRs and the general characteristics of in-
digenous creativity, it would appear clear that that the former legal framework 
is not particularly suited to protect the latter form of creativity, for three, but 
39 See Von Lewinski (n 7) 528; S Biber-Klemm and D Szmura Berglas, ‘Problems and Goals’, 
in Biber-Klemm and Cottier (n 38) 18-19; Gibson (n 8) 104; G Dutfĳield, Intellectual Property, 
Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (Earthscan, 2004) 101. Again, this might 
be somewhat of an oversimplifĳication. The fact that indigenous peoples tend to view their 
creativity to west with the collective need not preclude that customary norms prescribe 
that certain elements of the creativity are to be controlled by groups or individuals within 
the indigenous society. See e.g. Dutfĳield, ibid. 95. 
40 M Blakney, ‘The Protection of Traditional Knowledge under Intellectual Property Law’ 
[2000] European Intellectual Property Review, Vol 22 251-52.
41 Von Lewinski (n 7) 529-30.
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interrelated, reasons which are all rooted in the collective nature of indigenous 
creativity, as opposed to the individualistic focus of conventional IPRs. 
First, the fact that indigenous creativity tends to be marked not so much 
by original ideas of the individual author, but rather by a slow reworking of 
already existing material, wherefore a ‘new’ work regularly contains substan-
tial elements of material that already exists within that particular indigenous 
culture necessarily results in an apparent risk that the work is not considered 
sufffĳiciently original or novel for IP purposes. As a consequence, it will not be 
eligible for IP protection.42 
Second, the collective dimension of indigenous peoples’ creativity, resulting 
in it often being difffĳicult to attribute particular elements of indigenous cul-
tures to one or more identifĳiable individuals, may often lead to the conclusion 
that the author of the work is unknown for IP purposes and as such not IP 
protectable.43
In addition to the miss-match between conventional IPRs and indigenous 
creativity caused by their individualistic and collective nature, respectively, 
the fact that most IPRs are time-limited also renders much indigenous creativ-
ity ineligible for IP protection. The slow speed at which indigenous cultures 
evolve, where small bricks are added to existing bulk of creativity, results in, 
generally speaking, that major parts of indigenous creativity have been created 
‘long ago’, if measuring against an IP yardstick, and are as a result in the  public 
domain. Moreover, this bulk is likely to include the most central, and most 
culturally important, elements of indigenous peoples’ culture, as these are pre-
sumably the fundamental building blocks upon which the small bricks of crea-
tivity have subsequently been added. As a consequence, the IP-system leaves 
the underlying creative mass of indigenous peoples’ cultures unprotected.44 
The conclusion thus becomes that for the outlined reasons, indigenous cre-
ativity is largely ineligible for IP protection, but rather falls into the so called 
public domain. As a consequence, irrespective of that the cultural elements 
can be clearly attributed to a particular indigenous people, non-indigenous 
lawmakers have decided that such elements shall nonetheless be free for eve-
ryone to use, also against the direct objection of the indigenous people. 
42 Dutfĳield (n 39) 104. 
43 Dutfĳield (n 39) 101, 104; Carpenter (n 28) 54, 67-68; Von Lewinski (n 7) 529-30; Cottier and 
Panizzon (n 38) 216-18; Kongolo (n 38) 43; Lucas-Schloetter (n 38) 386-88; Biber-Klemm 
and Szmura Berglas (n 39) 18-19. 
44 Dutfĳield (n 46) 101, 104; Gibson (n 12) 8-9, 118, 124; Kongolo (n 45) 42; Carpenter (n 34) 54, 
69-70; Cottier and Panizzon (n 45) 216; Lucas-Schloetter (n 45) 384-85; Von Lewinski (n 11) 
531. 
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Generally speaking, the articulated conclusion fĳinds support in the doctrine. 
Johanna Gibson infers, with reference to  copyright, that IP ‘is an inadequate 
means of protection [for indigenous creativity] because of its limited duration, 
its attachment to individual authors… and its requirement of originality’.45 
In the same vein, Silke Von Lewinski notes that as a rule, ’[indigenous  tradi-
tional cultural expressions are] not protected by classical  intellectual property 
rights’.46 Terri Janke contrasts rights over creativity in indigenous customary 
legal systems with IP law. She notes that while the latter legal system ‘grants 
economic rights which are individual rights’, indigenous peoples’ rights tend–
in accordance with their own legal traditions–to be collective in nature…’.47 
Similarly, Peter Drahos notes that ‘[p]roperty rules, more than most rules, are 
rooted in the fundamental morality of a given society. Western  copyright laws, 
for instance, reflect a view of art that promotes the importance of individual 
creativity and individual rights…’.48 See in this context also some of the refer-
ences already referred to above.49 
In summary, the property rights regime that governs what forms of human 
creativity should be subject to property rights – the IP regime – takes the same 
position towards indigenous creativity today as it did historically, i.e. it largely 
leaves such creativity unprotected. The question then becomes; how well does 
this position – and in particular the notion of a  public domain – sit with the 
contemporary understanding of the right to equality? 
45 Gibson (n 8) 77, 123 (quote from this page), 124.
46 Von Lewinski (n 7) 527, 534 (quote from this page).
47 T Janke, ‘Don’t Give Away Your Valuable Cultural Assets: Advice for Indigenous Peoples’ 
[1998] Indigenous Law Bulletin 8 9. 
48 Drahos (n 23) 15.
49 That the present IP regime is not well equipped for protecting indigenous creativity is fur-
ther reflected in the deliberations undertaken under the auspices of the World Intellectu-
al Property Organization’s (WIPO) Intergovernmental Committee on Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC). Within the IGC, member states are negotiat-
ing legal instruments that, if adopted, would extend IP similar protection to traditional 
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions generated by indigenous peoples. Clearly, 
such an undertaking had not been necessary had it been generally held that convention-
al IPRs do sufffĳiciently protect indigenous creativity. See reports from the IGC sessions, 
WIPO documents WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1-29. In this context see also, more generally, Gibson 
(n 8) 73-126. 
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7 The Compatibility between the Right to Equality and the Notion 
of a Public Domain as Applied in an Indigenous Peoples’ Context
7.1 Introduction
As seen, the right to equality did not form part of classical international law, 
which left sovereigns free to politically formulate a law that professed that in-
digenous peoples were incapable of possessing property rights over land. By a 
similar token, we further saw that to what extent rights should vest in human 
creativity was also a political decision, and that the IP system that emerged in 
parallel with the  terra nullius doctrine became geared towards Western, rather 
than indigenous, forms of creativity. The justifĳication used in both instances 
was one of distinction. Argued dissimilarities between both indigenous land 
uses and forms of creativity, on one hand, and Western practices, on the other, 
was used to disqualify the former from property rights, although, as touched 
upon, the argument was more explicitly made in the land rights context. 
As further seen, however, equality emerging as a fundamental principle 
and right has, within the sphere of land rights, resulted in a conclusion that 
to what extent indigenous peoples hold property rights over lands and  natural 
resources is no longer only a matter of the will of the sovereign, but predomi-
nantly of human rights. This development begs the question; if the extent to 
which indigenous peoples may exercise control over lands traditionally used 
has become a question of equality, should it not the same be true with regard 
to creativity traditionally created? In other words, is there any legally relevant 
rationale that motivates that one distinguishes between the two categories of 
subject matter? Unless such a rationale can be identifĳied, one can perhaps ex-
pect international law to recognise indigenous peoples’ right to control not 
only their traditional lands, but also their  traditional knowledge and  tradition-
al cultural expressions?
7.2 On the Relevance of Comparing Property Rights over Land and IP
At fĳirst glance, it might appear far-fetched to compare IPRs with property 
rights over lands and natural resources in the suggested manner on the ground 
that lands, on one hand, and human creativity, on the other, are two funda-
mentally diffferent subject matters. And indeed, from a factual point of view it 
is difffĳicult to imagine two subject matters more distant from one another. The 
former is rock steady, while the latter need not necessarily even be fĳixed in a 
 tangible form. Many forms of creativity can be reproduced in infĳinity,50 where 
50 P Cullet et al., ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Plant Genetic Resources, and Traditional 
Knowledge’, in Biber-Klemm and Cottier (n 38) 113-14.
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each copy is equally representative of the creator’s production. A real estate, 
on the other hand, is a unique piece of property. It cannot be reproduced or 
otherwise copied. There is simply only one ‘version’ of it. It is surely possible to 
make the list over diffferences between lands and creativity longer.
Irrespective of how long the list, however, the distinction between land and 
human creativity remains one of fact, and not law. As seen, the right to prop-
erty is at its core a particular aspect of the right to equality, where each legis-
lator stands free to determine what sorts of subject matter should be eligible 
for property rights. Once the legislator has identifĳied the subject matters to 
which property rights may attach, the right to property must however – under 
the right to equality – apply equally to all such thus identifĳied categories of 
subject matters, irrespective of how factually diffferent they may be. One could 
perhaps say that in a ‘pre-property right stage, subject matter difffer widely, but 
once the legislator have made the various forms of matter subject to property 
rights, they are from a legal perspective generic. It follows that it is simply the 
role of domestic law to determine whether land, human creativity, and other 
subject matter, are so fundamentally diffferent that one should be subject to 
property rights and the other not. To conclude, the fact that human creativity 
factually distinguishes itself from lands and  natural resources is not necessar-
ily a rationale for legally distinguishing between the two categories of subject 
matter. 
The just inferred would seem to argue for that, as it has been fĳirmly argued 
for here everyone – indigenous and non-indigenous alike – must have the 
same possibility to establish property rights over land, the same should be true 
with regard to creativity, insofar the legislator determines that both categories 
can in general be subject to private rights. 
7.3 The Public Domain – Terra Nullius Revisited?
As touched upon, diffferent compared with the  terra nullius doctrine, little sug-
gests that the  public domain was deliberately construed to accommodate for 
‘legal’ European acquisition of elements of other peoples’ cultures. Irrespec-
tive of a lack of intent, however, the public domain has a very similar efffect on 
indigenous peoples’ rights over their collective creativity, compared with the 
efffects the  terra nullius doctrine has had on their rights over lands and natural 
resources. As with classical real estate law, framing IPRs with the structure and 
social patterns of the European society in mind has resulted in such rights of-
fering limited protection to human creativity common to indigenous cultures. 
The result is that the idea of a public domain caters for  misappropriation of 
indigenous peoples’ collective creativity, in a fashion comparable to how the 
notion of  terra nullius allowed the ‘legal’ occupation of indigenous territories 
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by others. Indeed, the contact areas between the  terra nullius doctrine and the 
notion of a public domain are even broader. As alluded to, the ‘dynamic of dif-
ference’ that has been applied to indigenous lands and creativity, respectively, 
is largely the same.
As seen, the  terra nullius doctrine professes that to establish property rights 
over land, the use must have ‘improved’ on the land, i.e. the land must have 
been made sufffĳiciently distinguishable – or ‘original’ if one wants – compared 
with the land prior to use. There is a clear resemblance between this crite-
rion and the IP novelty/originality criterion, which requires that a work is suf-
fĳiciently distinguishable from pre-existing works for a right to attach to it. The 
comparison limps, in the sense that under real estate law one judges whether 
the work is sufffĳiciently ‘original’ based on a comparison with a particular ob-
ject, i.e. that particular land-patch prior to use. By contrast, in an IP context the 
measurement is with all previously existing creativity. But the comparison is 
on the mark in that in both instances, it is the indigenous people’s work that is 
deemed not sufffĳiciently original to result in rights. In the context of ‘Western’ 
real estate law, the indigenous people’s work does not render the land area suf-
fĳiciently original compared with the land area prior to the indigenous people 
working on it. In the context of IPRs, the work is not sufffĳiciently original com-
pared with the indigenous people’s previous ‘works’. 
In addition, we saw how the fact that indigenous peoples’ land uses tend to 
be communal in nature where it is often not possible to attribute a particular 
land area to a particular individual or groups of individuals squared badly with 
more individualistic non-indigenous agrarian practices. This was what the Eu-
ropean states used to ‘legitimise’ declaring these territories  terra nullius as the 
Europeans failed to identify the individual right-holders intrinsic to their legal 
systems. Comparably, we further saw how indigenous creativity too tends to 
be communal in nature. As a consequence, it is often not possible to attribute 
a particular cultural element to an individual or an identifĳiable group of in-
dividuals within the indigenous people. Against this backdrop the creativity 
is from an IP perspective deemed anonymous and not eligible for protection. 
Rather, it is held to be in the public domain.
Again, similar observations have been made previously. Graham Dutfĳield 
notes the parallels one can draw between  terra nullius and the  public domain. 
He observes that the collective nature of indigenous creativity has led non-
members to treat such as ‘res nullius’, a term otherwise normally associated 
with land, before being ‘discovered’ by others.51 Johanna Gibson concurs that 
IP leaves indigenous creativity without protection through ‘criteria set by west-
51 G Dutfĳield, ‘The Public and Private Domains’ [2000] Science Communication, Vol 21 No 3.
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ern styles of knowledge generation and western concepts of innovation and 
creativity’.52 Also, Megan M Carpenter draws a direct parallel between juris-
prudence pertaining to property rights to land, on one hand, and to IPRs, on 
the other.53 
In this context, it is worth noting that John Locke’s theory that each owes the 
products of her or his labour was in fact not restricted to land. Rather, Locke’s 
argument was a more general one, and embraces creativity. According to him, 
if one adds value to the existing bulk of creativity, one ought to be in  posses-
sion of a property right, based on the same basic principle that adding value to 
land results in a property right to such subject matter.54 As John Locke’s theory 
was previously held equally relevant to indigenous lands and creativity, respec-
tively, perhaps it is time to acknowledge that it is eqaually irrerelevant to these 
two forms of subject matter today?
In conclusion, within the sphere of land rights, the  terra nullius doctrine has 
recently been rejected as inherently discriminatory. Rather, it has been estab-
lished that the right to equality requires that property right protection extend 
also to indigenous peoples’ traditional land uses. That indigenous land uses are 
collective in nature and do not signifĳicantly ‘improve’ on the land from a con-
ventional western legal perspective is no longer a legally relevant argument for 
leaving the land unprotected. There is seemingly no valid argument that speaks 
for – and this is the main argument of this chapter – that in a corresponding 
manner, the right to non-discrimination should not equally guide our under-
standing of property rights over indigenous creativity. The only rational con-
clusion seems to be that, in an indigenous context, the  public domain should 
face a destiny similar to that of the  terra nullius doctrine. Recent developments 
within international law seem to provide that the nature of indigenous creativ-
ity is no longer a legitimate reason to declare such to be in the public domain 
and free for others to misappropriate. The logical conclusion seems rather to 
be that indigenous peoples’ traditional manners in generating creativity are 
equally worthy of protection as practices common to non-indigenous cultures.
52 Gibson (n 8) 130. 
53 Carpenter (n 28) 64-66.
54 Von Lewinski (n 7) 37; Dutfĳield and Suthersanen (n 17) 259.
An Ontological Politics of and for the Sámi Cultural 
Heritage – Reflections on Belonging to the Sámi 
Community and the Land
Sanna Valkonen, Jarno Valkonen and Veli-Pekka Lehtola
1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to consider certain particular practices of belonging 
as integral aspects of the  intangible cultural heritage of the Sámi, an Indig-
enous people. The two practices to be discussed are vital social and  customary 
law institutions1 of the Sámi: the kinship-based practice of ethnic recognition 
and the particular relation of the people to the land. Both institutions have 
become heavily politicized and objects of external defĳinition during recent 
decades in Finland. We analyse them both in the light of the discourse on in-
ternational legal cultural heritage and as fundamental ontological elements of 
Sámi society. Our analysis draws on the work of R. Harrison,2 who in studies of 
Indigenous Australians has examined safeguarding of the cultural heritage as 
ontological politics, a politics in which choices are made from the past, in the 
present, for the future. Following Harrison, we consider protection of the Sámi 
cultural heritage as ontological politics, as politics for assembling a particular 
future.
The general aim of preserving cultural heritage is to maintain cultural di-
versity in the face of growing globalization.3 The importance of the cultural 
heritage is seen as lying not in its manifestations but rather in the wealth of 
knowledge and skills that is transmitted through it from one generation to the 
1 About the concept of institution, see A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the 
Theory of Structuration (Polity Press 1984).
2 R. Harrison (2015) ‘Beyond “Natural” and “Cultural” Heritage: Toward an Ontological Poli-
tics of Heritage in the Age of Anthropocene’ [2015] Heritage and Society, Vol. 8 No. 1, 24-42; 
See also R. Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches (Routledge 2013).
3 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) <http://portal.unesco.org/en/
ev.php-URL_ID=13179andURL_DO=DO_TOPICandURL_SECTION=201.html> accessed 8 
January 2016; UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Herit-
age (2003) <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17716andURL_DO=DO_TOPI-
CandURL_SECTION=201.html> accessed 78 January 2016; F. Lenzerini (2011) ‘Intangible 
Cultural Heritage: The Living Culture of Peoples The European Journal of International 
Law Vol. 22 no. 1., 101-120.
© 2017 Sanna Valkonen ET AL., isbn 978-90-04-34218-7. pp. 149-174
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next.4 In addition, it is often argued that heritage needs to be preserved to en-
sure that future generations can remember where they come from.5 The pur-
pose of preserving the cultural heritage is to transmit the heritage from past to 
present in a manner that ensures its future survival.
The principal focus in safeguarding a people’s cultural heritage is generally 
on identifying past customs which clearly reflect the people’s tradition. This 
orientation manifests itself in the ways in which the cultural heritage is dealt 
with and understood in the institutional practices that seek to safeguard the 
cultural heritage and that thus confĳine the discourse to that frame. For exam-
ple, the  UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the  Intangible Cultural 
Heritage stipulates that states are to preserve, identify, document and prepare 
inventories of the intangible cultural heritage and to protect and foster its en-
hancement.6 Thus, an intangible cultural heritage worth safeguarding com-
prises only elements that can be classifĳied, measured, quantifĳied, documented, 
and inventoried. These practices are the ways in which a heritage is rendered 
“safeguardable”. 
The process of safeguarding a cultural heritage thus involves interpretations 
and, fĳinally, produces common understandings of what a cultural heritage is 
and how it can be managed. This approach prompts the question whether the 
safeguarding of a cultural heritage is predominantly preserving elements, tra-
ditions and practices which existed in the past and which in the present are 
considered important for the particular group’s identity and existence. Or is 
what we see here rather the construction of the relation between the present 
and the future? It will be our contention in this chapter that safeguarding a 
people’s cultural heritage is primarily a process of producing the future; that 
is, it can be seen as an ontological politics for the future. Building on the work 
of R. Harrison, we approach preservation of heritage as ontological politics, 
fundamental for which is the recognition of ontological plurality, namely, “that 
diffferent forms of heritage practices enact diffferent realities and hence work to 
assemble diffferent futures.”7
This kind of approach emphasizes the fundamental contingency of the cul-
tural heritage – heritage is “neither ‘fĳixed’ nor ‘inherent, but emerges in dia-
4 F. Lenzerini, 2011, 102.
5 E.g. Promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples with respect to their 
cultural heritage. Study by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A/
HRC/EMRIP/2015/2. 
6 Unesco Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), art. 2, 
para. 3; art. 11; art. 12.
7 R. Harrison, 2015, 24.
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logue among individuals, communities, practices, places, and things”.8 Heritage 
is thus always a present-day phenomenon, a history of the present.9 Whenever 
heritage is defĳined and interpreted, assumptions are made about the past from 
the perspective of the present. Yet, as Harrison persuasively brings out, inter-
pretation of heritage is never innocent: the perspective of the present allows 
us to choose a range of histories. In other words, the values and power relations 
that prevail in the present determine what we choose as a representation of 
the past in the present as well as what we hope to preserve in the future.10
This conception of safeguarding means protecting cultural features whose 
function does not bear on the present as much as it does – and above all does 
– on the question of what kinds of futures communities want for themselves. 
Traditional elements, traditions and practices selected from the past and con-
sidered worthy of sustaining in the present form a particular assemblage of 
practices and objects, which is called “the cultural heritage”. When this assem-
blage of practices and objects is engaged in and within everyday life, rituals 
or institutional settings, the heritage is materialized as concrete realities for 
people. Accordingly, the diffferent practices of which the heritage is formed 
constitute a diffferent reality and thus always involve the assembling of a par-
ticular future.11
In this chapter, we view certain particular practices of belonging to Sámi 
community as integral facets of the cultural heritage of the Sámi people that 
are, as we argue, essential in assembling Sámi communities’ future(s). In 
other words, we examine the ontological politics of the Sámi cultural herit-
age through an analysis of two vital social and  customary law institutions: the 
kinship-based practice of ethnic recognition and group-making, and the par-
ticular relation of the Sámi to the land. As these are also constitutive parts of 
the political and legal ordering of Sámi society within the mainstream society 
of the nation-state, effforts have been made to render the institutions objec-
tively defĳinable, recognizable and legally valid, and thus viable bases for deci-
sions afffecting Sámi society. From the Sámi perspective, recognition of these 
traditions is important, as they are regarded as having sustained Sámi society 
in the past and as doing so in the present and future: they form the ontological 
basis of the Sámi community. The struggle for the recognition and acceptance 
8 Ibid., 35; H. Cornelius, and G. Fairclough, ‘The New Heritage and Re-shapings of the 
Past’, in A. González-Ruibal (ed.) Reclaiming Archaeology: Beyond the Tropes of Modernity 
(Routledge 2013), 197-210.
9 See M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison (Penguin Books [1975] 1991).
10 R. Harrison, 2015.
11 Ibid.
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of the two traditions can thus be seen as an ontological politics that will shape 
the future of Sámi culture and Sámi communities. 
In the analysis to follow, we discuss the impact of neoliberal rationalities on 
establishing and defĳining Indigenous subjectivity and Sámi rights in Finland. I. 
Altamirano-Jiménez,12 who has analysed the relations between neoliberalism, 
indigeneity, the environment and gender in Mexico and Canada, argues that 
“neoliberal understandings of the self, diffference, the economy, and the  envi-
ronment have shaped state practices and articulations of indigeneity”. Inspired 
by her work, we consider the politicization of belonging to the Sámi commu-
nity and to the land as an interplay of the complex colonial relations and the 
influence of neoliberal rationalities inscribed both in the Finnish state’s policy 
towards the Sámi and in certain interpretations of indigeneity in the country. 
These developments seem to question the ontological basis of Sámi communi-
ties by offfering a diffferent kind of understanding of being Indigenous. 
2 The Rationale for Safeguarding the Indigenous Cultural Heritage
The  UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the  Intangible Cultural Her-
itage, in paragraph 1 of Article 2, defĳines intangible cultural heritage as follows:
practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the 
instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith 
– that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as 
part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmit-
ted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communi-
ties and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with 
nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and 
continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human crea-
tivity.13 
The second paragraph of the article states: “The ‘intangible cultural heritage’, 
as defĳined in paragraph 1 above, is manifested inter alia in the following do-
mains: (a)  oral traditions and expressions, including language as a vehicle of 
the intangible cultural heritage; (b) performing arts; (c) social practices, ritu-
12 I. Altamirano-Jiménez, Indigenous Encounters with Neoliberalism. Place, Women, and the 
Environment in Canada and Mexico (UBC Press 2013).
13 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), 
art. 2, para. 1.
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als and festive events; (d) knowledge and practices concerning nature and the 
universe; (e) traditional craftsmanship”.14 Signifĳicantly, the elements chosen 
for consideration in the Convention are confĳined to those that are “compat-
ible with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the 
requirements of mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, 
and of sustainable development”.15
Finland ratifĳied the Convention in 2013. The instrument obligates states 
parties to preserve, recognize, document and draw up inventories of the  in-
tangible cultural heritage. Safeguarding also requires protection, research and 
enhancement of that heritage. Implementation of the Convention in Finland 
is the responsibility of the National Board of Antiquities. However, the former 
president of the Sámi Parliament, Juvvá Lemet (Klemetti Näkkäläjärvi) has 
proposed that management of the Sámi intangible cultural heritage should be 
entrusted to the Sámi Parliament, arguing that the Finnish Constitution, the 
 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) and Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) point to such an 
arrangement. He has also pointed out that “the intangible cultural heritage in 
the case of Sámi culture cannot be safeguarded merely by storing documents 
telling about it or other archival and  museum records or by doing research on 
Sámi culture. The protection of the Sámi intangible cultural heritage requires 
that its maintenance be supported through funding, administrative solutions 
and improved legislation”.16
A study by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
( EMRIP) study titled “Promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous 
peoples with respect to their cultural heritage”17 has noted that one can see 
increased attention to and recognition of the relationship between communi-
ties and cultural heritage. The report also points out that the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society defĳines 
cultural heritage as “a group of resources inherited from the past which people 
14 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), 
art. 2, para. 2.
15 F. Lenzerini, 2011.
16 Juvvá Lemet, K. Näkkäläjärvi. Puhe eduskunnan sivistysvaliokunnalle Unescon aineet-
toman kulttuuriperinnön suojelusopimuksen ratifĳioimisesta 15.11.2012 [Speech about the 
ratifĳication of the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding the Intangible Cultural Her-
itage to the Parliament Committee in 15 November 2012] <http://www.samediggi.fĳi/index.
php?option=com_docmanandtask=cat_viewandgid=209andItemid=99999999andmosm
sg=Yrit%E4t+p%E4%E4st%E4+sis%E4%E4n+ei+hyv%E4ksytyst%E4+verkko-osoitteest
a.+%28www.google.fĳi%29> accessed 16 November 2015.
17 A/HRC/EMRIP/2015/2/A/4.
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identify, independently of  ownership, as a reflection and expression of their 
constantly evolving values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions. It includes all 
aspects of the environment resulting from the interaction between people and 
places through time”.18 For her part, the Special Rapporteur in the fĳield of  cul-
tural rights has noted that “cultural heritage should be understood as resources 
enabling the cultural identifĳication and development processes of individuals 
and communities which they, implicitly or explicitly, wish to transmit to future 
generations”.19 
The documentation and classifĳication of cultural heritages referred to in 
international legal discourse has been considered problematic in Indigenous 
contexts.20 It has been stated in many connections that the distinction be-
tween  tangible and  intangible and between cultural and  natural heritages is 
unworkable and even absurd in the case of Indigenous peoples.21 This is also 
noted in the  EMRIP study cited above, which goes on to describe “[i]ndigenous 
cultural heritage is a holistic and inter-generational concept based on com-
mon material and spiritual values influenced by the  environment”.22 
We argue that if there is a true will to safeguard the cultural heritages of 
Indigenous peoples such that future generations can engage with the herit-
age and feel a connection to previous generations, it must be understood that 
indigeneity entail to a diffferent way of conceiving of reality and the world; that 
is, the reality of an Indigenous people is based on a diffferent ontology than 
that underlying the Western way of seeing the world.23 This being the case, 
effforts to safeguard the cultural heritage of an Indigenous people should be 
predicated expressly on the people’s own ontologies and on respect for those 
ontologies. 
18 Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, 
art. 2. Faro, 27.X.2005 Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 199; A/HRC/EMRIP/2015/2/A/4.
19 Report of the independent expert in the fĳield of cultural rights, F. Shaheed. A/HRC/17/38, 
paras. 4 and 6; A/HRC/EMRIP/2015/1/A/5.
20 See e.g. S. Disko in this volume.
21 E.g. ibid.; See also P. Magga and E. Ojanlatva (eds.) Ealli biras – Elävä ympäristö. Saamelai-
nen kulttuuriympäristöohjelma [Living Environment – Sámi Cultural Environment Pro-
gram] (Sámi museum – Saamelaismuseosäätiö 2013).
22 A/HRC/EMRIP/2015/2/B/6.
23 See M. Blaser, ‘Ontology and Indigeneity: On the Political Ontology of Heterogeneous As-
semblages’ [2014] Cultural Geographies, Vol 21(1), 49-58;  T. Ingold, The Perception of the 
Environment. Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (Routledge 2000), 132-152.
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3 Belonging to the Sámi Community – the Kinship-based Practice of 
Ethnic Recognition as Part of the Sámi Cultural Heritage
The kinship-based system of ethnic recognition is an oral and embodied tradi-
tion and a living practice in Sámi society that tells us who we are, where we 
come from and who belong to us.24 The system is a traditional way of know-
ing, maintaining and regulating the cohesion, togetherness and boundaries 
of Sámi communities and is transferred from generation to generation. In its 
richness and subtleness, it can be considered an Indigenous knowledge system 
that is still a functioning cultural practice despite modernization and the so-
cial change that has occurred in many local Sámi communities. 
In the past, groups who were linguistically and culturally Sámi lived rather 
far apart from each other. Importantly, old sources reveal how diffferent Sámi 
groups felt ethnic solidarity even before the Sámi started to organize them-
selves as a political community, as one people, in a movement that began in 
the 1950s. For example, the Deatnu River Sámi described their relationship 
with the Aanaar Sámi using the term lapinsuku (lit. family of Lapps), meaning 
that they felt they represented the same ethnicity. Finns who were familiar 
with Lapland referred to the phenomenon as a “feeling of nationality” shared 
by diffferent groups of Sámi.25 The basis for experiencing a common ethnicity 
was kinship: the diffferent groups located themselves as Sámi through their ex-
tended families.26 Kinship-based ethnic recognition fĳigures quite prominently 
and is very well documented in, among other practices, the Sámi yoik tradi-
tion27 and the reindeer earmarking system.28
24 See e.g. S. Valkonen, ‘The Embodied Boundaries of Ethnicity’ [2014] European Journal of 
Cultural Studies, Vol. 17(2) 209-224; S. Valkonen, Poliittinen saamelaisuus [Political Sámi-
ness] (Vastapaino 2009), 219-226.
25 V.-P. Lehtola, Saamelaiset suomalaiset. Kohtaamisia 1896-1953 (The Sámi and the Finns. 
Encounters in 1896-1953) (SKS 2012), 30-31.
26 Ibid.
27 M. Jouste, Tullâčalmaaš kirdâččij ‘tulisilmillä lenteli’. Inarinsaamelainen 1900-luvun alun 
musiikkikulttuuri paikallisen perinteen ja ympäröivien kulttuurien vuorovaikutuksessa [The 
Interplay of Tradition and Surrounding Culture of the Inari Sámi Music Culture in the Begin-
ning of 1900’s] (Tampere University Press 2011); M. R. Järvinen, ‘Saamelaisten musiikit ja 
musiikkien tutkimus’ [The Music and Music Research of the Sámi] [2011] in I. Seurujärvi-
Kari, P. Halinen & R. Pulkkinen (eds.), Saamentutkimus tänään (SKS 2011), 330-331.
28 K. Näkkäläjärvi, Jauristunturin poropaimentolaisuus. Kulttuurin kehitys ja tietojärjestelmä 
vuosina 1930-1995 [Reindeer Herding in Jauristunturi. The Development of Culture and its 
Knowledge System in 1930-1995](Näkkäläjärvi 2013); K. Näkkäläjärvi, ‘Poron korvamerkit 
yhteisöjärjestelmän perustana’ [The reindeer Earmarks as a Basis of Communal Life]
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To this day, the practice continues to be one of the principal distinguishing 
characteristics of the Sámi sense of community in addition to the Sámi lan-
guages; a considerable body of research can be cited illustrating this, such as 
that on the ethnic identifĳication of the Sámi living in urban environments.29 
The Sámi family and a sense of belonging to it, as well as the Sámi language, 
carry a strong emotional charge. Clearly, not all Sámi know one another per-
sonally beyond the community level, but family networks provide efffective 
links to Sámi living farther fĳield.
The practices of kinship-based ethnic recognition and a sense of communi-
ty are materialized and manifested (and documented) in North Sámi personal 
names. In addition to offfĳicial names, and even in place of them, Sámi have 
known one another best through a family-based name. An example would be 
Lásse-Biera-Sámmol-Máhte, the name of a man named Máhte who is known 
through his father as Sámmol’s son but also through his grandfather (Biera) 
and great grandfather (Lásse). The name one is given by one’s parents does not 
always necessarily come from the father’s side of the family. A son might also 
be named after his mother if she was better-known in the community or in the 
 environment in which the boy is spoken about. An example would be Gádjá 
Nilla: Gádja was a well-known and strong reindeer woman in her community 
in the 19th century, and her son Nilla followed in her footsteps. The same nam-
ing practices apply in the case of girls and women, an example being Jovnna-
Máreha-Máret.30 
Although the European practice of using patronyms has become common 
among the Sámi, Sámi read kinship in another way as well, that is, by male and 
female ancestors going farther back. For example, the Aikios and Helanders 
of the Utsjoki district (family surnames) are known among the Sámi as the 
descendants of Vulleš, who lived in the 1800s; the men and women descended 
from him are all referred to as “vulležat”, a name one can often see in a Sámi 
given name, an example being Vulleš-Jovnna-Máreha-Máret. The Niittyvuo-
pio (surname) family is known as the “Niillasaččat” family, that is, Niillas’s de-
[1999] in J. Pennanen and K. Näkkäläjärvi (eds.), Siiddastallan. Siidoista kyliin. Luontosi-
donnainen saamelaiskulttuuri ja sen muuttuminen. (Inarin saamelaismuseon julkaisuja 
2000), 171.
29 See e.g. A.-R. Lindgren, Helsingin saamelaiset ja oma kieli [The Sámi of Helsinki and Own 
Language] (SKS 2000), 166-190; A. Amft, ‘Etnisk identitet hos samerna i Sverige – en com-
plex bild’ [Ethnic identity of the Sámi – A Complicated Picture] in M. Autti, S. Keskita-
lo-Foley, P. Naskali and H. Sinevaara-Niskanen (eds.), Kuulumisia: feministisiä tulkintoja 
naisten toimijuuksista (Lapin yliopisto 2007), 66-101; S. Valkonen, 2009.
30 V.-P. Lehtola, Saamelainen evakko [A Sámi Evacuee] (Kustannus-Puntsi 2004), 7.
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scendants. Sámi characteristically have detailed knowledge of kinship going 
back three or four generations.
The Sámi naming practice is also a living practice in modern Sámi social 
institutions, as seen in the news broadcasts of Yle Sápmi, the Finnish Sámi’s 
own radio service, which often refer to people using their Sámi names in ad-
dition to their offfĳicial names. For example, the president of the previous Sámi 
Parliament was consistently called Juvvá Lemet (Finnish name: Klemetti 
Näkkäläjärvi).31 The rap artist Nikke Ankara (Niiles Hiirola), who comes from 
southern Finland, was identifĳied as a Sámi and located in his extended family 
through his Sámi name, Niillas Niillasa Káre-Márjjá Merja Niillas.32 
Kinship-based ethnic identifĳication is thus a means by which individuals 
identify with and locate themselves in their community through their family 
and by which the community, for its part, identifĳies and locates individuals as 
its members, most often over two or three generations, but over as many as fĳive 
when a young person is involved (Niillas Niillasa Káre-Márjjá Merja Niillas). 
Sámi communality – being Indigenous in a Sámi sense – is therefore connect-
ed both to the near history and to the present day sense of community which 
the kinship-based practice of ethnic recognition well indicates. This being the 
case, the system of kinship-based ethnic recognition can be considered a cen-
tral element of the living Sámi heritage.
3.1 The Politicization of Being Indigenous – the Question of Sáminess in 
the Era of Neoliberal Governance 
The Sámi in Finland have a constitutionally safeguarded status as an Indig-
enous people. One concrete realization of this status in Finland is cultural 
 autonomy in the Sámi Homeland,33 provided for in the Act on the Sámi Par-
liament of 1995 and implemented by the Sámi Parliament.34 During the dec-
31 See e.g. YLE Sápmi 8 October 2014: Juvvá Lemet ja Hánno Heaiká leaba duđavaččat 
vuođđoláhkaváljagotti gullamii [Juvvá Lemet and Hánno Heaiká are satisfĳied with the 
hearing of the Constitutional Law Committee] <http://yle.fĳi/uutiset/juvva_lemet_ja_han-
no_heaika_leaba_duavaccat_vuoolahkavaljagotti_gullamii/7515677> accessed 16 Novem-
ber 2015.
32 See Yle Sápmi 18 July 2014: Ođđa rap-lohpádus Nikke Ankara lea sápmelaš [The new rap 
talent Nikke Ankara is a Sámi] <http://yle.fĳi/uutiset/oa_rap-lohpadus_nikke_ankara_lea_
sapmelas/7364149> accessed 16 November 2015.
33 The Sámi Homeland of Finland is situated in Northern Finland and in the area of four 
Finnish municipalities.
34 Finnish Constitution/2/paragraph 17 <http://www.fĳinlex.fĳi/fĳi/laki/ajantasa/1999/19990731>, 
accessed 16 November 2015; The Act on the Sámi Parliament/1995/974/paragraph 25 <htt-
ps://www.fĳinlex.fĳi/fĳi/laki/ajantasa/1995/19950974> accessed 16 November 2015.
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ades after the Sámi in Finland acquired the status of an Indigenous people 
recognized by the state as well as established their own decision-making body 
for managing their  autonomy, the issue of defĳinition – how ‘Sámi’ and thus 
members of the Indigenous people should be defĳined – has become strongly 
politicized.
Before their status was laid down in the Finnish Constitution and the Sámi 
Parliament was established, Sámi afffairs were managed by the Sámi Delegation, 
set up in 1973. The Decree on the Sámi Delegation contained a defĳinition of a 
Sámi which has basically not been questioned by any parties whereby a Sámi 
means a person one of whose parents or grandparents has learned Sámi as his 
or her fĳirst language and any of that person’s descendants. A person also had 
to feel that he or she was a Sámi, as no one could be considered a Sámi against 
his or her will.35 This defĳinition emphasized that a person defĳined as a Sámi 
had to have a close connection to Sámi-speaking society over a period of three 
generations. A Sámi did not have to know the Sámi language, one reason being 
that after World War II the schools, among other institutions, alienated many 
Sámi from their language. In efffect, the defĳinition involved kinship-based eth-
nic recognition: in practice, families were considered Sámi if Sámi had been a 
living, spoken language for them at least up until the post-war period.36
In the 1995 Act on the Sámi Parliament, an addition was made to the Del-
egation’s defĳinition of a Sámi whereby a person was also considered a Sámi 
“if he is a descendent of a person who has been entered in a land, taxation or 
population register as a mountain, forest or fĳishing Lapp”. The aim was to make 
it possible to identify who was a Sámi also on the basis of the 1875 or later land 
and taxation records.37 The purpose of the addition was to reinforce the con-
nection of the Sámi to the land through the letter of the law. The records from 
1875 and thereafter were seen as guaranteeing that the addition would apply 
principally to the contemporary ethnic Sámi, not contemporary ethnic Finns. 
However, the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee dropped the date (1875), 
as its inclusion would have required that a decree be issued. The Sámi Delega-
tion was not asked for its position on the changed defĳinition. The end result 
of the process was that the defĳinition based on historical documents had no 
35 Committee Report 1973:46, 6.
36 See e.g. V.-P. Lehtola, 2012, 434; S. Valkonen, 2009, 237.
37 See V.-P. Lehtola, Saamelaisten parlamentti. Suomen saamelaisvaltuuskunta 1973-1995 ja 
Saamelaiskäräjät 1996-2003 [The Sámi Parliament. The Finnish Sámi Delegation 1973-1995 
and The Sámi Parliament 1996-2003] (Saamelaiskäräjät 2005). 
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temporal limit.38 This then meant that the language-based defĳinition covered 
three generations but the defĳinition based on historical records went back per-
haps hundreds of years: anyone who could fĳind even one ancestor who was a 
documented resident of a Lapp village, perhaps centuries ago, could insist that 
he or she be considered a member of the Sámi people and demand the legal 
and political rights accorded the Sámi, such as the right to vote and to stand for 
election to the Sámi Parliament.
The Sámi communities in general do not consider this so-called Lapp cri-
terion to be a legitimate one for proving that one is a Sámi, as it is not based 
on the Sámi’s conception of the membership of their communities.39 Nor has 
the Sámi Parliament, the people’s representative body, approved the addition. 
In fact, from its establishment, the Sámi Parliament’s policies have stressed 
the  self-determination of the Sámi and the defĳinition of a Sámi as based on 
the language criterion which mostly is feasible with the kinship -based ethnic 
recognition.40
From the outset, the Sámi Parliament has proceeded from the principle that 
the Sámi, as an Indigenous people, must be allowed to defĳine “who we are” on 
the basis of Sámi traditions and practices.41 The right of an Indigenous people 
to defĳine itself is safeguarded in article 33 of the  UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or 
membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. This does 
not impair the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the 
States in which they live.
38 See L. Heinämäki et al., Saamelaisten oikeuksien toteutuminen: kansainvälinen oikeusver-
taileva tutkimus [Actualizing Sámi Rights: International Comparative Research]. Publi-
cations of the Government´s analysis, assessment and research activities 4/2017 (Prime 
Minister´s Offfĳice, 25.1.2017), 187-194.
39 See e.g. L. Heinämäki et al., 2017, 176-223; V.-P. Lehtola, Suomen saamelaiskiista. Sortaako 
Suomi alkuperäiskansaansa? [The Sámi Conflict of Finland. Does Finland Oppress its In-
digenous People?] (Into-Kustannus 2015).
40 See L. Heinämäki et al., 2017, 86-216; S. Valkonen, 2009, 155-172; V.-P. Lehtola, 2015, 214-215.
41 See e.g. Saamelaiskäräjät [The Sámi Parliament], Saamelaiskäräjien lausunto perus-
tuslakivaliokunnan pykälämuutosehdotuksista saamelaiskäräjistä annetun lain muut-
tamiseen [Statement on the Changes in the Act on the Sámi Parliament] 10.12.2014 Dnro: 
565/D.a.4/2014. <http://www.samediggi.fĳi/index.php?option=com_docmanandtask=cat_
viewandgid=259andItemid=165> accessed 3 February 2016; L. Heinämäki et al., 2017, 
176-223.
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2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to se-
lect the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own 
procedures.42
Finland intended to amend the Act on the Sámi Parliament in 2015, as the law 
was considered to be outdated and inefffective in many particulars. A key point 
to be reformed was the defĳinition of a Sámi. The bill, drafted by a working 
group established by the Ministry of Justice that comprised representatives of 
the Sámi Parliament, the Finnish government and other experts, put forward 
kinship and socialization into Sámi culture (to complete the Lapp criterion) 
as the key criteria in addition to language.43 Expressly incorporating kinship 
into the defĳinition is a sign that kinship-based ethnic recognition is not only a 
traditional practice, but also one that is very much present today; it is a living 
means for constituting the Sámi community and one that the people wish to 
see continue in the future.
The bill, and particularly the defĳinition it contained, met with extensive op-
position by many diffferent, mostly non-Sámi parties.44 The fear was that legal 
Sámi subjectivity defĳined by the Sámi kinship would lead to arbitrary deci-
sions as to who is a Sámi and who is not and exclusion at the hands of the 
dominant Sámi families. The reference to kinship in the defĳinition in the Act 
was considered too vague and unclear. In fact, doubts were expressed as to the 
existence of the practice of kinship-based recognition or it was deemed to be 
nothing but a political tool by which the Sámi elite could wield exclusionary 
power.45 It was the Finnish Members of Parliament from Lapland in particular 
who found allowing the Sámi to exercise  self-determination in the question 
of who is a Sámi to be very problematic. They considered – and this view has 
persisted in the debate during recent decades – that the Sámi way to defĳine 
who the Sámi are runs contrary to the defĳinitions of “Indigenous people” in 
42 UNDRIP 2007, Article 33 <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfĳii/documents/DRIPS_
en.pdf>, accessed 8 January 2016.
43 Ministry of Justice, Saamelaiskäräjälakityöryhmän mietintö [Government bill] 55/2013 
<http://www.oikeusministerio.fĳi/fĳi/index/julkaisut/julkaisuarkisto/1382513081296/Files/
OMML_55_2013_MIETINTO_196_s.pdf> accessed 23 November 2015.
44 About the political mobilization and complex debate related to defĳining Sáminess in Fin-
land see V.-P. Lehtola, 2015; J. Valkonen, S. Valkonen and T. Koivurova, ‘Groupism and the 
Politics of Indigeneity: A Case Study on the Sámi Debate in Finland’ [2016] Ethnicities 
June 19, 2016.
45 See V.-P. Lehtola, 2015.
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international law, particularly that found in  ILO Convention No. 169.46 Their 
opposition ultimately led to the bill being rejected in the Finnish Parliament 
and to the previous defĳinition of Sámi, the one strongly opposed by the Sámi 
Parliament, remaining in force.47
Lenzerini writes about the philosophical rationale for preserving the  intan-
gible cultural heritage, which has a fĳirm basis in the presence of  self-identifĳi-
cation by the group concerned as one of the heritage’s constitutive elements. 
This difffers radically from the defĳinition of material cultural heritage, which is 
based on “an objective evaluation of its outstanding worth from the standpoint 
of a presumed universally valid appreciation of value”.48 The nature of intan-
gible cultural heritage, by contrast, “rests in the self-recognition of it as part of 
the cultural heritage of the communities, groups, and (if the case) individu-
als concerned”.49 According to Lenzerini, “the presence of self-identifĳication 
among its constitutive elements makes intangible cultural heritage valuable in 
light of the subjective perspective of its creators and bearers, who recognize the 
heritage concerned as an essential part of their idiosyncratic cultural inherit-
ance, even though it may appear absolutely worthless to external observers.”50
A second inherent characteristic of the intangible cultural heritage cited by 
Lenzerini, one also closely linked to self-identifĳication, is “its deep connection 
with the identity and cultural distinctiveness of its creators and bearers”.51 He 
notes that the connection is well evidenced by the defĳinition in Article 2 of 
the  Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, which 
describes the intangible cultural heritage as an entity that gives communities 
and groups a sense of identity and continuity. Lenzerini goes on to conclude 
that this is probably the principal value of the intangible cultural heritage.52
Clearly, the system of kinship-based ethnic recognition fulfĳils the criteria of 
self-identifĳication by the community and deep connection with the identity 
and cultural distinctiveness of its creators and bearers. The system is a living 
reality that has adapted to the historical and social evolution of the Sámi but 
without losing its character as an element of collective  customary law in de-
46 See V.-P. Lehtola 2015, 179-233; The ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989), art. 1. <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169.> accessed 24 March 2015.
47 V.-P. Lehtola, 2015, 179-223.
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fĳining the boundaries of the community and the subjects belonging to that 
community. Defĳining the boundaries of a community is a collective practice 
which evolves as the community does; the practice lives and is understandable 
within the particular culture and community. 
The reform of the Sámi Parliament and particularly the (Finnish) debate 
on the defĳinition of Sámi revealed clearly that a culture’s internal, immaterial 
and  intangible practices and mechanisms, ones based on the culture’s internal 
dynamic and its institutions, often go unacknowledged or there is no interest 
in acknowledging them in the mainstream society. Yet, for Sámi culture it is 
precisely such practices, however hard to defĳine, that are crucial if the culture 
is to survive. It is these practices that sustain the core of the culture and sense 
of community; they are essential in defĳining and maintaining membership in, 
the interrelationships within and the boundaries of the community. In other 
words, the practices are crucial for the ontological foundation of the commu-
nity, whereby the system of kinship-based recognition of ethnicity is a consti-
tutive element of Sámi society.
Why is it then that accepting kinship-based identifĳication with the commu-
nity as a part of Sámi  autonomy – and thus as a form of the Sámi cultural herit-
age, which enjoys statutory protection – has been so difffĳicult and prompted 
such resistance? We suggest that one central aspect of the answer lies in the 
limitations of the prevailing political institutions and ideologies; they seem 
to be infĳiltrated by the pervasive influence of neoliberal governance, making 
them unable to understand and acknowledge a conception of community and 
of membership in a community that is predicated on a diffferent type (non-
Western) of ontology.53 
Neoliberalism is a global economic, political and social phenomenon and 
political rationality that emphasizes and is based on deregulation, privatiza-
tion, individualization and transformation of the state-citizen relationship. It 
entails “practices, knowledge, and ways of inhabiting the world that empha-
size the market, individual rationality, and the responsibility of entrepreneuri-
al subjects”.54 Neoliberalism also “shapes the constitution of identity and com-
53 About neoliberalism and Indigenous peoples, see e.g. I. Altamirano-Jiménez, 2013; F. E. 
McCormack, ‘Levels of indigeneity: the Maori and neoliberalism’ [2011] Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute, 17(2), 281-300; M. Mora ‘The Politics of Justice: Zapatista 
Autonomy at the Margins of the Neoliberal Mexican State’ [2015] Latin American and Car-
ibbean Ethnic Studies Vol. 10:1, 87-106.
54 C. R. Hale, ‘Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights, and the Poli-
tics of Identity in Guatemala’ [2002] Journal of Latin American Studies 34 (3), 136-46; I. 
Altamirano-Jiménez, 2013, 70.
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modifĳication of nature”55 and thus has “cultural, social and political efffects 
that exceed its surface”.56 
Embracing the defĳinitions of “Indigenous” in international law, the Finnish 
debate on the defĳinition of Sámi places considerable emphasis on the rights 
and identity of the individual. The salient questions in discussing and imple-
menting politics in Finland are who at the individual level are Indigenous, 
who are entitled to indigenous rights and how “indigeneity” is to be defĳined. 
I. Altamirano-Jiménez writes that “the adoption of global discourses of indi-
geneity at the local level, although politically empowering, raises a number of 
extremely political questions. Who defĳines ‘Indigenous’ and what is ‘authentic’ 
or ‘traditional’?”57 The emergence of these questions, as has happened in the 
Sámi context in Finland, illustrates how the global discourses and develop-
ments related to Indigenous peoples’ rights and political position, while be-
ing Indigenous resistance against a colonial world order and the legitimacy 
of state powers, are at the same time constrained by those very power struc-
tures.58 They are part of the complex legacy of  colonialism, in which the emer-
gence of neoliberal rationalities is producing new forms of governance that 
rest on “old”, existing injustices and unequal structures. 
Although Indigenous peoples themselves are shaping and producing glob-
al articulations of indigeneity, “the sites involved create a complex fĳield in 
which Indigenous peoples negotiate a balance between local needs and global 
wants.”59 In Finland, the discussions among some established researchers and 
certain politicians on the defĳinition of Sámi have foregrounded the rights and 
the identity of the individual as the basis of indigeneity; being a member of an 
Indigenous people is seen as a right of an individual and, in keeping with the 
reading of international Indigenous law, it becomes necessary to “fĳind” the in-
55 I. Altamirano-Jiménez, 2013, 70; N. Laurie, R. Andolina and S. Radclifffe, ‘The Excluded 
“Indigenous”? The Implications of Multi-ethnic Policies for water Reform in Bolivia’, in R. 
Sieder (ed.), Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democ-
racy (Palgrave MacMillan 2002), 252-76. 
56 W. Brown, Politics Out of History (Princeton University Press 2001); I. Altamirano-Jiménez, 
2013, 70.
57 I. Altamirano-Jiménez, 2013, 7.
58 Cf. J. Cliffford, ‘Indigenous Articulations’ [2001] Contemporary Pacifĳic 13 (2), 472; Altamira-
no-Jiménez 2013, 4; see also C. Sturm, Becoming Indian: The Struggle over Cherokee Identity 
in the Twenty-fĳirst Century (SAR Press 2010); A. Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life 
Across the Borders of Settler States (Duke University Press 2014).
59 I. Altamirano-Jiménez 2013, 4.
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dividuals who can belong to a given Indigenous people.60 The question “Who 
is a Sámi?” has also become a question of an individual’s identity, meaning that 
the right to membership in an Indigenous people is considered to be bound up 
with an individual’s identity as he or she personally experiences it.61 This line 
of reasoning is at odds with Sámi conceptions of communality and the Sámi 
custom of defĳining the group based on group identifĳication. After all, it is an 
interpretation that originates in the political rationalities of modern societies, 
which places the rights of the individual at the core of society. What is more, 
it hampers effforts to secure political acceptance of the Sámi ontology as the 
foundation of a political community.
The decades-long deliberation of the defĳinition of Sámi and, in particular, 
the discussions in 2015 surrounding the amendment of the Act on the Sámi 
Parliament and the ratifĳication of the ILO Convention no. 169 reflect, among 
other things, the power relations and asymmetrical power structures that im-
pact effforts to defĳine “Indigenous cultural heritage” and by extension an “In-
digenous people”; those processes also reveal the deeply political condition 
of Indigenous  self-determination within the mainstream society. Although 
kinship-based ethnic recognition satisfĳies both the community’s own criterion 
for  self-identifĳication and the elements of deep identity and cultural unique-
ness defĳined by its creators and bearers, it is difffĳicult to accurately verify and 
document in a manner that would enable political actors from outside Sámi 
society to understand it.
4 Belonging to the Land: The Sámi in Their Environment
An integral part of an Indigenous people’s cultural heritage is their special re-
lationship to the land and the closely connected traditional  ecological knowl-
edge and tradition of cultural  landscape.62 The relationship to the land is a 
fundamental question of existence for Indigenous peoples, as cultures grow 
60 T. Joona, ‘Ihmisoikeusnäkökulma ILO-sopimukseen No. 169’ [A Human Rights Perspec-
tive on ILO Convention No. 169][2013] Agon 37-38, 6-12; J. Joona, ‘Kuka kuuluu alkuperäis-
kansaan – historian vastauksia tämän päivän kysymyksiin’ [Who Belong to an Indigenous 
People – Answers of History to Contemporary Questions], Lakimies 4/2013, 734-755; See 
also Lehtola 2015, 202-207.
61 Cf. E. Sarivaara, Statuksettomat saamelaiset. Paikantumisia saamelaisuuden rajoilla [Sámi 
without a Status. On the Edge of Sámi Culture] (Dieđut 2, Sámi allaskuvla).
62 P. Magga, ‘Mikä tekee kulttuuriympäristöstä saamelaisen?’ [What makes an Environ-
ment Sámi], in P. Magga and E. Ojanlatva (eds.), Ealli Biras. Saamelainen kulttuuri-
ympäristöohjelma (Sámi Museum – Saamelaismuseosäätiö 2013), 10-13.
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from the land and in places. The relationship to the land bears on the place 
where an indigenous people dwells, where its members practice their tradi-
tional livelihoods and what the people’s broader cultural conception is of it-
self, its identity and its past.63
The connection to the land in Sámi culture is an ethnic underpinning of all 
Sámi groups and the foundation on which Sámi culture rests. According to the 
anthropologist J. Pennanen, undergirding the Sámi feeling of ethnic identity 
is the conception that they belong to the same language family and share a 
nature-bound cultural background comprising the hunting, fĳishing and gath-
ering livelihoods and  reindeer herding.64 Sámi culture has a connection to a 
historical place defĳined through their life practices, to the ethnic ties and social 
relations which prevail in that place, to memories and to biographical experi-
ences of place. The connection to the land produces and sustains Sáminess 
and through the connection a Sámi today can experience an afffĳinity with Sámi 
who lived millennia ago.65 
Any examination of the Sámi connection to the land must take into consid-
eration that the connection involves both the  intangible and material cultural 
heritage. The Sámi worldview makes no distinction between nature and cul-
ture, nor are the two mutually exclusive. Accordingly, the connection to the 
land is seen as including not only a material bond but also elements of the 
intangible heritage, such as place names and the  oral tradition. In the Sámi 
worldview, the human being is not an agent who manipulates or exploits na-
ture; rather, the relationship entails a deeper awareness of, belonging to and 
obligation towards a place.66 The Sámi connection can be aptly described as 
” ecological connectivity”, a term coined by D. Rose. It indicates a ”mode of ex-
istence” in which the land is not only a place or object but also a subject (or 
”agent”) in its own right.67 According to Rose, for Indigenous peoples, the land 
63 See T. Ingold, 2000, 148-150.
64 J. Pennanen, ‘Ihmisen ja luonnon vuorovaikutus saamelaiskulttuurin lähtökohtana’ [Hu-
man-Nature Interaction as a Basis of Sámi Culture], in J. Pennanen and K. Näkkäläjärvi 
(eds.), Siidastallan. Siidoista kyliin. Perinteinen luontosidonnainen saamelaiskulttuuri ja 
sen muuttuminen (Inarin saamelaismuseon julkaisuja 2000), 13-18.
65 See J. Valkonen and S. Valkonen, ‘Contesting the Nature Relations of Sámi Culture’ [2014]. 
Acta Borealia 31(1), 25-40.
66 E. Helander-Renvall, ’Saamelainen tapaoikeus’ [The Sámi Customary Law] [2013], in P. 
Magga and E. Ojanlatva (eds.) 2013, 132-134.
67 D. Rose, Sharing Kinship with Nature: How Reconciliation is Transforming the NSW Nation-
al Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 2003); D. Rose, D. 
James, and C. Watson, Indigenous Kinship with the Natural World. (NSW National Parks 
and Wildlife Service 2003).
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is “nourishing terrain… a living entity with a yesterday, today and tomorrow, 
with a consciousness, and a will toward life. Because of this richness, country is 
home and peace; nourishment for body, mind, and spirit; heart’s ease”.68 
In R. Harrison’s view, the ontological basis of Indigenous peoples’ connec-
tion to the land hampers effforts to safeguard their  intangible cultural herit-
age. He asserts that the protection of Indigenous cultural heritage is based on 
a Western, anthropocentric mentality that emphasizes a distinction between 
culture and nature and a pre-eminence of human beings over nature. In  in-
digenous ontologies, by contrast, there is no boundary between nature and 
culture; rather, they emphasize that the two are intertwined and that culture 
is everywhere. Indigenous peoples’ connection to the land and notions of pro-
tecting their cultural heritage proceed from a wholly diffferent ontological ba-
sis, making protection of such heritages challenging.69
The Sámi researchers E. Helander-Renvall, A. Schanche and P. Magga have 
recognized and identifĳied special and distinctive features of the Sámi cultural 
 environment.70 To Sámi a  natural landscape can be a cultural landscape re-
gardless of whether it bears traces of human activity. These scholars argue that 
the Sámi cultural environment has not, to date, fĳit neatly into any of the public 
categories used in defĳining and managing cultural environments.71
Management of the environment in the Sámi homeland of Finland is gov-
erned for the most part by the Wilderness Act and the Conservation Act, which 
are essential elements of the Finnish system. In contrast, sites in the Sámi cul-
tural environment, in particular cultural usufruct areas, have not been given 
any particular consideration. Yet, given that Sámi usufruct of the  landscape 
and environment difffers from the Finnish, it easily remains invisible. It lives in 
68 D. Rose, Nourishing Terrains: Australian Aboriginal Views of Landscape and Wilderness 
(Australian Heritage Commission 1996).
69 Harrison 2015, 30.
70 E. Helander, ‘Sámi Subsistence Activities – spatial aspects and structuration’ [1999] in 
Acta Borealia 2, 7-25; A. Schanche, ‘Horizontal and vertical perceptions of Saami land-
scapes’ [2004] in Dieđut 3, 1-10; P. Magga and T. Elo, ‘Johdanto’ [Introduction] [2007] in 
Tiina Elo and Päivi Magga (eds.) Eletty, koettu maisema: näkökulmia saamelaiseen kult-
tuurimaisemaan (Lapin ympäristökeskus 2007); E. Helander-Renvall, ‘On customary law 
among the Saami people’ [2013] in N. Bankes and T. Koivurova (eds.), The proposed Nordic 
Saami Convention: national and international dimensions of indigenous property rights 
(HART 2013), 281-291; P. Magga, 2013; E. Helander, ‘The nature of Sami customary law’ 
[2014] in T. Koivurova, T. Joona and R. Shnoro (eds.), Arctic governance (University of Lap-
land 2014), 88-96.
71 Ibid. 
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the cultural knowledge of small communities and, inasmuch as it has not been 
articulated and asserted verbally, it is ignored in decision-making.72
The Sámi cultural  environment is defĳined flexibly in keeping with the situa-
tion at any given time; it is a whole consisting of the seen and unseen. The spe-
cial feature of the Sámi conception of the cultural  landscape is that the human 
being is not accorded a special status as a shaper and manipulator of nature; 
rather, a landscape may look like a  natural landscape but nevertheless bear 
values and meanings associated with a cultural landscape. One implication of 
this, however, is that the content of that landscape is not readily understood by 
an outsider; it appears to be wilderness, uninhabited and unused.
As the Sámi conceive it, nature is linked to everyday life, the use of resources 
and travelling from place to place. In this way the concept broadens in the di-
rection of  intangible culture heritage. Place names tell how the areas are used 
and encompass the settlements, the routes people use in getting from place 
to place as well as invisible boundaries. The place names and locations that 
live in the  oral tradition cannot necessarily be found on maps. Other elements 
to be found in  oral history, such as the yoik tradition, also reflect the people’s 
knowledge and use of nature. These have been shaped for generations by  cus-
tomary law: the knowledge of resources such as good cloudberry picking sites 
and fĳishing waters was often shared and their use agreed on jointly. The Sámi 
landscape also includes mystical sites, such as old places of worship and  sieidi 
(sacred sites), sacred fells and burial places. It is difffĳicult to translate the  oral 
tradition into a form that can be understood by others; there is a fear that infor-
mation on sacred places will end up being misused.73 However, the new Sámi 
cultural environment unit, established at the Sámi Museum  Siida in 2011, took 
as its starting point that even though the “coordinates” of a sacred landscape 
must be withheld to some extent, the landscape, along with other archaeologi-
cal cultural heritage, has to be recorded so that it is taken into account in land-
use planning, forestry and other land uses.
In Finland, the Sámi have continually sought recognition of their connec-
tion to the land as part of the safeguarding of the Sámi cultural heritage. The 
need for this recognition derives from the powerlessness the Sámi have ex-
perienced when it comes to the policies that steer the use of the land in the 
Sámi Homeland. Since the beginning of the 1990s, one has seen a series of legal 
reports and committees in Finland that have tried to determine how the Sámi 
could hold the rights to their lands and how these rights could be safeguarded 
without their infringing the legal rights of the other local residents of the area. 
72 See P. Magga and E. Ojanlatva (eds.), 2013.
73 Ibid.
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The impetus for these effforts is Finland’s commitment to ratifying  ILO Con-
vention No. 169. Ratifĳication has been put offf numerous times due to “ambi-
guities” where the land rights of the Sámi are concerned. The key issue that 
has emerged is who could be the subjects of the land rights on the individual 
level.74 
Sámi claims to the lands and waters in their region have been interpreted in 
terms of the legal and governance discourse; this requires that a legal basis be 
demonstrated for the connection to the land, a demand that makes it difffĳicult 
to take the Sámi connection to the land into account in land-use policies in the 
Sámi Homeland. According to Sámi researcher A. Nuorgam, Finnish legislation 
contains no defĳinitions of the concept “cultural  environment”, let alone “cul-
tural landscape”. The landscape in the Sámi region is classifĳied essentially in 
its entirety as a  natural  landscape, although large tracts of it are areas in which 
the traditional Sámi livelihoods are practiced.75 E. Helander-Renvall points 
out that the Sámi connection to the land is based on customary rights that are 
integrated in the form of an  oral tradition into the daily practices of the lo-
cal community”76 The members of the Sámi community do not even conceive 
of these as rules; the practices are renegotiated if someone for one reason or 
another departs from the land-use practices established by custom. Helander-
Renvall takes the view that the use and applicability of traditional legal notions 
are further eroded by the fact that there is a constant collision between them 
and national legislation and orders issued by government authorities. Moreo-
ver, the non-Sámi population in the Sámi region does not necessarily adhere to 
or even know the Sámi’s traditional norms as regards use of the land, a situation 
which might even prompt some members of the Sámi community to depart 
from the norms.77 What is more, as T. Kurttila and T. Ingold have shown, the 
Sámi’s traditional system of knowledge that underlies their use of the land is 
very difffĳicult, if not impossible, to express in concrete terms, for it is far too dy-
namic and practically oriented and adapts too readily to the situation at hand.78 
74 See e.g. J. Joona, 2013.
75 A. Nuorgam, ‘Saamelaisia koskeva lainsäädäntö ja sopimukset’ [The Legislation and Con-
vention Pertaining to the Sámi], 220, In P. Magga and E. Ojanlatva (eds.) 2013, 220-225.
76 E. Helander-Renvall, Saamelaisten perinnetieto, tapaoikeudet ja biologinen monimuo-
toisuus [The Sámi Traditional Knowledge, Customary Law and Biodiversity. 2011, 3. 
<http://www.ymparisto.fĳi/download.asp?contentid=127691andIan=fĳi> accessed 24 No-
vember 2015.
77 E. Helander-Renvall, 2014, 133-134.
78 T. Ingold, and T. Kurttila, ‘Perceiving the environment in Finnish Lapland’ [2001] Body and 
Society, 6, 183-196.
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The nature of Indigenous peoples’ connection to the land, including the un-
derpinnings of that connection in  customary law, has led to its not necessarily 
being accepted – or accepted at all – as equal to what is set out in the written 
legislation of the state. Yet, this does not mean that rules deriving from  cus-
tomary law cannot be taken as the basis for legislation or as part of it. There are 
many examples internationally of how  customary law has been taken into ac-
count in legal proceedings and negotiations dealing with Indigenous peoples’ 
land rights.79 According to Helander-Renvall, acknowledging the customary 
rights indicating in a state’s land-use policies the connection of an Indigenous 
people to the land requires active elaboration of that connection through 
diffferent practices and discourses so that the rights will be recognized more 
broadly and become part of society’s commitments.80
The implementation of the  UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding 
of the  Intangible Cultural Heritage requires Finland to defĳine, among other 
things, the diffferent elements of the intangible cultural heritage in the Sámi 
Homeland and to do so in cooperation with communities, groups and the rele-
vant civic organizations. According to Nuorgam, where Indigenous peoples are 
concerned, it is problematic that the UNESCO conventions do not recognize 
 ownership or  possession of the  traditional knowledge of Indigenous peoples; 
rather, the process of documentation and inventorying changes the status of 
cultural heritage such that it is seen as benefĳiting all of humankind.81 
In our view, as regards bringing the connection to the land within the scope 
of the protection of cultural heritage, a more daunting problem than owner-
ship or possession is how the Sámi connection to the land can be rendered in a 
form that the discourse on safeguarding cultural heritage is ready to recognize. 
As P. Magga, a researcher who has done work on the Sámi cultural environ-
ment, points out: “The concepts and vocabularies that defĳine the cultural envi-
ronment have not been directly applicable in the Sámi region, whereby it was 
essential to start the work [on defĳinition of the Sámi cultural environment] 
from these and ask what they mean in the Sámi context”. According to Magga, 
it is difffĳicult to explain fully what  landscape and the environment mean from 
the Sámi perspective. “To a Sámi the landscape is more than an object nor is 
the  environment merely an object of one’s actions; it is a person’s partner – 
79 See Helander-Renvall, 2014, 132; See also M. de la Cadena, ‘Indigenous Cosmopolitics in 
the Andes: Conceptual Reflections beyond Politics’ [2010] Cultural Anthropology 25(2), 
334-70; M. Blaser, ‘Ontology and Indigeneity: on the Political Ontology of Heterogeneous 
Assemblages’ [2014] Cultural Geogra Vol 21(1), 49-58.
80 E. Helander-Renvall, 2014, 132.
81 A. Nuorgam, 2014, 222.
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another subject with whom one has to act properly and wisely, because one’s 
own survival depends on it”.82 As the Sámi conception of the  landscape incor-
porates a cognitive dimension, religiousness, myths, tales and communality in 
addition to the values and meanings it entails it is difffĳicult to inventory and to 
convert into discrete pieces of information in a database. Yet, safeguarding of 
the cultural heritage requires this to some degree, as the UNESCO Convention 
for the Protection of the  Intangible Cultural Heritage, for example, obligates 
Finland to document and inventory the cultural heritage that the state wishes 
to preserve and sustain.83
In addition, the conflicts associated with the governance of land use in the 
Sámi region have brought with them pressures to play down attention to the 
Sámi connection to the land in administration. The state-controlled land and 
water areas in the Sámi Homeland are managed by Metsähallitus (National 
Forest Service), which controls some 90 per cent of the land and water areas in 
the region. Approximately 80 per cent of this area is set aside for conservation 
under either the Conservation Act or the Wilderness Act. The Metsähallitus Act 
prescribes that the management, use and protection of the  natural resources 
under the control of Metsähallitus in the Sámi Homeland must be coordinat-
ed such that the Sámi are guaranteed the conditions necessary for enjoying 
their culture. The government of Finland is amending the Metsähallitus Act 
and the special provisions on the Sámi Homeland have been removed. These 
stipulated that the plans and projects of the Metsähallitus could not detract 
from the Sámi’s opportunities to engage in traditional Sámi livelihoods. The 
removal of these special provisions is the result of demands of many actors in 
the Sámi Homeland, including the municipalities of Inari and Enontekiö. For 
example, the former municipal manager of Enontekiö, now a member of the 
Finnish Parliament, has called for “a comprehensive and independent map-
ping of conditions in the region that would determine in what way the position 
of the Sámi is weaker than that of the region’s other population or entrepre-
neurs”. Only after that can it be considered whether special Sámi provisions are 
needed in the legislation.84
As in the reform of the Metsähallitus Act, the criticism of the special status 
of the Sámi as users of the land often culminates expressly in how the connec-
tion of the Sámi to the land is understood. Due to their particular relationship 
82 P. Magga, 2013, 10.
83 A. Nuorgam, 2014, 222.
84 M. Kärnä, Uusi Suomi Blog, 9.5.2014 <http://mikkokarna.puheenvuoro.uusisuomi.fĳi/167
651-kolme-syyta-vastustaa-esitettya-metsahallituslakia> accessed 16 November 2015; 
About the reform of the Metsähallitus Act, see also L. Heinämäki et al., 2017, 34-50.
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to nature, the Sámi have been expected to act in harmony with nature; when 
these expectations have not been fulfĳilled, conclusions have been drawn on 
the state of modern Sámi culture. For example, it has been claimed that over-
grazing of reindeer, the attitude towards predators and the increased use of 
technology show how the culture of Sámi  reindeer herding has become “dis-
located”, “alienated from itself” and “lost its special nature as a culture”. The 
solution to this that has been proposed is a return to “the old” and “Indigenous” 
practices, which would mean giving up technology, a money economy and oth-
er elements of the modern world.85
Interpretations of the Sámi connection to the land have thus had their im-
pact on policies regarding nature in Finland. The Sámi connection to the land 
is a signifĳicant factor in considering the Sámi cultural heritage and its protec-
tion, for without a connection to the land the culture would end up with no 
concrete basis, jeopardizing its prospects for continuing in the future.
5 Conclusions
In this chapter, referring to the work of R. Harrison86 we have considered pro-
tecting Sámi cultural heritage as ontological politics, that is, a process of as-
sembling a particular future for Sámi communities. Central to this approach 
is that cultural heritage is understood above all as a present-day phenomenon: 
selection of elements representing that cultural heritage, in other words ele-
ments worth protecting for the future, is made from the present-day perspec-
tive and under and constrained by contemporary power conditions and dis-
courses, such as international legal discourses. 
We have examined two social institutions of Sámi related to  customary law 
that are closely linked to the questions of Indigenous belonging, the system of 
kinship-based ethnic recognition and the Sámi connection to the land, as ele-
ments of the cultural heritage whose recognition and acknowledgement are 
extremely important for the continued existence of the Sámi and of the special 
features of Sámi communities and Sámi culture. Each of the institutions has 
become highly politicized in recent decades as effforts have been made by the 
Finnish government to stabilize the status of the Sámi as an Indigenous people 
by granting them cultural  autonomy – managed through the Sámi Parliament 
– in their homeland. Interestingly, the global legal discourse on Indigenous 
85 See J. Valkonen, Lapin luontopolitiikka [The Nature Politics of Lapland] (Tampere Univer-
sity Press 2003), 171-194.
86 R. Harrison, 2015.
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peoples and interpretations of it that have taken on a neoliberal bent have 
made it possible to call into question the Sámi’s own forms of group-making 
and thus the ontological basis of Sámi communities. Safeguarding the politi-
cal status of the Sámi as an Indigenous people within the state system has in-
volved making membership in the Sámi community and the Sámi connection 
to the land facets of individual rights (and identity), which must be proven 
legally with documents. Such developments can be seen as part of a complex 
colonialist situation in which both the political foundations of the Sámi com-
munity and the international legal discourse on Indigenous rights and cultural 
heritage are constrained by structural relations of domination.
The UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Cultural Heritage recog-
nizes the threat to  intangible cultural heritage posed by globalization, social 
change and intolerance. Where the existence of Indigenous peoples is con-
cerned, the principal threat is the inability and reluctance of the Western sys-
tem and the prevailing political ideologies to recognize that the intangible cul-
tural heritage of Indigenous peoples and thus their very existence is based on 
a special ontology, one which is difffĳicult to grasp, translate and document in 
terms of the Western system. In a word, it seems that although the UNESCO 
Convention emphasizes the importance of a group’s  self-identifĳication in defĳin-
ing a cultural heritage that is to be preserved and safeguarded, in reality what is 
essential is how well the legislation of the mainstream societies and those who 
shape it are able to recognize and deal with the diffferent forms of intangible 
cultural heritage. The upshot of this is that only forms of the cultural heritage 
that are recognizable and comprehensible by the mainstream society as cul-
tural heritage and tradition, such as diffferent cultural performances or  duodji 
(traditional Sámi  handicraft), can be seen as cultural heritage that should be 
safeguarded. In this way ontological interpretations are made on the nature of 
a culture, interpretations that may be blind to the Indigenous people’s own on-
tology.
One problem is that because, on the one hand, the concept of cultural her-
itage, as a Western category, demands recognisability, a making visible and 
documentation and, on the other, Western legislation entails the requirement 
of legal recognition and transparency, it seems to be difffĳicult, or impossible, 
to protect social institutions such as the Sámi connection to the land and the 
practice of group identifĳication using legislation (of the mainstream society). 
When effforts are made to give a living, situational and ongoing practice a con-
crete form and to demand precision in observing it, the practice loses its flex-
ibility, logic and origin, whereupon it appears to be political and susceptible to 
political caprice. 
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The EMRIP study ‘Promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous 
peoples with respect to their cultural heritage’ provides the following guidance 
to states as regards safeguarding of cultural heritage: “States should recognize 
the value and livelihood aspects of the cultural heritage of Indigenous peo-
ples. States should recognize that the cultural heritage of Indigenous peoples 
is not limited to the protection of specifĳic manifestations, symbols or objects, 
but also includes  tangible and  intangible manifestations of their ways of life, 
achievements and creativity, and of their spiritual and physical relationships 
with their lands, territories and resources.”87
Safeguarding of the Sámi cultural heritage for the future requires that the 
people’s own understanding of the world and of its place in that world is taken 
seriously; the idea must be accepted that Sáminess is based on an ontology of 
its own, one that creates a Sámi reality. In that case, the political community 
should be established and built with due consideration for and reliance on 
the ontology. Safeguarding the Sámi cultural heritage would then play out pre-
cisely as it was intended to, that is, as the preservation of Indigenous peoples 
as distinctive, separate groups.
Can kinship-based ethnic recognition and connection to the land (in them-
selves) provide a foundation for government and politics where Sámi culture 
is concerned? Discussions on Sámi  autonomy have cast serious doubt on this, 
because the two are considered far too vague and thus cannot, for example, 
function as a basis for a law. Making kinship-based recognition the basis of 
the defĳinition of Sámi in a law would require setting down objective criteria 
describing the practice. The concern here is that without such criteria the Sámi 
could decide arbitrarily who is accepted as a Sámi and who is not.88
Doubts as to the applicability of the Sámi’s own practices in government and 
politics have their origin in the disparity between the Sámi minority and the 
mainstream society. According to E. Helander-Renvall, the majority population 
determines the discursive conditions in Indigenous politics, and it is in these 
terms that issues are considered, ascribed meaning and interpreted. It is often 
the case that the majority discourse does not – or perhaps does not even want 
to – engage with the reality in which a particular Indigenous people lives. She 
cites the example of conflicts in Norway and Sweden relating to overgrazing in 
 reindeer herding. In her view government offfĳicials in Norway readily use the 
term “overbetning” (overgrazing) and “beitedyr” (grazing animal) when dis-
cussing the problems of reindeer herding and pastures in a political context. 
However, the Sámi language has no clear references to overgrazing nor is there 
87 A/HRC/EMRIP/2015/2/Annex/B/9.
88 See V.-P. Lehtola, 2015.
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a term “grazing animal”.89 Thus overgrazing does not exist in the Sámi  reindeer 
herding culture in the same sense as that intended by Norwegian offfĳicials. Sámi 
reindeer herding examines questions of grazing in terms of its own knowledge 
practices, which offfĳicial discourse does not recognize as knowledge at all. 
The example put forward by Helander-Renvall shows how the majority 
population sets the conditions in political discussions and decision making 
for what is knowledge. In doing so, it imposes a semantic fĳield of sorts on In-
digenous politics, with this fĳield then forming the context in which an Indig-
enous people’s demands are assessed. It is also important to note that what is 
considered knowledge at any given time is never detached from the political 
prevailing situation. In political struggles, knowledge, politics and economics 
become closely intertwined and determine what is possible and what is not.
The importance of the Sámi system of kinship-based ethnic recognition and 
of the people’s connection to the land is determined in relation to the conflict-
ual situation which prevails in Finland. In other words, the political situation 
determines how viable the traditional institutions of the Sámi are seen as be-
ing. Before Sámi subjects had political rights associated with them – that is 
before the status of the Sámi as an Indigenous people was safeguarded – the 
traditional Sámi kinship-based practice of recognition was accepted as a vi-
able way to recognize a person as belonging to the Sámi people. The connec-
tion to the land was not a problem either, at least to the extent that it did not 
directly challenge land use plans of the majority culture. Clearly, the present, 
highly politicized situation greatly impacts how the traditional institutions of 
the Sámi are assessed and interpreted. This in turn shows that if the Sámi prac-
tices that have evolved as elements of  customary law were to be examined in 
diffferent contexts, they could be seen as forming a rational basis for politics 
and governance pertaining to Sámi culture.
The ontologies of Indigenous peoples are heterogeneous assemblages which 
as such trouble the established political conception of how issues and the re-
lationships between people should be organized. The idea that Sámi society 
could be organized on the basis of and with respect for the people’s own ontol-
ogy poses a challenge to what is a closely guarded colonialist and Eurocentric 
way of categorizing people and the world.
89 E. Helander-Renvall, Sámi Society Matters (Lapland University Press, 2016).
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Indigenous peoples are generally characterized as constituting a minority 
within the national states where they have their origin and traditional lands, 
and sharing culture, languages and  religions that have been suppressed and 
assimilated over a long period.2 This implies that indigenous peoples’ cultural 
heritage is in a particularly vulnerable situation. International society has be-
come aware of this situation, and by adopting the 2007 United Nations Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN states expressed a willingness 
to protect indigenous cultural heritage.3 
Indigenous peoples have largely based their livelihoods on traditional use of 
lands and  natural resources. This is noted by the UN  Human Rights Committee, 
which has stated that there is a clear link between land resources and cultural – 
and thereby cultural heritage. The Committee has explained this link as follows: 
1 This chapter is elaborated from a presentation on the UN Expert Seminar on the Promo-
tion and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples with Respect to their Cultural 
Heritage at University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, February 26 and 27, 2015. Thanks to Seamus 
Ryder for excellent proof reading and useful advices on the text. Chapter 2 and 3 is in parts 
also elaborated on Øyvind Ravna, ‘ILO 169 and Securing of Sámi Rights to Lands, Nature-
based Livelihood, and Natural Resources’, Understanding the Many Faces of Human Secu-
rity, eds. K. Hossain and A. Petréti, Brill-Nijhofff, Leiden, Boston 2016, 173-189. 
2 For a general description of the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’, see José Martinez Cobo, 
‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples’, UN Docs E/CN.4/
Sub.2/476; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/ E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21 (1981-1983). See also the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169, Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169) Article 1 (1) (b). The Convention was adopted 
in Geneva, 76th ILC session (27 June 1989) and entered into force 5 September 1991. It is 
currently ratifĳied by 22 countries. Full text to be found here: <www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169> accessed 22 April 2015.
3 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 61/295, Article 31 (1) and 
(2), adopted at the UN 107th plenary meeting 13 September 2007, see <www.un.org/esa/
socdev/unpfĳii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>, accessed 10 March 2015.
© 2017 Øyvind Ravna. isbn 978-90-04-34218-7. pp. 175-198
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With regard to the exercise of the  cultural rights protected under article 
27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, 
including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resourc-
es, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include 
such traditional activities as fĳishing or hunting and the right to live in re-
serves protected by law. The enjoyment of those rights may require posi-
tive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the efffective 
 participation of members of minority communities in decisions which 
afffect them.4 
The statement shows that traditional ways of life of indigenous peoples, and 
the lands needed for such life, are protected under the concept of culture in 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 27. Such 
lands are thus crucial for the protection of indigenous cultural heritage. 
In addition, a statement from the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples ( EMRIP) underlines the signifĳicance of land and  natural re-
sources for indigenous peoples: 
Indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage… should be considered [as] an ex-
pression of their  self-determination and their spiritual and physical rela-
tionships with their lands, territories and resources. While the notion of 
heritage encompasses traditional practices in a broad sense, including 
language, art, music, dance, song, stories, sports and traditional games, 
sacred sites, and ancestral  human remains, for indigenous peoples the 
preservation of heritage is deeply embedded and linked to the protection 
of traditional territories.5 
The link between land, resources and culture is also reflected in the state obli-
gations under the International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 ( ILO 
169).6 See e.g. Article 4 (1) and 5 (a). Consequently, the obligation to promote 
indigenous cultures, including by identifying the lands on which they depend, 
is strengthened, as it can be subsumed under each of these independent, bind-
ing international conventions, and the interaction between them.
4 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Article 27 (Fiftieth session, 1994), 
para. 7.
5 Human Rights Council, 30th session, Human rights bodies and mechanisms, ‘Promotion 
and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples with respect to their cultural heritage’, 
EMRIP, A/HRC/30/53 (2005), para. 6.
6 See supra note 2.
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The topic of this chapter is connected to lands and resources. More precise-
ly, the aim is to discuss and analyze how the international legal obligations to 
identify, recognise, and secure the indigenous peoples lands,  natural resources, 
and livelihood, as a basis for exercising culture, are implemented in relation to 
the Sámi people. The protection of Sámi cultural monuments and sites will not 
be given specifĳic attention.7 Although the Sámi have their homelands in both 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Russian Federation, and meet the criteria of 
the  ILO 169 defĳinition of ‘Indigenous Peoples’ included in article 1 (1) b, Norway 
is the only state among these four that has ratifĳied the ILO 169.8 In addition, 
Norway has sought to implement the obligations of the ILO 169 through inter-
nal legislation – namely through the  Finnmark Act.9 This chapter is therefore 
limited in scope to examining the situation in Norway, which is highlighted as 
a signifĳicant example for other Nordic countries.10 The fact that other Nordic 
countries such as Finland, are in a process of ratifying ILO 169, makes the sub-
ject of this chapter particularly topical. 
2 The Legal Commitments to the Sámi Undertaken by Norway
2.1 The Legal Basis for Protecting Sámi Lands and Culture in Norway 
Norwegian Sámi policy is based on the recognition that Norway is established 
on the territory of two peoples the Sámi and the Norwegians, as expressed by 
7 Act 9 June 1978 no. 50 Act Concerning the Cultural Heritage [Lov om kulturminner] Arti-
cle 4 automatically protects ‘Sami monuments and sites of the kinds described above that 
are over 100 years old’. An English translation of the Act can be found here: <www.regjer-
ingen.no/en/dokumenter/cultural-heritage-act/id173106/> accessed March 10, 2015. More 
about the Norwegian Act Concerning the Cultural Heritage, see Marit Myrvoll, Alma 
Thuestad, Elin Rose Myrvoll and Inger Marie Holm-Olsen, ‘Unpredictable Consequences 
of Sámi Self-determination: Rethinking the legal protection of Sámi cultural heritage in 
Norway', Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol 3, 2002, 30-50.
8 Ratifĳied by Norway June 19, 1990, see supra note 2.
9 Act 17 June 2005 No. 85 relating to legal relations and management of land and natural 
resources in the county of Finnmark (The Finnmark Act) [Lov 17. juni 2005 nr. 85 om retts-
forhold og forvaltning av grunn og naturressurser i Finnmark fylke (fĳinnmarksloven)], 
An English translation of the Act can be found here: <www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-
20050617-085-eng.pdf>, accessed March, 10, 2015.
10 James Anaya, The situation of the Sámi people in the Sápmi region of Norway, Sweden and 
Finland, <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/docs/countries/2011-report-sapmi-a-hrc-18-35-add2_
en.pdf> accessed March 10, 2015, para. 44.
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H.M. King Harald as he opened the third Sámi Parliament in 1997.11 The ratifĳi-
cation of  ILO 169 implies that the government has also acknowledged that the 
State of Norway is established on the territory of two peoples; the Sámi and the 
Norwegians, and that the Sámi are the indigenous people of Norway. The rati-
fĳication also implies that the government is committed to identify, recognise, 
and secure Sámi lands lying within Norwegian territory.
The Constitutional amendment of 1988, Article 108, which commits Nor-
way to ‘create conditions enabling the Sámi people to preserve and develop its 
language, culture and way of life’, also strengthens the state’s commitment to 
identify Sámi land and user rights as part of the basis for Sámi culture. In addi-
tion, Norway has passed the Human Rights Act in 1999, which incorporates the 
ICCPR, and gives precedence to the terms and efffect of the latter instrument 
in the event of any conflict with existing national law. Together, the ILO 169, 
Article 108 of the Norwegian Constitution, and Article 27 of the ICCPR, form 
the basis for the protection of Sámi culture, language and livelihood in Norway, 
and thus the legal basis for Norwegian Sámi policy. Norway has also endorsed 
the  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples – itself triggering rel-
evant obligations and commitments – and has promoted it actively.12
The following section will analyse ILO 169 – the main binding instrument 
under international law committing Norway to identify and recognize Sámi 
lands. In addition, the chapter will review Article 27 of the ICCPR, which clear-
ly protects and promotes the cultures of minorities, including the Sámi. The 
chapter will then discuss how these international commitments are imple-
mented and applied in Norwegian national law.
2.2  ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries 
The ILO 169, which Norway ratifĳied as the fĳirst state in the world, is of ma-
jor signifĳicance for state parties to the convention, when it comes to securing 
Sámi rights to lands and  natural resources. Notable are the introductory provi-
sions of Articles 1 and 2, which defĳine indigenous peoples and establish the 
general purposes of the Convention. Of signifĳicance is also Article 6, which 
safeguards the rights of indigenous peoples to be consulted; Article 7, which 
safeguards the rights of indigenous peoples to decide their own priorities, and 
11 St.meld. nr. 55 (2000-2001) [A white paper] Om samepolitikken, 17.
12 The space, scope and aim of this chapter does not allow for a separate discussion of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, although it is highly relevant to the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage. However, at the end of section 2.2, 
there are some considerations of the UN Declaration.
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to participate in ‘the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and 
programmes for national and regional development which may afffect them 
directly’; and Article 8, which protect  indigenous customs and  customary law 
and obligates governments to respect these. 
However, it is Chapter II, entitled Land, which is the most signifĳicant part of 
the Convention in relation to identifying and securing Sámi traditional lands 
and livelihood.13 It is not without reason that Article 14 is the most referred 
among the seven articles forming the land chapter. Article 14 (1) reads: 
The rights of  ownership and  possession of the peoples concerned over 
the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addi-
tion, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right 
of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, 
but to which they have traditionally had  access for their subsistence and 
traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of 
nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect.
Paragraph (2) and (3) of article 14 contains key provisions, too, stating that: 
Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which 
the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee efffective 
protection of their rights of ownership and possession.
and:
Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal sys-
tem to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.
In spite of its unambiguous wording, there has been intense discussion on 
whether Article 14 requires the states to recognize ownership of indigenous 
peoples to traditional lands, or whether it is sufffĳicient that strong use rights are 
recognized.14 Today, the prevailing opinion seems to favour a close following to 
the wording of the convention: i.e. that indigenous communities have rights to 
13 NOU 1993: 34 Rett og forvaltning av land og vann i Finnmark, 70.
14 Geir Ulfstein, ‘Indigenous Peoples Right to Land’, Max Planck UNYB 8 (2004): 21-23. See 
also the discussion in NOU 1993: 34, 70-72 and NOU 1997: 5 Urfolks landrettigheter etter 
folkerett og utenlands rett, 33-37; the latter with an interpretation more consistent with 
the current view that indigenous peoples are entitled to ownership. 
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collectively own their traditional lands.15 Article 14 is therefore of great signifĳi-
cance, not only for identifying lands to which the Sámi can claim  ownership, 
but also in defĳining areas where the Sámi have rights of use. 
Although Article 15 has not received the same attention as Article 14, it is 
no less signifĳicant for safeguarding Sámi rights to  natural resources, particu-
larly in relation to extractive industries within indigenous lands. The provision 
poses four obligations on state authorities: a general obligation to involve po-
tentially-afffected indigenous peoples in decision-making processes, and three 
more specifĳic commitments in cases where the state retains the ownership 
of mineral or sub-surface resources, or rights to other resources pertaining to 
traditional indigenous lands. These latter commitments include establishing 
or maintaining procedures for  consultations with indigenous peoples, before 
undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation 
of such resources pertaining to their lands; providing indigenous peoples with 
benefĳits (royalties) of such activities; and ensuring fair  compensation for any 
damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities. 
Moreover, Article 15 (1) reads: 
The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining 
to their lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the 
right of these peoples to participate in the use, management and conser-
vation of these resources.
This  participation obligation safeguards and clarifĳies the terms of  participatory 
rights, such as those ensured in Article 7, by clearly stating that indigenous 
peoples have rights to participate in the use, management, and conservation 
of the resources pertaining to their traditional areas.16 Hans Petter Graver and 
Geir Ulfstein maintain that the provision implies that the indigenous peoples 
shall be represented in the bodies that make decisions and are responsible for 
management of natural resources in indigenous areas. However, they argue 
that since the provision uses the word ‘participate’, it may not require that the 
management must be left to the indigenous peoples, or that they should be 
given conclusive influence in matters concerning resources pertaining to their 
15 James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 
2004), 143 and Mattias Åhren, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 
(Oxford University press 2016), 175.
16 NOU 2007: 13 Den nye sameretten, 850. 
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areas. If one looks at the  ILO 169 in conjunction with UN Declaration on Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, this becomes even clearer.17 
Nonetheless, this means that decisions, such as those made according to 
the Planning and Building Act, the Nature Conservation Act, and other Nor-
wegian domestic legislation, cannot be settled without Sámi representation 
in the bodies that make such decisions or exercise the management of the re-
sources.18
Further, Article 15 (2 ) reads:
In cases in which the State retains the  ownership of mineral or sub-sur-
face resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, govern-
ments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall 
consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what 
degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or per-
mitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such re-
sources pertaining to their lands. The peoples concerned shall wherever 
possible participate in the benefĳits of such activities, and shall receive 
fair  compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of 
such activities.
The  consultation obligation safeguarded in the fĳirst sentence of Article 15 (2), 
is imposed on the government when planning the extraction of mineral re-
sources that the state retains the ownership of, which is the case in Norway.19 
Whether or not the provision requires the government to establish special con-
sultation arrangements to determine the extent to which the indigenous inter-
ests would be prejudiced as a result of exploration of mineral resources can be 
debated. However, the case law of the ILO bodies, in the complaints procedure, 
do not draw any distinction between the obligations derived from Article 6, on 
17 In a more binding relationship, participation includes the concept of Free, Prior and In-
formed Consent, which is ensured in the UNDRIP (articles 10, 11 (2), 19, 28, 29 (2), 32 (2)). It 
can be strongly argued that the ILO 169 commitments of Norway must be interpreted in 
accordance to the UNDRIP. However, the space and aim of this chapter, do not allow me 
to elaborate on it here. 
18 Hans Petter Graver og Geir Ulfstein, Folkerettslig vurdering av forslaget til ny Finnmarkslov 
(November 3, 2003), see <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/rapporter_planer/
rapporter/2004/folkerettslig-vurdering-av-forslaget-til/3.html?id=278380> accessed March 
10, 2015. The Sámi Rights Committee will not extend the provision so far, see NOU 2007: 13, 
1044. 
19 See lov [Act] 19 June 2009 nr. 101 om erverv og utvinning av mineralressurser (minerallo-
ven) (The Mineral Act) Section 7, para. 1.
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one hand, and those derived from Article 15 (2), on the other.20 The fact that 
there is a special provision for  consultations in Article 15 (2) next to the general 
rule in Article 6, may be reason to suggest that it is particularly important that 
the governments implement consultations ‘in good faith’, and prior to exploita-
tion of  natural resources that states have retained  ownership of in indigenous 
traditional territories.21 Article 15 (2) is also designed more specifĳically than 
Article 6, since it poses a particular obligation of consultation regarding plans 
to allow the exploitation of natural resources to which the state claims  owner-
ship. In such a way, it strengthens the obligations for consultations settled in 
Article 6 (1).
The second sentence of Article 15 (2), introduces a  benefĳit sharing commit-
ment, stating that the indigenous peoples ‘shall wherever possible participate 
in the benefĳits of such activities’. This is in addition to a  compensation com-
mitment, also provided for in Article 15 (2), which states that the indigenous 
peoples concerned ‘shall receive fair  compensation for any damages which 
they may sustain as a result of such activities’.22 Together, these  benefĳit sharing 
and  compensation commitments establish that indigenous peoples not only 
should be fĳinancially compensated for damages and losses, but also should 
partake in the benefĳit of the profĳits of the industry ‘wherever possible’.
The Norwegian government has not only acknowledged the above men-
tioned commitments and obligations by ratifying the ILO 169 in 1990; it has 
also moved to fulfĳil them by adopting and implementing the 2005  Finnmark 
Act, which ‘shall apply with the limitations that follow from ILO Convention 
No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries’.23 The Norwegian authorities also signed the UN Declaration on Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples and actively participated in the work of the declaration 
since its inception in 1984. On the government’s web page, one can read: 
The government’s goal has been a declaration that can contribute to a 
strengthened legal protection for the world’s indigenous peoples. In the 
20 Graver and Ulfstein, supra note 18 and the Sámi Right Committee in NOU 2007: 13 Den nye 
sameretten, 1044.
21 The Sámi Rights Committee in NOU 2007: 13, 1044.
22 When it comes to compensation for damages, loss, and inconvenience as a result of inter-
vention, the Sámi, and others, are secured by the Constitution § 105, Expropriation Act (23 
October 1959 no. 3) and other laws including the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Protocol 1 Article 1 to receive full compensation for interference. This is not discussed 
further here.
23 The Finnmark Act section 3, see supra note 9. 
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work, the government has cooperated closely with the Sámi Parliament, 
which consistently has been represented in the Norwegian delegation to 
the negotiations at the United Nations on the Declaration.24
That Norway has signed the Declaration, and actively promoted it, is not with-
out obligations. It strengthens the legal obligations to the country’s own indig-
enous people, both in terms safeguarding the rights to land, water and cultural 
heritage.
How  Finnmark Act implements and safeguards the legal obligations under 
ILO 169, I will return to below.
2.3 The signifĳicance of the relation between the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the Norwegian Constitution 
Article 108
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also commits 
Norway.25 For the topic of this chapter, Article 27, which protects the rights of 
minorities’ cultural practices, is of particular interest.26 What makes Article 
27 particularly interesting in relation to securing lands, resources and cultural 
heritage of indigenous peoples, as mentioned in the introduction, is that the 
 Human Rights Committee interprets it to protect the substantial basis for a 
minority’s culture; i.e. the particular way of life associated with the use of land 
resources.27 In this way, the provision establishes a threshold for interferences 
in lands and  natural resources of the kind that could threaten the exercise of 
Sámi culture and livelihood – both at the individual and community level. In-
terferences exceeding this threshold will violate Article 27. 
The Norwegian government acknowledges this understanding as it endors-
es the report of the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion: “In relation to the 
Sámi as an indigenous people, it is a common interpretation that the provision 
24 See FNs erklæring om urfolks rettigheter <www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/urfolk-og-
minoriteter/samepolitikk/internasjonalt-urfolksarbeid/fns-erklaring-om-urfolks-ret-
tigheter/id87024/> accessed 12 Oct. 2016. 
25 Lov [Act] 21. mai 1999 nr. 30 om styrking av menneskerettighetenes stilling i norsk rett 
(menneskerettsloven) [The Human Rights Act] incorporates the ICCPR with precedence 
in front of National legislation.
26 Article 27 reads: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, or to use their own language’.
27 See the quotation in section 1, reference given in supra note 4.
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[Article 27] includes the substantive bases for the Sámi total cultural practices, 
also referred to as a natural basis for Sámi culture”.28
Case law from the  Human Rights Committee also clarifĳies that modern ways 
of exercising traditional culture-related industries, such as coastal fĳishing with 
modern gear or  reindeer herding with motor vehicles, enjoy protection under 
Article 27.29 
Article 27 of the ICCPR constitutes a signifĳicant legal obligation in securing 
the  natural resources and lands used by the Sámi, insofar as it sets up a frame-
work that limits interventions. Seen in the context of Norwegian Constitution 
Article 108,30 which protects Sámi language, culture and livelihood and is mod-
elled on the ICCPR Article 27,31 establishes a special protection of the Sámi 
culture. The link between these two provisions helps to strengthen the mutual 
obligations. Moreover, Article 108 must be interpreted in accordance with the 
‘requirements of international law committed to the Norwegian authorities’.32 
The implication is that Article 108 not only creates a legal obligation for the 
Norwegian authorities as regards the implementation of the country’s Sámi 
policy, but also contributes in protecting lands, natural resources and cultural 
heritages as a basis of Sámi culture.
3 The Implementation of ILO 169 in National Legislation
3.1 The Legislative Story of the  Finnmark Act
Norway has taken an active approach in respect of the ILO 169 commitments 
to ensure the Sámi’s rights of  ownership and  possession over their tradition-
al lands, implementing such commitments through national legislation by 
adopting a particular law for the most central Sámi areas known as the 2005 
28 St.meld. nr. 28 (2007-2008) Samepolitikken (Recommendation to the Parliament from the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion on the governmental Sámi Policy), 33. (Translation 
of quotations here and below, except for the sections of the Finnmark Act, is done by the 
author). 
29 Apirana Mahuika v. New Zealand, Comm. 547/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/547/1993 
(HRC 1995). See also Ravna, supra note 1. 179-180. 
30 Article 108, which protects Sámi language, culture and livelihood, reads: The authorities 
of the state shall create conditions enabling the Sámi people to preserve and develop its 
language, culture and way of life. Translation from<www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/
english/constitutionenglish.pdf> accessed October 12, 2016.
31 NOU 1984: 18 ibid., 441.
32 Sámi Rights Committee II in NOU 2007:13, 191.
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 Finnmark Act.33 Before examining how the ILO 169 commitments are imple-
mented and applied in practice, I will briefly explore the background and the 
legislative history of this Act.
Notwithstanding the discourses in the 1980s that acknowledged the Sámi 
as an indigenous people who were entitled to ownership of their traditional 
lands, the question of Sámi rights to lands and waters remained highly con-
troversial. This was clearly evident when it came to the implementation of 
the ILO 169 in national legislation. Although the Sámi Rights Committee had 
proposed a rather more far-reaching way of meeting the relevant ILO 169 ob-
ligations, including, inter alia, by identifying local community-owned lands to 
be governed by the those communities,34 the government, through the 2003 
bill of a  Finnmark Act, submitted that the ILO obligations could be met by 
transferring the state-held lands to a regional body only.35 The Sámi rights to 
ownership and  participation were to be ensured by letting the Sámi Parlia-
ment appoint three of the six board members. In such a way, the Sámi were 
supposed to enjoy substantial participation in the governance of all former 
state lands, including the Coastal sector with a traditional Norwegian popula-
tion. Consequently, the government did not see any need to identify local com-
munity lands, or particular lands to which the Sámi Community could claim 
collective  ownership to, as Article 14 of ILO 169 prescribes.
The government bill was met with broad opposition, not least from the 
Sámi Parliament, which argued, alongside others, that the bill was contrary 
to international law.36 As a result of this criticism, the legislature asked for an 
independent assessment of the draft, which was a unique occurrence in the 
history of Norwegian legislation. The law professors Geir Ulfstein and Hans 
Petter Graver were engaged to undertake the assessment. They concluded that 
the draft bill was, on a number of key points, insufffĳicient in meeting the re-
quirements of ILO169, including, inter alia, when it came to the identifĳication 
and recognition of specifĳic Sámi lands:
Should the  Finnmark Act meet ILO Convention requirements for recog-
nition of land rights, the decision rules must be changed so that the Sámi 
33 See supra note 9. The county of Finnmark, which is the northernmost county of Norway, 
is the area with the most signifĳicant concentration of traditional Sámi lands and settle-
ments.
34 NOU 1997: 4 Naturgrunnlaget for samisk kultur, 239-268.
35 Ot.prp. nr. 53 (2002-2003) Om lov om rettsforhold og forvaltning av grunn og naturres-
surser i Finnmark fylke (Finnmarksloven) [The Finnmark Act], 90-91. 
36 Innst. O. nr. 80 (2004-2005), 17.
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are secured the control according to an  ownership position. If this is not 
relevant for the entire county, the particular Sámi areas need to be identi-
fĳied with a view to ensure the Sámi the control and rights to these areas.37
The broad criticism in the report of Graver and Ulfstein served to trigger  con-
sultations between the Parliamentary Standing Committee of Justice, the Sámi 
Parliament and the Finnmark County Council. During these consultations, the 
legislature acknowledged that Norway was required to identify the rights to 
specifĳic lands and waters in Finnmark in order to meet the ILO 169 obligations 
under Article 14.38 Accordingly, legal identifĳication and recognition had to be 
included as a key element in the  Finnmark Act. 
Instead of addressing the identifĳication and recognition process through 
the ordinary courts or through a specialized land tribunal, the legislature pro-
posed that the rights to lands and waters in Finnmark should be identifĳied in 
two steps: First, by a commission mandated to investigate rights to lands and 
waters; and second, by a special court mandated to settle disputes concerning 
those rights arising from the investigation of the commission. This proposal is 
now formalized in the  Finnmark Act, section 5, para. 3. From the preparatory 
work, it is not clear why the legislature chose this two-step solution. Howev-
er, it can partly be reasoned in the criticism that was directed at Uncultivated 
Land Commission for Nordland and Troms, where the same body both inves-
tigated the case and ruled the trials that arise.39 That the procedure chosen 
in the  Finnmark Act, consumed twice more time, was not in the mind of the 
legislators.40 
There is also reason to inquire why the focus of identifĳication and recogni-
tion of land rights is on private property rights, rather than the two categories 
prescribed in the ILO 169 Article 14.41
37 Graver and Ulfstein, supra note 14.
38 Innst. O. nr. 80 (2004-2005), 17.
39 The Uncultivated Land Commission for Nordland and Troms (1985-2004) had the task to 
clarify boundaries between state land and private property in Troms and Nordland, in-
cluding usage rights that rested on state lands. The Commission were severely criticized 
by the Sami Parliament, which argued that it was not an adequate procedure within the 
national legal system to resolve land claims by indigenous peoples: see Sámi Parliament 
meeting protocol, case 61/1993 (May 10 and 11, 1993).
40 See Øyvind Ravna, ‘The Finnmark Act 2005 Clarifĳication Process and Trial “Within a Rea-
sonable Time”’, Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 29 (2011): 184-205.
41 See Innst. O. nr. 80 (2004-2005) p. 28, where the Sámi Parliament proposed to include 
identifĳication land categories according to the categories of ILO 169 Article 14 (1), which 
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The Finnmark Commission aimed ‘to establish the scope and content of 
the rights held by Sámi and other people on the basis of prescription or im-
memorial usage’, and the Uncultivated Land Tribunal for Finnmark aimed ‘to 
settle disputes concerning such rights’, were both established to fulfĳil the com-
mitment in respect of ILO  169, particularly Article 14. Consequently, these two 
bodies stand as the most prominent institutions established to meet the legal 
commitments Norway has undertaken by signing ILO 169.
Another controversial topic addressed during the  consultations was the 
removal of legal protection for the interests of the public living outside the 
county of Finnmark, which the government bill sought to protect in its pream-
ble.42 The intention of such removal was to strengthen the local communities’ 
control and management of the nearby outlying areas and  natural resources. 
In relation to the theme of this anthology, it is worth mentioning that Sámi 
cultural heritage provided minimal attention in the government’s 2003 bill to 
the  Finnmark Act.43 Cultural heritage is only mentioned in a proposal for a 
provision that the Finnmark Estate44 may not claim  compensation when ex-
propriating land or resources for a number of public purposes, including cul-
tural heritage projects. The proposal was not adopted by the legislature.
The fact that Sámi cultural heritage received minimal treatment in the draft 
bill that formed the basis for the  Finnmark Act is recognized by the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, but further discussion of cultural heritage is gener-
ally absent.45 
3.2 The  Finnmark Act and the Obligations under ILO 169
The 2005  Finnmark Act is established as a result of the development of Sámi 
rights that occurred towards the end of the last millennium. It has an aim to in-
clude the Sámi in the governance of land and renewable resources in the Coun-
ty of Finnmark in order to fulfĳil Norway’s various obligations under ILO 169. 
In its preamble (section 1), the act pronounces that: 
The purpose of the Act is to facilitate the management of land and natu-
ral resources in the county of Finnmark in a balanced and ecologically 
is ‘rights of ownership and possession’ and ‘right… to use lands (not exclusively occupied 
by them)’.
42 Innst. O. nr. 80 (2005-2006), 32. 
43 Ot.prp. nr. 53 (2002-2003), supra note 35.
44 The Finnmark Estate (Finnmarkseiendommen) is the legal entity that shall administer the 
land and natural resources that it owns on behalf of the peoples of Finnmark.
45 Ot.prp. nr. 53 (2002-2003), 24.
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sustainable manner for the benefĳit of the residents of the county and 
particularly as a basis for Sami culture,  reindeer husbandry, use of non-
cultivated areas, commercial activity and social life (my emphasis).46
The  Finnmark Act incorporates the ILO 169 into Norwegian law. This is estab-
lished in Section 3, which reads: 
The Act shall apply with the limitations that follow from ILO Conven-
tion No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries. The Act shall be applied in compliance with the provisions 
of international law concerning indigenous peoples and minorities and 
with the provisions of agreements with foreign states concerning fĳishing 
in transboundary watercourses.
This is a partial incorporation,47 limited to the jurisdictional area covered by 
the  Finnmark Act. It is important to be aware that the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee of Justice48 emphasizes that the phrase ‘the limitations’ implies 
that the ILO 169 prevails over the  Finnmark Act in case of conflicts. On the oth-
er hand, if one fĳinds, on the basis of the ILO 169, that the Act lacks provisions 
on a certain topic, the Committee states that it will be a task for the legislature 
to address such a gap. The Courts shall, in other words, not rely on the ILO 169 
to determine rules that are not specifĳied in the  Finnmark Act.49
The  Finnmark Act Section 3 and the rationale in the preparatory works have 
recently been discussed by the Supreme Court of Norway, which has interpret-
ed the incorporation narrowly.50 The Court fĳinds that ILO 169 only has priority 
over the provisions of the  Finnmark Act. Thus, ILO  169 is not incorporated in 
46 Translation here and below of sections of the Finnmark Act is taken from <http://app.uio.
no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/>, see supra note 9.
47 The Parliamentary Standing Committee of Justice in Innst. O. nr. 80 (2004-2005), 33.
48 Parliamentary Standing Committee of Justice is one of the committees of Parliament. 
It hears matters related to the Judiciary of Norway, the Police and Correctional Services, 
Prosecutors, general administrative law, criminal law, procedural law and general civil 
law. Consequently, the Committee had parliamentary responsibility for completing the 
preparatory work of the Finnmark Act. 
49 Innst. O. nr. 80 (2004-2005), 33.
50 The Norwegian Supreme Court, Stjernøy Reindeer Husbandry district and Johan J. Sara 
et al. vs. the Finnmark Estate, 28 Sept. 20016, HR-2016-2030-A, para. 76. See also Ø. Ravna, 
‘Norway and its obligations under the ILO 169 – some considerations after the recent 
Stjernøy Supreme Court Case’, Arctic Review on Law and Politics (7) no. 2 2016.
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front “jurisdictional area of the act” and does not take precedence over prop-
erty law to be applied as a result of the  Finnmark Act.
Section 4, which sets out guidelines for the Sámi Parliament regarding 
changes in the use of uncultivated land, allows the Sámi Parliament to adopt 
guidelines for changes in the use of outlying fĳields and mountainous areas. 
Such guidelines were in fact adopted in 2007.51 It is among these guidelines 
that we fĳind the only consideration of Sámi cultural heritage related to the 
 Finnmark Act. The relevant guideline requires public authorities, including 
Finnmark Estate, to conduct a thorough and proper assessment of the poten-
tial efffects on Sámi culture,  reindeer herding, areas, commercial activity and 
social life before making a decision in matters concerning changes in the use 
of land in Finnmark. Section 7 (of the Guidelines) states that, in particular, it 
shall be taken into account that the measures or plans are not unsightly, and 
do not infringe upon Sámi sacred sites, burial sites and other places of special 
cultural signifĳicance, see the Act Concerning the Cultural Heritage.52 
Returning to the  Finnmark Act itself, the most substantial commitment to 
the Sámi is pronounced in Section 5, paragraph 1, which reads: 
Through prolonged use of land and water areas, the Sámi have collec-
tively and individually acquired rights to land in Finnmark. 
Paragraph 1 reflects the commitment of the ILO  169, Article 14 (1), which en-
sures the rights of  ownership and  possession of the Sámi over the lands which 
they have traditionally occupied. The Parliamentary Standing Committee of 
Justice has noted that the provision explicitly prescribes that the Sámi have 
acquired rights to lands in Finnmark. This is a principled and political recogni-
tion of the occurrence of such rights.53
Paragraph 2 and 3 of Section 5 are also certainly of signifĳicance: 
This Act does not interfere with collective and individual rights acquired 
by Sami and other people through prescription or immemorial usage. 
This also applies to the rights held by reindeer herders on such a basis or 
pursuant to the Reindeer Herding Act.
51 Sametingets retningslinjer for vurderingen av samiske hensyn ved endret bruk av meah-
cci/utmark i Finnmark [The Sámi Parliament’s guidelines for the assessment of Sámi con-
siderations for changes in the use of uncultivated land (meahcci) in Finnmark], regula-
tion 11 June 2007 no. 738.
52 For the full reference of the Act, see supra note 7.
53 Innst. O. nr. 80 (2004-2005), 37. 
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In order to establish the scope and content of the rights held by Sami 
and other people on the basis of prescription or immemorial usage or on 
some other basis, a commission shall be established to investigate rights 
to land and water in Finnmark and a special court to settle disputes con-
cerning such rights, cf. chapter 5.
Paragraph 2 clearly establishes that the act cannot intervene in established 
use and  ownership rights, for example through the regulatory regime that is 
established under Chapter 3, or through the surveying and identifĳication of 
legal rights under Chapter 5. Paragraph 3 reflects the commitments in ILO  169, 
Article 14 (2), which provide that governments shall take steps as necessary 
to identify the lands that indigenous peoples have traditionally occupied by 
establishing and guaranteeing efffective protection of their rights of ownership 
and  possession. It also reflects Article 14 (3) which provides that adequate pro-
cedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land 
claims from the indigenous peoples.
It is noteworthy that the majority of the Parliamentary Standing Committee 
of Justice stated that the assessment of evidence in recent case law has been 
satisfactory. Newer Norwegian jurisprudence, especially the  Selbu- and  Svart-
skog cases, provide insight on how traditional Sámi use shall be considered as 
a basis for the acquisition of rights. They are important sources of law for the 
Commission and the Court.54 In the precedent-setting Selbu- and Svartskog 
cases,55 the Supreme Court of Norway acknowledged Sámi pastoral rights on 
private land (in the former case), and title to an area of uncultivated land the 
local Sámi population had used over centuries (in the latter case). 
Protection of Sámi cultural heritage was not a topic in the Selbu Case. How-
ever, the importance of such heritage was in focus as evidence of Sámi pres-
ence in earlier times. In this context, the Supreme Court refers to a survey of 
1985, where it was stated:
An overall consideration of the scope of cultural heritage in this area re-
veals a Sámi dwelling and usage area with long traditions... The Sámi’s 
cultural heritage extends throughout the whole project area.
Based on this report, the Supreme Court rejected the assertion of landowners 
that there was no Sámi cultural heritage in the disputed area: ‘Even if it is just 
54 Ibid., 36.
55 Published in Norsk Retstidende (NRt) 2001, 769 fff. and 1229 fff., respectively.
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a fĳield report, it does at least exclude conclusions that there is no Sámi cultural 
heritage in the area.’56 
Chapter 2 includes Sections 6 and 7. Section 6 prescribes that Finnmark-
seiendommen (‘the Finnmark Estate’) is an independent legal entity seated in 
Finnmark, which shall administer the land and  natural resources that it owns 
in compliance with the purpose of this Act. According to the government, the 
provision forms the legal basis for the establishment of the new governing sys-
tem, and stipulates that the body is a separate legal entity within the frame-
work of the act.57
Section 7 is an important provision, which governs the composition of the 
board of the Finnmark Estate. It provides that the Finnmark County Council 
and the Sámi Parliament shall each elect three members, in addition to per-
sonal deputies, for a total of six board members – in line with the arrangement 
to fulfĳil the obligations of ILO  169 that was originally envisioned by the gov-
ernment in its 2003 law bill. The provision must also be seen as a follow-up to 
Article 15 (1), which, as previously discussed, safeguards ‘the right of these [in-
digenous] peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation of 
these resources’. However, it has yet to be formally established whether locals 
who have historical rights in the nearby outlying areas, both Sámi and non-
Sámi, can participate in its governance and management.
Chapter 3 (Sections 21-27), which defĳines the rights of the municipality 
and the county’s population, respectively, and provides the Finnmark Estate 
a broad right to regulate the use of natural resources, is not discussed further. 
However, one should note that the statutory regulatory regime shall not in-
clude acquired-use rights or property rights.
Chapter 5, entitled ‘Survey and recognition of existing rights’, includes Sec-
tions 29 and 36, which grant authority to the Finnmark Commission and the 
Uncultivated Land Tribunal for Finnmark, respectively. These bodies are a di-
rect consequence of the recognition of the obligations under ILO 169, Article 
14 (2) and (3). However, the entire Chapter, which was drawn up during the 
 consultations between the Sámi Parliament, the Finnmark County Council 
and Parliamentary Standing Committee of Justice, must be seen in this light. 
56 NRt. 2001, 769 at 808. More about the Selbu- and Svartskog cases, published in NRt 2001, 
p. 769 et seq. and p. 1229 et seq, respectively, see Øyvind Ravna, ‘The Process of Identify-
ing Land Rights in parts of Northern Norway: Does the Finnmark Act Prescribe an Ad-
equate Procedure within the National Law?’ in Yearbook of Polar Law, vol. 3, 2011, 423-453 
at 429-432.
57 Ot.prp. nr. 53 (2002-2003), 123. The Parliamentary Standing Committee of Justice has no 
further comments to the provision.
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More specifĳically, Section 29 imposes a particular duty on the Finnmark Com-
mission, on the basis of current national law, to ‘investigate rights of use and 
 ownership to the land to be taken over by Finnmark Estate pursuant to Section 
49’. The preparatory works show that ‘current national law’ implies that Sámi 
 customary law must be emphasized as a source of law,58 in line with Norway’s 
commitments under ILO  169, Article 8.
The above-explained review is not exhaustive.59 However, it demonstrates 
that the Finnmark  Act has a broad range of provisions intended to address 
Norway’s obligations under ILO 169. Nevertheless, the identifĳication process 
established under Chapter 5 can be criticized, given that it has a private-law 
focus, rather than representing an initiative to identify the categories of lands 
listed in ILO 169, Article 14. Whether the Commission should be obliged to take 
such an initiative is worthy of further attention, particularly in light of the fact 
that the ILO 169 enjoys priority over the Finnmark  Act. A further review of 
Chapter 5 will also show that it contains unusual and unsuitable procedural 
regulations.60
3.3 The Application of the Finnmark  Act in Relation to Identifying and 
Securing Sámi Lands and Collective Use Rights
The process of legally identifying Sámi lands, aimed at defĳining the owner-
ship and use rights provided under the Finnmark  Act, Section 5, paragraph 1, 
started in March 2008 when the Finnmark Commission was fĳirst established. 
This process is not only of regional or national interest, but also of interna-
tional interest, as it demonstrates how the fĳirst state to sign the ILO 169 fulfĳils 
its commitments to the Sámi. In addition, the fĳive reports of the Finnmark 
Commission published to date,61 are the fĳirst specifĳic documents to clarify the 
rights of the Sámi to particular land areas, and arose after many decades of 
investigation and political discussions on Sámi land rights. 
58 Inst. O. nr. 80 (2004-2005), 19.
59 Among other things, the relatively complicated procedural requirements have not been 
discussed: On this, see Øyvind Ravna, ‘The Process of Identifying Land Rights in parts of 
Northern Norway: Does the Finnmark Act Prescribe an Adequate Procedure within the 
National Law?’, Yearbook of Polar Law, 3 (2011): 423-453 at 437-450.
60 More about this, see Ravna, supra note 59, 444-450. 
61 Finnmarkskommisjonen, Rapport felt 1 Stjernøya/Seiland, March 20, 2012 (Report 1), Rap-
port felt 2, Nesseby, February 13, 2013 (Report 2), Rapport felt 3 Sørøya, October 16, 2013 
(Report 3), Rapport felt 5, Varangerhalvøya Øst, June 24, 2014 (Report 5) and Rapport felt 
6, Varangerhalvøya Øst, October 16, 2015 (Report 6), see <http://www.domstol.no/no/En-
kelt-domstol/Finnmarkskommisjonen/Felt-1---3/Avsluttede-felt/>, accessed December 
10, 2015. 
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The fĳirst report concerns the islands of Stjernøya and Seiland in the Alta 
Fjord in West Finnmark.62 The area covered by the report is inhabited by both 
Sámi and non-Sámi coastal populations. It is also used as summer pastures for 
nomadic Sámi reindeer-herders. In addition, the Sibelco Nordic mining compa-
ny produces the valuable mineral nepheline syenite on one of the two islands. 
While taking position on substantive questions concerning the local Sámi, 
the non-Sámi population, and the nomadic Sámi reindeer-herders’ usage and 
 ownership-rights on the two islands, the Finnmark Commission found that 
none of the land users had acquired collective property rights. However, the 
Commission found that there are established use rights with an independent 
legal basis. Nonetheless, this fĳinding does not imply that the local population 
have rights to use the  natural resources without permission from the Finnmark 
Estate or to participate in the management and conservation of these rights as 
the ILO 169, Article 15 (1) prescribes. In fact, neither the locals nor the reindeer 
herders were acknowledged to enjoy any rights beyond those that these groups 
already enjoy under the 2007 Reindeer Husbandry Act and the Finnmark  Act, 
Sections 22 and 23.63 
Remarkably, the Commission refused to take a position on whether or not 
the Sámi herders are entitled to benefĳits derived from Sibelco Nordic’s mining 
activities on their pastoral lands. The reason for this is that the question must 
be settled on the basis of international law, i.e. ILO 169 solely, which, according 
to the Commission, is not within the scope and mandate of the legal clarifĳi-
cation process.64 However, the ILO 169 prevails the Finnmark  Act in case of 
contradictions.
The assessments in the Report 1 have been heard by the Uncultivated Land 
Tribunal for Finnmark and the Supreme Court of Norway. In both instances, the 
Courts held that the Sámi reindeer herders had not acquired title to Stjernøya. 
As shown above, the Supreme Court constricted the importance of ILO  169 in 
relation to the Finnmark  Act.65 However, the Supreme Court highlights the so-
called “presumption principle”. This principle says that Norwegian law as far as 
possible shall be interpreted in accordance with international law.66
62 Ibid., Report 1.
63 For more reading, see Øyvind Ravna, ‘The First Investigation Report of the Norwegian 
Finnmark Commission’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013), 
443-457.
64 Supra note 61, Report 1, 50.
65 Supra note 50.
66 Ibid., para. 77.
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In the second report, published in February 2013, which covers the Sámi 
municipality of Nesseby in the eastern parts of Finnmark, the conclusions 
reached in relation to collective rights are substantially the same, although the 
 landscape, location, and evidence of use varied signifĳicantly from the circum-
stances under focus in the fĳirst report.67 Consequently, not a square meter of 
collective ownership was recognized for the inhabitants of the Sámi Commu-
nity of Nesseby. However, as was the case in the earlier report, it was assumed 
that both locals and reindeer herders had use rights with an independent legal 
basis. In the report, however, it was more clearly articulated why the rights 
holders were not entitled to dispose of or exercise control over their own usage 
rights. The reason for this involved the allocations of the government, which 
through its governance and management, has established a right to rule over 
the local population's use rights.68 To be denied control over their own usage 
rights is contested by the locals, who have brought the case before the Unculti-
vated Land Tribunal for Finnmark. A judgement in the case is expected in late 
autumn 2016.
Report 3 and 5, published in October 2013 and June 2014 respectively, con-
fĳirm the ‘case law’ regarding collective rights as established in the previous two 
reports.69 So does Report 6, published in October 2015. 
However, there is an exception in Report 6. In the small abandoned Coastal 
Sámi village Gulgofĳjord by the Tana fĳjord, the Finnmark Commission found 
that the people who moved away from the village in 1970, and their ancestors, 
have pursued such an extensive use while government allocations have vir-
tually been absent, which means that they hold title to an outlying area of 
30 square kilometers.70 The Commission, however, concluded that since the 
village is abandoned, the Finnmark Estate have the title until the residents 
reportedly move back to the village, which has neither infrastructure, shops 
or schools. The Finnmark Estate has called this as a “sleeping  ownership,” to 
which it opposes.71
It is worth noting that within the preparatory works of the Finnmark  Act, 
the legislature assumed that the two precedent Supreme Court cases of  Selbu 
and Svartskogen72 were examples to be followed: 
67 Supra note 61, Report 2.
68 Supra note 61, Report 2, 122.
69 Supra note 61, Report 3 and 5.
70 Supra note 61, Report 6, 158-172. 
71 Protocol of the chair meeting of Finnmark Estate 20 and 21 June 2016, para. 9.4.
72 Published in NRt. (2001), 769 fff. and 1229 fff., respectively.
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It is opinion of the majority [of the Parliamentary Standing committee 
of justice] that the assessment of evidence in recent case law has been 
satisfactory. Recent Norwegian case law, especially the  Selbu- and  Svart-
skog cases, have given instructions on how traditional Sámi use shall be 
considered as the basis for the acquisition. It will be important sources of 
law for the commission and the court.73
The Finnmark Commission has found that the local peoples’ use of lands in 
all the fĳive fĳields investigated was extensive, flexible, and long-lasting – similar 
to that of the locals in Manndalen,74 who won the title to land in the Supreme 
Court Case of Svartskogen.75 However, the Commission did not conclude in ac-
cordance with the latter judgment. Instead, it argued that the state’s allocations 
as proprietor, and administrative deeds as authority, had been so extensive in 
all the four fĳields that they had extinguished the collective property rights of 
the local people – even though they had been there prior to 1775, when the 
state began to survey and register private land plots. 
When it comes to use rights, they have in principle survived, but are of little 
signifĳicance because the right holders are not granted any exclusive protec-
tion from outsiders. In addition, the right holders are not permitted to use the 
rights without the permission of Finnmark Estate, nor can they participate in 
management or benefĳit from dividends.
Rather than emphasising Sámi use of lands or Sámi  customary law, as the 
legislature prescribed in the preparatory works for the Finnmark  Act,76 the 
Finnmark Commission has identifĳied the governmental exercises of authority 
and ownership, together with lack of local, informal management of  natural 
resources, to be of signifĳicance for law-making. Thus, it is not lack of continu-
ous and intensive use of land and natural resources in good faith, as prescribed 
in the rules of immemorial usage that prevent people from acquiring their 
rights, but rather place heavy emphasis on the state’s former colonial legal re-
gime and associated land transactions and allocations.
Accordingly, colonial state  ownership, the very thing that the Finnmark  Act 
aims to abolish, is the same thing preventing the Norwegian state from up-
holding its commitment to the Sámi under the same act, in Section 5 – that 
is, that ‘the Sámi have collectively and individually acquired rights to land in 
Finnmark’. That the Commission has, to a very limited extent, taken into ac-
73 Inst. O. nr. 80 (2004-2005), 36. 
74 Supra note 61, Report 1, 64, Report 2, 65 and Report 3, 51.
75 Nrt. (2001), 1229 fff. The case is referred in 3.2 (above).
76 Innst. O. nr. 80 (2004-2005), 19. 
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count the varying situations between the islands in western Finnmark and a 
municipally in eastern Finnmark, which have a living Sámi culture, both in 
terms of the local population use and management, and government disposi-
tions, is a part of the case.
Notably, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, in 
her report on the human rights situation of the Sámi people in the Sápmi re-
gion of Norway, Sweden and Finland, have criticized the weight the state’s ear-
lier dispositions as the claimant of property rights in Finnmark in the reports 
of the Finnmark Commission.77 She proposes instead that a starting point for 
any measures to identify and recognize indigenous peoples’ land and resource 
rights “should be their own customary use and tenure systems”. She also high-
lights the management of areas, nature and cultural heritage is therefore im-
portant to ensure the basis for preserving and developing Sámi culture.78
4 Summary
This chapter deals with land and resources as a part of cultural heritage. More 
precisely, it analyzes how the international legal obligations to identify, recog-
nise, and secure indigenous peoples’ lands,  natural resources, and livelihoods 
– as provided for under the ILO  169 – are met in Norway. Based on this analysis, 
one can clearly argue that the Finnmark  Act could give stronger guidance as 
to how the usage and  ownership rights to the former state lands of Finnmark 
are to be identifĳied. The Act could also better safeguard the identifĳication of 
lands in accordance with the established categories under ILO 169. To assume 
that the Sámi have sufffĳicient influence on their traditional lands by letting the 
Sámi Parliament appoint three out of six board members, may also seem naive. 
The Act can consequently also be criticized for its limited consideration and 
protection of Sámi cultural heritage.
Notwithstanding, the review above shows that the legislature has endeav-
oured to implement provisions in the Finnmark  Act that allow the law to meet 
commitments under the ILO 169. Bearing in mind that the Act resulted from 
a compromise between many interests, one has to admit that the legislature 
probably came as far as it was possible in 2005. To complete the implementa-
77 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples (Victoria Tauli-Cor-
puz) on the human rights situation of the Sami people in the Sápmi region of Norway, 
Sweden and Finland, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/33/42/Add.3, para. 24.
78 Ibid., para. 27 (my emphasis). 
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tion, there have to be a focus on the application of the law in relation to both 
the Finnmark  Act and the ILO  169. 
The application of the law, as conducted by the Finnmark Commission has 
not had this focus, but rather, has emphasized other considerations. By plac-
ing heavy weight on governmental exercises of  ownership and authority, in 
the fĳive areas that are have been investigated, the Commission has prevented 
the local inhabitants – both Sámi and non-Sámi – from acquiring recognition 
of both collective property rights and use rights beyond what is already pro-
vided in the Finnmark  Act. Particularly noteworthy is the statement that even 
though the locals are acknowledged to possess original use rights with an inde-
pendent legal basis, the state’s exercises as land owner and executive authority 
in the past, has implied that the locals do not have the rights to control or man-
age their use rights. The fact that the Commission argues that the communities 
have not exercised a local, customary-based governance and management of 
lands, contributes to strengthening the assertion that the locals do not have 
the right to control and manage the usage rights of their own traditional lands.
In addition, when taking into account the special guidelines for the legal 
identifĳication and clarifĳication process embedded in the preparatory work, in-
cluding reference to the  Selbu and Svartskogen Cases, it becomes necessary to 
ask whether the governmental exercises and the presumed absence of local 
governance – in method and in actual fact – is too heavily emphasized. This 
is, as mentioned, pointed out by the UN Special Rapporteur on Rights of In-
digenous Peoples in her 2016 Report on the human rights situation of the Sámi 
People.
Giving signifĳicant weight to state allocations and lack of local governance 
will efffectively imply that it is not possible to achieve the aim of the Finnmark 
 Act. In other words, a ‘signifĳicant historic shift to local control’,79 will not take 
place – despite the fact that the language of the ILO obligations is relatively 
well implemented in the Finnmark  Act itself, including Section 5 (1) and (2).80
Nor does this manner of application contribute to advancing the legisla-
ture’s intentions regarding the strengthening of Sámi rights to participate in 
the use, management, and conservation of the  natural resources pertaining to 
their lands.
79 Ot.prp. nr. 53 (2002-2003), 7.
80 (1) Through prolonged use of land and water areas, the Sámi have collectively and in-
dividually acquired rights to land in Finnmark, (2) This Act does not interfere with col-
lective and individual rights acquired by Sámi and other people through prescription or 
immemorial usage.
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Admittedly, the methodological and practical challenges the Finnmark 
Commission has faced have not been easy to meet. Assessing the signifĳicance 
of Sámi customary use, control, and governance of lands in a context of vary-
ing factual circumstances is no small feat, espe cially where the state has exer-
cised broad public governance over a long period. However, it does not justify 
the current application of the law. By a general, proprietary law approach, the 
landowner’s allocations must obviously be heavily emphasized. Nevertheless, 
the situation in Finnmark is diffferent: The state’s position as landowner in the 
Sámi areas has long been both unclear and disputed,81 and the government 
has acknowledged that it is ‘difffĳicult to conclude for sure that state  ownership 
can be fully maintained’.82 A responsibility to both the Sámi and the non-Sámi 
population in Finnmark has also been recognized by the statement that ‘there 
is a need for a clear recognition of the independent rights on ordinary property 
law basis, not because the legal situation has to be altered or modifĳied, but to 
make it clear that the former position of the state as landowner, has not been 
an obstacle to obtaining such rights’.83
Accordingly, the law cannot be applied in such way that the former position 
of the state, based on a colonial doctrine, prevents Norway from identifying 
Sámi collective rights to lands and waters, and thereby fails in ensuring Sámi 
rights to lands, traditional nature-based livelihood and  natural resources. Such 
an application of the law not only implies that international law obligations 
are in danger of being violated; it also means that the Sámi are not free to enjoy 
their  cultural rights or have necessary control over their cultural heritage.
81 See inter alia Nrt. (1979), 492 (Varfĳjell-Stifĳjell) where Sámi reindeer herders were not af-
fected by the statute of limitations as a result of uncertainty about the ownership of the 
unregistered land in Finnmark.
82 Ot.prp. nr. 53 (2002-2003), 43.
83 Ibid., 96. 
The Self-Governing of Inuit Cultural Heritage in 
Canada: The Path so Far
Violet Ford
Introduction
For the last few decades, indigenous peoples around the world have sought 
opportunities and methods to govern their own cultural heritage. In the previ-
ous administration, President Obama acknowledged this struggle: on a visit to 
Alaska, he changed the name of Mount McKinley back to the historical tradi-
tional name that the indigenous peoples of Alaska had given to this highest 
mountain peak in North America – Denali, which means ‘the High One’.1 This 
step by a world leader to acknowledge the cultural heritage of an indigenous 
people is positive, as indigenous peoples have faced many challenges regarding 
the  misappropriation and  misuse of their cultural heritage. UN bodies contin-
ue to look at indigenous cultural heritage, and scholars are currently studying 
and discussing the many issues that indigenous cultural heritage raises. The 
goal of this chapter is to discuss how indigenous peoples in the Arctic are gov-
erning their cultural heritage. The chapter argues that the Inuit in Canada are 
governing their cultural heritage to varying degrees and with various results. 
The United Nations Educational, Scientifĳic and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) refers to culture as ‘the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, ma-
terial, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social 
group. It includes not only the arts and letters but also modes of life, the fun-
damental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.’2 
Cultural heritage, then, may be defĳined as both the physical,  tangible forms 
of lifestyle and the expression of culture, including buildings,  landscapes, ar-
tifacts, and archaeological remains, and the  intangible expressions of culture, 
including values, customs, traditional skills, language, and artistic expressions. 
1 Roberta Rampton, ‘Obama Changing Name of Alaska’s Mount McKinley to Denali’ Reu-
ters (Washington, 31 August 2015) <www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/31/us-usa-obama-
alaska-idUSKCN0QZ0YZ20150831?feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews>.
2 United Nations Educational, Scientifĳic and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Constitu-
tion of the United Nations Educational, Scientifĳic and Cultural Organization(UNESCO), 16 
November 1945.
© 2017 Violet Ford. isbn 978-90-04-34218-7. pp. 199-217
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Indigenous peoples’ right to their cultural heritage is now clearly recognized 
under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.3
Numerous academics, advocates, and stakeholders have studied and writ-
ten about cultural heritage. Jofffe highlights the connection between the prin-
ciple of  free, prior and informed consent ( FPIC), a cornerstone of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the protection of 
cultural heritage,4 while Prosper argues that the study of cultural  landscapes 
can lead to alternative ways of seeing heritage value centered around relation-
ships.5 
The relationship between archaeologists and indigenous peoples has been 
a matter of concern over the last years. Cliffford looks at the limits of collabo-
rative work between archeologists and the community.6 Chirikure and Pwiti 
rightly suggest that community  archaeology empowers previously disenfran-
chised peoples such as indigenous peoples and local communities that had 
lost their rights to their heritage through  colonialism.7 They argue that com-
munity involvement in  archaeology and cultural heritage management has 
created in some areas a positive relationship between archaeologists and com-
munities. At the same time, they recognize that heritage management and the 
relinquishment of control by heritage managers and archaeologists has been a 
challenge; and working towards an equal partnership between the indigenous 
community and scientists remains a challenge.8 Specifĳically on the Inuit, Mari-
anne Stenbaek notes that although the they have faced many cultural changes 
3 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295, see Articles 11, 
12, 13, and 14.
4 Paul Jofffe, ‘Canada’s Opposition to the UN Declaration: Legitimate Concerns or Ideologi-
cal Bias’ in J Hartlet et al. (eds.) Realizing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Triumph, Hope, and Action (2010) 70, 81.
5 Lisa Prosper, ‘Wherein Lies the Heritage Value? Rethinking the Heritage Value of Cultural 
Landscapes from an Aboriginal Perspective’ (2007) The George Wright Forum, vol 24, no 
2, 117.
6 James Cliffford, ‘Looking Several Ways: Anthropology and Native Heritage in Alaska’ 
(2004), Current Anthropology vol 45, no 1, 5.
7 Shadreck Chirikure and Gilbert Pwiti, ‘Community Involvement in Archaeology and Cul-
tural Heritage Management: An Assessment from Case Studies in Southern Africa and 
Elsewhere’ ( 2008) Current Anthropology vol 49, no 3, 467.
8 Ibid.
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due to the influx of peoples from southern regions, the Inuit culture maintains 
its strength as a culture of a transnational region.9
Traditional knowledge is very important to Inuit. It is a body of knowledge 
in its own right that reflects who the Inuit are and the worldview that they 
hold. In their paper, Andrew Stewart, Darren Keith, and Joan Scottie propose 
that traditional knowledge is played out in the archaeological  landscape.10 
Inuit place names are another aspect of Inuit cultural heritage and describe 
physical or cultural features of the landscape.11 George Wenzel posits that  tra-
ditional knowledge has become a political concern because of the  appropria-
tion of this knowledge and argues for closer ethical treatment through  intel-
lectual property.12
What remains rather unexplored in the literature is how the governance of 
cultural heritage by indigenous peoples within the context of land rights is 
progressing to date, particularly at the domestic level. Therefore, the question 
explored in this chapter is the extent to which the protection and promotion of 
Inuit cultural heritage can be reached under Inuit land claims agreements and 
the  self-government arrangements flowing from these agreements. Its purpose 
is to look at Inuit governance and the legal arrangements that provide for gov-
ernance and how these arrangements have created a path for the Inuit control 
over and management of their cultural heritage. 
Inuit in Canada are located in four regions: the western Arctic, the central 
Arctic, Northern Quebec, and Northern Labrador. Part one provides a sample 
of the activities that Inuit are carrying out in the governing of their cultural 
heritage under various legal arrangements. Part two examines other legal ar-
rangements that pertain to the issue of governing and protecting Inuit legal 
rights. Finally, part three discusses more in depth these fĳindings. 
9 Marianne Stenbaek, ‘Forty Years of Cultural Change among the Inuit in Alaska, Canada 
and Greenland: Some Reflections’ (1987) Arctic vol 40, no 4, 30.
10 Andrew Stewart, Darren Keith, and Joan Scottie, ‘Caribou Crossings and Cultural Mean-
ings: Placing Traditional Knowledge and Archaeology in Context in an Inuit Landscape’ 
(June 2004) Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory vol 11, issue 2, 183.
11 Inuit Heritage Trust, <www.inti/eng/placenames/pp.index.html>.
12 George W. Wenzel, ‘Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Inuit: Reflections on TEK Re-
search and Ethics’ (1999) Arctic vol 22, no 2, 113.
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PART ONE: MAKING A PATH FOR INUIT GOVERNANCE OF 
CULTURAL HERITAGE
First, the paper will examine the legal arrangements under Inuit land claims 
agreements, the accompanying  self-government regimes, and the related land 
claims provisions. All these agreements have had a direct impact on the pro-
tection of Inuit cultural heritage and have allowed the development of cultural 
institutions where the Inuit have control over the management of their cul-
tural heritage.
Inuit Land Claims Agreements 
Before Canada’s Constitution Act of 1982 came into existence, the Aboriginal 
Peoples in Canada were not protected. Section 35(1) of Canada’s Constitution 
Act, 1982, recognized and afffĳirmed existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Section 35(3) states that the treaty rights re-
ferred to in section 35(1) include ‘rights that now exist by way of land claims 
agreements or may be so acquired’. Therefore, the Inuit land claims agreements 
are protected. As such, the Inuit land claims agreements are intended to defĳine 
resource rights and to improve the social, cultural, and economic well being of 
the Aboriginal people concerned by providing long-term certainty and clarity 
for land and resource use and management.13 Self-government goes hand in 
hand with the constitutional rights reflected in the Land Claims Agreement. 
The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent right of self-government 
as an existing Aboriginal right under section 35 of the Constitution.14 Recog-
nition of inherent rights is based on the view that the Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada have the right to govern themselves in matters that are internal to their 
communities; integral to their unique cultures, identities, traditions, languag-
es, and institutions; and pertaining to their special relationship to their land 
and resources.15 
13 Land Claims Agreements Coalition <www.landclaimscoalition.ca> accessed 15 Septem-
ber 2015.
14 Ibid.
15 The government acknowledges that the inherent right of self-government may be en-
forceable through the courts and that there are diffferent views about the nature, scope, 
and content of the inherent right. However, litigation over the inherent right would be 
lengthy and costly and would tend to foster conflict. In any case, the courts are likely to 
provide general guidance to the parties involved, leaving it to them to work out detailed 
arrangements. This includes federal self-government policy. 
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Rather than trying to defĳine  self-government in abstract terms, the gov-
ernment of Canada has developed an approach to implementation that fo-
cuses on reaching practical and workable agreements on how self-government 
will be exercised. There are a number of subject matters where Aboriginal 
governments or institutions have no or limited law-making authority under 
these self-government arrangements – for example in the area of  intellectu-
al property, such as  copyright or trademarks. These are the areas where laws 
and regulations tend to have impacts that go beyond individual communities; 
therefore, primary law-making authority remains with the federal or provin-
cial governments, and their laws would prevail in the event of a conflict with 
Aboriginal laws.16 However, in practice, to the extent that the federal govern-
ment has jurisdiction in these areas, it is prepared to negotiate some measure 
of Aboriginal jurisdiction or authority. Of course, in such areas where impacts 
are within individual communities, the jurisdiction remains with the Aborigi-
nal authority. In some cases, detailed arrangements are required to ensure the 
harmonization of laws, while in others, a general recognition of Aboriginal 
jurisdiction or authority may be sufffĳicient. There are also a number of areas 
where Aboriginal governments or institutions have no law-making authority 
at all under these self-government arrangements. These can be grouped under 
two headings: powers related to Canadian sovereignty, defense, and external 
relations; and other national interest powers. In these areas, it is essential that 
the federal government retain its law-making authority. 
Let us now have a brief overview of the Inuit land claims agreements and 
the measures that Inuit have taken to protect and govern their cultural herit-
age.
The  James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement
In 1975, the Inuit of Nunavik in Northern Quebec signed the James Bay and 
Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA),17 the fĳirst comprehensive Land Claims 
Agreement in Canada between Aboriginal people and the federal government. 
Nunavik comprises 14 Inuit communities on the eastern shore of Hudson Bay 
and Hudson Strait and extends over 560,000 square kilometers. The JBNQA 
gave rise to new institutions, controlled by Inuit in Nunavik, that include es-
16 Subject matters in this category would include environmental protection and assessment, 
pollution prevention, fĳisheries co-management, and migratory birds co-management. 
17 This agreement provides provisions that defĳine the land regime as well as Aboriginal 
rights to resource management and environmental protection. See also The James Bay 
and Northern Quebec Settlement Act S.C 1976-77, c.32 Assented to 1977-07-14.
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sential powers related to the management, conservation, and development of 
Inuit territory and resources. 
Following this agreement, the  Avataq Cultural Institute, the Inuit cultural 
organization of Nunavik, was established in 1990 and tasked with protecting 
and advancing the language and culture of all the Inuit of Nunavik.18 This in-
stitute received its mandate from the Elders. Initiatives taken by this institute 
include, for example, the production and sale of Northern Delights, an Inuit 
herbal tea made from plants found in the Nunavik territory. This tea project 
serves both to preserve and to promote Inuit culture: in the description of its 
mandate, the  Avataq Cultural Institute has expressed that ‘We, the Inuit, be-
lieve that our ways and this earth must be protected. As such, we are prepared 
to share our knowledge even as we hold on to our values.’19 The sale of this tea 
provides fĳinancial resources that may be used to further promote Nunavik Inu-
it culture. Prior to the launch of the project, the Inuit communities in Nunavik 
were consulted to ensure the project would reflect Inuit values.20 
Another interesting example of Inuit cultural heritage and its governance 
can be found in the area of education. Since 1978, the Inuit of Nunavik have had 
their own school board – namely the  Kativiq School Board. Within this struc-
ture, they have placed the learning of mathematics in the context of the Inuit 
culture and have therefore created a curriculum that demonstrates how math-
ematics can be linked to the Inuit culture.21 The existing mathematics curricu-
lum created a challenge for non-Inuit teachers because of a lack of knowledge 
of Inuit culture. In addition, the curriculum is aligned with the Quebec offfĳicial 
curriculum. However, the cultural diffferences have created various challenges 
for the schools, such as a disconnection between the mathematics taught in 
Nunavik schools and the daily experience of Inuit students. For example, the 
concept of probability means in the Inuit culture a guess, an estimate, whereas 
in Quebec it is taught as a frequency or an evaluation. Concerns about the 
diffferences in indigenous and non-indigenous cultures led to further reflec-
tion on how mathematics could be taught in a way that allows Nunavik stu-




21 Annie Savard, Dominic Manuel, and Terry Wan Jung Lin, ‘Incorporating Culture in the 
Curriculum: The Concept of Probability in Nunavik Inuit Culture’ (2014) in education vol 
19, no 3, 152 <www.//ineducation.ca/ineducation/article/view/125/627> accessed 14 Sep-
tember, 2015.
22 Ibid, p. 3.
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this challenge resulted in incorporating cultural objects and moving them into 
a mathematical context. The mathematical concept of probability for exam-
ple is related to the Inuit students’  environment such as weather patterns, and 
places survival at the core of their thinking. It was felt by the Kativik School 
Board that these concepts should be incorporated into the maths curriculum. 
As a result, the Inuit students study mathematics as a tool of critical thinking 
and learn to apply mathematics to aspects of Inuit society and culture. This 
approach was inspired by other theoretical frameworks in which the socio-
cultural context bridges the contexts of mathematics and citizenship. 
 Inuvialuit Land Claims Settlement Act
The Inuvialuit Final Agreement23 was settled in 1984 between the Inuit of the 
western Arctic – the Inuvialuit – and Canada. Fully aware of the potential 
threats of development, the Inuvialuit wanted a strong voice in resource de-
velopment decisions. Therefore, the agreement includes the state’s obligation 
to provide certainty and clarity in the rights to  ownership and use of lands and 
resources and to take measures to realize the rights for Inuit to participate in 
decision-making concerning the use, management, and conservation of land, 
water, and resources, including the offfshore. Under this agreement, many bod-
ies exist that allow the Inuvialuit to have genuine input into decisions that 
afffect them. For example, the Inuvialuit Regional Council established the  Inu-
vialuit Cultural Resource Centre, targeted to the Inuit in the Inuvialuit region 
specifĳically; the centre’s mandate is to preserve and promote the  Inuvialuktun 
language and to provide support for its inclusion in the curriculum.24 The cen-
tre has also produced several books for both children and adults in the  Inuvi-
aluktun language. Another example of the activities undertaken by Inuvialuit 
includes the effforts to examine and document the Inuit artifacts that are now 
in museums, such as those in the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, D.C.; 
to explore the relevant collections and to inspect the artifacts. The group’s 
goal is to expand their knowledge on curation of the artifacts, to develop re-
lationships with institutions such as the Smithsonian, to consult with those 
institutions in order to develop educational projects relating to indigenous 
cultures, and to disseminate knowledge about the artifacts to both Inuvialuit 
communities and the wider public.25 The group from the  Inuvialuit Cultural 
23 Agreement Between the Inuit of the Inuvialuit Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of Canada (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Afffairs and Northern Development, 1984) 
[hereinafter Inuvialuit Final Agreement].
24 <www.irc.inuvilauit.com/community/cultural.html>.
25 Maia Lepage, ‘Museums and Mukluks’ (Winter 2010) Tusaayaksat, 29, 37.
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Resource Centre has already paid a visit to the Smithsonian Institute, and this 
trip launched a broader program of outreach with Inuvialuit youth, Elders, and 
community members, allowing the Inuvialuit “to connect their old culture to 
the present.”26 The project is now launched in collaboration with the Smith-
sonian Institute Arctic Studies Center, which focuses on cultural research and 
education and seeks to bring researchers from the Arctic Studies Center to-
gether in collaborative explorations.
Also, the  Inuvialuit Self-Government Agreement in Principle27 has now 
been signed between the Inuvialuit of the western Arctic, represented by the 
Inuvialuit Regional Corporation; the government of Canada; and the govern-
ment of the Northwest Territories. The work is ongoing. The agreement could 
afffect more than 5,000 Inuvialuit and non-Inuit in the Beaufort Delta region, as 
Aboriginal government will have control over the management of a variety of 
areas, including culture and heritage.28 The agreement provides the Inuvialuit 
with jurisdiction and a broad scope to manage their cultural heritage in ways 
that they see as appropriate for their particular needs; developing cultural her-
itage through educational activities is one example.
The  Nunavut Land Claims Agreement and the  Nunavut Act
The creation of the Territory of  Nunavut presupposed a model of self-gov-
ernment where mainstream institutions such as legislatures and courts are 
tools of Aboriginal government. This region became a self-governing territory 
in April 1999, following the signing of the  Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
(NLCA)29 on May 25, 1993, by the government of Canada, the government of 
the Northwest Territories, and the Tunngavik Federation of  Nunavut, and the 
enactment of the  Nunavut Act. Inuit culture is a cornerstone of both the NLCA 
and Inuit self-government. According to Paul Okalik, a former premier of  Nu-
navut, ‘If Inuit  self-government is to manifest itself through the public govern-
26 <www.inuvilauit living history> accessed 10 September 2015.
27 www.irc.inuvialuit.com/publications/pdf. This is an agreement between the Inuvialuit 
Regional Council, the Government of Canada, and the Government of the Northwest Ter-
ritories.
28 <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/> This agreement will be legally binding when it is ratifĳied 
by the Inuvialuit Regional Council, the Government of Canada, and the Government of 
the Northwest Territories.
29 Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of Canada (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Afffairs and Northern Development, 1993) 
[hereinafter Nunavut Land Claims Agreement].
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ment, Inuit culture will have to become apparent in policies and operation.’30 
The  Nunavut Department of Culture and Heritage was established with a man-
date to develop and implement policies to strengthen culture, language, and 
heritage for all people in  Nunavut.31
The preamble of the NLCA points out that ‘the Constitution Act, 1982 rec-
ognizes and afffĳirms the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada, and treaty rights includes rights that may be acquired by 
way of land claims agreements.’ The articles in the NLCA provide principles for 
the various aspects of Inuit cultural heritage in  Nunavut. Article 33 recognizes 
the connection that the archeological record has with Inuit spirit, culture, and 
education. It recognizes the rights and interests of Inuit in the archaeological 
areas and provides that  Nunavut Inuit will manage the  archaeology of the ter-
ritory, including Inuit involvement in the design of policies and legislation.32
Section 33.4.1 of the NCLA establishes a heritage trust with certain powers 
and functions to manage the Inuit cultural heritage, including the facilitation 
of the conservation and display of archaeological sites. The trust’s mandate is 
to preserve, enrich, and protect Inuit cultural heritage and identity embodied 
in archeological sites, ethnographic resources, and traditional place names. 
Section 33.5.1 establishes a permit system with respect to the protection of 
archaeological sites. This provision gives the trust the ability to control ar-
chaeological activities on Inuit lands and manage the activities surrounding 
archaeological sites within the  Nunavut territory, under section 33.5.9 of the 
land claims agreement. Enacted under the authority of the  Nunavut Act,33 pur-
suant to subsection 51(1) of that act, the  Nunavut Archaeological and Palaeon-
tological Sites Regulations provide for the protection of archaeological sites in 
 Nunavut. Under section 4 of the regulations, permits are required for projects. 
Under section 13, archaeological and paleontological sites must be returned 
to their original state after completion of an excavation. And under section 
14, permit holders are required to submit reports to the Inuit Heritage Trust, 
the appropriate minister in the Government of  Nunavut, and the Canadian 
Museum of Civilization.
Part 9 of Article 33 of the NLCA specifĳies that the Inuit Heritage Trust can 
and will review the offfĳicial names of locations, geographic features, and land-
marks in the  Nunavut Settlement Area and may change these offfĳicial names 
– that is, the names imposed by non-Inuit colonizers – back to the traditional 
30 Ibid, 7.
31 <www.ch.gov.nu.ca/en/home.aspx>.
32 Article 33.3.1, Part 2.
33 S.C.1993, c 28.
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names that the Inuit used. The Inuit Heritage Trust which is comprised of Inuit 
members from  Nunavut is now gathering information from Elders about tradi-
tional place names.34 So far, over 8,000 names have been collected.
Further,  Nunavut has developed a  human remains policy that states that 
any archaeological investigation or analysis of human remains will be carried 
out in a way that is sensitive to Nunavummiut35 values and ethical and scien-
tifĳic principles and that complies with all applicable laws, codes of conduct, 
and conventions.36 This policy is based on respect for the dead and the spir-
itual and cultural interests and views of Inuit under Article 33 of the ILCA. The 
policy specifĳies that “‘the excavation of human remains will be permitted only 
under exceptional circumstances’, and only after  consultation with land claims 
authorities.37
The NLCA also established the  Nunavut Wildlife Management Board 
(NWMB), under Articles 5 and 15 of the NLCA. According to Article 5.9.5, the 
NWMB’s duties include establishing and managing harvest levels; allocating 
resources to other residents; identifying wildlife management zones; approv-
ing plans for managing wildlife habitats within conservation areas, territorial 
parks, and national parks; providing advice about  compensation by commer-
cial and industrial developers that cause damage to wildlife habitats; and regu-
lating access to wildlife in  Nunavut. The NWMB also allows the Inuit to regu-
late harvesting practices among members, including, for example, assessing 
the specifĳic harvesting needs in the community for food and trade. The NLCA 
also established the  Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB) to screen, assess, 
and recommend or not development project proposals and to monitor pro-
jects to assess their eco-systemic and socio-economic impacts. According to 
Article 12.2.24 of the NLCA, in doing its work, the NIRB is to be guided by ‘the 
broad application of the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness’ 
and specifĳically to ‘give due regard and weight to the tradition of Inuit oral 
communication and decision-making’.
The government of  Nunavut has developed policies to protect and promote 
its  intangible  cultural property. In particular, Inuit Qaujimajatuqangi ( IQ) is a 
34 Nick Walker, ‘Mapping Traditional Place Names in Canada’s North’ (July /August 2013) 
<www.canadiangeographic.ca/magazine/ja13/Inuit_heritage>.
35 Nunavummiut are the people inhabiting the territory of Nunavut.
36 Department of Culture, Language, Elders and Youth: Culture and Heritage Program 
(Archaeology): Human Remains Policy <http://www.gov.nu.ca/sites/default/fĳiles/fĳiles/
Human%20Remains%20Policy.pdf>.
37 Ibid.
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form of knowledge, ‘a new organic way of knowing’,38 understanding and ex-
plaining  Nunavut.  IQ is Inuit traditional knowledge gained and passed down 
through generations now being applied to social and economic development, 
governance, and education, based on the principle that better, far more rel-
evant and palatable solutions to some modern issues can and will flow out of 
closer adherence to ancient Inuit wisdom. IQ goes further than contextualiz-
ing traditional knowledge. It is, by one defĳinition, ‘a living technology, a means 
of rationalizing thought and action, a means of organizing tasks and resources, 
a means of organizing family and society into coherent wholes.’39
IQ embodies and reflects Inuit  traditional knowledge and values, including 
the relationship of the Inuit to the land and nature, is responsive to the needs 
of Inuit in  Nunavut, and is a vehicle to shape policy, guiding the government 
in its framing of decisions, policies, and laws that reflect the key philosophies, 
attitudes, and practices of the Nunavummiut. Indeed, IQ has been integrated 
into the policies of new  self-government arrangements. An IQ working group 
in the  Nunavut’s Department of Sustainable Development defĳined six guiding 
principles for policy and program development based on IQ:40
1. Pijitsirniq (or the concept of serving). This principle lays out the roles and 
relationships between the organization and the people it serves;
2. Aajiiqatigiingniq (or the concept of consensus decision-making). Tied in 
with this concept is the need to develop a standardized  consultation pro-
cess for the government of  Nunavut and the Inuit organizations;
3. Pilimmaksarniq (or the concept of skills and knowledge acquisition). This 
concept was added to ensure a meaningful capacity-building adjunct to 
all government community-empowerment exercises. More research into 
teaching and learning practices needs to be done;
4. Piliriqatigiingniq (or the concept of collaborative relationships or work-
ing together for a common purpose). The initial research that Joelie San-
guya, an Inuit consultant from Clyde River, conducted with Inuit Elders 
for Sustainable Development suggested strongly that the communities 
38 Larry Simpson, ‘An Inuit Way of Knowing and the Making of Nunavut’ (1 August 2004) 
Policy Options <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/issues/social-policy-in-the-21st-century/an-
inuit-way-of-knowing-and-the-making-of-nunavut/>.
39 Jaypetee Arnakak, ‘Commentary: What is Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit?’ (25 August 2000) 
Nunatsiaq News <http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/archives/nunavut000831/nvt20825_17.
html>.
40 The following principles are quoted from Arnakak, ‘Commentary: What is Inuit Qaujima-
jatuqangit?’
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wanted to be full and meaningful partners in all community and social 
development activities;
5. Avatimik Kamattiarniq (or the concept of environmental stewardship); 
6. Qanuqtuurunnarniq (or the concept of being resourceful to solve prob-
lems). There is no single defĳining factor of being Inuit, but this comes 
close. Inuit culture is qanuqtuurniq.
Such principles are now reflected in  Nunavut’s Wildlife Act,41 which points out 
in its preamble that  IQ ‘means traditional Inuit values, knowledge, behavior, 
perceptions, and expectations’.42 It is evident that the government of  Nunavut, 
armed with the  Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, has developed a complex 
approach to protecting and advancing Nunavummiut cultural heritage in the 
day-to-day administration decision-making and practices.
The  Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement
The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement ( LILCA)43 provides similar op-
portunities for Nunatsiavut, the Inuit area in the Canadian province of New-
foundland and Labrador. In its fĳirst chapter, entitled ‘General Defĳinitions and 
Interpretation’, the agreement clarifĳies that ‘Inuit Law’ means law of the Nu-
natsiavut government and includes both subordinate legislation under law of 
the Nunatsiavut government and any Inuit  customary law that is proclaimed, 
published, and registered in accordance with the registry of laws, thus ac-
knowledging the role of customary laws. The agreement states that the Nu-
natsiavut government shall ‘maintain a public registry of the Labrador Inuit 
Constitution, Inuit Laws, including Inuit customary laws in respect of matters 
within the jurisdiction of the Nunatsiavut government, and Bylaws.’ The aim of 
these provisions is to provide a sense of cultural well-being and to ensure the 
Nunatsiavut government governs activities on its homelands. 
The Nunatsiavut government ‘has the exclusive authority to establish, im-
pose and collect fees, charges, rents and royalties for commercial Harvesting 
of Plants in Labrador Inuit Lands.’ The principle of  free, prior and informed 
consent ( FPIC) is applied through the Torngat Wildlife and Plants Co-Manage-
ment Board, which is comprised of seven members. Three of the members are 
appointed by the Nunatsiavut government and are Inuit. Two are appointed 
41 SNu 2003, c.26.
42 Ibid.
43 Agreement between the Inuit of Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada 
(Ottawa: Indian and Northern Afffairs and Northern Development, 2005) [hereinafter Lab-
rador Inuit Land Claims Agreement].
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by the provincial government and one is appointed by the Canadian govern-
ment. This board has the power and responsibility to make recommendations 
regarding the conservation and managements of wildlife, plants, and habitat, 
and the research activities that may be carried out in areas of important bio-
logical activity. Labrador Inuit have the right to harvest wildlife and plants sub-
ject to Inuit laws – and the Nunatsiavut government can make laws regarding 
the collection and publication of Inuit  traditional knowledge about wildlife, 
plants, and habitat, such as laws in relation to the quantities of plants that may 
be harvested in Labrador Inuit lands. According to the  LILCA, harvesting in the 
Labrador Inuit Settlement Area is also subject to legislation implementing the 
terms of an international agreement that was in efffect at the time the LILCA 
came into efffect. Like other land claims agreements, the LILCA acknowledges 
the signifĳicance of cultural material, such as archaeological material. Under 
the agreement, the federal government must consult with the Nunatsiavut 
government with respect to archaeological activities and national parks, for 
example, and the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador must 
assist in the recovery of Inuit cultural heritage.44 The Nunatsiavut government 
has jurisdiction and control over the creation of laws to protect archaeological 
and cultural material.45 Furthermore, Canada and Newfoundland and Labra-
dor must  consult the Nunatsiavut government prior to passing legislation in 
this area.46
As is the case in  Nunavut, in Nunatsiavut, permits for archaeological activi-
ties are required.47 With respect to  human remains, the agreement specifĳies 
that the cultural afffĳiliation of human remains must be determined as Inuit, not 
Inuit, or not able to be determined.48 The Nunatsiavut government currently 
does not have an approved policy on the repatriation of human remains and 
burial objects from archeological sites in Nunatsiavut.49 However, the Nunatsi-
avut government has given a mandate to its department of Culture, Recreation 
and tourism the mandate to carry out consultations.50
The LILCA provides the Inuit of Labrador with opportunities to undertake 
cultural heritage activities and to play a role in the management of Inuit cul-
44 Ibid., ch. 15.2.3.
45 Ibid., ch. 15.3.1.
46 Ibid., ch. 15.5.1.
47 Ibid., ch. 15.6.




tural heritage.51 As a past Inuit leader in Nunatsiavut said, ‘Heritage is so im-
portant; our history is what made us who we are today. It surrounds and binds 
us together...’52 To date, the Nunatsiavut government has taken a number of 
steps, including adding previously unrecorded archaeological sites to the gov-
ernment’s archeological database so that these sites are considered before any 
future development.
The Nunatsiavut government has also taken steps to repatriate the remains 
of Labrador Inuit located outside the territory. In 2010 the remains of Labrador 
Inuit located in a Chicago  museum were returned and reburied in Labrador, 
and the Nunatsiavut government is now holding public  consultations to de-
termine whether the  human remains of an Inuit found in the French Natural 
History Museum in Paris will be brought back to their original homeland.53
The Nunatsiavut government’s Department of Culture and Tourism is re-
sponsible for the Torngasok Cultural Centre, which focuses on the preserva-
tion, protection, promotion, and advancement of the Labrador Inuit language 
and culture. One of the centre’s initiatives is the Illisautikka Inuttitut Initiative, 
which involves the development and distribution of learning tools. The learn-
ing tools are intended to preserve, protect and promote Inuit language and 
culture.54
The Nunatsiavut government, along with other organizations in the prov-
ince, including among many others the Labrador Heritage Society, Parks 
Canada, and the government of Newfoundland and Labrador, participates in 
the Nunatsiavut Heritage Forum, which began in 2010. The fĳirst Heritage Fo-
rum launched the Inuksuit Project, in which Elders talk about how inuksuit55 
are being constructed and also express concern that inuksuit are losing their 
meaning. More than 100 sites of inuksuit have been located so far.56
51 Ibid., ch. 15.2.1.
52 Patty Pottle, Minister of Aboriginal Afffairs for the Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, speech at the 2011 Heritage Forum in Hopedale. The Heritage Forum is part of 
province-wide initiative and is a community-based gathering.




55 Inuksuit is the plural of inukshuk.One of their purposes is to provide direction in the harsh 
arctic environment.
56 Jon Beale and Jamie Brake, Heritage Forum 2011 Report (2012) Nunatsiavut Government, 15 
<http://www.nunatsiavut.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Heritage-Forum-Report-2011.
pdf>.
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The  LILCA is the most recent Inuit land claims agreement to be settled. The 
agreement provides opportunities for Inuit in this land claims region to par-
ticipate in the governing of their cultural heritage, including through  consulta-
tions with the Nunatsiavut government under the principle of  FPIC. The ini-
tiatives and activities undertaken so far offfer insight into how this land claims 
agreement is actually working to provide Inuit with governance over their 
cultural heritage. However, it may too soon to draw any conclusion about the 
extent to which they may be able to govern their cultural heritage in the future. 
PART TWO: OTHER LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT PERTAIN 
TO THE GOVERNANCE AND PROTECTION OF INUIT 
LEGAL RIGHTS 
Beyond the land claims agreements, other Canadian legislation has a bearing 
on the question of cultural heritage. Intellectual property legislation in par-
ticular is important for the protection of  intangible cultural heritage. However, 
Canada’s  intellectual property regime does not reflect the many views and val-
ues of indigenous communities and other aspects that possibly comprise what 
indigenous peoples’ intangible cultural heritage is. Neither does the existing 
legal regime take into account, for example, the protocols that indigenous peo-
ples apply and practice in their respective communities when these types of 
heritage are considered. 
 Canada’s Copyright Act57 provides the legal framework within which crea-
tors and other rights holders are entitled to recognition and control of and 
payment for the use of their work. The objective of the Copyright Act is to grant 
rights to authors to ensure their work is properly credited. The legislation cov-
ers only the expression of the ideas in a particular work and does not include 
the ideas that are conveyed by the actual artistic work. Copyright establishes 
the economic and moral rights of creators and other rights holders to con-
trol the publication and commercial exploitation of their works to protect the 
integrity of their endeavors and ensure that they are properly remunerated. 
For a work to be protected by  copyright, it must be original and contain an 
expression of the author’s creativity. Copyright protects expressions but not 
ideas, procedures, processes, systems, and methods of operation, concepts, 
principles, or discoveries. This legislation encourages individual interests and 
individualistic values that are dominant in mainstream society. Case law is an-
other place to look for support for the rights of indigenous people to govern 
57 Copyright Act, R.S.1985, c. C-46.
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their cultural heritage. In Canada, case law provides for a duty to consult when 
Aboriginal rights are claimed. In the Sparrow decision, the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated that the crown is obliged to consult with First Nations who assert 
the existence of rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
The higher courts have also set down the conditions of duties to consult 
under land claims agreements specifĳically. In the case of  Nunavut Tunngavik v. 
Canada,58 the Court held that in light of the provision of the agreement, there 
must be activities and results that reflect the intent of the agreement, includ-
ing meaningful inclusion in the decision-making process before any decisions 
are made. In this case the Inuit used Article 5 of the  Nunavut land claims agree-
ment that set out the principles of the relationship between Canada and the 
 Nunavut Inuit. 
The 1998 Makivik Corp v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) (T.D.) 
was about the comprehensive claims negotiations that Nunavik Inuit and the 
Labrador Inuit Association had been engaged with the federal government. A 
framework agreement had been negotiated between the Nunavik Inuit and the 
federal government, which recognized the claims of the Nunavik Inuit with-
out any ultimate resolution of the issue of their Aboriginal rights or title in 
Labrador. The federal policy for the establishment of national parks purported 
to operate within the framework of protection for Aboriginal interests. The 
Labrador Inuit had participated in the fĳive-stage process for the creation of a 
park, while the Nunavik Inuit were excluded. The position of the Nunavik Inuit 
was that they were not requesting a determination of any Aboriginal rights 
to land in Labrador, but rather recognition of the procedural obligations of 
the federal government flowing from its agreements to negotiate a treaty in 
settlement of a comprehensive land claim. The federal government held that 
the Crown’s fĳiduciary duty could be satisfĳied by the involvement of Aboriginal 
peoples in decisions with respect to their lands and that this gives rise to a 
duty of  consultation. The nature and scope of the duty would vary with the 
circumstances. The establishment of a national reserve might have a minimal 
impact on Aboriginal title. The Federal Court used the following principles in 
granting the declaratory relief: fĳirst, the Court held that the fĳiduciary relation-
ship that exists between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples may be satisfĳied by 
the involvement of Aboriginal peoples in decisions taken with respect to their 
lands. In addition, there is a duty of consultation, and consultation must be 
done in good faith and with the intention of substantially addressing the con-
cerns of the Aboriginal peoples whose rights and lands area at issue. Also, the 
Court held that all Aboriginal nations that have a stake in the territory claimed 
58 (1997) 134 F.T.R.246 (F.C.T.D.) 269.
215The Self-Governing of Inuit Cultur al Heritage in Ca nada
should be included in the negotiations; and, pursuant to section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, Aboriginal rights that existed and were recognized under the 
common law are elevated to constitutional status. Therefore, according to the 
Court, the federal government had a duty to consult with Nunavik Inuit prior 
to establishing a park reserve, which included the duty to inform and listen. It 
also had a duty to consult and negotiate in good faith the Nunavik Inuit claims 
to Aboriginal rights prior to the establishment of a national park. 
PART THREE: THE PATH SO FAR
This paper examined to what extent a Canadian legal regime of Inuit land 
claims agreements, the existing  intellectual property law, and case law can 
provide Inuit with governance over their cultural heritage. The next section 
evaluates the role of Inuit land claims agreements in the governing of Inuit 
cultural heritage and the ongoing matters that require further attention in the 
ongoing effforts to govern Inuit cultural heritage.
Land Claims and Self-Government
In a broad sense, the Inuit land claims agreements have been a response to the 
political struggles that Inuit have experienced as a result of colonization. Part 
of the colonization process was the loss of control over their cultural heritage. 
Now, the Inuit land claims provisions and accompanying Inuit  self-government 
arrangements are providing a legal framework from within which Inuit may 
begin to govern their own cultural heritage. The land claims agreements and 
legislation flowing from these agreements and accompanying self-government 
arrangements have provided Inuit with a response to the  misuse of their cul-
tural heritage. The diffferent Inuit land claims agreements and their respective 
provisions determine how cultural heritage will be governed and what aspects 
of cultural heritage will be advanced and how they will be promoted and pro-
tected. As shown in this chapter, the activities undertaken by the respective 
land claim agreements vary among the land claims regions. This chapter also 
suggested that the land claims agreements truly are providing Inuit with the 
ability to determine for themselves how they want to govern their cultural her-
itage. At this time of transition to Inuit self-governance, challenges to further 
effforts to protect their cultural heritage are ongoing, the dominant society’s 
views and archeologists’ beliefs are largely unchanged, and relationships be-
tween communities and archeologists are sometimes frail. 
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The Canadian Intellectual Property Regime
Even though the rights of Inuit to their cultural heritage are afffĳirmed and pro-
tected under Canada’s Constitution, protection of their  intangible property, 
such as cultural expression, remains unchanged. Inuit  intellectual property is 
now in the  public domain, and so the federal government has taken the po-
sition that it does not require protection.59 The history of  copyright law in 
Canada dates back to before Confederation, before 1867.60 This legislation en-
courages the individual interests and individualistic values that are dominant 
in mainstream society. The existing  intellectual property legislation, such as 
the Copyright Act, illuminates the relationship among knowledge, power, and 
authority in that it still represents the values and interests of the dominant 
society. The existing  intellectual property regime remains grounded within a 
white, patriarchal, middle-class system of values that reflect the traditional im-
age of legal liberalism, the rule of law, and, therefore, the status quo.
Canada’s  intellectual property legislation limits the extent to which Inuit 
can protect their intangible cultural heritage. The Copyright Act cannot fully 
protect Inuit rights to their intangible property or provide a means for gov-
ernance over it. This lack of protection may be due in part to a lack of shared 
understanding between the dominant society’s perspectives and the values 
that Inuit hold toward their cultural heritage, the meaning and value of this 
type of cultural heritage, and the diffferent relationships that Inuit have to their 
cultural symbols. The existing  intellectual property regime does not reflect the 
views and perspectives of Inuit and does not reflect the other legal obligations 
that Canada has under the Inuit land claims agreements.
Case Law
Although Canada’s  intellectual property legislation does not see Inuit intan-
gible property as something that can or should be protected under existing 
 intellectual property legislation, Canada’s higher courts have nevertheless ac-
knowledged that steps must be taken when legislation infringes on existing 
Aboriginal rights. The case law afffĳirms that when an Aboriginal right can be 
claimed, based on the section 35 rights, the government is obligated to consult 
with Aboriginal peoples according to this right. In examining other legal rights 
that Inuit are provided through their land claim agreements, it can be argued 
strongly that the  intellectual property regime interferes with the Aboriginal 
59 WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Tradi-
tional Knowledge and Folklore 2nd Sess, UN Doc.GRTKF/IC/2/16 Prov., 41.
60 David Vaver, Copyright Law (Irwin Law Inc. 2000) 2-4.
217The Self-Governing of Inuit Cultur al Heritage in Ca nada
rights of the Inuit and interferes with the goals and objectives of the Inuit land 
claim agreements. 
The case law indicates that when negotiating with Aboriginal groups 
in Canada, the government must be mindful of the overlap between difffer-
ent Aboriginal groups; each group must be respected based on its Aboriginal 
rights under its land claim agreement. Thus, the legal principle emerging from 
this jurisprudence has been seen as a triggering mechanism to further involve 
Inuit in legislation that has an impact on their Aboriginal rights, such as their 
Aboriginal rights to the protection of their  intangible property. Because the 
Inuit land claims are a section 35 right, the protection of Inuit cultural heritage 
rights must be heeded, especially if they are to be involved in any laws that af-
fect this right. Copyright legislation does not reflect the obligations of govern-
ment as set out under the Inuit land claims agreements.
Conclusions
Some progress has been made in terms of Inuit regaining control over their 
cultural heritage. The goals and aspirations of indigenous peoples can be 
achieved when the values and beliefs of a single cultural grouping are identi-
fĳied and there is a shared understanding of what is important and a recogni-
tion that relationships with others – for instance, archaeologists – are impor-
tant to maintain for mutual benefĳit. However, it is important to note that all 
Inuit cannot be painted with the same brush; the diffferent regions have their 
own goals and aspirations. Cultural heritage is tied to the land, and there is a 
two-way relationship between protecting and promoting cultural heritage and 
furthering the Inuit’s ability to survive on the land. Cultural heritage is also 
signifĳicant for language and education. 
The fĳindings of this chapter show that Inuit have gained governance over 
their  tangible cultural heritage, which is both a generator and a product of 
decolonization. However, Inuit still do not have control over their intangible 
property, and therefore the control and governance over their cultural heritage 
has been extended only within the context of the various land claims agree-
ments.
The steps to be taken to ensure that Inuit rights to all forms of their cultural 
heritage are protected and that full Inuit control and governance are achieved 
lie in the broader political context and are addressed under more recent hu-
man rights provisions, including the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, which has yet to be fully implemented.
Cultural Heritage, Traditional Knowledge and 
Intellectual Property1
Daphne Zografos Johnsson and Hai-Yuean Tualima
Introduction
The notion of cultural or  natural heritage has evolved considerably to include 
‘traditional knowledge’. The term traditional knowledge, or its abbreviation 
‘ TK’, is sometimes used to describe the entire fĳield of  traditional knowledge 
(TK) and  traditional cultural expressions ( TCEs). There are presently no agreed 
defĳinitions of TK and TCEs, but TK can be described to refer to a living body 
of knowledge that is developed, sustained and passed on from generation to 
generation within a community, often forming part of its cultural and spir-
itual identity. It encompasses knowledge, know-how, skills, innovations and 
practices that are passed between generations, in a traditional context, and 
that form part of the traditional lifestyle of indigenous and local communities 
who act as their guardian or custodian. TK can be, for example, agricultural, 
environmental or medicinal knowledge, or knowledge associated with genetic 
resources. TCEs can be described as the forms in which traditional culture is 
expressed. They can be, for example, dances, songs, handicrafts, designs, cer-
emonies, tales, or many other artistic or cultural expressions.2
1 This article does not necessarily represent the views of the World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization (WIPO) or any of its Member States. It is not a substitute for legal advice. Its purpose 
is limited to providing basic information and draws from WIPO pre-existing publications 
and in particular from ‘Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
and Traditional Cultural Expressions. An Overview’. All WIPO publications for further read-
ing and more in-depth analysis and study are available from WIPO at : www.wipo.int/tk and, 
particularly, www.wipo.int/tk/en/resources.
 WIPO is one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations and the leading in-
tergovernmental organization dedicated to the promotion and use of IP. WIPO seeks to 
develop a balanced and efffective international IP system that rewards creativity, stimu-
lates innovation and contributes to the economic, social and cultural development of all 
countries, while safeguarding the public interest.
2 A WIPO Glossary of Key Terms proposes defĳinitions and descriptions of the terms used 
most frequently in the fĳield. It is available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/resources/glos-
sary.html.
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Intellectual property (IP) refers to creations of the mind such as inventions; 
literary and artistic works; designs; and symbols, names and images used in 
commerce. IP is protected in law by, for example, patents,  copyright and trade-
marks, which enable people to earn recognition or fĳinancial benefĳit from what 
they invent or create. Under the conventional IP system, TK and TCEs are gen-
erally regarded as being in the  public domain and, therefore, not eligible for IP 
protection. TK and TCEs, from the perspective of people outside the communi-
ties (or ‘third parties’), constitute a rich, afffordable, and in many cases, easily 
accessible source of inspiration and innovation, if not a template for reproduc-
tion or superfĳicial adaptation.
In recent years, indigenous peoples and local communities as well as gov-
ernments, mainly in developing countries, have demanded IP protection for 
traditional forms of creativity and innovation, thereby rejecting a public do-
main status of TK and TCEs.They argue the issue of the public domain opens 
them up to  misappropriation and unwanted use, harms their cultural identity 
and deprives them of the benefĳits that they could otherwise draw from their 
use.3 Those stakeholders ask for a more balanced IP system that would meet 
their interests and concerns as holders and custodians of a rich and diverse 
cultural heritage that should be protected as part of their identity and as a 
potential source of income. 
Indigenous peoples and local communities have unique needs and expec-
tations in relation to IP, given their complex social, historical, political and 
cultural dimensions and vulnerabilities. They face challenges unlike any other 
that IP law has yet presented, as the protection of TK and TCEs intersect every 
category of IP and often involve other legal issues, as well as ethical and cul-
tural sensitivities, reaching well beyond IP. 
Importantly, human rights form a crucial part of the context for protection 
of  TK,  TCEs and GRs, insofar as the needs and interests of their holders are 
concerned. In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Unit-
3 The debate about appropriate protection centers on whether, and how, changes should 
be made to the existing boundary between the public domain and the scope of IP pro-
tection. The term ‘public domain’ refers to elements of IP that are ineligible for private 
ownership and the contents of which any member of the public is legally entitled to use. 
Elements of IP that are in the public domain should not be confused with those that are 
‘publicly available’, for example, content on the Internet may be publicly available but not 
in the public domain from an IP perspective. A WIPO document, Note on the Meanings 
of the Term ‘Public Domain’ in the Intellectual Property System with Special Reference to 
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expression/Expressions 
of Folklore (document WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/INF/8) provides a detailed analysis of the ap-
plication of this concept to the protection of TK and TCEs.
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ed Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration 
recognizes that ‘indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all 
other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of 
discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their 
indigenous origin or identity’ (Article 2). Article 31 provides that indigenous 
peoples ‘have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their Intellec-
tual Property over such cultural heritage,  traditional knowledge and  tradition-
al cultural expressions.’ The Declaration is frequently referred to in the work of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
In 1998, WIPO launched an ambitious work programme on those issues, 
starting with world-wide fact-fĳinding missions in 1998 and 19994, regional  con-
sultations, workshops and roundtables concerning  TK,  TCEs and genetic re-
sources, to ascertain the needs and expectations of indigenous peoples and 
local communities as well as government representatives and representatives 
of industry and civil society around the world. In 2000, WIPO members es-
tablished and  Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Ge-
netic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore ( IGC), where exchanges 
of experiences and building-up of expertise around the issues culminated, in 
2009, with the launch of text-based negotiations to develop an international 
legal instrument or instruments that would ensure the balanced and efffective 
protection of TK, TCEs and genetic resources.5
What Does ‘Protection’ Mean in an IP Context?
‘Protection’, in the IP context, refers to the use of IP laws, values and princi-
ples to prevent unauthorized or inappropriate uses, by third parties, of TK and 
TCEs. The objective of IP protection is to make sure that the intellectual inno-
vation and creativity embodied in TK or TCEs are not wrongly used.
IP protection can take two forms – positive and defensive protection. Posi-
tive protection could enable traditional holders, if they so wish, to acquire and 
exercise property rights over their TK and TCEs, prevent culturally offfensive 
and demeaning uses by third parties, authorize uses by third parties under mu-
tually agreed terms, and/or fĳinancially benefĳit from their commercial exploi-
4 The report is available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/tk/768/wipo_pub_768.
pdf.
5 See Background Brief 2: The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property 
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore available at http://www.wipo.
int/export/sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/tk_brief2.pdf. 
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tation, for example, through the granting of licenses and earning of fees and 
royalties or through building up their own  handicraft enterprises. Defensive 
protection, on the other hand, does not grant property rights over the subject 
matter of TK and TCEs, but aims to stop such rights from being acquired or 
maintained by third parties. Defensive strategies include the use of document-
ed TK to preclude or oppose  patent rights on claimed inventions that make 
direct use of TK.
Protection in the IP sense is diffferent from ‘preservation’ and ‘safeguarding’, 
which involve the identifĳication, documentation, transmission,  revitalization 
and promotion of cultural heritage. The objective in that case is to ensure that 
TK and TCEs do not disappear and are maintained and promoted.
‘Protection’, ‘preservation’ and ‘safeguarding’ are not mutually exclusive. 
Although their objectives are diffferent, implementing them together may be 
mutually supportive, for example, through documentation and the compi-
lation of inventories. However, these diffferent forms of protection may also 
conflict. Preservation effforts that document TK and TCEs, particularly in elec-
tronic (digitized) form, can make them more accessible and vulnerable to uses 
that are against the wishes of their holders, thereby undermining the efffort to 
protect them in an IP sense. It is therefore advisable to have policies in place 
for the strategic management of IP during the recording, digitization and dis-
semination of TK and TCEs.
Options for the IP Protection of TK and TCEs
The legal options for the IP protection of  TK and  TCEs that are currently avail-
able or discussed, aside from the non-IP options,6 are large and diverse, both 
in terms of the scope they would cover and the objectives they would serve. 
Some countries and communities have already elected some of those options, 
while others are still considering them.7 It should also be emphasized that the 
new IP-related protection does not intend to replace, or interfere with, the cus-
tomary laws, protocols and practices that defĳine how communities develop, 
6 Non-IP legislative and policy measures can include, for example, trade practices, con-
sumer protection and labeling laws, the use of contracts, customary and indigenous laws 
and protocols, cultural heritage preservation, civil liability and common law remedies 
such as unjust enrichment, rights of privacy, blasphemy, as well as criminal law.
7 See Background Brief 3: Developing a National Strategy on Intellectual Property and Tra-
ditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions and Genetic Resources, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/tk_brief3.pdf. 
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hold, transmit and use TK and TCEs within their own traditional context.8 Ad-
ditionally, it does not mean that conventional IP systems would be forced upon 
TK and TCEs but rather that values and principles embedded in IP law (such 
as that creations of the human mind should be protected against  misappro-
priation) could be adapted and redeployed for new subject matter and for new 
benefĳiciaries.
When considering those options, it is fĳirst necessary to examine the avail-
able legal and policy options under conventional IP systems. Existing IP rights 
can indeed be useful for the protection of TK and TCEs; for example, rights 
granted by trademarks and geographical indications, as well as the protection 
affforded by unfair competition laws, can be very helpful in protecting reputa-
tions associated with TK and TCEs and related goods and services. If there are 
gaps in existing national legislation, it may be possible to fĳill them by adapting 
the existing IP framework or protecting TK and TCEs through  sui generis IP 
systems. These options will be examined in the following paragraphs.
Protecting TK and TCEs with Existing IP Rights
Existing IP laws have been successfully used to protect against some forms of 
 misuse and  misappropriation of  TK and TCEs, including through the laws of 
patents,  copyright, trademarks, geographical indications and trade secrets.9
Existing IP to Protect TCEs
TCEs can sometimes be protected by existing systems, such as  copyright and 
related rights, geographical indications, trademarks and certifĳication and col-
lective marks. 
Contemporary original adaptations of TCEs, made by members of the com-
munities or by third parties, may be copyrightable. Copyright protects the prod-
ucts of creativity against certain uses such as reproduction, adaptation, public 
performance, broadcasting and other forms of communication to the public. 
Performances of  TCEs may come under international related rights protection, 
such as that provided under the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
1996, and the WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (2012), on an 
equal footing with the rights that would be granted to any other performer. 
8 See Background Brief 7: Customary Law and Traditional Knowledge, available at http://
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/tk_brief7.pdf.
9 WIPO provides information, practical assistance and technical advice to enable tradi-
tional holders to make more efffective use of existing IP systems, if they so wish to.
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Article 15.4 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (1886) provides a mechanism for the international protection of unpub-
lished and anonymous works, including TCEs. Copyright can also provide pro-
tection against insulting, derogatory, offfensive, demeaning or degrading use 
of a work, an issue that is often a concern in relation to TCEs, which embody 
spiritual qualities and the very cultural identity of a community.
IP laws that aim at the protection of established reputation, distinctiveness 
or goodwill, including trademarks, collective or certifĳication marks, geographi-
cal indications, as well as unfair competition may offfer direct or indirect pro-
tection of TCEs, in particular handicrafts, artworks or traditional products in-
tended for commercial exploitation by communities.10
Traditional signs and symbols could be directly protected as registered 
trademarks. Registering and using a  trademark can increase consumer rec-
ognition of authentic TCEs and add to their commercial value. Registration 
gives the trademark owner the exclusive right to prevent others from using an 
identical or confusingly similar mark on identical or similar goods or services. 
Trademark law also provides protection against the registration of offfensive 
and deceptive marks by others, for example, if someone applies for a trade-
mark that falsely implies that a good or service has an indigenous origin, where 
such origin would be a signifĳicant factor for the purchaser, and this is not actu-
ally the case, the trademark must be objected.
Collective and certifĳication marks can be used to inform the public of cer-
tain characteristics of the products or services marketed under such marks. 
Registering and using a collective or  certifĳication mark can help indigenous 
communities to distinguish their TCEs from others, and promote them and 
the artists who made them nationally and internationally. It can help improve 
their economic position and ensure that they get fair and equitable returns. 
Collective and certifĳication marks can also raise public awareness and provide 
reassurance to consumers as to the  authenticity of the goods they are buying. 
While certifĳication marks or  authenticity labels cannot prevent the sale of imi-
tations, they can discourage them by distinguishing the genuine  TCEs.
A geographical indication is a sign that can be used on goods with a specifĳic 
geographical origin and possessing qualities, reputation or characteristics that 
are essentially attributable to that place of origin. These products are often the 
result of traditional processes and knowledge, carried forward by a commu-
10 See Background Brief 5: Intellectual Property and Traditional Handicrafts, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/tk_brief5.pdf and Interna-
tional Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO and WIPO, Marketing Crafts and Visual Arts: The Role 
of Intellectual Property: A Practical Guide (ITC/WIPO: Geneva, 2003).
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nity from generation to generation in a given region.  TCEs, such as handicrafts 
made using  natural resources, with qualities derived from their geographical 
origin, may qualify for registration as geographical indications. Geographical 
indications do not directly protect the actual knowledge or know-how associ-
ated with the TCEs. Instead, knowledge often remains in the  public domain un-
der conventional IP systems, and is open to  misappropriation by third parties. 
However, they can contribute to their indirect protection in several ways. They 
can protect TCEs against misleading and deceptive trading practices, protect 
the reputation or goodwill accumulated over time, and safeguard a niche mar-
ket. In addition, they can prevent others from using a protected geographical 
indication on goods that do not come from the defĳined area or do not possess 
the requisite quality or characteristics. 
Finally, unfair competition law can be used to restrain dishonest practices 
in the marketplace, and can be a useful means of combating false and mislead-
ing claims as to  authenticity or origin – for example, where a cheaply made 
souvenir item carries a label falsely indicating that it is ‘authentic’, ‘indigenous 
made’, or originates from a particular community, measures can be taken by 
those producing the authentic products to prevent those claims.
Existing IP to Protect  TK
Existing IP laws have been successfully used to protect TK against some forms 
of  misuse and  misappropriation, including the laws of patents, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial design, unfair competition and trade se-
crets or confĳidential information.
Innovations that are based on TK and have been developed in a traditional 
context are, in principle, patentable, just in the same way as innovations that 
come out of modern laboratories, providing that the  patent applicants fulfĳill 
the required patentability criteria of novelty, inventiveness and industrial ap-
plicability. Besides, existing patent laws requires from patent applicants that 
they disclose, to some extent, the TK that has been used in, or relates to, their 
claimed inventions. Such provision grants defensive protection to TK to the 
extent that technical measure be taken in order to give it any efffect in practice. 
Implementation measures have been adopted internationally to expand and 
make more widely accessible the content of the documentation that is avail-
able on TK as prior art,11 and improve the search tools available to patent exam-
iners in this regard, including the International Patent Classifĳication System.
The law of confĳidentiality and trade secrets may also be used to protect non-
disclosed TK, including secret and sacred TK. Courts may grant remedies for 
11 For example, the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library that has been compiled by India.
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breach of confĳidence when customary laws of secrecy are violated by a third 
party user who would reveal secrets that were supplied in confĳidence to him 
or her.
Adaptation of Existing IP and Sui Generis Systems
Debates within and outside WIPO have underlined the limitations of existing 
IP laws in meeting all the needs and expectations of TK and TCEs holders.12 TK 
and TCEs are rooted in the traditions of their holders and not static, but the re-
sult of a living and collective creative process, they do not easily fĳit within the 
scope of protection that is currently provided by IP rights. For example, while 
 trademark law can provide defensive protection against offfensive and decep-
tive uses of indigenous names, signs and symbols where third parties apply to 
register such signs as trademarks, it will not prevent the offfensive use of such 
signs where the user does not seek to register a trademark. Moreover, trade-
mark law will not prevent the registration of indigenous names, signs and sym-
bols by third parties where the signs are not considered offfensive or deceptive; 
similarly, while  copyright protection may be available for  tangible, contempo-
rary TCEs, pre-existing TCEs, and mere imitations and recreations thereof, are 
unlikely to meet the originality and identifĳiable author requirements and re-
main, for  copyright purposes, in the  public domain. Additionally, TK and TCEs 
are often held collectively by communities, rather than by individual owners, 
and collective  ownership is often alien to most current IP systems. 
Certain adaptations or modifĳications to IP law may be needed to better ac-
commodate the interests of TK and TCEs holders, and some legal initiatives of 
that kind have been undertaken both internationally and by particular coun-
tries.13 For example many countries and some regional organizations have 
opted for directly protecting TCEs by adapting their  copyright law, either by 
referring to  TCEs as a form of  copyright work, or by including provisions spe-
12 For more details, see the two ‘gap analysis’ prepared by the WIPO Secretariat that ap-
preciate to which extent the existing conventional IP system ensure protection of TCEs 
and TK respectively. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_13/wipo_
grtkf_ic_13_4_b_rev.pdf and http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_13/
wipo_grtkf_ic_13_5_b_rev.pdf. 
13 The online WIPO Database of Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions 
and Genetic Resources Laws gathers national and regional laws, treaties and regulations 
on the protection of TK, TCEs and genetic resources. It is freely accessible at http://www.
wipo.int/tk/en/databases/tklaws/.
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cifĳically designed for TCEs within their  copyright legislations. But it should be 
reminded that such provisions are not enforceable beyond the boundaries of 
those countries or regions. Other examples of adaptations, in the fĳield of trade-
mark law, include a the United States of America’s Database of Offfĳicial Insignia 
of Native American Tribes, which prevents third parties from registering these 
insignia as trademarks, and the adaptation of New Zealand’s trademark law to 
take into account cultural offfensiveness, especially to Maori, in the  trademark 
registration process. At the international level, the principal tool for locating 
technical information for  patent purposes, the International Patent Classifĳica-
tion (IPC), has been expanded to take better account of TK subject matter, 
in particular concerning medicinal products based on plant extracts. This in-
creases the likelihood that patent examiners locate already published TK that 
is relevant to claimed inventions in patent applications, without adversely af-
fecting the legal status of TK from the point of view of TK holders.
However, in some cases, adapting existing IP rights may not be considered 
sufffĳicient to cater for the holistic and unique character of TK and TCEs. A deci-
sion may then be taken to protect TK and TCEs through  sui generis systems. Sui 
generis systems are specialized measures or laws aimed exclusively at address-
ing the characteristics of specifĳic subject matter, such as TK and TCEs. Some 
countries and regions have opted for such option and have developed their 
own specifĳic systems for protecting their TK and TCEs.
When considering a sui generis system for the protection of TK and TCEs, 
key questions include defĳining the objectives of protection and identifying the 
subject matter to be protected. It is also important to clarify what the TK and 
TCEs are to be protected against, and what forms of behavior should be consid-
ered unacceptable or illegal. Other issues to consider include the formalities to 
be required (such as registration), the sanctions and penalties that should ap-
ply, the exceptions and limitations attached to the rights (for example, the use 
of TCEs in archives, libraries or museums for non-commercial cultural heritage 
purposes), the duration of protection, the application in time of legal protec-
tion (retroactive or prospective), the enforcement of rights and dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms, and the protection of foreign benefĳiciaries.
The on-going negotiations in the  IGC regarding the development of an in-
ternational legal instrument (or instruments) of protection could possibly lead 
to the adoption of such as sui generis system or systems at the international 
level.14 The  IGC is considering the key questions highlighted above, but the 
answers to those questions, and others, remain subject to debate, as the WIPO 
14 The two relevant draft texts that have been developed so far as work-in-progress on TK 
and TCEs, respectively, are available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_
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Member States still disagree on basic principles, objectives and substantive 
provisions. The status of the instrument(s) to be adopted remains open as well, 
the options ranging from a legally binding treaty to a declaration.
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities’ Participation in 
the  IGC
Since the inception of the  IGC, the focus has been on an inclusive approach 
to promote the direct involvement and meaningful engagement of all stake-
holders, especially indigenous peoples and local communities. WIPO’s work is 
founded on extensive  consultation with representatives of indigenous peoples 
and local communities and other NGOs, which are permanent observers to 
WIPO or specifĳically accredited to the  IGC.15
Indigenous peoples and local communities are able to participate and ex-
press their views in the  IGC decision-making process, in accordance with the 
2007  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. During  IGC sessions, 
they may intervene on any issue on the agenda and make drafting proposals, 
which are incorporated in the text under discussion if supported by at least 
one Member State. Representatives of indigenous peoples and local communi-
ties are also included in drafting groups and informal consultations. In 2005, 
the WIPO General Assembly established a WIPO Voluntary fund to facilitate 
the participation of accredited indigenous peoples and local communities. 
Through this mechanism more than 80 representatives of indigenous peoples 
and local communities from around the world have been funded to participate 
in  IGC sessions.
Each  IGC session is preceded by panel presentations chaired by and com-
posed of representatives of indigenous peoples and local communities, whose 
participation is funded by WIPO. These presentations are an invaluable source 
of information on the experiences, concerns and aspirations of indigenous 
peoples and local communities regarding the protection, promotion and pres-
ervation of GRs, TK  and TCEs .
Other practical measures to enhance the  participation of indigenous peo-
ples and local communities in the  IGC have included briefĳings, consultative 
processes and logistical support. Practical Workshops for Indigenous Peoples 
and Local Communities on IP and GRs, TK and TCEs are also organized by 
grtkf_ic_28/wipo_grtkf_ic_28_5.pdf and http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_
grtkf_ic_28/wipo_grtkf_ic_28_6.pdf. 
15 Information on participation: http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/participation.html.
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WIPO, which impart knowledge of the main principles of the IP system, and 
explain, amongst other things, the rationale, objectives and methodology of 
the negotiations that are taking place in the  IGC.16 
Finally, since 2009, WIPO has offfered the opportunity for an Indigenous Fel-
low to work, within the WIPO Secretariat, on issues relevant to IPLCs, includ-
ing the  IGC. The WIPO Indigenous Fellowship builds on a series of initiatives 
to ensure that indigenous peoples are actively involved in the work of WIPO 
on issues that matter to them and recognizes the strong expertise that exists 
within indigenous communities.17
Conclusion
By providing a specialized forum for the structured exchange of information 
and views within WIPO, the  IGC process has succeeded in building up a robust 
international understanding of the issues. Its discussions have taken place 
with the fĳirm and, since 2009, explicit objective of reaching agreement on an 
international legal instrument (or instruments) that will ensure the balanced 
and efffective protection of TK,  TCEs and genetic resources. The exploratory ‘fo-
rum’ has evolved into a true negotiating body, framed by clear and tight sched-
ules and sound working methods.
Recognizing traditional forms of creativity and innovation as protectable 
IP would be an historic shift in international law, enabling indigenous peoples 
and local communities as well as governments to have a say over the use of 
their TK and TCEs by third parties. However, the issues are complex and there 
is no ‘one-size-fĳits-all’ solution likely to suit all the needs of holders in all coun-
tries. Diversity is the very essence of TK and TCEs, precisely because they are 
so closely intertwined with the cultural identity of many diverse communities, 
and convergence requires flexibility and time in fashioning an international 
instrument.
16 Information on the Practical Workshops: http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/indigenous/work-
shop.html.
17 Information on the WIPO Indigenous Fellowship Program: http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/
indigenous/fellowship/. 
Wider Use of Traditional  Sámi Dress in Finland: 
 Discrimination against the Sámi?
Piia Nuorgam
1 Introduction
1.1 Wider Use of  Sámi Dress and its Efffects on Sámi Culture
In 2014, Tanja Poutiainen, a successful Finnish Alpine skier, fĳinished her long 
career in slalom racing at an event in Austria. After Poutiainen’s fĳinal race, she 
donned an outfĳit that had been bought from a Finnish company called Pilai-
lupuoti (lit. “joke shop”) which was very similar to the Sámi  gákti, the tradi-
tional clothing of the Sámi people. This obvious, yet extremely poor, copy of 
the Sámi gákti is marketed by Pilailupuoti for fancy balls and similar occasions 
as “Pohjolanasu” (lit. costume of the North) at its shops around Finland and 
on its website.1 Pilailupuoti even places this costume in the same category as 
other clothing designed to imitate the “Spaniards, Roma and other foreigners”. 
The Sámi criticised Poutiainen for choosing what was obviously non-authentic 
Sámi clothing and an offfensive imitation of the gákti and the criticism was 
noted in the media.2 
That same year the Sámi association Mii in Rovaniemi3 received a request 
from a central European couple, through a Finnish friend of theirs. The couple 
was planning to wed at a local reindeer farm in Rovaniemi during the win-
ter and planned a small wedding celebration with their closest family. For this 
event they requested the Sámi association to provide them with 14 children be-
tween the ages of 5 and 7 to line the aisle in traditional dress, ostensibly to act 
as some sort of aesthetic accoutrements to their nuptial. This request included 
detailed instructions on how the children should stand and graciously offfered 
to pay a small fee for the children’s services. 
These two cases are far from unique. Sámi culture and dress have been ex-
ploited outside of the Sámi for commercial purposes in Finland for decades, as 
1 ‘Costume of North’, Pilailupuoti-shop <http://www.pilailupuoti.com/tuote/pohjolan-asu/> 
accessed 20 December 2015.
2 <http://yle.fĳi/uutiset/tanja_poutiaisen_pukuvalintaa_kritisoidaan_voimakkaasti/7140720>, 
accessed 15 December 2015.
3 Rovaniemi is the administrative capital of Finland’s northernmost province, Lapland, and 
is located near the Arctic Circle. 
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a product or as component of services. This is especially the case in Lapland, 
the northern part of the country.4 Frequently, the Sámi people and culture 
are represented outside of the Sámi community in old-fashioned ways, which 
maintain stereotypes and prejudices. For example, they are romanticized, de-
scribed as shamans or drunkards, as living in primitive villages, or as Santa’s 
helpers. This caricature is apparent in the 2015 tourism promotion video ‘100 
Days of Polar Night Magic’, made by the state-funded company ‘Visit Finland’.5 
In ‘100 Days of Polar Night Magic’ the Sámi are presented as dirty shamans 
chanting, dancing and singing in their lavvu, a traditional tent. 
Sámi culture and dress are exploited by non-Sámi entities in all kinds of 
products and services; indeed, one of the most popular souvenirs in Lapland 
in 2014 was a doll in mock Sámi dress.6 This unwanted and unendorsed use of 
Sámi traditional dress by outsiders is having signifĳicant negative impacts on 
Sámi culture, both culturally and economically. The economic efffects are clear 
– the Sámi do not benefĳit from the sale of the products and services that use 
Sámi dress in unwanted and unauthorised ways.7 Perhaps of greater concern, 
however, are the cultural impacts that follow such exploitation. The Sámi say 
that this unwanted use of their traditional dress by outsiders offfends the Sámi 
and is having a negative impact on Sámi culture. Sámi Committees, research-
ers, and organisations have consistently highlighted the negative efffects these 
stereotypes have on the Sámi’s identity and self-image, both collectively and 
4 Indigenous Sámi people inhabit area called Sápmi, which encompasses areas of north-
ern Finland, Norway Sweden and the Kola Peninsula of Russia.
5 ‘100 days of Polar Magic’ <http://www.visitfĳinland.fĳi/news/100-days-of-polar-night-magic-
mainos/>, accessed 15 December 2015. <http://yle.fĳi/uutiset/likaiset_lappalaiset_seko_
myy_maailmalla__visit_fĳinlandin_mainosvideo_suututtaa/8312073> accessed 15 Decem-
ber 2015. After the stir, Visit Finland decided to change the video.
6 ‘The Most Popular Souvenirs’ (Travel Rovaniemi, Spring 2015. 23st Annual Volume) 14. Esti-
mated income from tourism in Lapland is about 630 million euros per year. See ‘Lapin mat-
kailustrategia 2015-2018’ Lapin Liitto, Sarja A; 43:2015) <http://www.lappi.fĳi/lapinliitto/c/
document_library/get_fĳile?folderId=2265071&name=DLFE-25498.pdf>, accessed 20 De-
cember 2015.
7 Sámi traditional dress is also an important part of the Sámi handicraft tradition, known 
as duodji. Legal protection could support duodji as a traditional Sámi livelihood, at least 
indirectly. Duodji means ‘handicraft’, ‘work’, ‘accomplishment’ or ‘creation’. With refer-
ence to handicraft it is understood as meaning a concrete creation. Duodji involves ex-
tensive know-how in acquiring materials, knowing the characteristics of materials, work-
ing methods, how to use the fĳinished product and the cultural meanings associated with 
the product. See P. Sammallahti, Suoma-Sámi sátnegirji (Girjegiisá 2014), and G. Guttorm, 
‘Duodji – Sami handicrafts – who owns the knowledge and the work’ in J.T. Solbakk (ed.), 
Traditional Knowledge and Copyright (Samikopiija Karasjok 2007) 65-66.
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individually.8 Many of them – and Sámi youth themselves – have been espe-
cially worried about the efffects that the distorted, humiliating, and false stere-
otypical image given and maintained by the Pilailupuoti and tourism industry 
in general has on young Sámi people in their formative years.9 The Sámi, like 
all human beings, desire that their dignity be respected and protected, and do 
not want to see their cultural identity degraded, ignored, or used as a cartoon-
ish prop. 
1.2 Discussion on the Need for Protection of the  Sámi Dress
The Sámi have discussed the need to protect the  gákti against  misuse by out-
siders since the 1930s; and attempts have been made to educate the tourism 
industry in Rovaniemi about the meaning the gákti has to the Sámi and the ef-
fects caused by extensive outside exploitation, but to little avail.10 One attempt 
to secure some sort of protection for Sámi products occurred in the 1980s when 
the Sámi agreed on the establishment of a certifĳication  trademark, Sámi Duod-
ji, but this has not met the expectations set for it.11 The trademark, which main 
goal is to promote sales of handicrafts, is usually ill suited to protect heritage 
that has more cultural than commercial signifĳicance. Traditional Sámi dress 
8 M. Aikio and P. Aikio ‘Saamelaiskulttuuri ja matkailu’ in R. Huopainen (ed.), Selviytyjät, 
Näyttely pohjoisen ihmisen sitkeydestä. (Lapin maakuntamuseon julkaisuja 7, Jyväskylä, 
1993) 95-96. Aikios’ explain the reactions of Sámi to the wider use of Sámi Dress and Sámi 
Culture in tourism. See also Saamelaiskomitean mietintö 1976: 46, 81. 
9 Sámi youth have organized demonstrations against the misuse of Sámi dress twice, in 
1995 and 2008, and have organized a seminar to discuss the issue in 2011. See for example 
‘Sámekultuvrra ávkkástallama livččii vejolaš bissehit’ 18 October 2011. <http://yle.fĳi/uuti-
set/samekultuvrra_avkkastallama_livccii_vejolas_bissehit/6626533>, accessed 16 February 
2016. Interview with I-M. Helander, Chairperson, Suoma Sámi Nuorat (Inari, 20 August 
2016). See also Rovaniemi Declaration at the 19th Saami Conference, 2008, para. 14.
10 Interview with emeritus professor (Sámi culture and language) P. Sammallahti, 20 August 
2016. In the very beginning, waiters in hotels were using the Sámi dress as work outfĳit. 
1990’s Sámi association in Rovaniemi had a massive campaign to inform the tourism in-
dustry on Sámi views. 
11 First discussion on the need for trademark was in 1950’s, but it did not lead to establish-
ment of it. See V.P. Lehtola: ‘Saamelaisten parlamentti, Suomen saamelaisvaltuuskunta 
1973-1995 ja Saamelaiskäräjät 1996-2003’ (Saamelaiskäräjät 2005) 54. The Sámi Duodji-
trademark was established by the Nordic Saami Council <http://www.Sámicouncil.net/
en/?deptid=3329&cHash=8028f9b35a8940cdb048d74866379b29>, but has been poorly 
managed over the years by it. In 2015-2016, the Council set a Sámi Duodji trademark revi-
talization project to assess the functioning of the trademark and went through a round of 
negotiations with handicraft organisations in four countries to study the current needs. 
The author led the project. 
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embodies the core values and codes of Sámi culture and is an important part 
of the people’s culture, cultural heritage, and  traditional knowledge. Often the 
use of indigenous peoples’ cultures by non-indigenous people has been dis-
cussed under the concept of cultural  appropriation, which has been defĳined as 
“taking… from a culture that is not your own – of  intellectual property, cultural 
expression or artefacts, history and ways of knowledge”.12 Cultural  appropria-
tion typically occurs where there is a power imbalance and has been linked 
to racism and the experiences of historical and continuing dispossession that 
indigenous peoples are facing or have had to face.13 Even though cultural  ap-
propriation might be a vague concept, it combines the diffferent aspects of the 
phenomena and looks at the issues in broad perspective. From a human rights 
perspective, the Sámi’s right to their traditional dress can be seen in terms of 
at least three diffferent notions of rights, depending on the aim of the protec-
tion sought. It can be approached as an (intellectual) property right, a cultural 
right, and a right to equality and non-discrimination.14
The Sámi have often claimed that they have no means to protect their tra-
ditional dress.15 During the stir surrounding the Visit Finland marketing video, 
Tiina Sanila-Aikio, president of the  Saami Parliament in Finland, asserted that 
the tourism industry’s consistent refusal to listen to the Sámi and its active 
attempts at ignoring Sámi concerns constitutes structural racism.16 With ref-
erence to her statement, the present chapter looks at the wider use of tradi-
tional Sámi dress by outsiders, as well as the demands and arguments calling 
for the protection of the dress and dignity of the Sámi people as an issue of 
equality. Particular emphasis is placed on Sámi children and youth and the 
12 B. Zifff and V. Rao Pratima (eds.) ‘Introduction to Cultural appropriation: A Framework for 
Analysis’, in Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation, (Rutgers University Press 
1997) 2.
13 Angela R. Rileya and Kristen A. Carpenter, ’Owning Red: A Theory of Indian (Cultural) 
Appropriation’, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 859. 2016, 1-2; and R. Tsosie, ‘Reclaiming Native Stories: An 
Essay on Cultural Appropriation and Cultural Rights’, 34 Arizona State Law Journal 299, 
2002, 311. 
14 Mattias Åhren has dealt extensively with the issue in his PhD thesis of 2010. See M. Åhren, 
The Saami Traditional Dress and Beauty Pageants: Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Ownership 
and Self-determination over Their Cultures, Universitetet i Tromsø, Juridisk fakultet, 2010. 
15 For example ‘Dárpmehuvve go oidne sirkusis turistagávttiid, sirkus dadjá daid albma 
gáktin’ 13 June 2013. <http://yle.fĳi/uutiset/darpmehuvve_go_oidne_sirkusis_turistagavt-
tiid_sirkus_dadja_daid_albma_gaktin/6687397>, accessed 10 January 2016.
16 ‘“Likaiset lappalaiset, sekö myy maailmalla?” – Visit Finlandin mainosvideo suututtaa’, 
17 September 2015 <http://yle.fĳi/uutiset/likaiset_lappalaiset_seko_myy_maailmalla__vis-
it_fĳinlandin_mainosvideo_suututtaa/8312073> accessed 10 January 2016.
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impact which the issue might have on them. The chapter focuses on the fol-
lowing questions: What kind of meaning does the traditional dress have for 
the Sámi? Does  self-government give the Sámi a possibility to have a say in the 
use of the dress? Does the Finnish Act on Non- Discrimination offfer protection 
to Sámi through its protection of the dignity of persons against harassment? 
Pilailupuoti’s action will be assessed more carefully in light of the concept of 
harassment. Pilailupuoti has been chosen as an example because its Pohjola-
nasu product has constantly invoked feeling of ill will and raised questions on 
the morality and equity of its actions.17 The chapter proceeds as follows: sec-
tion two fĳirst discusses traditional Sámi dress, its signifĳicance and the related 
customs. Section three looks at the Sámi views and actions and legal status 
of the Sámi in Finland and its relevance to these considerations. Section four 
provides a view on the issue by looking at the legal framework of equality. The 
last section puts forward and discusses the author’s conclusions. 
2  Sámi Dress and Related Customs as Part of the Sámi 
Cultural Heritage
2.1  Sámi Dress – as Part of Sámi Identity
Sámi dress and its accessories have changed from being of value to everyday 
life and survival to being a way to show and strengthen the Sámi identity, es-
pecially for young Sámi.18 The people’s traditional dress is unique and very dis-
tinguishable from the Finnish, Norwegian, or Swedish national costumes. In 
the Finnish Sámi region there are fĳive main designs seen in Sámi dress and its 
accessories. Variations between the designs lie in the cut and in decorations, 
as well as in the cultural signs that the outfĳits convey. The regional boundaries 
are still strong and the accessories are specifĳic to the dress of each region.19 
Traditional dress is worn mostly on particularly important occasions, such as 
17 Another example is from 2015 when a Finnish representative to a beauty pageant called 
Miss World decided to present herself in Pilailupuoti’s costume. ‘Suomen Miss Maailma 
– kilpailija edustaa pilailupuodin lapinpuvussa’ 1 November 2015 <http://yle.fĳi/uutiset/
suomen_miss_maailma_-kilpailija_edustaa_pilailupuodin_lapinpuvussa/8493787>, 
acces sed 10 January 2016. 
18 S.R. Somby: ‘Beaivenieidda duodji. Duodjeárbevieru kultuvrralaš mearkkašumit ja 
enkulturašuvdna golmma sohkabuolvva áigge Gáregasnjargga ja Kárášjoga guovllus 
1900-logus.’ (Pro gradu – dutkamuš. Giellagas Instituhtta, Oulu Universitehtta 2003) 56, 
115. See also T. Lehtola ‘Saamelainen perintö’ (Kustannus-Puntsi. Jyväskylä 2001) 121 and 
Rovaniemi Declaration at the 19th Saami Conference, 2008, para. 20.
19 See n 18, T. Lehtola 128.
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weddings, funerals, and celebrations,20 and is part of Sámi cultural commu-
nication: the colours, shapes and decorations of an outfĳit link a Sámi person 
to both the community she or he comes from and the Sámi people in general. 
The traditional dress a person wears indicates membership in a certain family, 
village, region, and generation.21 In addition it can indicate e.g. marital status 
and occupation. Sámi dress is used in the Sámi community to strengthen social 
bonds and local identity. These cultural functions have been described in vari-
ous ways by Sámi researchers.22 Saara Tervaniemi has used the concept of cul-
tural symbol to describe things that are important to the Sámi. These symbols 
defĳine, build and delineate the community; essentially, they help Sámi feel the 
existence of the Sámi community.23 The traditional dress is a key element not 
only in the collective identity of the people but also in the individual identities 
of Sámi persons; it tells in subtle ways a story behind the person through the 
cultural signs within it. Altogether, there are more than 30 designs in the tra-
ditional dress worn throughout Sápmi.24 These designs vary in diffferent areas, 
but have many common elements and similarities that they are recognised as 
Sámi dress. This dress is thus something that is common to all Sámi throughout 
Sápmi, regardless of the state in which a particular Sámi person lives and what 
she/he does for a living; it unites the Sámi people across borders.
There appear to be certain rules governing how Sámi dress and its acces-
sories are related to regions and local Sámi communities and families: that is, 
people from a certain area wear the particular dress of that area. This is not 
the whole picture, however, as there also seems to be a common understand-
ing throughout Finland and Sápmi on who is entitled to wear traditional Sámi 
outfĳits, even though this varies depending on the region. When 64 members of 
the Sámi handicrafters association in Finland were asked who, in their opin-
20 However, it has recently seen a revival in everyday use by many Sámi, and can be seen 
being worn by Sámi people on any given day in towns and cities throughout Sápmi. 
21 J. Lehtola et al., Sámi Duodji, Saamenkäsityö, Sámi Handicraft (Sámi Museum – Saamelais-
museosäätiön julkaisuja no. 7, Inari 2006) 38. See also V.P. Lehtola; ‘Saamelaiset, historia, 
yhteiskunta ja taide’ (Kustannus-Puntsi, 1997) 11. 
22 See e.g. V. Hirvonen, Saamenmaan ääniä. Saamelaisen naisen tie kirjailijaksi (Suomalaisen 
kirjallisuuden seura, 1999), 184: Duodji is “a part of ethnic identity, a skill through which an 
individual experiences belonging to a community and sharing common values with the 
other members of the community”. See also n 18, S.R. Somby, 2003, 86, 114. “Duodji and the 
skills it involves are the building-blocks of personal, social and ethnic cultural identity.”
23 S. Tervaniemi, ‘Symbolista sodankäyntiä saamelaisuudesta’ AGON, N:ot 37-38, 23 May 2013, 
14. 
24 P. Nuorgam, ‘Mánnávuođa muittut’ (Bumbá-lágádus 2016) 42-51. Some designs correspond 
to Sámi regions that a span across national borders.
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ion, has the right to wear the traditional  gákti, 75 per cent answered, “a Sámi or 
person who has a connection to Sámi society”;25 20.3 per cent responded, “only 
Sámi can wear the dress”; and 4.7 per cent said, “anyone, as long as they wear 
it appropriately”. No one answered “whoever wants to”. Since almost all people 
answered that either Sámi persons or persons who have a connection to Sámi 
society may wear the dress, Sámi tradition seems to indicate that the right to 
wear the Sámi dress is bound to the Sámi origin of the wearer, with an excep-
tion to this main rule for people having a connection to Sámi society. People 
were also asked in an open-answer question, “What is your opinion based on?”. 
More than twenty people said that it was taken from their family, relatives, 
community or just simply traditions. Almost twenty people explained either 
how to wear the dress or what the exceptions are. Two exceptions were men-
tioned when non-Sámi were allowed to wear Sámi dress: marriage to a Sámi or 
when honouring a person in recognition of something that he/she has done 
for the community, albeit that it was expected that the person also shows re-
spect for the Sámi people and traditions.
2.2 Customs Related to  Sámi Dress –  Customary Norms? 
Researcher Elina Helander-Renvall has studied Sámi customary norms on 
land use in certain areas of northern Norway. She defĳines customary norms 
as traditions and concepts of justice,26 describing “Sami  customary rules [as] 
dynamic, adjusting over time, flexible, based on common understanding and 
social acceptance, well-known locally, and practiced in specifĳic situations and 
contexts, ‘traditions’ from the past, transferred to new generations according 
to contemporary needs”.27 It is striking how similar the customary norms she 
describes are to (social) norms and customs on the use of traditional dress 
mentioned above. The Sámi have clear legal conceptions regarding who can 
wear Sámi dress and how; these vary in diffferent areas, just as the conceptions 
of land use do. The results of the questionnaire to handicrafters conducted by 
the Sámi Council’s Sámi Duodji trademark  revitalization project confĳirm that 
25 The survey was part of Sámi Duodji-trademark revitalization project and was completed 
between November 2015 and January 2016. Most of the questions were single response 
questions. See n 11. 
26 E. Renvall-Helander, ’Saamelainen tapaoikeus’, in P. Magga and E. Ojanlatva (eds.), Ealli 
biras =  Elävä ympäristö: saamelainen kulttuuriympäristöohjelma (Saami Museum – 
Saamelaismuseosäätiön julkaisujano. 9, Inari 2013) 132.
27 E. Renvall-Helander, ‘On Customary Law Among the Saami People’ in N. Bankes and 
T.  Koivurova (eds.), The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention, National and International 
Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights. (Hart 2013) 290.
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the rules concerning the use of Sámi dress have taken on their present forms 
over a long period time and that they are traditions, “agreed on” communally. 
The rights related to Sámi dress are thus essentially collective in nature. In ad-
dition, even though the dress is a product of  handicraft, it is not possible to 
identify a single craftsperson as the creator of the designs. Helander-Renvall 
posits with regard to land use that customary norms within the community 
are perhaps not even perceived as being rules in the same manner as written 
laws are. They are more like a code of conduct for the social  environment of 
the Sámi community; one notices the nature of the rules when some conflict 
requires that the rules be articulated or when research is done on them.28 The 
same can be applied to a conflict surrounding Sámi dress that centres on de-
meaning use by outsiders. The problem is that the Sámi legal perceptions and 
customs have not gained recognition and acknowledgment in Finnish juris-
prudence. In fact, it is essentially accepted under the current Finnish  intel-
lectual property regime that anyone may use the Sámi dress commercially: it 
is not regarded as meeting the requirements for protection under  intellectual 
property law, or falls within some exception to IP protection, which means that 
it can be freely used by anyone. This is clearly against the Sámi custom and 
legal perception on the Sámi dress.
Case law and research on Sámi law has shown that Sámi customs can consti-
tute  customary law and can act as one of the sources of law alongside national 
and international law.29 Knowing and acknowledging these norms is essen-
tial if there is clear determination to solve the conflicts and redress the harms 
caused by the wider use of Sámi traditional dress.30 Do the Sámi then have a 
right and a mandate to have a say in when and how traditional dress is worn, 
and can they exercise that right?
3 Collective Right to Have a Say on the Wider Use of  Sámi Dress? 
3.1 Sámi Views on Cultural Heritage, the  Sámi Dress and its Wider Use
But what are the Sámi’s demands regarding Sámi dress and Sámi cultural herit-
age in general? The nature of the protection sought in the demands has varied. 
On the one hand, there have been calls for  ownership; on the other hand, there 
28 See n 26.
29 See generally on Sámi customs and their interpretation as customary law E.V. Svensson, 
‘Sami Legal Scholarship: The Making of a Knowledge Field’, in C. Allard and S.F. Skogvang, 
Indigenous Rights in Scandinavia, Autonomous Sami Law, (Ashgate, 2015) 223-225.
30 See also n 13, A.R., Rileya and K.A. Carpenter, 2016, 4.
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have been calls for at least negative protection. In their declaration regarding 
cultural heritage 2008, the Saami Council specifĳically stated that the Sámi have 
the right to their own material and intellectual cultural heritage and required 
the tourism industry to stop  misappropriation of the Sámi traditional dress.31 
At the same time Saami Parliamentary Council (SPR)32 declared that the ‘Sámi 
people have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural 
heritage,  traditional knowledge and  traditional cultural expressions and their 
 intellectual property rights'.33 In the same vein they stated that Sámi symbols 
cannot be used without the consent of Sámi and only for purposes acceptable 
to the Sámi. In 2011 SPR expressed that their view on cultural heritage is in line 
with Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and repeated what they 
had declared in 2008 on ‘Sámi’s right to maintain, control, protect and develop 
their cultural heritage’ and stated that the ‘States have both [a] duty to respect 
Sámi’s right to determine over their traditional knowledge and traditional cul-
tural expression and to guarantee this right...’34 In 2011 SPR also made a point 
that where businesses in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia express and use 
Sámi culture they must do so in accordance with ethically acceptable prin-
ciples and demanded that states make an action plan for this together with 
the Sámi. As an example for implementation SPR mentioned ethical rules and 
quality certifĳication mechanism.35 
Representatives of the Saami Parliaments have been part of the expert 
group negotiating the Draft Nordic Saami Convention, which contains a dedi-
31 The Sámi have posited many times, they have not placed anything in the public domain. 
They have called for sui generis protection for Sámi folklore. See Saami Council state-
ments at WIPO’s IGC 4/2002 and Saami Council Statement 1 IGC 5/2003. The Saami Coun-
cil has in the Rovaniemi Declaration at the 19th Saami Conference called for the right for 
the Sámi to own their material and intellectual cultural heritage and the possibility to 
control and develop it. In the same breath, it has been declared that the intention is not 
to establish an absolute exclusive right to Sámi culture but rather the Sámi gladly share 
parts of their culture. Among other things, the Declaration demands that decisions on 
requests coming from other than Sámi persons to exploit the elements of Sámi culture 
should be directed to Sámi institutions. The actions of the Finnish state and the private 
sector, which may afffect the Sámi culture, may only be carried out on the condition that 
the impacts of the actions on the culture are assessed in advance. See Rovaniemi Declara-
tion at the 19th Saami Conference, 2008, sections 13-15, 22, pp. 6-8. The Saami Council has 
also discussed the issue in its Conferences in 1980 and 1986. 
32 Saami Parliamentary Council is a cooperation body of the Saami Parliaments in Finland, 
Sweden and Norway. 
33 Declaration of the Saami Parliamentary Council 2008 Rovaniemi, 2.
34 Declaration of the Saami Parliamentary Council 2011 Kirkenes, para. 6. 
35 See n 52, para. 22.
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cated article on the protection of cultural expressions that would also cover 
Sámi dress. Article 31 of the Draft Convention provides: “the states shall make 
effforts to ensure that the Sámi people gain influence over such activities and 
a reasonable share of the fĳinancial revenues. The Sámi culture shall be pro-
tected against the use of cultural expressions that in a misleading manner give 
the impression of having a Sámi origin”.36 In 2008, the Saami Parliamentary 
Council and the Saami Council formed a joint committee to discuss the Sámi 
symbols, such as the flag and the dress, but the committee has not been very 
active, nor have they produced any statements on the issue. 
Most of the wider use of cultural expressions occurs in Finland and it is 
therefore interesting to see how the  Saami Parliament in Finland37 has dealt 
with the issue. It seems to have quite rarely addressed the demeaning use of 
Sámi dress over the last two decades. There might be several reasons for this 
including primarily the limited budget and its having to focus on land rights, 
language, and education as well. Still, in view of the attention that Sámi soci-
ety has drawn to the issue and the recurring instances of  misappropriation, it 
would seem – at least to judge by the statements and guidelines on the issue 
– that the Saami Parliament has given little political attention to the matter 
until recently. 
Though the Sámi dress has economic value, its cultural meaning and value 
cannot be understated and over time has been viewed as more substantial. 
The issue of dress and  handicraft might to some extent have a gender-related 
dimension as well, since statistics show that a majority of the people doing 
handicraft are women.38 Moreover, the overwhelming majority of craftsper-
sons who work with soft materials – and hence sewing garments and dresses 
– are women. In this connection, one could examine the gender balance in the 
Saami Parliament, which was established in 1972 as the Sámi Delegation and 
took its current form in 1996. From the very beginning, the Delegation had very 
36 Unofffĳicial version of the ‘Draft Nordic Saami Convention 2007’. <www.galdu.no/getfĳile.
php/3131394.2388.../3_2007_samekonvensjon_eng.pdf>, accessed 30 August 2016.
37 Where reference to Saami Parliament is made in this chapter, the author is referring to the 
Saami Parliament of Finland, unless stated otherwise.
38 This was confĳirmed in statistics compiled from a survey made by the Saami Council Sámi 
Duodji-trademark revitalization project. See n 11. 74.1% (157 persons of 212) who answered 
the survey where women. Closer analysis of the data showed that in Finland around 90% 
of those who are making handicrafts from soft materials are women. On the other hand 
the issue is more complex; handicraft as an issue has been on the political agenda on Sámi 
and their discussions for decades, but it seems that the politicians have not been able to 
solve the demands for protection and on demand to support the sales of Sámi handicraft 
and the support for it as a livelihood. 
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few women among its 20 members. The proportion of women has gradually in-
creased over time, but it is only in the last three Parliaments – since 2008 – that 
almost half of the members have been women. Hence, the gender balance of 
the Parliament can be a factor in the slow progress of views and Parliamentary 
positions on  Sámi Dress.
As mentioned in the introduction, wider use of traditional dress has been 
an issue since the 1930s. Through the actions taken and the political docu-
ments on record, one can see that the Sámi have consistently wanted to pro-
tect the dress. Yet, there have been other voices, arguing for wider use of the 
dress. For example, in 1970s when the Sámi Delegation discussed the use of 
the dress at a secondary school in Rovaniemi on a festive occasion, some of 
the members looked upon the idea favourably and thought it would publicize 
Sámi culture.39 At the end of the day, the main reason for the limited political 
attention might be the collective nature of the customs related to Sámi dress: 
no single person owns it; on the contrary, it belongs to all Sámi and, as noted, 
there are over 30 diffferent outfĳits in four countries, all with local traditions of 
their own, making the issue a complex one. It seems that it has been difffĳicult 
to determine who has legitimacy as the proper rights holder to act on the issue 
and at the same time has the responsibility to do so. 
Even though political attention to the issue of dress has been limited over 
time, it has increased over the last decade and especially recently. In 2007 the 
 Saami Parliament stated that the tourism industry should act in a culturally 
sustainable manner, meaning that Sámi culture should be portrayed with re-
spect and the information given on it should be accurate.40 In its statement 
to the Minority Ombudsman in 2010 (at present the Non- Discrimination Om-
budsman), the Saami Parliament explained the importance of the Dress in 
Sámi culture and stated that the use of Sámi dress should be governed or guid-
ed through regulations and guidelines that adhere to Finland’s obligations un-
der international law.41 In 2016 the Saami Parliament released a guide on how 
to present the Sámi and Sámi dress in pictures for the purposes of the tourism 
industry. The guide says that the Sámi and the Sámi dress should be presented 
truthfully and in cooperation with Sámi themselves.42 Even though the dress 
has not been a topical matter until lately, the Saami Parliament has worked 
39 See n 11, V.P. Lehtola, 81.
40 Saamelaiskäräjien lausunto Lapin matkailustrategialuonnoksesta 13.6.2007, s. 2-3. Since 
then it has repeated these views in many documents.
41 Saamelaiskäräjien lausunto Vähemmistövaltuutetulle 2010, 10-12. 
42 <http://www.houseoflapland.fĳi/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Saamelaisten_kuvaohjeis-
tus.pdf>, accessed 17 October 2016.
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towards the recognition of  traditional knowledge in legislation and, as a result, 
Finland has now passed an Act on the Nagoya Protocol, which will afffect the 
 benefĳit sharing in use of traditional knowledge related genetic resources of the 
Sámi; however, since it’s scope is limited, this will have questionable efffect on 
the issue of dress.43 The  Saami Parliament has also participated in the meet-
ings of WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee on Genetic Resources, Folklore 
and Traditional Knowledge and according to its action plan for 2016-2019 plans 
to do so also in future to make sure that traditional knowledge endures for fu-
ture generations.44 All in all the political interest in these issues has started to 
increase in Finnish political discourse. 
3.2 Fundamental Right to One’s Language and Culture
The Finnish Constitution has two separate but related sections concerning the 
Sámi, namely section 17.3 and subsection 4 of section 121. Subsection 4 of sec-
tion 121 will be discussed further in chapter 3.3. The fĳirst one, section 17.3 pro-
vides that “[t]he Sámi, as an indigenous people… have the right to maintain 
and develop their own language and culture”. According to the preparatory 
works of the Constitution, the aim of the section was to secure the survival of 
linguistic and national minorities and their cultures. The materials also state 
that the content and status of the Sámi’s fundamental right to maintain and de-
velop their culture is recognised in and follows from international law and the 
relevant international conventions.45 Finland has ratifĳied all relevant human 
rights conventions, with the exception of the International Labour Organiza-
tion’s Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries ( ILO 169), which is now being considered by the Finnish Parliament. 
Even though this section on the Sámi in the Constitution talks about a col-
lective right, it secures the linguistic and  cultural rights of Sámi individuals 
as well. This follows from the fact that the model used in setting out the fun-
damental right to culture in Finland’s Constitution was Article 27 of the UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states: “In 
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
43 Finnish government Bill, HE 126/2015 vp. The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefĳits Arising from their Utilization 
(ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity is a supplementary agreement to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.
44 Saami Parliament Action Plan 2016-2019, 15 April 2016, 14. 
45 Finnish government Bill, HE 309/1993 vp, 65.
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practice their own  religion, or to use their own language.” The Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) uses the same language (Art. 30) with specifĳic ap-
plication to indigenous children.46 The case law of the  Human Rights Commit-
tee ( HRC) has confĳirmed that indigenous peoples have the right to have their 
distinct cultural identity protected.47 The  HRC has also called several times for 
positive measures to implement the right and to protect peoples against the 
acts of other persons within the state party.48 
The Committee responsible for the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) has issued a number of general comments expressing a position on the 
status of indigenous children in diffferent areas, with one comment explicitly 
referring to indigenous children and their rights under the Convention. On 
many occasions the Committee has emphasised the need to respect the collec-
tive cultural values and identity of the child and to respect culture, languages 
and traditions in general.49 In line with  HRC, CRC has required states to take 
positive measures through legislative, judicial, or administrative authorities 
both against its action but also against acts of other persons that might lead to 
denial or violation of the right.50 The Committee has stressed that the needs of 
indigenous children are unique and should be specifĳically addressed. In light 
of the Committee’s views, it would be critical that Sámi children and youth 
have a secure  environment in which to build their Sámi identity; this would 
be an environment without stereotypes of the Sámi as being underdeveloped, 
without their being romanticized, and without false characteristics being im-
puted to them. Some television programmes have portrayed the Sámi in this 
way and the tourism industry and shops like Pilailupuoti continue to reinforce 
the stereotypes created.51 As one of the most visible parts of the identify of 
Sámi children and youth the Sámi dress holds great meaning and value, and 
deserves adequate protection. 
46 Finland has ratifĳied the Convention in 1991 (59/1991). So far there is only one case judged 
by the Committee and it concerned a violation of other articles of the Convention. 
47 For instance in Sandra Lovelace v. Canada. Communication No. R6/24, U.N.Doc. Supp. No. 
40 (A/36/40/) at 166 (1981), para. 13.1, 16, 17. 
48 General Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27): 08/04/94. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.5 6.1. 
49 CRC/C/GC/11. 12 February 2009. General Comment No. 11 (2009). Indigenous children and 
their rights under the Convention, para. 18.
50 See n 49, para. 17.
51 Television programs Hymyhuulet and Pulttibois had two Sámi characters, whom were 
presented being alcoholics’, hay in the hair, and black teeth with the dress copies on. The 
program were aired fĳirst time 1980’s and 1990’s and have been aired many times after that. 
<https://fĳi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulttibois>, accessed 30 August 2016.
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The mental health of Sámi youth is also an area with unique challenges. 
According to the research of Omma et al. in Sweden, young Sámi have more 
suicidal ideation/death wishes/life weariness compared to the majority of the 
Swedes, problems exacerbated by harsh circumstances and experiences of bad 
treatment relating to their ethnicity. It is stated that the “[s]uicidal behaviour is 
not necessarily primarily an expression of a wish to die, but part of an internal 
existential dialogue contributing to building a human identity”. The research 
also states that “the majority of young Sami share the experience of being 
forced to defend the Sami culture and the Sami way of living”.52 There has not 
been any research in Finland on the mental health of Sámi youth separately 
but the situation in Sweden is quite similar in many ways and there is a rea-
son to believe that mental health is an issue within the Sámi youth of Finland 
as well. Finland’s country report to CERD Committee raised a similar issue – 
Sámi youth in Finland were tired of justifying being a Sámi.53 In addition, the 
suicide fĳigures of the Sámi in Finland indicate mental health problems are an 
issue among the young Sámi in Finland too.54 The Swedish studies on mental 
health also reinforce the connection between the realisation of the rights of 
indigenous peoples and mental health solutions. With better realisation, and 
security in ones culture, better mental health follows. 
Sámi have for a long time also highlighted how little the majority population 
knows about the Sámi and how important it would be to include education 
on the Sámi in the national school curriculum. So far the calls for raising the 
awareness of the Sámi have not led anywhere even though e.g. The European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has recommended that 
the Finnish authorities take measures to teach the Sámi culture in schools.55 In 
light of this situation – the Sámi’s constant need to justify their existence – it 
seems unconscionable that the Sámi should also be consistently offfended and 
52 L. Omma, M. Sandlund, L. Jacobsson: ‘Suicidal expressions in young Swedish Sami, a 
cross-sectional study.’ Int J Circumpolar Health. 2013;72. doi: 10.3402/ijch.v72i0.19862. Epub 
2013 Jan 171, 8.
53 CERD Committee monitors the implementation of International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. CERD/C/FIN/23. Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Consideration of reports submitted by States par-
ties under article 9 of the Convention. Twenty-third periodic reports of States parties due 
in 2015. 23 December 2015, para. 41.
54 L. Soininen ‘The Health of the Finnish Sami in Light of Mortality and Cancer Pattern’. 
<https://helda.helsinki.fĳi/bitstream/handle/10138/154662/THEHEALTHO_korjattu.
pdf?sequence=3>, accessed 30 August 2016.
55 ECRI Report on Finland (fourth monitoring cycle), adopted on 21 March 2013, published 
on 9 July 2013, para. 106.
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humiliated by the ongoing rebuilding and maintaining of stereotypes by the 
tourism industry and other private actors. 
3.3 Saami Parliament – Self-Government Body 
The above has thus concluded that Sámi have  cultural rights and introduced 
certain instruments for the implementation of those rights. Subsection 4 of 
section 121 of the Finnish Constitution establishes the legal foundation for 
the Saami Parliament, a body responsible for the  self-government that aims 
to implement the people’s cultural and linguistic rights. According to subsec-
tion 4 of section 121 of the Constitution, “In their native region, the Sámi have 
linguistic and cultural self-government, as provided by an Act.” The Act on the 
Saami Parliament states that “the Sámi as an indigenous people shall be en-
sured cultural  autonomy within their homeland in matters concerning their 
language and culture.”56 The aim of the law has been to ensure that Sámi can, 
as extensively as possible, control their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment and participate in the planning of their development on the national and 
international level.57 Within the Sámi homeland, the Saami Parliament may 
make proposals and issue statements to state authorities. Furthermore, section 
9 of the Act afffĳirms that authorities are to negotiate with the Sámi Parliament 
regarding “all far-reaching and important measures that directly or indirectly 
may afffect the Sámi’s status as an indigenous people,” including matters relat-
ing to the management, use, leasing, and assignment of state lands, among 
other issues. The problems associated with section 9 arise from it being read 
in conjunction with the previous sections, thus limiting its application only 
to actions with afffect the Sámi homeland, although a majority of Sámi live 
outside this region. Another problem is that the government does not have an 
agreement with the Saami Parliament that establishes how and under what 
circumstances  consultations should be arranged. Hence, it can be questioned 
whether the  Saami Parliament can genuinely participate in and influence de-
cisions that afffect the Sámi people, their culture, and their indigenous status. 
The statutory mandate of the Sámi Parliament is limited, and its input is re-
stricted further.58 Ultimately, under the current practice the Sámi only have a 
56 Laki saamelaiskäräjistä (17.7.1995/974), section 1.
57 Finnish government Bill, HE 248/1994 vp., 14. 
58 The lack of procedure on section 9 of the Act was noted and the degree of participation 
was noted by the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2010, when 
Rapporteur paid an offfĳicial country visit to Sápmi in 2010. Report of the Special Rappor-
teur on the rights of indigenous peoples on the situation of the Sami people in the Sápmi 
region of Norway, Sweden and Finland. A/HRC/18/35/Add.2, 38.40.
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right to be consulted in issues that fall within the  Saami Parliament’s mandate 
and where a matter is offfĳicially recognised as a “Sámi matter”. This, however, 
can also act as an efffective tool if the Saami Parliament calls for negotiations 
and most importantly the offfĳicials are in fact willing to listen and take into ac-
count the Sámi view on the issue.
3.4 Legal Protection for  Sámi Dress?
Apart from the Act on the Saami Parliament, there are a few Acts dealing ex-
clusively with Sámi matters and approximately 100 Acts, decrees, or regula-
tions that mention the Sámi. Most refer to the Act on the Saami Parliament or 
language, however none of these instruments protects Sámi dress specifĳically. 
Even though dress is one of the key expressions of the culture, it has no specifĳic 
legal protection, nor are there any special measures to ensure that the Sámi 
can have a collective say in how Sámi dress can or cannot be used by outsiders. 
By contrast, as mentioned previously,  intellectual property law appears to al-
low anyone to use Sámi dress commercially.59 
However, the importance of the dress and  handicraft has been acknowledge 
many times. The Finnish Parliament voted in the spring of 2015 on an amend-
ment to the Act on the Saami Parliament, but the amendment was rejected. 
In the suggested amendment, it was proposed that Sámi culture be defĳined in 
an open and non-exhaustive way.60 Sámi culture would include the Sámi lan-
guage, the Sámi cultural heritage, cultural expressions, art,  traditional knowl-
edge, traditional livelihoods, and the contemporary forms of practicing these, 
as well as other ways and forms in which the Sámi can practice their culture as 
an indigenous people. According to the explanatory part of the bill containing 
the amendment, these are the essential elements of the Sámi culture; Sámi 
handicraft was also explicitly mentioned.61 Also salient in this regard is the 
 draft Nordic Saami Convention article 31 which mentions “ traditional cultural 
expressions” and the preparatory materials which cite Sámi handicraft and 
wearing traditional Sámi dress as examples of these.62 
Signifĳicantly, Finland has ratifĳied the  UNESCO Convention on the Protec-
tion and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which states that 
cultural expressions “are those expressions that result from the creativity of 
59 See n 14, 137-138, 140-142. 
60 Finnish Government Bill, HE 167/2017 vp, 48. 
61 See n 45, 30-31. 
62 Draft Nordic Saami Convention, 2007. The draft is currently under negations.
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individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural content”.63 It has also 
ratifĳied the  UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the  Intangible Cultur-
al Heritage 2003, which defĳines in article 2, paragraph 1 intangible cultural her-
itage as “the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills… that 
communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their 
cultural heritage”. According to paragraph 2 of the article, “intangible cultural 
heritage... is manifested, inter alia, in... (e) traditional craftsmanship”.64 In the 
implementation of the Convention, traditional Sámi  handicraft has been listed 
as falling within the scope of the instrument.65 Overall, the value and impor-
tance of Sámi handicraft and dress as part of Sámi culture has been acknowl-
edged many times on the preparatory works on laws and draft conventions, 
but this has not in practice led to legal protection. By ratifying the UNESCO 
conventions Finland has however committed itself to, among other things, 
safeguarding the intangible cultural heritage in general and ensuring respect 
for, and raising awareness about, it. 
Even though the mandate of the  Saami Parliament does not give it a collec-
tive mandate on the Sámi dress and and other legal instruments do not specifĳi-
cally protect the Sami dress, there are other legal avenues available to protect 
the dignity of the Sámi from the most offfensive instances of  misappropria-
tion. One legal approach, which has been raised by the Non- Discrimination 
Ombudsman herself, is that the demeaning use of Sámi dress may be viewed 
as harassment, which is a form of discrimination.66 Let us thus turn to the rel-
evant legislative provisions on equality and non-discrimination.
63 Laki kulttuuri-ilmaisujen moninaisuuden suojelemista ja edistämistä koskevan yleissop-
imuksen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta (600/2006).
64 Valtioneuvoston asetus aineettoman kulttuuriperinnön suojelemisesta tehdyn yleissop-
imuksen voimaansaattamisesta (47/2013). 
65 Wikilist <https://wiki.aineetonkulttuuriperinto.fĳi/wiki/Saamelainen_k%C3%A4sity%C3
%B6perinne> accessed 1 August 2016.
66 Non-Discrimination Ombudsman Kirsi Pimiä, “Oikeus omaan kieleen ja kulttuuriin – yh-






id%3Dcolumn-2%26p_p_col_pos%3D2%26p_p_col_count%3D3>, accessed 20 May 2016. 
She said that combating cases of harassment can be sometimes difffĳicult, since it is ex-
plained or defended to be humour or comedy.
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4 Pilailupuoti – Harassment?
4.1 Right to Non-discrimination
The right not to be discriminated against is guaranteed in various human 
rights instruments. Finland has accepted or ratifĳied all of the central ones or 
is a party to them as a member of the UN, the Council of Europe, and the Eu-
ropean Union.67 Treaty bodies interpreting the provisions on equality have 
emphasized in their general comments or recommendations that indigenous 
peoples are free and equal in dignity and rights, and free from any discrimi-
nation, and that states have positive obligations to take measures to prevent 
discrimination.68 The CRC Committee has also called upon the states actively 
identify the existing and potential areas of discrimination and hence gaps and 
barriers to the enjoyment of the rights of indigenous children. CRC call for 
the states to identify the children whose right may demand special measures. 
Hence, CRC Committee requires states to recognize the special needs of in-
digenous children in order to eliminate conditions that cause discrimination, 
and to take special measures to respond to or accommodate those needs, such 
as changes in legislation, administration and allocation of resources. This is to 
ensure that indigenous children enjoy their rights on an equal level with non-
indigenous children.69 
Finland has guaranteed both the right to equality and prohibited discrimi-
nation in section 6, subsections 1 and 2 of its Constitution: “Everyone is equal 
before the law. No one shall, without an acceptable reason, be treated difffer-
ently from other persons on the ground of sex, age, origin, language,  religion, 
conviction, opinion, health, disability or other reason that concerns his or her 
person.” According to the preparatory works of the Constitution, the provi-
sions include both the traditional requirement of formal equality as well as 
the idea of equality in fact. The section has been described as being a prevail-
ing principle of justice. The Finnish Non- Discrimination Act (2002, amended 
2014), which gives more substance to the constitutional right mentioned, is ap-
67 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Art. 7, CCPR 26, International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 2.2. ICERD, European Convention on the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 14. 
68 See e.g. HRC GC NO 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties 
to the Covenant:26.05.2004 CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add13 8. and CESC GC NO 20, Non-discrim-
ination in economic, social and cultural rights (Art. 2, para. 2, of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, 9. 
69 See n 49, para. 24, 25, 26.
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plied to both public and private activities.70 One of the main goals of the law is 
to promote de facto non-discrimination and actions that aim to improve situ-
ations for those that are disadvantaged.71 The Act prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of origin, language, belief or other personal characteristics. It extends 
this prohibition to direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, and denial 
of reasonable accommodation as well as a instructions or orders to discrimi-
nate which also constitute discrimination.72 
4.2 Harassment 
Section 14 of the Non- Discrimination Act reads: “The deliberate or de facto in-
fringement of the dignity of a person is harassment, if the infringing behaviour 
relates to a reason referred to in section 8(1) [prohibited grounds e.g. origin, 
language] and as a result of the reason, a degrading or humiliating, intimi-
dating, hostile or offfensive  environment towards the person is created by the 
behaviour”.73 The former Act (from the year 2002) also mentioned a group’s 
dignity but this was removed when the Act was revised in 2014. Even though the 
current provision refers only to a person, the preparatory works indicate that 
it was also meant to apply to activities, which are directed to a certain group 
as well, whereby it also protects a group’s dignity.74 Dignity relates here to the 
inherent dignity and to the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family and to everyone’s right to enjoy equally all the rights and free-
doms. It is mentioned that the dignity of a person can be infringed by acting in 
a way that demonstrates a fundamental lack of respect to a person on a prohib-
ited ground or based on a prohibited ground, or that questions a person’s right 
to be treated equally. Further, any act that is to be deemed harassment would 
normally need to be an action that is continual, evident, or public.75 An exam-
ple for present purposes would be a situation where an entrepreneur makes 
publicly available in his or her shop (or on the Internet) material portraying 
an ethnic group in a degrading or humiliating way. Whether an act constitutes 
70 (1325/2014) Section 2.(2) This Act does not, however, apply to activities pertaining to pri-
vate or family life or the practising of religion.
71 Finnish Government Bill, HE 19/2014 vp., 54.
72 Chapter 3, Prohibition of discrimination and victimisation, Section 8 Prohibition of dis-
crimination (1) (2).
73 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treat-
ment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (Racial Equality Directive) 
obligated Finland to enact national legislation prohibiting harassment. 
74 See 71, 78.
75 T. Ojanen, M. Scheinin, ‘Yhdenvertaisuus ja Syrjinnän kielto’, in P. Hallberg et al. (eds.), 
Perusoikeudet, (toinen uudistettu painos WSOY Pro 2011) 246.
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harassment is assessed according to objective criteria; subjective views are not 
decisive.76 In addition, creating the  environment mentioned in the section is 
required. For example, joking in way that humiliates an entire population can 
offfend a person, even though this was not the intention.77 Thus, when looking 
at the content and the scope of the law, norms on harassment could protect 
the dignity of the Sámi and hence Sámi dress from demeaning use.
There is very little legal praxis in Finland on what constitutes harassment. 
Only one case has been considered in the Supreme Administrative Court 
(SAC). In the case A and B et al., it was alleged that the state-owned Finnish 
broadcasting company (Yle) had discriminated against the Roma as an ethnic 
group by broadcasting a TV show and a series that in the opinion of the Roma 
infringed their dignity and portrayed them in a very prejudicial manner. 78 The 
SAC upheld decisions made by the lower courts that the action did not con-
stitute harassment. The fact that the Roma themselves were involved in mak-
ing the programme and that it actually promoted discussion in general on the 
situation of the Roma were used as the main arguments. In addition, the Court 
emphasized that the programme was lightly humorous. The Court determined 
that the evidence did not establish that the programme had factually caused 
serious harmful efffects. The right not to be discriminated against was weighed 
against freedom of expression. The Court had thus set a high threshold for 
fĳindings of harassment. 
With this in mind one can ask, how should the actions of Pilailupuoti be 
assessed? Can they be seen as constituting harassment? Even though the SAC 
did not seem to put much weight on a person’s or group’s own view on of-
fensiveness, let us look at the response from the Sámi to Pilailupuoti. In the 
questionnaire about the Sámi Duodji certifĳication  trademark, 63 people were 
asked what they thought about the use of the dress in the Pilailupuoti case. It 
was a multiple-response question with a possibility to choose several options. 
Thirty-fĳive people (55.6 per cent) answered either “it offfends me” or “it humili-
ates or degrades the Sámi”, which means that over half of the people were of-
fended personally or in the name of the Sámi people. Forty-four people chose 
either “it increases or exacerbates prejudice against the Sámi” or, “it humiliates 
or degrades the Sámi”; 34 per cent felt that it reinforces prejudices; 28 per cent 
responded that “it can afffect in a negative way Sámi’s self-image or identity”. 
Altogether 51 persons chose one of the negative options offfered. Only two 
76 See 71, 78.
77 See n 71. 
78 KHO:2011:22, 9.3.2011/588, <http://www.fĳinlex.fĳi/fĳi/oikeus/kho/vuosikirjat/2011/201100588>, 
accessed 20 January 2016.
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chose “It does not offfend me” and seven “it has no efffect on the Sámi”. In addi-
tion, 25 chose an ‘and/or’ option where they could write an open answer. For 
the most part, the open answers indicated disappointment that the Sámi as a 
people and Sámi culture or knowledge of  handicraft were made fun of or de-
meaned in that way. Respondents also mentioned the deceptiveness regarding 
the origin of the product, the economic exploitation of Sámi culture, or other 
negative elements.79 The responses on the questionnaire coincide rather well 
with earlier Sámi views and statements on the use of the dress by outsiders. 
Offfensiveness or humiliation, the fĳirst part of the requirement for harass-
ment, would thus be met if Sámi were asked. Clearly offfensiveness or humili-
ation (cultural value, meaning, and consequences) can only truly be assessed 
by the people in question. However, both the preparatory works of the Non-
 Discrimination Act and the related case law seem to confĳirm that harassment 
is to be assessed on the basis of ‘objective criteria’, namely, the judgment of the 
majority of people about the nature of the action taken.80 It means that deni-
gration has to be obvious to the majority of people as well. Since the Sámi are 
a minority in Finland, and as mentioned one about whom the majority often 
knows very little, it seems that merely selling a copy of the dress is unlikely to 
meet the objective criterion for infringement. However, if case was brought to 
Non-Discrimination tribunal and administrative courts, they would also have 
to take into account the human rights of the Sámi as indigenous people and 
assess the need for protection of the Sámi identity from subjective opinion and 
actions by the majority Finns.
As for the second part of the requirement, proving a creation of such  envi-
ronment, the SAC has also set the bar high. In many of the cases in the Euro-
pean context, the harassment at issue either has occurred at work or has been 
sexual, incidents whose sphere of influence can easily be recognized.81 Can the 
Sámi really even have a chance to prove that the environment created by Pilai-
lupuoti fulfĳils the requirement, since the sphere of influence is not as clear-cut 
as in some other types of harassment? If the environment were only the store, 
it might be easier, but since it is the Internet, the sphere of influence is practi-
cally the whole of Finland. In the Roma case that came before the SAC, there 
was a great deal of evidence presented by the Roma people on the prejudice 
79 See n 11.
80 Finnish government Bill, HE 19/2014 vp, 78.
81 Employment Tribunal, 24 October 2012, Beyene v. JDA International Ltd, Case No. 
2703297/11., Employment Tribunal, 5 November 2012, Henry v. Ashtead Plant Hire Co Ltd, 
Case No. 3202933/1. In both of these cases an employee had used an insulting phrase 
about a colleague in front of other people. 
250 Nuorga m
they faced since the TV programme and still the Court did not fĳind that Yle had 
created the atmosphere mentioned in the requirement. Moreover, the defĳini-
tion of harassment in the EU Racial  Discrimination Directive, which was the 
model for the norm on harassment, has been criticized as being unclear and 
far from perfect. As Makkonen notes the efffect of the “prohibition of harass-
ment remains not just uncertain but also limited”.82 
The relevance of the prohibition on harassment seems unclear in the Pilai-
lupuoti case, but it seems that in certain cases where the offfensiveness is clear 
to the majority and the sphere of influence is defĳined, it can protect the dignity 
of Sámi and be used when trying to hinder the most offfensive  misappropria-
tion of the Sámi dress and culture. An example would be where a person pre-
tends to be a Sámi by wearing Sámi dress and does so in a demeaning way on 
a single occasion; for example at a party. In other words, prohibition against 
harassment protects the dignity of a person as a Sámi, not the dress itself, even 
though the dress is a manifestation of Sámi identity. Hence, under the contem-
porary interpretation, it seems the Sámi dress as a component of Sámi identity 
is protected only indirectly. 
5 Conclusions
Thus far, Sámi demands for the protection of the Sámi dress as a distinctive 
and vital expression of culture seem to have gone unheeded – at least judging 
from the inertia of the Finnish state. This is unexpected in light of the Sámi’s 
legal status as an indigenous people in the Finnish Constitution. The state of 
afffairs is perhaps even more surprising given that the principles and terms 
governing the interpretation of the Sámi’s fundamental rights follow from in-
ternational law on indigenous peoples, which has seen considerable progress 
during the last few decades. Hence, although there is formal protection in the 
Constitution, it has not been implemented in practise. The collective right to 
decide on what is important in Sámi culture and have it protected is in practise 
a right to be consulted. Nor does the Sámi dress enjoy any specifĳic legal protec-
tion at this time.
For the above-mentioned reasons, it seems that Sanila-Aikio’s statement 
regarding structural racism in the tourism industry against the Sámi is partly 
accurate. This is particularly worrisome if it means that both private and state 
actors ignore the need to provide special protection for traditional Sámi dress 
82 T. Makkonen, Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact, Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and the Le-
gal Response Thereto in Europe, (Brill-Nijhofff 2012) 242.
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as part of the people’s cultural identity. It is quite clear that the Finnish Gov-
ernment has not taken the issue seriously. At the same time, one might ask 
whether the Sámi Parliament and other Sámi actors have used all the political 
and legal means at their disposal to efffectively articulate the need to protect 
the dignity of the Sámi and of Sámi dress directly. The Non-Discrimination Act 
can, in certain cases, protect Sámi’s dignity and the dress. It can also be antici-
pated that scope of the norm on harassment is actually wider than what the 
legal praxis indicates when the norm is read together with fundamental rights 
pertaining Sámi and human rights, which obligate the protection of Sámi’s  cul-
tural rights and accommodation of the needs of Sámi children and youth. In 
this respect the Non- Discrimination Ombudsman may have a greater role to 
play by raising awareness, and using her mandate to take the cases to Finnish 
Non-Discrimination and Equality Tribunal. 
More research is certainly needed on the benefĳits and shortcomings of oth-
er avenues for the protection of Sámi dress and other culturally signifĳicant ele-
ment. Namely the laws and mechanisms for consumer protection and the laws 
and self-regulatory mechanisms in the private sector, one example being the 
Council of Ethics in Advertising. As mentioned, the tourism industry and the 
Sámi have also seen positive developments lately. One important actor in the 
industry – the House of Lapland – took an important initiative and requested 
guidelines on Sámi dress, which the  Saami Parliament provided to an extent. 
It remains to be seen what kind influence this will have on the industry and 
private actors. Yet, this positive development shows that the Saami Parliament 
and other Sámi organizations could benefĳit from intensifying their coopera-
tion with the diffferent actors in the tourism industry. Close cooperation with 
the self-regulatory mechanisms of commercial actors and with actors promot-
ing consumer protection in order to provide the industry with guidelines that 
are more comprehensive on human rights might be a step in the right direc-
tion for the protection of Sámi dress. An additional option would be for the 
Saami Parliament to use its mandate to propose to the Finnish Parliament that 
it pass an Act on the protection of Sámi symbols similar to the Act that exists 
on protection of the Finnish Flag. This Act makes public mutilation of the flag 
or its disrespectful use punishable by law (section 8) and prohibits forms of the 
flag that distort the prescribed colors and dimensions.
Reasons for demanding protection of traditional Sami dress are both cultur-
al and economic. Traditional dress has an economic value to Sámi handcraft-
ers and, in a wider context, promotes the economic development of the Sámi 
community as a whole. Generally speaking, demands that the cultural heritage 
of the Sámi be protected should be addressed, for they reflect a desire to pro-
tect the distinctive nature of Sámi culture, the Sámi community, Sámi identity, 
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and the Sámi way of life. The fact that anyone can exploit Sámi dress and cul-
ture commercially as he or she chooses undermines this distinctiveness and 
blurs the diffferences between the Sámi and other people. Over time this could 
increase the risk that the Sámi will be assimilated into the majority population 
in a manner contrary to the spirit of international treaties, declarations, and 
the Finnish Constitution. Hence, protection of traditional Sámi dress should 
be seen as protection of the Sámi cultural identity and, ultimately, their human 
dignity – one of the essential underlying values of human rights. This is par-
ticularly salient given that young people have stated repeatedly how they feel 
and how worried they are about their Sámi identity and place within society 
as Sámi. We should listen to them and act – for the benefĳit of all concerned.
.
The Cultural Heritage of South Africa’s  Khoisan 
Willa Boezak
It takes a village to raise a child.
When the elephants fĳight, it’s the grass that sufffers.
  African proverbs
Introduction 
The Khoisan’s /ʹkɔısɑ:n/ approach to culture is a holistic one. Over thousands 
of years they have cultivated an integrated life-style, undergirded by socio-
religious values. In a sense it is therefore artifĳicial to discuss separate cultural 
issues as if they are silos in the life of this indigenous nation. However, the ero-
sion of their cultural heritage occurred systematically during protracted colo-
nial and neo-colonial eras which allows for a focused approach. Some cultural 
strands survived the colonial onslaught while others became extinct. In mod-
ern times effforts have been made and still are being made, to restore, preserve 
and promote their heritage. 
The following fĳive areas will be dealt with here: land, identity, leadership 
structures, languages and  religion. These are all inter-related. Other relevant 
issues, such as their  indigenous knowledge system and legislation protecting 
their  intellectual property, are too complex to be included here. In this chapter 
we will look at the current state of these 5 foci, their historical context and the 
possibilities to preserve them for future generations.
Mother Earth
Colin Bundy points out that it was archaeologists who fĳirst exposed falsehoods 
like the myth of the ‘empty lands’.1 The  terra nullius idea, of course, was used as 
moral justifĳication for the colonial invasion. The very fĳirst people who bore the 
onslaught of colonial oppression in South Africa were coastal Khoisan commu-
nities. It was the Portuguese, craving to ‘discover’ the world outside of Europe, 
1 Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (James Currey Publications 
1988), 8-10.
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who reached the Cape in 1488. Having survived tempestuous seas, they called 
it Cabo Tormentuoso (Cape of Storms). H.C. Bredekamp sketches the ambigu-
ous nature of Bartholomeus Diaz’s achievement: It ‘[M]arked the beginning of 
a new era of exploration and trade, but for the indigenous Khoikhoi and San it 
was the beginning of a process of colonial subjugation’.2 It was also marked by 
Diaz’s murder of a Khoikhoi herder on the beach of Mossel Bay.3
Two decades of intermittent, reasonably peaceful trading contacts turned 
ugly when, in 1510, Portuguese Viceroy Francisco de Almeida tried to manipu-
late the barter by kidnapping some Khoikhoi children near Table Bay. A skir-
mish ensued culminating in the killing of De Almeida and about sixty of his 
soldiers. Rationalizing their part in the unfortunate incident, the Europeans 
began to scandalize the Khoisan’s nature and lifestyle. /Hui-!keib /ʹhu:i: kaıb/ 
(“The Cape”, with clicks) was then avoided for a hundred years by passing sea-
farers, while views such as ‘Those people are uncivilized, godless and blood-
thirsty’ abounded. ‘They are cruel and kill strangers’, Thomas Stevens remarked 
in 1579. That demonization reached its peak with: ‘They are cannibals’.4 
The fĳirst land dispossession under Dutch colonial rule occurred in 1657 
when the fĳirst farms were granted to so-called ‘free burghers’ (Dutch citizens), 
without the permission of the local chief. That land-theft resulted in a war 
orchestrated by Doman, a young Goringhaiqua /gǝriŋʹhaıkwɑ:/ warrior (1659-
60). Further encroachment on Khoisan land led to another war of resistance 
from 1673-77 by the Cochoqua /ʹkǝtʃǝᵿkwa:/ (guttural tʃ). But something that 
puzzled the Europeans was the Khoisan’s ancient custom that during war they 
would rather strike at the enemies’ property, than taking their lives.5 Ironically 
it was this ingrained, humane view that made it easier for foreigners to subju-
gate the aboriginal inhabitants ruthlessly. One of the more extended wars of 
resistance later was waged in the Eastern Cape under the leadership of Captain 
Klaas Stuurman (1799-1803).
Another downside of these land wars was that the Europeans then applied 
Roman Dutch law, which meant that land won through wars became the ter-
2 H.C. Bredekamp, ’From Fragile Independence to Permanent Subservience’ in T. Cameron 
and S. Spies (eds), An Illustrated History of South Africa (Southern Book Publishers 1986), 
102.
3 E. Boonzaier et al. The Cape Herders – A History of the Khoikhoi of Southern Africa (David 
Philip 1996), 52-56.
4 W. Boezak, Struggle of an Ancient Faith – the Khoisan of South Africa (Bidvest Data 2016), 
40.
5 V.C. Malherbe, ‘The Khoi Captains in the Third Frontier War’ in S. Newton and V.C. Mal-
berbe, The Khoikhoi Rebellion in the Eastern Cape: 1799-1803 (UCT Centre for African Stud-
ies 1984), 97-98.
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ritories of the conqueror. It became a pattern: the two successive colonial 
regimes, namely the Dutch (1652-1800) and the English (1800-1910), would re-
peatedly use violence and oppressive legislation to dispossess the indigenous 
people. Because both hunter-gathering and pastoralism were intimately linked 
to land, these age-old economies were virtually destroyed.6 
Diffferent worldviews regarding land caused huge conflicts. While the Khois-
an regarded land as a gift from Tsui//Goab / ʹzu:ıʹgwa:b/ (one name for the Su-
preme Being) and not something that could be privately owned by anyone, it 
was simply another commodity for the colonists. A khoeseb /ʹkɔısеb/ (chief) 
could not privately own the tribe’s territory, and only administered it on be-
half of his people – as usufruct. So, signing a treaty with white trek-farmers or 
the colonial government did not mean the right to  ownership. Land is Mother 
Earth. These diffferent approaches frequently led to misunderstandings, wars, 
and loss of land. ‘Western historians in the 1800s unashamedly… justifĳied the 
right of certain nations to conquer, rule and actively transform those “others” 
whom they branded as inferior to themselves’.7 
Certain cultural  rites of passage tied a tribe to a specifĳic territory. With the 
birth of a child, its umbilical cord was buried in the family kraal, and his or 
her funeral was undertaken near that spot. Ongoing rituals at ancestral graves 
further strengthened the spiritual attachment to specifĳic territories. Moreover, 
Khoisan Africans had acquired a green cosmology that was geared toward the 
enhancement of harmony between all living beings. They had lived in close 
proximity to nature – with the Creator as Giver of rain, health and abundance. 
The colonial invasion had severed that sacred link. It was therefore much more 
than loss of territories and subsistence. Devastating smallpox epidemics broke 
out in 1713 at the Cape added to the depletion of Khoisan people. It lingered on 
for years and many more died when some fled to the rural areas, unknowingly 
taking the virus with them.8 As can be seen on the chart, Khoisan communities 
had lived all across the land. (See map).9




9 H.C. Bredekamp and O. van den Berg (eds), A New History Atlas for South Africa (Edward 
Arnold Publishers 1986).
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In the meantime the  Bushmen/San were hunted down during the 1700s on a 
scale that constituted genocide. Colonial land-grabbing led to violent clashes 
fĳirst with the Obiqua /ʹƱbıkwa:/ San of the Boland and continued for the next 
100 years. So, for instance, the entire Bushmen population of Sneeuberg (Snow 
Mountain) was wiped out by so-called commandos under the auspices of the 
Dutch East India Company. The sad thing is that colonists and trek-farmers 
increasingly forced their Hottentot/Khoikhoi servants to fĳill the ranks of those 
commandos. What is even worse is that the white Dutch Reformed Church 
still had a long debate in 1913: ‘Is the Bushman an animal or a human being?’10
While we cannot assume that relations between the Khoikhoi herders and 
 Bushmen/San hunters in the pre-colonial era were always harmonious, there 
was at least a relatively stable situation of co-existence based on mutually 
acknowledged territories. The continuing, violent land-dispossession left the 
herders with much less grazing land and the hunters with virtually no hunt-
ing grounds. This led to unnecessary friction and even bloodshed between 
indigenous factions who had built an age-old mutual understanding regard-
ing territories. In short, the diffferent attitudes between the indigenous people 
and colonists toward land were culturally grounded in diffferent perceptions 
formed by African communalism and European individualism. The latter 
10 Boezak, Struggle of an Ancient Faith, 145.
Map 1 Two major Khoikhoi groupings in the 17th an 18th centuries
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eroded African communal values. It created and intensifĳied cultural and racial 
animosities in a land where a premium had been put on the common southern 
African derivation.
In the aftermath of the South African (or Anglo-Boer) War of 1899-1902, 
which was waged essentially over the region’s rich  natural resources such as 
diamonds and gold, the whites negotiated a settlement among themselves – 
which included the Natives Land Act of 1913.
Together with later legislation the Act confĳirmed the right of the white 
conquering minority to  ownership of some 87% of the land on which 
were developed highly productive commercial farms, and confĳined the 
ownership rights of the indigenous black majority to the remaining 13%, 
which became overgrazed, eroded and impoverished. That remained the 
situation until 1994.11
That efffectively meant that South Africa was then regarded as a white country 
with a relatively small portion allocated to Blacks. Khoisan Africans, however, 
were totally left out of the equation. Following the unbanning of the African 
National Congress (among other organizations) and the release of Nelson 
Mandela in 1990, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa began. At these 
CODESA talks by all stakeholders, a path was carved out for a new South Af-
rica. Khoisan leaders were not invited to the round table and even though the 
Paramount Chief of the Griqua /ʹgrıkwa:/ National Conference made his wish 
known to be part of the talks, his request was turned down. The  Restitution 
of Land Rights Act of 1994 focused on redressing land dispossession after 1913. 
Because the Khoisan had been dispossessed long before that cut-offf date, it 
meant a denial of their right to reclaim their heritage. The legislative context 
of all land reform policies in South Africa is its Constitution.12 Since its prom-
ulgation leaders from the aboriginal nation have protested and made appeals 
to have it amended.
Ancestral land was then restored to some communities. For instance, in 1972 
the  Apartheid regime had forcefully removed the ǂKhomani /ʹkᵿmɑnı/ San 
from a park in the Northern Cape. With the assistance of WIMSA (Workgroup 
of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa) and SASI (South African San In-
stitute), they lodged a claim with the new government and six farms outside 
11 M. Engelbrecht, ‘Racially motivated land dispossession in Gordonia’, unpublished paper 
(Kimberley 4 April 2013), 1.
12 Act 108 of 1996, especially sections 25, 26, 27 and 36. 
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the park were handed over in 1999 and another 25 000 hectares in 2002.13 In 
similar vein a dispossessed farm of the Griqua National Conference, Ratelgat 
/ʹrɑ:tǝlgɑt/ (guttural g), was given back to them in 1999 – without any costs.
During the past three years special national land summits were organized 
by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. A National Khois-
an Reference Group was established to assist the government formulating a 
policy framework that focuses on restitution, reform, and redistribution. Al-
though the 1913 cut-offf date still stands, land claims by Khoisan communities 
would henceforth be regarded as exceptions. Also included is the possibility to 
have their sacred spaces and cultural places, such as graves, be declared as his-
torical landmarks and heritage sites. The map included in this chapter clearly 
shows that the Khoisan had inhabited the entire South African surface. Today, 
however, they are citizens of a modern-day Republic under the jurisdiction of 
the Constitution. Realpolitik, therefore, dictates that – as responsible South 
Africans who respect the Constitution – the following factors should be seri-
ously considered. 
– Realism: It must be remembered that history, although it may be unfair and 
cruel, cannot be changed or ignored. Even though there is sufffĳicient histori-
cal and scientifĳic evidence to show that they are southern Africa’s aborigi-
nal people, they cannot wish away the fact that  colonialism happened. The 
clock cannot be turned thousands of years back when their ancestors were 
the only human beings in this region. 
– Reasonableness: Reliable maps along with rock art sites also afffĳirm where 
the diffferent tribes had lived. However, reasonableness means that they 
cannot reconstruct a land or provinces in which only Khoisan people exist 
or rule. When they claim land they will have to be reasonable. E.g. it will 
not be reasonable for the Griqua to reclaim the whole Griqualand West and 
East, although solid documentation is available that they had ruled there in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. 
– Responsibility: Today the issue is not simply a matter of ‘giving back the 
land’. It is a complex socio-political and macro-economic issue that has to 
do with national matters like food security.14 
13 N. Crawhall and R. Chennels, The ǂKhomani San: From Footnotes to Footprints – the History 
of the their Land Claim, booklet (Trans Orange Press, undated), 3.
14 W. Boezak, ‘A Historical View of the Khoisan’, at a meeting of the South African Depart-
ment of Rural Development and Land Reform (unpublished paper, Johannesburg March 
2015).
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Coupled with this is the correct interpretation of  ILO Convention 169. Its pre-
amble recognizes the aspiration of indigenous peoples to exercise control over 
their own institutions, way of life, economic development and to maintain and 
develop their own identities, languages and  religion within the framework of 
the states in which they live.15 That the South African state has not as yet rati-
fĳied  ILO 169 is indicative of its reluctance to grant the Khoisan their rightful 
place within the country’s cultural  landscape. Perhaps it is fear of the implica-
tions of  self-determination. However, the Khoisan have never indicated that 
their right to self-determination would lead to land-grabbing or a ‘state within 
a state’.
Another vexed question is how colonial churches can practice restorative 
justice, such as the white Dutch Reformed Church that now possesses large 
tracts of land, which belonged to the Khoisan’s ancestors. The same question 
arises with respect to missionary churches, like the Moravians, who also have 
huge pieces of ill-gained land. Land reform, restitution, and redistribution will 
not be complete without taking this into account.
In conclusion: the very fĳirst thing the Khoisan had been dispossessed of by 
colonialists was land. Wars of resistance proved futile, exacerbated by ongo-
ing foreign diseases. The Khoisan regard land as Mother Earth, the God-given 
space where they have practised their culture for millennia. It is inextricably 
linked to their heritage in all its forms and without it the aboriginal people 
will not be able to reclaim their rightful place and dignity. However, as citi-
zens honouring the country’s Constitution, their land reform plans should be 
realistic, reasonable, and responsible. The South African government, on the 
other hand, needs to ratify ILO Convention 169, granting the Khoisan’s right to 
self-determination.
First Indigenous Nation 
African-American philosopher, Cornel West, has coined the phrase: ‘the nor-
mative gaze’. Via pseudo-sciences like phrenology and physiognomy the foun-
dation for the Eurocentric principle of negative comparison had been laid in 
the sixteenth century.16 Kieskamp says that a ‘Chain of Life’ was designed: God 
at the top, then human beings, and animals. On various lists of humans the 
15 International Labour Organisation Convention (No 169) concerning Indigenous and Trib-
al Peoples in independent countries, 1989.
16 C. West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity (Beacon Press 
1982), 57.
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Khoisan were put on the lowest rung of human existence, nearer to apes and 
without a soul. The Eurocentric principle meant that when compared to Euro-
peans, the Khoisan seemed to have missed every standard that indicated the 
existence of what was regarded as civilization: a king, jurisdiction, laws, script, 
arts, agriculture, money, marriage and  religion. 
These prejudices were augmented by fear of the unknown especially after 
hearing stories of shipwrecked people meeting hostile savages – accompanied 
by illustrations and ethnological descriptions. Jan van Riebeeck, mandated by 
the Dutch East India Company to establish a refreshment post at the Cape in 
1652, did not, therefore, arrive with an objective mind. He was indeed already 
fĳilled with the ideas of white supremacy.17
Moreover, Christian ideologues misappropriated the Biblical story of Noah 
who had cursed his son, Ham: that his descendants – supposedly Africans – 
would be ‘the lowest of slaves to his brothers’. Together these ideas provided 
the moral justifĳication for the vicious enslavement of those with a dark skin 
– a colour theologically associated with Satan and sin, morally with evil and 
aesthetically with ugliness. No wonder then that over time advancing colonists 
had murdered numerous ‘soulless Bushmen’ without a qualm.18 But who are 
the Khoisan really and what is the nature of their cultural identity? 
Recent linguistic and biological tests have proven beyond a doubt that the 
fĳirst modern human beings (homo sapiens) evolved on the African continent – 
the cradle of humanity.
Oldest DNA
In a newspaper article Elsabé Brits quotes Drs Peter Foster and Matsumura of 
the University of Cambridge who stated that the Khoikhoin and  Bushmen/San, 
all originally being hunter-gatherers, stem from the same genetic stock. On the 
basis of extensive tests it was found that the Khoisan people of southern Africa 
possess ‘the oldest DNA’, i.e. human genes, on earth.19 Renowned South African 
geneticist Himla Soodyall agrees with her peers and she is doing ongoing tests 
in Khoisan communities today. Archaeological evidence points in the same 
direction. Philip Tobias states that remains of modern human civilization at 
Klasies /ʹklɑ:sıs/ River Mouth Cave, more than 100,000 years old, led to the con-
17 J. Kieskamp, in A. Bank (ed), The Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage, IHR, Univ. of 
the Western Cape infoSOURCE (Cape Town 1998), 163-70.
18 W. Boezak, Struggle of an Ancient Faith, 40-42.
19 E. Brits, ‘Oudste DNS – Khoisan’ in Die Burger, 18 March 2006.
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clusion that the ancestors of the Khoisan of South Africa are part of the same, 
large division of Sub-Saharan peoples. Archaeologists Hilary and Jeanette Dea-
con emphasize: ‘Biological tests… strengthen the view that the Khoikhoin and 
San shared the same ancient southern African genetic heritage’.20 
Khoikhoin means ‘genuine people’ (singular: a people person) and Sa means 
‘to gather’, while the plural (with –n) means ‘gatherers’ (of veldkos /ʹfeltkɔs/ i.e. 
wild edible plants). The names Hottentotten (Hottentots) and Bosjesmannen 
(Bushmen) were given to them by the Dutch – both neutral, descriptive des-
ignations at the time. Since then ‘Hottentots’ has been reduced to an insult: 
‘hotnots’, a term rightly regarded today as hate-speech.
Alan Barnard’s ethnographic approach indicates a nomadic movement 
within southern Africa: ‘At least some of the ancestors of the Khoi Bushmen 
migrated from or through what is now Zimbabwe or eastern Botswana… After 
the Khoi Bushmen divergence, the ancestors of the Khoikhoi moved slowly 
southwards’.21 (See map). 
20 H. and J. Deacon (eds), Human Beginnings in South Africa (David Philip 1999), 171.
21 A. Barnard, Hunters and Herders of Southern Africa: A Comparative Ethnography of the 
Khoisan Peoples (Cambridge University Press 1992), 34-35. 
Map 2 Nomadic movement within southern Africa
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However, when the German anthropologist Leonard Schultze coined the amal-
gam Koїsan in 1928, he did it on the basis of their common southern African 
derivation. The two names indicate a division that came about 2 000 years ago 
when herding had been introduced as an optional, economic lifestyle. The 
amalgam ‘Khoisan’ indicates an actual process of intermingling, intermarriage, 
acculturation and assimilation which occurred over centuries. Some historians 
have reasoned for many years that the Khoisan were originally from East Africa 
Contrary to these migrationist views historian Yvette Abrahams boldly states: 
There is simply no evidence to make a systematic distinction between 
who hunted and gathered for a living, and people who also herded cattle, 
sheep and goats. We all hunted and gathered, even if we kept livestock. 
We all shared a set of values, arts and culture. There is absolutely no evi-
dence that our people came from anywhere else. Cows did, not people, 
after all, we had bartered and traded for centuries.22
Hilary and Jeanette Deacon, conclude: ‘We can confĳidently state that the an-
cestors of the Khoikhoin and the San were an indigenous population that orig-
inated and diversifĳied within southern Africa’.23 Isaac Schapera concurs that 
the Khoikhoin and the  Bushmen/San share the same origin by highlighting the 
similarities of their belief systems.24 
This scientifĳic evidence accumulatively plays a crucial role when the Khois-
an claim they are in fact South Africa’s aboriginal people. Despite this the 
South African government thus far has not shown any political will to grant 
the status of ‘fĳirst nation’ to them. The right to  self-identifĳication thus has been 
met with historical distortion and offfĳicial denialism. After the abolishment of 
slavery in 1834-38, the free slaves and the Khoisan were all lumped together as 
the new working classes and jointly called ‘people of colour’. Since 1948 the 
 Apartheid regime continued to reclassify the majority of Khoisan people as 
‘Cape Coloured’ and used their Group Areas Act of 1950 to forcefully remove 
them from their remaining ancestral land.25
Professor Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Special Rapporteur on the Fundamen-
tal Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, visited South Africa in 2005. He took note 
of the fact that the Khoisan’s identity was forcefully changed under the old 
22 Y. Abrahams, ‘Bill makes all groups indigenous’ in Eland (4-17 April 2013), 14.
23 Deacon and Deacon, Human Beginnings in South Africa, 129, 171.
24 I. Schapera, The Khoisan Peoples: Bushmen and Hottentots (Routledge & Keegan Paul 
1965), 360-76.
25 SA Race Classifĳication Act of 1950.
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race classifĳication laws, and recommended that ‘actions should be undertaken 
towards the removal of all legitimate claimants to indigenous identity of the 
stigma to having been classifĳied as “Coloured”’.26 To be sure, the individual 
rights of all South Africans, including the Khoisan’s, are guaranteed in the Con-
stitution.27 But what about their collective rights?
Since the advent of South Africa’s new, democratic dispensation in 1994, the 
Khoisan people have incessantly yet unsuccessfully tried to convince the gov-
ernment of their status as the country’s fĳirst indigenous nation. That fact does 
not imply a dominant position in the wider society. They also do not accept the 
assumption that because all Africans are indigenous, no grouping can claim to 
be South Africa’s aboriginal people. The ILO’s controversial resolution pertain-
ing to  self-determination should not be seen as a threat.
The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities 
for the process of development as it afffects their lives, beliefs, institutions 
and spiritual wellbeing and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and 
to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, so-
cial and cultural development.28 
Rather, with the right to self-defĳinition and  self-identifĳication as its pillars, self- 
determination has essentially to do with steering their own cultural destiny. 
Article 11 (1) of the  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and 
develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, 
such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, 
technologies and visual and performing arts and literature.
The Khoisan accept the argument that in South Africa, as in other African coun-
tries, all Africans are indigenous because they are ‘non-dominant’, original in-
habitants – hence culturally diffferent from white colonists. However, they are 
not simply Africans in the broader, generic sense of the word, but specifĳically 
the autochthonous population of southern Africa. This internal diffferentiation 
is signifĳicant – an issue that should be urgently dealt with by the country’s De-
26 R. Stavenhagen, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Mission to 
South Africa, 2005.
27 Act 108 of 1996, Articles 30, 31.
28 ILO 169, Article 7 (1).
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partment of Justice.29 Yet, in an offfĳicial brochure the symbolism of the national 
coat of arms is explained as follows: ‘Contained within the shield are some of 
the earliest representations of humanity in the world. Those depicted were the 
very fĳirst inhabitants of the land, namely the Khoisan people’.30 
In conclusion: Overwhelming scientifĳic evidence has proven the Khoisan’s 
special identity as South Africa’s fĳirst indigenous nation. It links them inextri-
cably to their cultural heritage. The government’s continuing denialism and 
refusal to grant them their inherited status, constitutes a serious violation of 
human rights.
Participation in the Protection of Their Cultural Heritage
Besides land loss during the colonial eras, the Khoisan’s ancient leadership 
structures had been destroyed. Loss of control over their cultural heritage not 
only meant loss of face, but in fact constituted ethnocide. In light of this his-
tory of systematic dispossession, the question remains: If cultural heritage is 
essentially inheritance, what is left to promote, preserve, and develop? It is 
here that the unique story of the Griqua comes to the fore. Of all fĳive major 
groupings it is the only one that has consistently managed to keep their iden-
tity and culture intact in an organized fashion.31 
To be sure, cultural remnants had been kept alive in and by all communities, 
whether it was the Khoi reel dance on isolated farms or the Nama-language 
spoken by elders. The ≠Khomani-San deserves special mention though. Hav-
ing had to endure unspeakable hardship, a strong leader, !Gam /Gaub Regop-
staan Kruiper /ʹgam gaᵿb regɔpstɑ:n krǝᵿpǝr/ began to ensure their future dur-
ing the last century. He eventually found refuge in the 1980s for his clan on a 
tourism farm.32 Further momentum among Khoisan groups was gained in the 
late 1990s – a revival that was assisted by academics, notably historian H.C. 
Bredekamp and archaeologist Janette Deacon. But it was the Griqua who, with 
29 P.L. Waldman, The Griqua Conundrum: Political and socio-cultural Identity in the Northern 
Cape, South Africa, PhD Thesis, Univ of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (2001), fn 8.
30 South African Dept of Arts & Culture’s booklet, The National Identity Passport (under-
lined, undated), 6.
31 A. Morris, ‘The Griqua and the Khoikhoi’ in Kronos, Journal of Cape History (No 24, Nov 
1997) 112. ‘The 1980 census fĳigures indicate that the category “Griqua” includes nearly 
100 000 people’.
32 N. Crawhall and R. Chennels, The #Khomani-San: From Footnotes to Footprints (Trans Or-
ange Publishers undated), 2.
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unbroken leadership structures, were able to survive and adapt throughout the 
colonial and post-colonial  Apartheid /aʹpartheıd/ eras in an organized form. 
Literally thousands of pages have been written on their extraordinary his-
tory.33 In a nutshell: Around 1750 a free slave, named Adam Kok, had gathered 
the rest of the dispossessed ≠Karixuriqua /karıʹgᵿrikwa:/ (Griqua) on the West 
Coast along with people of mixed descent, married a Khoisan woman and had 
built a strong following through his sons. Under their and other Griqua leaders’ 
guidance two huge territories were demarcated (Griqualand West and Griqua-
land East) but later annexed by the British Colonial government. The chieftain-
cy was eventually taken over during the late 1800s by Andrew le Fleur I, who 
then established the Griqua National Conference in 1904. Today their culture 
is preserved via various structures including an independent church. A recent 
study by the University of the Free State has shown: ‘The Griqua are evidently 
aware of their very specifĳic cultural traditions and rituals’.34 
As mentioned earlier, when the Griqua National Conference (GNC) was 
refused  participation at the CODESA, they made submissions in 1995 at the 
UN’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations. The outcome was that the 
late President Mandela started direct talks with them, which eventually led 
to the establishment of the National Khoisan Council in 1999 – an offfĳicial 
forum mandated to negotiate with government regarding constitutional ac-
commodation. The same year researchers were commissioned to draw up a 
Status Quo report concerning the Khoisan’s historical leadership structures. 
Five major groupings were identifĳied:  Bushmen/San, Cape Khoi, Griqua, Ko-
rana, and Nama. In 2001 about 600 delegates of these self-identifying groups 
in terms of the United Nations characteristics, gathered for the fĳirst time in a 
town called Oudtshoorn. The theme of the consultative conference was: ≠gui 
!nâgusib guisib !nâ /ʹgᵿı ʹnagᵿsıb ʹgᵿısıb ʹna/ (with clicks) – Diversity in Unity.35 
It was indicative of their acknowledgement that although there were cultural 
diffferences, they wanted to revitalize their traditions and customs as a united 
people. 
Khoisan Africans felt left behind when already in 2003 Parliament passed the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act No. 41 (for Black South 
33 The most comprehensive academic work: Michael Besten, Transformation and Recon-
struction of Khoe-San Identities: AAS le Fleur I, Griqua Identities and Post-Apartheid Khoe-
San Revivalism (1894-2004), unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden University, 2005.
34 University of the Free State, A Socio-economic & Cultural Study of the Griqua People of 
South Africa (Centre for Development Support 2010), 14.
35 National Khoisan Consultative Conference (Institute for Historical Research, University 
of the Western Cape, archived document (Bellville 2001).
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Africans). The Constitution’s Chapter 12 has been implemented which provides 
for the recognition of traditional leadership, according to  customary law. Since 
then a new legislative framework has been issued to accommodate the Khoisan 
alongside recognized traditional leaders. The latest version is the National Tra-
ditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill, expected to be promulgated by Parlia-
ment in 2016. The SA government’s willingness to let them participate in exist-
ing structures beside traditional communities, is a step in the right direction. 
Those communities and their leaders that would be recognized, will serve 
with already recognized traditional leaders in national, provincial, and local 
Houses. Moreover, recognized Khoisan councils will receive support to pre-
serve, promote and develop their cultural heritage. In a real sense that will 
mean opportunities for all cultural groupings in terms of state funding. 
However, while it is expected that certain standards should be maintained, 
applicants will be subjected to some unreasonable criteria that do not take their 
historical  fragmentation into consideration. For instance, a community must 
have ‘a history of  self-identifĳication by members of the community concerned, 
as belonging to a unique community distinct from all other communities’ and 
‘a proven history of coherent existence from a particular point in time up to 
the present’.36 These stipulations ignore harsh historical realities, such as the 
removal of whole communities under apartheid via the Group Areas Act. What 
is therefore needed, human rights lawyer Lesle Jansen argues, is an approach 
that will restore the human dignity of the Khoisan with restorative justice. Such 
an approach will fully take the cultural vulnerability of Khoisan Africans into 
consideration, allowing them sufffĳicient time to rebuild their heritage. 
A restorative approach is necessary to address the root causes of Khoi-
San vulnerability; the classifĳication of being labelled Coloured, denoting 
them being neither European nor Black made them to be politically in-
visible. A history of self-identifĳication may be difffĳicult to prove. Groups 
may no longer occupy a specifĳic area and may have been forced to stop 
observing certain Khoi-San customary laws and practices.37 
At a recent seminar on cultural heritage organized by the Expert Mechanism 
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ( EMRIP) Juha Karhu posed a challenging 
question: ‘When states do accommodate indigenous peoples constitutionally, 
36 The National Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill 2015, Ch 2, Part 1, Articles 5 (1) (a) 
and (v).
37 Lesle Jansen, Power Point Presentation, Report back on York University/Natural Justice Re-
port, Natural Justice, Cape Town (2014), Slide 10.
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are they then empowered or domesticated?’38 Thus, would offfĳicial recognition 
of some Khoisan leaders and their communities come at too high a price? Will 
they be empowered or domesticated? After closer scrutiny it seems that Khois-
an and traditional leaders will not be of equal rank. The Act will also exclude 
any recognition as fĳirst indigenous nation.
In conclusion: Since the inception of the offfĳicial National Khoisan Council 
in 1999 strides have been made regarding legislation that would constitution-
ally accommodate the Khoisan. The relevant Act to recognize Khoisan leaders 
and their communities is expected to be promulgated by the SA Parliament in 
2016. Recognition will enable the Khoisan to promote, preserve and develop 
their cultural heritage with state funding and to make use of the state’s in-
frastructure. However, while willing to participate in the protection of their 
cultural heritage at this level, certain criteria will unfairly exclude most com-
munities because of historical factors beyond their control. 
Languages
Before the dawn of South Africa’s democracy in 1994 only two languages en-
joyed offfĳicial status, namely Afrikaans /ɑfrıʹkɑ:ns/ (stemming from the Dutch 
colonial era, 1657-ca. 1800) and English (from the British colonial era, 1800-
1910). South Africa is a complex, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic society but its 
Constitution ensures that: ‘Everyone has the right to receive education in the 
offfĳicial language or languages of their choice in public institutions…’39 Imple-
mentation, however, proved to be so challenging that new legislation has been 
deemed necessary: ‘All learners have the constitutional right to be educated in 
their mother-tongue’.40 
Not a single aboriginal Khoisan language is included in the list of 11 offfĳicial 
languages. And yet, to be fair, in Chapter One of the Constitution it is stated 
that a special language board would also ‘promote the Khoi, Nama and San lan-
guages’, which it does.41 This vehicle is called the Pan South African Language 
Board (PanSALB). An additional council for the advancement of Khoisan lan-
guages has been established because most of those had become extinct, e.g. the 
38 UN EMRIP Seminar on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
with Respect to their Cultural Heritage, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland, 26-27 
Feb 2015. My paraphrase.
39 Act 108 of 1996, Sect 29/2. 
40 South African Offfĳicial Languages Act 12 of 2012.
41 Sect 6/5.
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Griqua’s Xiri /ʹgırı/ (guttural g), the Bushmen’s /Xam /ʹɑm/ (with click) and Ko-
rana. The only Khoisan language that is still being spoken, written and taught 
in some schools, is Namagowab /ʹnɑmɑgᵿǝʹvɑb/. The Bushman language, N/u 
/ʹnᵿ/ (with click), is slowly but surely being rekindled and preserved.42
Historians Richard Elphick and V.C. Malherbe observe that the Nama Khoi-
language is closely related to a specifĳic group of (Bushman/San) ‘hunter lan-
guages’.43 However, linguist Nigel Crawhall cautions that within the Khoisan 
language stock there are three radically diffferent language families, namely, 
Khoe, Ju /ʹdʒᵿ/ and !Ui-Taa /ʹᵿıtɑ:/ (with click).44 At a practical level this means 
that frequently members from diffferent groups could not even understand one 
another. The fact of diversity, however, does not negate the fundamental and 
original unity of the Khoisan.
Here is a peculiar fact that has been brought to light: Afrikaans is actually 
part of the Khoisan’s cultural heritage. Although historians, such as Robert Ross, 
have alluded to that connection in the 1980s, it was only recently endorsed by 
thorough research commissioned by the Afrikaanse Taalraad /ʹtɑ:lrɑ:d/ (Afri-
kaans Language Board).45 The foundation for Afrikaans had already been laid 
in the late 1500s when the Khoisan coastal communities had tried to commu-
nicate with passing European seafarers on their way to the East. It developed 
rapidly when the Dutch established their fort at the Cape and imported slaves 
from Angola, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. 
Diversity and the geographical dispersal of the rural slave population in-
hibited a unifying culture. Some slaves used a form of creolized Portuguese, 
but most slaves, masters and Khoisan conversed in an evolving form of Dutch, 
which contributed to the development of Afrikaans. At fĳirst this new language 
was ridiculed as a ‘Hottentot’ and a ‘kitchen’, slave language. In 1875 a white 
Afrikaner movement, the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners /gǝʹnᵿǝtskɑp ʹfɑn 
ʹregtǝ ɑfrıʹkɑ:nǝrs/ (guttural g’s – Society of Real Afrikaners) started to gather 
all the various strains and standardized them. This society never acknowl-
edged the coastal Khoisan’s creativeness, and annexed it wholly as part of their 
culture. Because Afrikaans was the  Apartheid regime’s preferred language, it 
gained the negative connotation of being the ‘language of the oppressor’. 
42 PanSALB CD, The n/u Language Project (Lingo Software 2006).
43 R. Elphick and V. Malherbe, ‘The Khoisan to c 1770’ in R. Elphick and H Giliomee (eds), The 
Shaping of South Africa: 1652-1820 (Longman Penguin 1989) 4-7. 
44 N. Crawhall, ‘Languages, genetics and archaeology’ in H. Soodyall (ed), The Prehistory of 
South Africa (Jonathan Ball Publishers 2006) 109-24.
45 R. Ross, Cape of Torments (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983), 2; C. van Rensburg, So kry ons 
Afrikaans (Lapa Uitgewers 2012), 13-28.
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In conclusion: The diffferent aboriginal languages of the Khoisan have be-
come extinct, except for the Khoikhoi’s Namagowab and the Bushmen’s N/u. 
The former is being taught with state funding at schools in those parts of the 
country where Nama people reside. The latter is being preserved in less formal 
ways, but a CD was released by PanSALB. Lastly, Afrikaans, despite its connota-
tion, is part of the Khoisan’s cultural heritage – its offfĳicial status a proud beacon. 
In the meantime it is interesting to note that rock art (petroglyphic) is actu-
ally their earliest form of sacred texts.
Ancient Religion
Rock art sites are clear indicators that the Khoisan had lived everywhere in 
South Africa – undeniably an integral part of the Khoisan’s cultural heritage. 
Correct interpretations of these texts reveal ancient religious customs in which 
the  healing of the sick and rainmaking rituals by shamans played a crucial 
role.46 It is heartening that today there are still shamans among the ǂKhomani 
San of the Kalahari practising these ancient rituals. 
The Khoisan’s ancient religion needs redress. Irrespective of the fact that 
rock art sites were out of their reach, the damage done by Christian missionar-
ies since the 18th century is incalculable. For them the aboriginal inhabitants 
were godless heathen – spiritually empty vessels in whom the true  religion had 
to be instilled. By then the Khoisan had been rendered landless and virtually 
powerless. In those circumstances mission-stations became safe havens, secur-
ing a fĳixed address instead of them being harassed as vagrants or turned into 
slaves on the white trek-farmers’ farms. 
The plusses were that the missionaries taught them to read and write and 
the advantages of agriculture. Liberal missionaries, such as Dr Johannes van der 
Kemp and Dr John Philip, fought for the Khoisan’s human rights. New laws were 
made to improve their lot. Ordinance 50 of 1828 did away with the humiliating 
carrying of passes and granted land rights. Yet even they remained in the Chris-
tian Western Civilization mold. Baptism meant loss of identity and survival on 
mission-stations meant forgoing their own cultural practices, traditions, cus-
tomary laws and indigenous faith. W.M. Freund poignantly remarks: ‘Christiani-
zation went hand in hand with the destruction of the older Khoikhoi culture’.47
46 S. Ouzman, ‘The Magical Arts of a Raider Nation’ in South African Archaeological Society 
(Goodwin Series, vol 9, Dec 2009) 101-12; Boezak, Struggle of an Ancient Faith, 49-58.
47 W.M. Freund, ‘The Cape under the transitional governments, 1795-1814’ in Elphick and 
Giliomee (n. 5) 342.
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Today the vast majority of Khoisan people are Christians, but two major 
groups tried to retain some elements of their original faith by establishing own 
churches, namely, the Nama Qua Church and the Griqua Independent Church 
(GIC). In the former they read from a Namagowab bible and the older folk 
still pray in that language. After services they would easily dance the tradi-
tional Nama-step. Hundreds of GIC-members gather every year on 31 Decem-
ber, singing and praying till the early hours of the New Year, while a sheep is 
slaughtered. This is a link to an ancient, religious Khoikhoi custom, called the 
ǂguri-ab /ʹgᵿrı-ɑb/ (with click) – an annual thanksgiving ceremony.48
As stated earlier, in 2001 the fĳirst National Khoisan Consultative Conference 
(NKCC) was held. I was asked to present a paper on ‘Khoisan Faith’, in which I 
explained the holistic approach with  religion and culture inextricably woven. 
Their lifestyle was fĳilled with values pertaining to the heavenly realm, Mother 
Earth, fellow human beings and every living entity. The challenge is how the 
ancient faith could be revitalized, and three options were posed to the confer-
ees. They voted for the third option.
1) Had the time arrived for them to establish their own separate Christian 
Church where all the tenets and elements of their ancient belief system 
can be incorporated?
2) The Nama Qua Church and Griqua Independent Church already exist: 
Should they instead take up this challenge?
3) Mainline churches’ Khoisan-members should challenge their clergy to 
include Khoisan symbolism in existing liturgies and sacraments – i.e. in-
corporation or inculturation.49 
The Khoi ritual of breaking and sharing an askoek /ʹɑskᵿk/ (ash loaf) with 
everyone present, even strangers, serves as an example of the African value of 
incorporation. The ritual is based on an attitude of life: khoi-/namxa-sîb /ʹkɔı 
nɑmgɑ sıb/ (with guttural g) – neighbourly love. A missionary working in the 
northern region of South Africa during the 19th century conceded that it was 
precisely this communal trait which was exploited by foreigners, who really 
were immoral land robbers.50 Exclusivity has never been a facet of African phi-
losophy. Gabriel Setiloane argues that the colonists had misused the ancient 
African tradition of sharing and kindness. He states that: 
48 Scapera, 376; Cf W Hoernlé, The Social Organisation of the Nama – and other Essays (Wit-
watersrand University Press 1985), 32-34, 55.
49 W. Boezak, ‘Khoisan Faith’, NKCC (n 34), 10.
50 G. Meyer, Die Gemeente te Steinkopf (Pro Ecclesia 1927) 23, 45.
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Africa fell a prey to the wiles and greed of the European interloper com-
ing in all disguises – a wandering shipwrecked traveller, explorer, teacher, 
missionary… However, the resolution: ‘This land belongs to us’ (lomhla-
ba ongowethu ɵlɔmʹɵlɑ:bɑ ɔŋgᵿwetᵿ/), does not necessarily foreclose or 
shut out any other consideration borne out of the generosity of hearts 
begotten and nurtured in Botho-Ubuntu-Ubuntungushi /ʹbɔ:tɔ ᵿʹbᵿntᵿ 
ᵿʹbᵿntᵿʹgᵿʃı/ (the value of incorporation).51
Currently I try to educate the broader South African public regarding the abo-
riginal faith and culture of the Khoisan with a series called The Umbilical Cord 
Lectures. Khoisan communities themselves, such as the Outeniqua of George, 
hold Full Moon prayer sessions augmented by reel dancing and story-telling. 
At the same time the South African Human Rights Commission is conducting 
hearings chaired by Commissioner Danny Titus, assessing their concerns.52 Al-
though the outcome is not known yet, a submission was made regarding fĳirst-
ly, the possibility that the Khoisan’s faith be included in school curriculums 
(Comparison Religion) and secondly, the South African Council of Churches 
to review their church history and catechism books. 
In conclusion: Although the majority of Khoisan people today are devout 
Christians, many seem to long for earlier times when they could still freely 
practise their ancient  religion. Successive eras, especially the advent of mis-
sionary Christendom, efffectively destroyed that. Various avenues are being 
sought today to revitalize at least some aspects. The two independent Chris-
tian-Khoisan churches have also managed to retain some ancient rituals.
The National Khoisan Heritage Route 
South Africa has a range of state and private institutions geared toward the 
preservation of culture – governed by relevant legislation. Besides a Depart-
ment for Arts and Culture (with Freedom Park and the National Heritage 
Council under its auspices), the Commission for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities has been 
51 G. Setiloane, ‘Land in the Negotiations Chamber’ in Journal of Black Theology in South 
Africa (vol. 5 no. 2, 1991) 37; Cf W. Boezak, God’s Wrathful Children: Political Oppression & 
Christian Ethics (Wm Eerdmans 1995) 228-29.
52 The SAHRC is a so-called Ch 9 institution, its functions described in the Constitution. It 
has the powers ‘to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been 
violated (Article 184, 2b).
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established in 2003 (CRLC) – a constitutional body.53 Legislation such as the 
National Environmental Management Act (NEMA), the National Heritage Re-
sources Act (NHRA) and the Intellectual Property Amendment Act collectively 
strengthen the reserve of communities to revitalize their cultural heritage.54 
A promising sign of a joint venture between the Khoisan and the South Afri-
can government which will link the numerous aboriginal sacred spaces and his-
torical landmarks, is the planned National Khoisan Heritage Route (NKSHR).55 
This idea originated with the Khoisan themselves when about 200 delegates 
met in 2002 at the McGregor Museum, Kimberley. It did not take root because 
of lack of state funding. It is therefore ironic that, ten years later, the govern-
ment relaunched it as their ‘Draft Final Report’. However, the relevant depart-
ment does work together with representatives of the National Khoisan Council.
L. van Rensburg defĳines culturally signifĳicant places quite broadly as 
‘[A]ssociated with living heritage, includes monuments, historical settlements, 
 landscapes and  natural features of cultural signifĳicance, archaeological and 
paleontological sites, graves and burial grounds, movable objects recovered 
from soil and water.’56
Despite the obvious pitfalls pertaining to cultural or heritage tourism, the 
NKSHR provides a possible platform for the Khoisan to showcase their unique 
inheritance. It clearly meets the UN’s standard:
States shall provide redress through efffective mechanisms, which may 
include restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, 
with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property 
taken without their  free, prior and informed consent or in violation of 
their laws, traditions and customs.57
53 Act 108 of 1996, Article 185.
54 Act 107 0f 1998; Act 25 of 1999; Act 28 of 2013.
55 South African Dept of Arts & Culture, The National Khoisan Route (Draft Final Report 2012).
56 L. van Rensburg and L. Kotze, ‘Legislative protection of cultural heritage resources: A 
South African perspective’. Paper presented at the 8th Annual Qualitative Methods Con-
ference: Something for Nothing, May-Sept 2002.
57 UNDRIP, Article 11 (2).
Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Own Legal Orders and 




In the colonization processes all over the world, indigenous peoples’ own gov-
ernance systems and legal orders were formally replaced by legal regimes and 
institutions of the settler societies.1 By the same token,  colonialism has led to a 
demise or at least gradual erosion of indigenous peoples’ own systems for  self-
determination and autonomous governance. Despite the historical and ongo-
ing settler  colonialism, many indigenous peoples have managed to retain de 
facto their own legal orders and institutions of autonomous governance, which 
are grounded on their own customs, traditions and values, even if they are not 
necessarily recognized de jure.2 In recent decades, indigenous peoples’ legal 
orders and laws have started also to gain stronger recognition and protection 
under international law. 
In this chapter, I will examine how the international human rights regime 
has acknowledged and interpreted indigenous peoples’ rights to their own le-
gal orders, governance systems and customary laws with special focus on in-
digenous lands and livelihoods as an integral part of their cultural heritage. By 
examining the  reindeer husbandry as part of Sámi culture, I highlight the im-
portance of indigenous peoples’ own institutions in the successful governance 
of their cultural heritage. I am thus interested in how international instru-
ments have afffĳirmed indigenous peoples’ right to govern their lands and con-
sequently, cultural heritage in accordance with their own laws. In this chapter, 
the concept of cultural heritage is thus understood widely as encompassing 
both  tangible and  intangible aspects. As noted by James Anaya, ‘autonomous 
governance for indigenous communities is considered instrumental to their 
capacities to control the development of their distinctive cultures, including 
their use of lands and resources.’3 Indigenous peoples’ legal orders encompass 
essentially also the set of rules that regulate the land tenure systems, and set 
1 J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd ed. OUP 2004).
2 Ibid. 152-153.
3 Ibid. 152.
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up dispute resolution mechanisms.4 Jeremy Webber even contends that the 
indigenous peoples’ land rights necessarily presuppose the continuation of 
indigenous legal orders and indigenous institutions.5 By this he means that 
‘rights are intrinsically bound up with the legal order they have been defĳined 
and according to which they have been interpreted, adjusted and developed’.6 
By extension, this tends to apply also to indigenous cultural heritage rights as I 
will demonstrate in the course of this chapter.
In this sense, indigenous peoples’ own legal orders and customary laws can 
thus be considered an integral part of their successful  self-determination and 
self-governance over, for instance, their lands and cultural heritage. Customary 
laws refer to both ongoing practices and perceptions about the legal validity of 
such practices.7 Many indigenous and non-indigenous scholars have, however, 
avoided using the concept of  customary law and preferred instead to use the 
terms indigenous law or indigenous legal orders, which do not cement law as 
something traditional and static as suggested by the prefĳix customary.8 John 
Borrows has resisted the use of  customary law by referring to the fact that in-
digenous peoples’ law consists also of natural, sacred, deliberate and written 
law.9 Keeping this critique in mind, I refer to customary laws when analyzed 
instruments use that wording. 
In legal literature, however, the place of indigenous custom in legal hier-
archy or conflicts of laws is far from clear.10 Those questions remain outside 
the scope of this chapter. It aims instead to demonstrate the problems that 
arise when  customary law systems are ignored altogether in the governance of 
indigenous cultural heritage, such as that of  reindeer husbandry. In the words 
of Brendan Tobin, however, ‘Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination 
would mean little if it did not allow them the freedom to govern their afffairs in 
accordance with their own laws, customs and traditions’.11 Nevertheless, self-
4 Ibid. 152.
5 J. Webber, ‘The Public-Law Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights’, in T. Koivurova 
and N. Bankes (eds.) The Proposed Nordic Sámi Convention. National and International 
Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights (Hart Publishing 2014) 80.
6 Ibid. 83.
7 E. Helander, Samiska rättsuppfattningar (Lapland University Press 2004) 9-10. 
8 J. Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University of Toronto Press 2011); V. Napo-
leon, ‘Thinking about Indigenous Legal Orders’, in R. Provost and C. Sheppard (eds.) The 
Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (Springer 2013) 229.
9 J. Borrows (nr 10) 23.
10 B. Tobin, Indigenous Peoples, Customary Law and Human Rights – Why Living Law Matters 
(Routledge 2014).
11 Ibid. 52.
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determination as such falls outside the scope of the chapter. While there is 
a great deal of research on indigenous peoples’ right to  self-determination,12 
indigenous peoples’ right to their own legal orders in management of their cul-
tural heritage has gained surprisingly little attention by international lawyers 
thus far. This is quite surprising given the centrality of own legal orders and 
laws for indigenous peoples’ self-determination.
In analyzing the protection of indigenous peoples’ legal orders in instru-
ments and case-law, I am focusing on how they become articulated in connec-
tion with rights to lands. This may seem an odd way to approach cultural herit-
age at fĳirst glance, but there are several reasons for this choice. First, cultural 
heritage as such has not gained that much attention in analyzed instruments. 
This is obviously linked with my second point, that is, indigenous peoples’ un-
derstanding of cultural heritage can difffer remarkably from that of western 
cultures. Mattias Åhrén has diffferentiated the notion of land in properterial 
terms and in  cultural rights terms.13 In the former sense, the land is consid-
ered as a material commodity subject to lease and purchase, and falling un-
der the protection of private property. For indigenous peoples land is as much 
a cultural right as it is a material right, laying the foundation for indigenous 
peoples’ cultural heritage, identity and traditional livelihoods. This notion has 
also been the backdrop for the  Inter-American Court of Human Rights land-
mark cases as will be demonstrated later. And third, it is important to note 
that traditional institutions can be also considered an integral part of cultural 
heritage as they maintain cohesion in indigenous communities and transfer 
traditional teachings and knowledge from generation to generation. Therefore, 
I approach cultural heritage as encompassing both indigenous lands and liveli-
hoods. However, I do not contend that indigenous rights should be framed in 
cultural terms only. As Patrick Macklem argues, limiting indigenous diffference 
only to a set of  cultural rights delimits equally important aspects of indigenous 
diffference that merits constitutional protection: sovereignty, land and territo-
12 See e.g. J. Anaya (nr 2); M. Scheinin and P. Aikio, Operationalizing The Right of Indigenous 
Peoples to Self-Determination (Åbo Akademi 2004); M. Scheinin, J. B. Henriksen and M. 
Åhrén, 'Saami People’s Self-Determination', in Gáldu Čála. The Journal of Indigenous Peo-
ples Rights (2007) 3; M. Åhrén, The Saami Dress and Beauty Pageants. Indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination (University of Tromsø 2010); A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and 
United Nations Standards. Self-determination, Culture and Land (Cambridge University 
Press 2007).
13 M. Åhrén (nr 14) 122.
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rial rights, and treaty rights.14 My chapter thus offfers only partial insight into 
the complex issue.
In the fĳirst part, I will analyze how the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 afffĳirm 
indigenous peoples’ right to their own legal orders. Regardless of its non-bind-
ing nature, the Declaration has had serious implications for the development 
of customary international law as well as the jurisprudence of human rights 
monitoring bodies during recent years.15 The emphasis in the analysis is on the 
interconnections between indigenous peoples’ legal orders and land rights be-
cause the land has been seen as a prerequisite for implementing a set of other 
rights, including cultural heritage rights as we will see in my case study. In the 
second part, I will analyze how the  Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
interpreted and applied indigenous peoples’ customary laws and the concept 
of cultural heritage when deciding indigenous peoples’ land claims. After the 
analysis of relevant international instruments and jurisprudence, I will dem-
onstrate how the denial of indigenous peoples’ right to govern their cultural 
heritage in their own legal orders is in violation of rights identifĳied in the pre-
vious section by investigating the case of Sámi  reindeer husbandry in Finland 
and analyzing how non-recognition of the traditional Sámi governance system 
called siida violates the aforementioned rights. The case illuminates the prob-
lems that arises when indigenous peoples are denied the right to govern their 
cultural heritage, reindeer husbandry, in their own institutions according to 
their own customs and laws. Finally, I will argue that the imposition of foreign 
governance systems and laws ultimately undermines Sámi reindeer herders’ 
 self-determination. The aim of the chapter is to illustrate how indigenous peo-
ples’ traditional governance systems are an integral part of securing a set of 
other rights, including rights to cultural heritage and lands. 
14 P. Macklem, Indigenous Diffference and the Constitution of Canada (University of Toronto 
Press 2001) 75.
15 T. Koivurova, ‘Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Regarding Indig-
enous Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects’, in International Journal of Minority and Group 
Rights 18 (2011) 1; M. Åhrén ‘The Provisions on Lands, Territories and Natural Resources in 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indienous Peoples. Introduction’, in C. Charters and 
R. Stavenhagen (eds.) Making the Declaration Work: the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen 2009) 212-213; Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples 2013. Rights of Indigenous Peoples. UN/Doc. A/68/317, para. 64.
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2 Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Own Legal Orders, Governance 
Systems, and Customary Laws under International Law
In analyzing indigenous peoples’ right to their own legal orders, governance 
systems, and customary laws, James Anaya’s distinction between constitutive 
and ongoing aspects of self-determination is helpful in understanding the role 
of indigenous institutions in the protection of their lands and cultural her-
itage.16 The former refers to the constituent moments such as establishment 
of institutions. So, when establishing or modifying institutions they should 
be done in a way that is acceptable to indigenous peoples: ‘Constitutive self-
determination […] requires that such institutions and arrangements in no case 
be imposed upon indigenous peoples.’17 The latter refers to the ongoing as-
pects of the implementation of self-determination: ‘The underlying objective 
of the  self-government norm, is that of allowing indigenous peoples to achieve 
meaningful self-determination through political institutions and consultative 
arrangements that reflect their specifĳic cultural patterns and that permit them 
to be genuinely associated with all decisions afffecting them on an ongoing ba-
sis’.18
Indigenous peoples’ own laws and governance systems thus become crucial 
in both aspects of self-determination. On one hand, they can be classifĳied as a 
substantive right of their own as UNDRIP does. On the other hand, they pro-
vide procedural safeguards in  consultations and juridical proceedings as is evi-
dent in  ILO Convention 169. Meaningful self-determination is to be achieved 
through political institutions that reflect indigenous peoples’ own values, cus-
toms and traditions, as emphasized by James Anaya:
Independently of the extent to which indigenous peoples have retained 
de facto or de jure autonomous institutions from previous eras, they gen-
erally are entitled to develop autonomous governance appropriate to 
their circumstances on grounds instrumental to securing ongoing  self-
determination.19 
16 J. Anaya, ‘Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right under Contemporary Inter-
national Law’, in M. Scheinin and P. Aikio (eds.) Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous 
Peoples to Self-Determination (Åbo Akademi 2000) 3. 




2.1  ILO Convention No 169: Customary Laws as Procedural Rights
International Labor Organization’s Convention 169 concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries was opened for ratifĳication in 
1989. It revised the earlier  ILO Convention 107 (1957), which reflected rather 
assimilationist and integrationist tenets towards indigenous peoples.20 In con-
trast to its predecessor,  ILO Convention 169 respects the distinct cultures and 
ways of life of indigenous peoples and aims for  revitalization of indigenous 
cultures by setting standards especially for the procedural rights.21 It does so, 
however, without reference to the right to cultural heritage as such22 and hav-
ing an emphasis on land rights.
ILO Convention 169 upholds the substantive right of indigenous peoples to 
retain their own customs and institutions.23 A number of articles embody re-
spect towards customary laws and indigenous peoples’ traditional institutions. 
The Convention provides that in applying national laws and regulations to the 
indigenous and tribal peoples, due regard shall be given to their customs or 
customary laws.24 Given its obligatory status as a binding treaty, the states are 
principally obliged to take into account these peoples’ customs and  custom-
ary law systems when both developing and implementing national legislation. 
This pertains obviously to land rights, too, as the Convention requires, that 
states recognize, respect and identify indigenous peoples’ land rights.25
Article 14 lays down requirements for the states to recognize the rights of 
 ownership and  possession of the indigenous peoples over the lands, which 
they have traditionally occupied.26 Respect towards indigenous peoples’ cus-
toms related to land ownership is apparent in Article 17. The article demands 
that the governments shall respect indigenous peoples’ inheritance systems 
related to property and lands.27 Also procedures established by indigenous 
peoples for the transmission of land rights among their members shall be re-
spected.28 This implies that the Convention recognizes that indigenous peo-
ples have developed their own property and inheritance institutions that are 
distinct from European ones. 
20 Ibid. 58.
21 J. Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen publishing 2009) 138;
22 M. Scheinin et al. (nr 14) 59.
23 International Labour Organisation, Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries, 05 September 1991, (ILO Convention 169), art. 8.1.
24 Ibid. art. 8.1.
25 Ibid. art. 14, 15 and 17.
26 Ibid. art. 14.1.
27 Ibid. art. 17.1.
28 Ibid. art. 17.1.
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As noted earlier, Article 8 states that governments shall respect indigenous 
peoples’ customs when applying national laws. Furthermore, Article 14 pro-
vides that governments shall identify those lands traditionally occupied by in-
digenous peoples and establish adequate procedures within the national legal 
system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned. When Article 8 is read 
together with Article 14, it seems evident that these land demarcations and 
land claims shall be decided in accordance with the customs, laws and land 
tenure systems of indigenous peoples.
Article 15 deals with management of  natural resources and provides that 
indigenous peoples’ rights to natural resources situated on the lands they have 
traditionally occupied shall be safeguarded. It also requires that indigenous 
peoples’  participation in the management and conservation of natural re-
sources be safeguarded. This provision, however, does not provide full  owner-
ship over natural resources. However, even in cases where the State retains 
the ownership of natural resources, the Convention requires that states shall 
establish and maintain  consultation procedures in order to assess the efffects of 
the planned activity for their traditional lands.29 As for conducting consulta-
tions, it is required that when applying the provisions of the Convention, the 
states consult the peoples through appropriate procedures and that they take 
place in particular through indigenous peoples’ representative institutions.30 
Given the variety of indigenous peoples’ social organizations and institutions, 
this can be construed to encompass both the formal institutions as well as in-
digenous peoples’ traditional institutions such as the village and tribal coun-
cils, or for instance Sámi siidas. The obligations do not seem to depend on the 
form of organization or the recognition of the state in that sense.
The question that emerges in connection with the abovementioned obliga-
tions is the ranking of customary laws in the system of legal sources. Article 
8 asserts indigenous peoples’ right to uphold their customs and institutions 
as far as “these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defĳined by the 
national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights”.31 The 
article seems to refer to the traditional laws that allow inhuman or degrading 
treatment, justify oppression or violence against children or women, and other 
kinds of actions that amount to pain or sufffering of animals and peoples. 32 The 
Convention remains silent about other situations, such as land use conflicts, 
and instead provides that governments shall establish procedures to resolve 
29 Ibid. art. 15.2.
30 Ibid. art. 6.1 (a).
31 Ibid. art. 8.2.
32 J. Anaya (nr 2) 139.
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conflicts which may arise from integration of  indigenous customs and state 
law.33
In Norway, where  ILO 169 has been ratifĳied, the conflicts between Sámi  cus-
tomary law and Norwegian law highlight the challenges related to the use of 
indigenous law as a source of law.34 After the ratifĳication of ILO 169, the con-
vention was incorporated into the  Finnmark Act and Reindeer Husbandry Act 
and accordingly, the obligation to respect Sámi customs has had consequences 
for the application of law by courts and administrative bodies in Norway.35 The 
ratifĳication of ILO 169 has given Sámi law a formal status in Norwegian law and 
“ customary law should be considered both in the legislative process and in the 
application of the law.”36 This has been evident in the Supreme Court case of 
 Selbu, in which the Court ruled that reindeer herders had acquired pastoral 
rights to the land on the basis of customary use, and in the  Svartskog case, in 
which the Court ruled that local people had acquired property title.37 Apart 
from those cases, the hierarchy between Sámi  customary law and other legal 
sources in Norwegian courts when contradictions arise has not been solved.38
2.2 UNDRIP: Operationalizing Self-Determination through Indigenous 
Peoples’ Own Institutions
As opposed to the ILO Convention 169, the emphasis of the Declaration is on 
the right to  self-determination, but it also contains provisions dealing with a 
wide spectrum of issues relevant for indigenous peoples. Due to its more re-
cent origin, UNDRIP has more focus on indigenous peoples’ right to own insti-
tutions and legal orders when compared to ILO Convention 169. In doing so, 
the Declaration purports to realize one of its main objects, that is, indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination. Instead of using the term  customary law as 
such, the Declaration refers to indigenous peoples’ “customs, laws, traditions 
and land tenure systems”.39 As in ILO Convention 169, the right to customary 
laws or judicial systems is not absolute. Indigenous peoples have the right to 
maintain their customs in accordance with international human rights stand-
33 ILO Convention 169, art. 8.2.
34 Ø. Ravna,The Legal Protection of the Rights and Culture of Indigenous Sámi People in 
Norway’, in Journal of Siberian Federal University 11 (2013) 6, 1587.
35 Ø. Ravna, ‘Sámi Legal Culture – and its place in Norwegian law’, in J. Ø. Sunde and K. E. 
Skodvin (eds.) Rendezvous of European Legal Cultures (Fakbokforlaget 2010) 149.
36 Ø. Ravna (nr 38) 1586.
37 Ibid. 1582.
38 Ibid. 1588.
39 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) A/RES/61/295, 
arts. 26, 27 and 34; cf. B. Tobin (nr 12) 53.
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ards.40 The practices and customs that are incompatible with international hu-
man rights standards are apparently beyond the scope of the protection. What 
these standards are, remains unspecifĳied, yet it seems apparent that at least 
customs and traditions that discriminate against women or amount to inhu-
man treatment cannot be justifĳied in any case.
The Declaration recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to preserve their 
legal institutions. Article 5 states that “Indigenous peoples have the right to 
maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and 
cultural institutions” without being excluded from the decision-making on 
the state level. 41 When read together with Article 4 concerning the right to 
self-governance, it is quite evident that it is indigenous peoples’ own institu-
tions that should implement and execute the self-governance in the fĳirst place. 
Regardless of their right to their own institutions, indigenous peoples should 
also retain their right to participate in the political life of the State in matters 
pertaining to them.
Article 34 of the Declaration lays down indigenous peoples’ right to “pro-
mote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive 
customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, and in case where 
they exist, juridical systems or customs”.42 Without reference to customary 
laws as such, Article 34 obviously protects indigenous legal customs and tradi-
tions. The protection of cultural heritage is laid out in Article 32, which states 
that indigenous peoples have the right to protect their cultural heritage. When 
read together with Article 34, this protection should be implemented obvious-
ly in accordance with  indigenous customs and traditions.
The customary laws and land rights become closely intertwined in the 
Article 26, which states that “Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, 
develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by 
reason of traditional  ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well 
as those which they have otherwise acquired”.43 The article clearly states that 
customs, traditions and land tenure systems must be foundations for resolv-
ing indigenous peoples’ land rights. The article requires that states shall give 
legal recognition and protection to indigenous peoples’ lands, territories and 
resources.44 Recognition and protection of land rights shall be conducted with 
40 UNDRIP, article 34.
41 Ibid. art. 5.
42 Ibid. art. 34.
43 Ibid. art. 26.2.
44 Ibid. art. 26.3.
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“due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indig-
enous peoples concerned”.45 
Article 27 goes on to oblige states to establish and implement “a fair, inde-
pendent, impartial, open and transparent process to recognize and adjudicate 
indigenous peoples land rights and rights to territories and resources, includ-
ing those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used”.46 
Again, in adjudicating land rights and rights to territories and resources in 
such processes, due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, cus-
toms and land tenure systems’ should be given. Koivurova interprets that these 
processes should be separate from regular domestic court proceedings.47 In 
any case, processes should be carried out in conjunction with the indigenous 
peoples concerned and indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate 
in these processes.48 The provision, however, does not provide that land claims 
should be resolved solely on the basis of customary laws, but they have clearly 
a central role to play.
The Declaration also requires that states consult with indigenous peoples 
through their own representative institutions concerning any project afffecting 
their lands and territories and other resources.49 Indigenous peoples have also 
“the right to access to and prompt decision through just and fair procedures 
for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, as well 
as to efffective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collec-
tive rights”.50 Collective rights include self-evidently collective land rights, too. 
Such decisions shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules 
and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned as well as to interna-
tional human rights.51 Interestingly, these articles expand the duty to respect 
indigenous law onto the third parties, too. This indicates that disputes and 
conflicts with private sectors and extractive industries need to be settled in 
accordance with indigenous peoples’ customs, rules and legal systems in addi-
tion to international human rights. The declaration clearly afffĳirms that in the 
conflicts over the lands and resources with extractive industries, indigenous 
peoples’ legal orders cannot be ignored.
45 Ibid. art. 26.3.
46 Ibid. art. 27.
47 T. Koivurova (nr 17) 22.
48 UNDRIP, art. 27.
49 Ibid. art. 32.2.
50 Ibid. art. 40.
51 Ibid. art. 40.
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2.3  Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Indigenous Laws as an 
Origin of Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights
The Inter-American Human Rights system has recognized and used indigenous 
peoples’ customary laws as a source of law in its jurisprudence related to land 
rights. The following analysis focuses on the role and signifĳicance of customary 
laws in the decisions concerning land rights. As James Anaya notes, “inasmuch 
as property is a human rights, the fundamental norm of nondiscrimination 
requires recognition of the forms of property that arise from the traditional 
or  customary law tenure of indigenous peoples, in addition to the property re-
gimes created by the dominant society”.52 The fact that we cannot avoid deal-
ing with indigenous peoples’ own legal orders when deciding land rights, and 
vice versa, has been a leading principle for the  Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.
The Inter-American Human Rights system, consisting of the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights and the  Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights,53 is known for its progressive case-law as regards indigenous peoples 
and its innovative implementation of international human rights instruments 
relevant for indigenous peoples. Both organs have repeatedly emphasized a 
need to take into account the unique cultural and historical context and ju-
ridical systems of indigenous peoples.54 The court cases demonstrate that for 
indigenous peoples the lands are as much a cultural right as they are a material 
right, laying the foundations for indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage, identity 
and livelihoods. This notion has also been the backdrop for the argumentation 
of the  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for instance, in the landmark 
case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua:55
52 J. Anaya (nr 2) 142.
53 The Commission and the Court are two independent organs which monitor the compli-
ance of American Convention on Human Rights: the Commission examines individual 
petitions and submits them further to the Court. See Organization of American States 
2010. Petition and case system. Available at www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/HowTo.pdf 
[last accessed 19 August 2015].
54 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Indigenous and tribal people’s rights over 
their ancestral lands and natural resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Human Rights System (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS 2010) OAE/
Ser.L/V/II. Doc 56/09, Available at: www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/docs/pdf/ances-
trallands.pdf [last accessed in 20 June 2015].
55 I/A Court H. R. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgement of Janurary 31, 2001. Series Case No. 79.
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For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely a mat-
ter of  possession and production but a material and spiritual element 
which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and 
transmit it to future generations.56
That interpretation has rendered many indigenous land claims successful in 
the  Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Court has applied the provi-
sions on the right to property and culture in an innovative manner to indig-
enous peoples’ land claims. This is evident especially in its landmark decisions 
in the cases of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Xakmok 
Kasek v. Paraguay, Saramaka, and Sawhoyamaxa, which I will analyze next.
In the Awas Tingni case, the Commission fĳiled a petition against Nicaragua 
for violating the rights of the Mayagna community to property. The Commis-
sion argued that despite the lack of offfĳicial title, the Community had commu-
nal property right to lands and  natural resources based on traditional land use 
and occupation of ancestral territory. Those patterns of use and occupation 
generate  customary law property systems. The Commission held unanimously, 
that indigenous  customary law norms and practices create property rights, 
which must be protected and treated as property rights.57
The Court applied a so-called  evolutionary interpretation of the interna-
tional instruments and argued that the international human rights system has 
autonomous meaning irrespective of the domestic laws and national court’s in-
terpretation.58 In order to treat diffferent forms of property without discrimina-
tion, the Court identifĳied that some specifĳications are required on the concept 
of property. Accordingly, it interpreted the concept of property in a manner 
that it also protects the rights of indigenous peoples to communal property: 
“Indigenous peoples have a communal form of collective property of the land, 
in the sense that the  ownership of the land is not centered on an individual”.59 
The Court thus used the community’s own customary laws as the basis when 
deciding that the Awas Tingni community had a communal property right to 
the lands. It iterated, that “As a result of customary practices, possession of the 
land should sufffĳice for indigenous communities lacking real title to property to 
obtain offfĳicial recognition of that property”.60
56 Ibid. para. 149.
57 Ibid. para. 140.
58 Ibid. para. 146.
59 Ibid. para. 149.
60 Ibid. para. 151.
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The Court came to the decision, that states cannot discriminate diffferent 
forms of property that arise from diffferent property regimes and  customary 
law systems. As one of the legal advisors in the case James Anaya concludes, 
the Court was the fĳirst international tribunal to rule out that “the international 
human right of property embraces the communal property regimes of Indig-
enous peoples as defĳined by their own customs and traditions”.61 It was thus 
asserted that property rights stem from Indigenous peoples’ customary use of 
lands and that traditional ownership and customary laws are grounds for ob-
taining offfĳicial recognition of their ownership.
In a similar vein in Saramaka v. Suriname62 and Xakmok Kasék v. Paraguay, 
the origin of indigenous peoples’ land rights was seen to stem from ancestral 
use and occupancy and not from any act of the state. In Xakmok Kásek,63 the 
Commission presented a case to the Court in which it alleged that Paraguay 
had failed to guarantee the right of the indigenous community to ancestral 
property and as a consequence, prevented the community from practicing 
traditional economic activities and having  access to their ancestral lands. The 
Court ordered Paraguay to ensure the community members’ right to owner-
ship of their traditional lands and, consequently, to the use and enjoyment 
of those lands. As a  reparation, the Court ordered Paraguay to return the tra-
ditional lands to the community. In its ruling, the Court relied on its previous 
fĳindings in the Awas Tingni case, according to which “the traditional posses-
sion by the indigenous peoples of their lands has the same efffects as a title of 
full  ownership granted by the State”.64 In conclusion, the Court recognized, 
that the community had entitlement to the lands they were dispossessed of, 
even if they lacked the offfĳicial title to them or even if the lands were privately 
owned.
In Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay,65 the question was whether a continuation 
of land rights exists where indigenous peoples have unwillingly left their tra-
ditional lands or lost  possession thereof. By applying, inter alia, Article 13 of 
 ILO 169, the Court held that indigenous communities’ close relationship with 
their traditional lands is not only a question of means of survival but also the 
61 J. Anaya (nr 2) 146-147.
62 Saramaka v. Suriname 2007 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Series C No. 172 (No. 
28, 2007).
63 I/A Court H.R. Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua Peo-
ples and its Members v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Case no. 12,420.
64 Ibid. para. 109.
65 I/A Court H. R. Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs. Judgement of March 29, 2006, Series C No. 146.
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basis of their worldview and cultural identity, and therefore, the relationship 
with lands must be secured under right to property.66 The Court reiterated that 
an indigenous notion of  ownership and  possession of land does not necessar-
ily conform to the classic concept of property, but deserves equal protection 
under right to property.67 According to the Court, demanding and imposing 
western ways of using and having property on indigenous systems “would 
render protection under Article 21 of the Convention illusory for millions of 
persons.”68 This would be discriminatory for peoples who have diffferent un-
derstanding of property. 
The court invoked its previous rulings in the cases of Moiwana Communi-
ty69 and Yakye Axa,70 and drew conclusions that even in the cases where the 
community has unwillingly left its land, indigenous peoples maintain prop-
erty rights to their lands and are entitled to restitution. The Court thus ana-
lyzed whether the enforcement of restitution of lands has a time restriction. 
It came to the conclusion that as long as indigenous peoples maintain their 
relationship with traditional lands, the right to restitution remains.71 Since the 
community depended on traditional livelihoods and considered the lands as 
their own, the restitution right had not lapsed. Finding a violation of prop-
erty rights, the Court ordered Paraguay to restore the traditional lands of the 
Sawhoyamaxa community.
In conclusion, the Sawhoyamaxa case afffĳirmed that there is a continuation 
of land rights where indigenous peoples have unwillingly left their traditional 
lands or lost possession thereof. According to the Court, despite the fact that 
an indigenous community lacks a legal title and the lands have been lawfully 
transferred to third parties in good faith, indigenous peoples do have a right 
to restitution.72 The most far-reaching fĳinding in the case was that neither the 
loss of material possession nor prohibitions on access to traditional territories 
by the formal owners are obstacles to the continuous territorial rights and right 
to restitution of indigenous communities.73 This entails that in addition to the 
66 Ibid. para. 121.
67 Ibid. para. 120.
68 Ibid. para. 120.
69 Case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Judgement of June 15, 2005, Series C No. 124, 
para. 134.
70 Case of Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Judgement of June 17, 2007. Series C No. 125.
71 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para. 121.
72 Ibid. para. 138.
73 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (nr 58) para. 127; This is in contrast to, for 
instance, the Australian Supreme Court case of Mabo v. Australia, in which the break in 
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origin, also the extinction of such rights have to have respect for  indigenous 
customs – whether they are offfĳicially recognized or not.
What has been remarkable in the Court’s decisions is its willingness to see 
interconnections between indigenous peoples’ lands and cultural heritage. 
The Court has reiterated in numerous cases that: “For indigenous communi-
ties, their relationship with the land is not merely a matter of  possession and 
production, but rather a material and spiritual element that they must enjoy 
fully, even in order to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future 
generations.”74 In its report Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their An-
cestral Lands and Natural Resources, the Inter-American Commission explains 
that in the Inter-American system, the right to territorial property is viewed 
as a fundamental basis for culture, economic survival and enjoyment of other 
fundamental human rights for indigenous peoples.75 This is well-reflected in 
the cases of Xakmok Kasek and Sawhoyamaxa, in which the Court paid par-
ticular attention to the close relationship of indigenous peoples to their tradi-
tional lands and  natural resources recognizing them as the fundamental basis 
for their culture.76 Hence, according to the Court’s interpretation, indigenous 
peoples’ special relationship with their traditional lands falls under the right 
to property as interpreted in the light of provisions of  ILO Convention 169 and 
UNDRIP.77
3 The Case of Sámi Reindeer Husbandry and the  Siida System 
in Finland
As other indigenous peoples, the Sámi in Norway, Sweden and Finland have re-
tained their traditional governance system called the siida system in  reindeer 
husbandry. It is highlighted by the Sámi themselves that reindeer husbandry is 
a manifestation and integral part of Sámi cultural heritage and it keeps Sámi 
languages and  traditional knowledge alive and communities robust. Siida is 
a flexible family and kinship-based social and land use unit that has its own 
continuity for whatever purpose was taken to extinguish native title, see B. Tobin (nr 12) 
111-112.
74 I/A Court H.R. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgement of Janurary 31, 2001. Series Case No. 79. para. 149.
75 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2010, 1-2.
76 I/A Court H.R. Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua Peo-
ples and its Members v. Paraguay. Judgement of August 24, 2010. Case no. 12,420, para. 85.
77 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2010, 3.
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rules for the distribution of the lands, waters and resources.78 Siidas have been 
basic units of Sámi society since time immemorial, and during the Swedish 
rule, so-called Lapp villages were offfĳicially used as taxation units.79 During that 
era, Finnish and Swedish authorities recognized Sámi people’s  ownership to 
their traditional lands until the abolition of the Taxed Lapp Land system dur-
ing the 19th Century.80
Whereas siidas or Lapp villages were incorporated at least partially in the 
offfĳicial management of reindeer husbandry in Norway and Sweden, the intro-
duction of a central management of reindeer husbandry in Finland started to 
gradually erode the  autonomy of the siida system from the end of the 1800s. 
In 1898, all the reindeer owners were obliged to establish co-operatives in the 
areas where they had not done so.81 The co-operative system was founded 
on an agricultural reindeer husbandry model practiced by Finnish settlers in 
southern Lapland, where they had established co-operatives already during 
1700–1800.82 In the Sámi  reindeer herding area, the fĳirst co-operatives were es-
tablished as late as 1898 as a result of the senate’s order, while siidas continued 
their existence in parallel with co-operatives. 
In reindeer husbandry legislation, siidas were replaced by the co-operatives: 
the fĳirst Reindeer Husbandry Act (1932) and none of the subsequent acts in-
clude any references to the siida system whatsoever.83 The preparatory works 
for the current Reindeer Husbandry Act instead explicitly state that the Rein-
deer Husbandry Act extends the co-operative model also to the Sámi area, 
where  reindeer husbandry is organized around a siida model.84 The govern-
78 M. N. Sara, ‘Siida and Traditional Sámi Reindeer Herding Knowledge’, in The Northern 
Review 30 (2009) 157.
79 K. Korpijaakko, Saamelaisten oikeusasemasta Ruotsi-Suomessa. Oikeushistoriallinen tut-
kimus Länsi-Pohjan Lapin maankäyttöoloista ja -oikeuksista ennen 1700-luvun puoliväliä. 
[The legal status of the Sámi in Sweden-Finland. Legal historical study on land use condi-
tions and rights in Lapland before the mid-18th Century] (Lakimieskustannus 1989); M. 
Åhrén, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Culture, Customs and Traditions and Customary Law – The 
Saami People’s Perspective’, in Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 21 
(2004) 67-74.
80 K. Korpijaakko (nr 83); M. Åhrén (nr 83) 89.
81 Keisarillisen senaatin kuulutus 28.5.1898.
82 J. Kortesalmi, Poronhoidon synty ja kehitys Suomessa [The birth and development of rein-
deer husbandry in Finland] (SKS 2007), 364.
83 Finnish Reindeer Husbandry Act (RHA) 239/1932; 444/1948 and 848/1990. Outside the 
reindeer husbandry, the Skolt Sámi Act is founded on siida meetings (sij’dd sååbbar), in 
contrast to the Sámi Parliament Act (974/1995) where the siida system goes unrecognized.
84 PeVL 3/1990 vp, 3.
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mental bill, however, falsely states that due to the similarities between Sámi 
and Finnish reindeer husbandry, there is no need to separate reindeer hus-
bandry administratively or legally.85 As a consequence, the current Reindeer 
Husbandry Act (848/1990) contains no mention of Sámi reindeer husbandry, 
nor recognition of the siida system. However, the Sámi organizations and Sámi 
parliament have constantly highlighted the diffferences between Sámi and 
Finnish reindeer husbandry.
Despite the imposition of a state-centric co-operative system in the Sámi 
 reindeer herding area, the siida system has remained in many places the func-
tioning governance system, which governs and organizes land use within the 
territory of a co-operative. As demonstrated in the previous section, indig-
enous peoples have both a substantive right to maintain, develop and pre-
serve their traditional institutions as well as to have their customs respected 
in formal negotiations and  consultations with the states and third parties. I 
will demonstrate next how the lack of recognition of the siida violates many 
international standards in the following ways: the siida lacks a legal status and 
protection in the legislation; its customary land use system, borders or codes 
for membership are not formally registered anywhere; and there is no obliga-
tion to negotiate directly with siidas. 
Due to the lack of legal status, it is hard for siidas to bring suit against the 
State or third parties in the cases of encroachments upon siida lands or vio-
lations of its borders. This is problematic in the Sámi homeland area, where 
the usufruct and  ownership rights on the so-called state lands have not been 
solved to date in spite of numerous attempts.86 In the Sámi  customary law sys-
tem, however, siidas continue to be considered as the land rights holders. 
In a couple of Supreme Administrative Court cases related to Sámi  rein-
deer husbandry, the defĳinition of siida has been central. In the Nellim case, 
in which Inari Sámi reindeer herders sued the co-operative for implementing 
forced slaughter, the defendants questioned the existence of the Nellim siida 
altogether since there exist no offfĳicial records about existing siidas and their 
members.87 In the  Käsivarsi case, the question of whether one person could 
count as a siida and therefore be entitled equally to construct a fence was es-
sential.88 In both cases, the facts that siidas are not acknowledged as rights 
holders in law and they are not offfĳicially registered anywhere, pose difffĳiculties 
for individuals before the courts. 
85 HE 244/1989, 4.
86 K. Korpijaakko (nr 83).
87 Finnish Supreme Administrative Court KHO:2011:13, 11.2.2011/318.
88 Finnish Supreme Administrative Court KHO:2012:126, 27.12.2012/3665.
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As asserted in  ILO 169 and UNDRIP, indigenous peoples have the right to 
maintain their own distinct legal institutions and customs.89 These entail self-
evidently customary land use practices. Within many co-operatives, siidas 
have maintained their land use systems, which have existed in some places 
for centuries. However, the Reindeer Husbandry Act obscures the existence of 
such a system. It merely states that ‘The task of a  reindeer herding co-operative 
is to ensure that the reindeer of the cooperative’s shareholders are looked after 
in the territory of the reindeer herding co-operative’.90 When it comes to the 
rights of the individual reindeer owner, the act remains silent about Sámi  own-
ership rights to siida lands and stipulates only that “Reindeer owners residing 
in the reindeer herding area have a right to have their reindeer looked after in 
the territory of the reindeer herding co-operative”.91 By ignoring the siida sys-
tem, the legislation also denies those underlying rules for division of lands and 
membership in siidas. Due to the fact that siida land use systems, borders and 
members are not registered anywhere, it is hard for reindeer herders to have 
recourse to legal remedies for protecting their land from encroachments or the 
exclusive right to  reindeer husbandry in the co-operatives. This poses serious 
threats for reindeer husbandry as indigenous cultural heritage since it is basi-
cally open to any citizen of the European Union.
In the light of the analyzed instruments and case-law, indigenous peoples’ 
land rights must be decided on the basis of their own customs and legal orders. 
Pursuant to Article 14 of ILO 169 and Article 27 of UNDRIP, states should estab-
lish processes “giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, 
customs and land tenure systems” in order to adjudicate and recognize indig-
enous peoples’ rights to lands which they have traditionally used or occupied. 
In Finland, there have been no such procedures where siida borders or land 
rights would have been determined. They have never been examined by the 
courts either.
International standards also provide, that negotiations over  natural re-
sources and lands should be run with indigenous peoples’ representative in-
stitutions paying due respect to their customs and traditions. Pursuant to, for 
instance, Finnish Mining Act (621/2011), the co-operative concerned must be 
heard before applying for mining permission.92 Also, the authorities have to 
fĳind out in cooperation with co-operatives the impacts of the proposed mining 
project on reindeer husbandry. A hearing procedure also applies to the Sámi 
89 ILO Convention 169, art. 8; DRIP, art. 5 and 34.
90 RHA 848/1990, 7 §.
91 Ibid. 9 §.
92 Finnish Mining Act 621/2011, 38 §.
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parliament when the projects have “far-reaching consequences for Sámi as an 
indigenous people”.93 In a similar vein, the Reindeer Husbandry Act 3 § lays 
down a consulting obligation for state authorities to consult with the repre-
sentatives of the  reindeer herding co-operative when the plans concerning the 
”State land” will have a substantial efffect on the reindeer herding.94 The acts do 
not oblige authorities to consult directly with siidas or respect Sámi customs 
and traditions in  consultations. This can be problematic if the board or head 
of the co-operative gives permission to some activities without having consent 
from a siida whose lands are afffected. From the viewpoint of Sámi reindeer 
herders, distinguishing impacts on Sámi culture, on the one hand, and on rein-
deer herding, on the other, seems artifĳicial since  reindeer husbandry and Sámi 
culture are inseparable.
4 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have encompassed both indigenous livelihoods and lands 
under the rubric of cultural heritage and shown through the case of reindeer 
husbandry, how the rights to lands are a prerequisite for the implementation 
of the right to cultural heritage: without lands, there is no reindeer husbandry. 
Instead of viewing cultural heritage narrowly as  tangible or  intangible “prop-
erty”, the analysis shows that also domestic law should start to acknowledge 
interconnections between indigenous peoples’ governance systems, lands and 
cultural heritage and move focus from a narrow view of cultural heritage and 
protection of individual cultural objects or artefacts to the real implementa-
tion of indigenous peoples’ self-governance through their own institutions. 
This interpretation has rendered many cases successful in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System. Culture for indigenous peoples should be comprehend-
ed as comprising of complex relationships with lands and animals rather than 
material objects or cultural products in the western sense of the term.
Both UNDRIP and ILO169 also afffĳirm that indigenous peoples’ have the 
right to preserve their distinct governance systems and legal orders and states 
must respect indigenous peoples’ own laws and customs when implementing 
national laws or negotiating, for instance, over the use of  natural resources. 
From international instruments and jurisprudence it follows, that foundations 
of land and territorial rights must derive from indigenous peoples’ own legal 
orders. These rights are integral in order to protect their lands and natural re-
93 Ibid. 38 §.
94 RHA 848/1990, 53 §.
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sources from encroachments and thus preserve indigenous peoples’ cultural 
heritage.95
The  Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interlinked the concepts of 
property and cultural heritage in an evolutionary manner to indigenous peo-
ples’ land rights cases. In conclusion, the Court has recognized the continued 
relevance of autonomous indigenous legal orders. In the cases of Awas Tingni, 
Saramaka and Sawhoyamaxa the Court held that the customary use of lands is 
a foundation for obtaining offfĳicial recognition of property and that indigenous 
land titles must stem from indigenous law, and not from the state law. The ju-
risprudence of the Court stands in stark opposition to that of the European 
Court of Human Rights, which has interpreted the rights to property in a nar-
row sense and failed to accord protection for collective rights of indigenous 
peoples.96 Due to rapidly evolving customary international law, however, the 
decisions of the Inter-American Court set an important precedent for other 
human rights bodies including the ECHR. 
My analysis of the case of the siida system in  reindeer husbandry in Fin-
land shows, that non-recognition of indigenous governance systems and legal 
orders violates ultimately the Sámi rights to their lands and cultural heritage. 
The colonial process where siidas were gradually replaced by the co-operatives 
as administrative units, obscures the fact that siidas have de facto continued to 
exist as autonomous legal orders parallel to the co-operative system. The main 
problem with the reindeer husbandry legislation is that it does not recognize 
Sámi governance systems, leaving them without any legal status and protec-
tion, which is problematic when conflicts and disputes arise over siida lands, 
borders and membership. The current reindeer husbandry legislation stands 
thus in stark contrast with Sámi traditions and customs leaving the reindeer 
husbandry, which is an integral part of Sámi culture, without protection. As 
Jeremy Webber argues, initial recognition of indigenous rights to land must 
draw on indigenous law.97 By extension, protection and management of in-
digenous cultural heritage must derive from Indigenous peoples’ own institu-
tions. Against this notion and analyzed insruments, it can be interpreted that 
the imposition of state institutions and laws on indigenous peoples aims to 
nullify the continuation of those rights and hereby perpetuate the disposses-
sion of indigenous peoples from their lands and livelihoods that set the basis 
for their cultural heritage.
95 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (nr 58) para. 101.
96 T. Koivurova (nr 17) 34-36.
97 J. Webber (nr 6) 79.
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Finnish  reindeer husbandry legislation is thus in violation of international 
human rights standards and customary international law that all clearly afffĳirm 
that indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, preserve and develop their 
own traditional institutions and legal orders, and govern their lands in accord-
ance with their own customs and laws. In spite of the facts that UNDRIP is not 
a legally binding convention and Finland has not ratifĳied the ILO Convention 
169, many of their provisions have already been crystallized into customary 
international law.98 In order to comply with international standards, Finland 
should acknowledge siida as a rights holder in the Reindeer Husbandry Act. 
In Norway, the siida system was brought into the Reindeer Husbandry Act in 
2007.99 Following the example of Norway, the next step would entail determin-
ing and registering the siida borders, members and rules of land use.100 Third, 
the government should establish procedures for adjudication of siida lands 
in order to provide reindeer herders with an opportunity to claim the offfĳicial 
title to the lands they have traditionally occupied if they wish so. Constitu-
tional and administrative courts may not be competent to decide such issues, 
so there is a need to establish separate juridical institutions with experts on 
indigenous law and reindeer husbandry.
As exemplifĳied by the chapter, indigenous peoples’ governance systems al-
ready have complex rules and procedures in place for governing their lands, 
livelihoods and cultural heritage. Denial of the right to practice self-govern-
ance within indigenous peoples’ own governance systems according to their 
own laws undermines their status as self-determining peoples.
98 J. Anaya (nr 2) 147–148; B Tobin (nr 12) 54; M. Åhrén (nr 14).
99 M. N. Sa ra, ‘Land Usage and Siida Autonomy.’ Arctic Review on Law and Politics 3 (2011) 138.
100 Ibid. 138.
Under the Umbrella: The Remedial Penumbra 
of Self-Determination, Retroactivity and 




The year 2014 saw the closure of the Second International Decade of the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples.1 The jewel in its crown that had eluded the initial Interna-
tional Decade of World’s Indigenous Peoples2 was the passage of the 2007 U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP or the Declaration].3 
Much praise, and rightly so, has been lavished upon the UNDRIP. Commen-
dation has centered on its progressive standards in relation to  autonomy, the 
control and restitution of land,  free prior and informed consent [ FPIC] and  self-
determination. In particular, much of this praise and subsequent interest have 
focused on the UNDRIP’s progress in relation to the latter. Yet, scant attention 
has been paid to the remedial role of self-determination in relation to the resti-
tution of  cultural property to Indigenous Peoples despite its potential profound 
signifĳicance as a tool for achieving the restitution of cultural property.
Accordingly, the following chapter seeks to rectify this lacuna by explor-
ing the relationship between self-determination and cultural property and its 
restitution. Ultimately it demonstrates that aside from some concerns, self-
determination has great potential to aid in the continuing effforts to secure 
the restitution of the traditional cultural property of Indigenous Peoples. The 
1 U.N.G.A., Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2004: Second Inter-
national Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. G.A. Res. A/RES/59/174 (24 
February 2005). 
2 See U.N.G.A., International Decade of World’s Ind igenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/48/163 (21 
December 1993). See also International Working Group for Indigenous Afffairs, First In-
ternational Decade of World’s Indigenous Peoples, at http://www.iwgia.org/human-rights/
un-mechanisms-and-processes/2nd-un-decade-on-indigenous-peoples/1st-un-decade-
on-indigenous-peoples (15 January 2015).
3 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295, UN 
GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen mtg, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (13 September 2007) [hereinafter 
UNDRIP].
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chapter proceeds as follows. First, it lays the foundations for such an inquiry 
by detailing core concepts such as self-determination,  cultural property, the 
repatriation debate and non-retroactivity. With the foundation laid, the paper 
then examines how the concepts of self-determination and cultural property 
traditionally have been linked through the cultural aspect of the penumbra 
of self-determination and looks briefly at the logic of these links. The chapter 
eventually dispels potential theoretical concerns by revealing a diffferent facet 
of self-determination which links the concepts of self-determination and cul-
tural property as well as restitution and yet has received little attention. Next, 
the chapter explores the signifĳicance of this facet of self-determination: its re-
medial aspect paves the way for the retroactivity of the law. This inquiry then 
offfers an analysis of alternative approaches to achieve the retroactivity crucial 
to the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples, but also highlights 
their shortcomings. Yet not all is gloom and doom; this chapter concludes with 
a brief exploration of general and  sui generis rights that in combination hold 
much promise for the future. 
1 Self-Determination, Cultural Property, the Repatriation Debate 
and Non-Retroactivity 
A. Self- Determination: From Political Concept to International 
Human Right
In 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson declared that ‘peoples may not be 
dominated and governed only by their consent. “Self-determination” is not 
a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will 
henceforth ignore at their peril.’4 Evolving from this political concept, self-de-
termination slowly gathered recognition as a right in international law within 
the limited context of decolonization and the equality of states as a right to 
political power accompanying statehood. However, more recently it has come 
to be recognized as a right within International Human Rights Law [IHRL]. 
The shift to a specifĳic human right was manifested by its appearance in the 
twin articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [IC-
CPR] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
[ICESCR] which both provide that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to  self-determi-
nation. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
4 W. Wilson, War Aims of Germany and Austria (1918) reprinted in M. Dixon et al. (eds.), 
Cases & Materials on International Law (5th edn., OUP 2011) 220. Ultimately, it served as 
the foundation for the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.
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freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’5 Self-determi-
nation traditionally has been divided into two aspects: external and internal 
self-determination. As regards the former, it was developed within the context 
of decolonization and is exercised mainly through either secession or inde-
pendence. As regards internal self-determination, it has been developed with-
in IHRL and fĳinds its clearest expression in General Recommendation 21 issued 
by the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD]6 which 
offfers that the focus is on  participation in the democratic process,  autonomy 
and  self-government within the state.7 It is this modality of self-determination 
that was initially and cautiously offfered to Indigenous Peoples under IHRL.8 In 
turn, inclusion as a human right did not result in an automatic expansion of 
the concept of self-determination from peoples living under  colonialism to all 
peoples including Indigenous Peoples. Only after a lengthy, intense and con-
tentious debate which predominately occurred within the drafting process of 
the UNDRIP concerning who are the benefĳiciaries of this right, has a general 
consensus been reached that an equal right of self-determination is applicable 
to Indigenous Peoples in IHRL. 
Indeed, not to give an equal right of  self-determination to Indigenous Peo-
ples would be both discriminatory and violate the principle of equality in 
contradiction to the entire ethos of IHRL in general and Articles 1 and 2 of 
the UNDRIP in particular concerning the full enjoyment of rights and the free 
and equal enjoyment of rights.9 In turn, presenting a monumental and praise-
worthy development in the struggle for the rights of Indigenous Peoples, the 
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976 at Art. 1(3)[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, at Arts. 1,3,6, 15 entered into force January 3, 1976 at Art. 1(3)[herein-
after ICESCR](emphasis added).
6 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21, 
The right to self-determination, U.N. Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII at 125 (1996) at para. 10; 
See also Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, Canadian Supreme Court at 
para. 126.
7 See A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, 
Culture, and Land (CUP 2007)160-66 (detailing democracy, autonomy and participation 
relevant to fulfĳilling an internal right to self-determination).
8 See W. Barney Pityana, Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Africa, DOC/OS(XXVI)/130 
at para. 11 reprinted in P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples (Manchester University Press 
2002) 257.
9 UNDRIP (n3) Arts. 1 and 2.
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right to  self-determination has been unequivocally recognized as applicable to 
Indigenous Peoples through its inclusion in the Declaration at Article 3. Mir-
roring much of the language of the right to self-determination offfered in the 
aforementioned twin articles of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, Article 3 of the 
UNDRIP provides: ‘Indigenous Peoples have the right of self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.’10 
B Cultural Property
Aside from self-determination, the UNDRIP also addresses the issue of the res-
titution of cultural property. Specifĳically, Article 11(1) states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and 
develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, 
such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, 
technologies and visual and performing arts and literature.
In order to fulfĳill this right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions 
and customs, Article 11(2) subsequently imposes the procedural obligation that:
States shall provide redress through efffective mechanisms, which may 
include restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, 
with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property 
taken without their  free, prior and informed consent or in violation of 
their laws, traditions and customs.
In the legal context, the term  cultural property fĳirst appeared in the 1954  Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict11 followed in 1970 by the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
10 Ibid. Art. 3. 
11 See I. M. Goldrich, Comment, ‘Balancing the Need for Repatriation of Illegally Removed 
Cultural Property with the Interests of Bona Fide Purchasers: Applying the UNIDROIT 
Convention to the Case of the Gold Phiale’ 23 Fordham International Law Journal 118, 133 
(1999)(noting that this was the fĳirst time the term had appeared in international law). 
See also, M. Frigo, ‘Cultural property v. Cultural Heritage; A “battle of concepts” in In-
ternational Law’ 86 IRRC 367 (June 2004) [citation omitted]; L. Prott and P. J. O’Keefe, 
‘”Cultural Heritage” or “Cultural Property”?’ 1 International Journal of Cultural Property 
307, 318 (1992); R. O’ Keefe, ‘The Meaning of “Cultural Property” Under the 1954 Hague 
298 Esterling
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property (UNESCO Convention) and most recently in 1995 in the International 
Institute for the Unifĳication of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Convention on Stolen 
or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT Convention). Article 1 of the 
UNESCO Convention and Article 2 of the UNIDROIT Convention which col-
lectively make up the present international framework for the protection of 
cultural property, offfer that it is property that is important for ‘ archaeology, 
prehistory, history, literature, art or science….’12 However, the real substance of 
both these defĳinitions lies in the identical list that both provide13 which out-
line the broad contours of this concept including that it is both religious and 
secular in nature as well as animate and immovable but more commonly in-
animate and movable. Finally, implicit in this list is that  cultural property only 
includes  tangible items which is often underscored; yet it is the tangible nature 
of cultural property as objects that can be touched, seen and preserved and so 
‘have the likelihood of becoming symbols with diffferent layers of meaning to 
many diffferent groups’14 that makes them capable of restitution and hence at 
the center of the repatriation debate. 
C The Repatriation Debate
[R]epatriation is perhaps the most intractable and contentious part of 
the bitter art wars.15
Daniel Shapiro
It is cultural property that lies at the center of the repatriation debate. Broadly 
speaking, repatriation can refer to any return of cultural property. For instance, 
Convention’ XLVI Netherlands International Law Review 26 (1999); J. Blake, ‘On Defĳining 
the Cultural Heritage’ 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 61 (2000).
12 International Institute for the Unifĳication of Private Law, Final Act of the Diplomatic 
Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International 
Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, done June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1326 
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention] at Art. 2; UNESCO, Convention on the Means of Pro-
hibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property, adopted Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention] at Art. 
1 [emphasis added]. 
13 UNIDORIT Convention, (n12) Annex; UNESCO Convention (n12) Art. 1.
14 J. Watkins, ‘Cultural Nationalists, Internationalists and “Intra-nationalists”: Who’s Right 
and Whose Rights?’ 12 International Journal of Cultural Property 78, 81 (2005).
15 D. Shapiro, ‘Repatriation: A Modest Proposal’ 31 New York University Journal of Interna-
tional Law & Policy 95 (1998). 
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it can refer to the return of cultural property to a state after its illegal export 
while it can also refer to the return or more accurately the restitution of cul-
tural property to its owner after theft. In turn, simply stated at its core the re-
patriation debate concerns whether or not the  cultural property of states and 
Indigenous Peoples that has been removed should be returned upon their re-
quests by the current possessors16 of such property.
In relation to the repatriation of cultural property, the rationale for its repa-
triation is three-fold: the restoration of the sacred link between people, land 
and cultural heritage, the amelioration or reversal of internationally wrongful 
acts, including discrimination and genocide and repatriation as ‘an essential 
components of a people’s ability to maintain, revitalise and develop their col-
lective cultural identity.’17 
The historical theft, illicit trafffĳicking or any other form of historical removal 
of cultural property has generated modern indigenous claims for repatriation. 
These requests characteristically are made many years after the initial removal 
of such property with many suggesting that the initial removal occurred un-
der dubious conditions at best as part and parcel of the circumstances and 
incidents of  colonialism. To add insult to injury, these requests are further 
typifĳied by the fact that the international framework for the protection of cul-
tural property in which this debate is contained lacks any clear legal obligation 
to return such property. Ultimately, this stems from the fact that the current 
framework for the protection of such property relegates the issue of repatria-
tion especially as regards Indigenous Peoples but more signifĳicantly limits it 
through the principle of non-retroactivity. 
16 The term possessor rather than owner is deliberate here as many states and Indigenous 
Peoples that desire repatriation do not see the would-be defendants as the legal owners of 
the property in any respect as they often claim a wrong was at the heart of their acquisi-
tion of the property. In turn, at the core of the dispute is both the possession of cultural 
property and the concept of ownership. The preferred word is possessor in the sense that 
the UNIDORIT Convention uses this word; to include any person against whom a claim 
for restitution of an object should be brought. 
17 A.F. Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects (Cambridge 
University Press 2006) 299-30 as paraphrased by and reprinted in K. Kuprecht, ‘Human 
Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation’ Working Paper No. 2009/34, 








Sorry about that. It’s something that happened in history.18
Tony Blair
Necessary for a stable and predictable legal system, non-retroactivity is the 
idea that ‘[u]nless a diffferent intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact 
which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the 
entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.’19 As the UNESCO and 
UNIDROIT Conventions came into efffect in 1972 and 1998 respectively, this not 
only leaves the most famous requests by successor states for the restitution of 
their cultural property without a claim under these treaties,20 this fundamen-
tal norm of international treaty law also has the efffect of preventing the claims 
for the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples removed as part 
and parcel of  colonialism; long before the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conven-
tions came into efffect.
Despite the  Mataaua Declaration which calls on the international commu-
nity to recognize a cultural property regime that has retroactive coverage,21 it 
18 Former Prime Minister Tony Blair made this statement during a visit to China in 2003 
when asked by Chinese supporters of the repatriation of their cultural property to justify 
the British Museum’s continued possession of approximately 23,000 relics from the Mid-
dle Kingdom looted from the Summer Palace in Beijing during a brief invasion by Anglo-
French armies in 1860. Not surprisingly, this statement enraged the Chinese supporters. 
O. August, ‘China Relics Row Echoes Battle for Elgin Marbles’ Times (London), Sept. 20, 
2003, A13 available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1161019.ece (ac-
cessed Apr. 9, 2008).
19 U.N., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331; 
8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force January 27, 1980. 
20 Most notably it leaves frustrated the requests by the successor states of Greece for the 
return of the Elgin Marbles housed in the British Museum and of Egypt for the return of 
the Bust of Nefertiti from the Egyptian Museum in Berlin. For an excellent account of the 
repatriation issue surrounding these pieces see respectively: J.H. Merryman, ‘Thinking 
About the Elgin Marbles’ 83 Michigan Law Review 1881 (1984-85); K.G. Siehr, ‘The Beau-
tiful One Has Come – To Return’ in J. Merryman (ed.), Imperialism, Art and Restitution 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 114; S.K. Urice, ‘The Beautiful One Has Come- To Stay’ 
in J. Merryman (ed)., Imperialism, Art and Restitution (Cambridge University Press 2006) 
135.
21 The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Preamble, June 1993 at para. 2.5. available at http:/www.wipo.int/tk/en/databas-
es/creative_heritage/indigenous/link0002.html.
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is ‘well documented that neither UNESCO 1970 nor UNIDROIT 1995 was ever 
intended to unlock the imperial trophy cases’.22 Both conventions make this 
clear though their explicit non-retroactivity. The former explicitly embodies 
this idea in Article 7 which lays out its key limited repatriation obligations that 
state parties undertake as evidenced through the language of ‘after entry into 
force of this Convention.’23 Although Article 15 of the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion does allow states parties to negotiate their own terms regarding the repa-
triation of  cultural property that was acquired before the Convention took ef-
fect, many states have not exercised this option. This non-retroactivity is most 
aptly demonstrated in R. v. Heller.24 
Under the auspices of legislation implementing the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion known as the Cultural Property Export and Import Act, in R. v. Heller Can-
ada prosecuted Issaka Zango and Ben Heller. These dealers from New York im-
ported a Nok terracotta sculpture into Canada without the appropriate export 
certifĳicate from Nigeria, and so at the request of Nigeria, they were prosecuted 
in Canada. Zango and Heller were arrested in Calgary in 1981 with the terra-
cotta piece that Zango purchased in 1979 which was to be sold to Mobil Oil of 
Canada Ltd. for USD 650,000. They were charged with illegal export under §37 
of the Cultural Property Export and Import Act. Nigeria claimed the sculpture 
as a piece of  cultural property which had been illegal exported. However, the 
sculpture had been part of a private collection in Paris from the 1950s until 
the 1970s when Zango, an innocent purchaser, acquired the item. Although at 
the time of the import both the requesting State of Nigeria and Canada were 
parties to the Convention, thus making both the Convention and so the Act 
applicable, counsel for the accused argued there was no evidence regarding 
when the object had been illegally exported from Nigeria. In reaching his de-
cision, the judge reasoned that the Act needed to be interpreted in a man-
ner consistent with the UNESCO Convention. In doing so, he relied on Article 
7(a) of the UNESCO Convention to conclude that the Act can only apply to 
property ‘illegal exported after entry into force’ of the Convention in the states 
22 J. Shuart, Note, ‘Is All “Pharaoh” in Love and War? The British Museum’s Title to the 
Rosetta Stone and the Sphinx’s Beard’ 52 Kansas Law Review 667, 717 (2004) citing 
Memorandum from Lyndel V. Prott, Director, International Standards Unit, Division 
of Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, to the Parliament Select Committee on Culture, Media 
and  Sport,  available  at  http://www.parliament.thestationaryofffĳice.co.uk/pa/cm199900/
cmselect/cmcumeds/371/371ap51.htm (last visited Feb 23, 2004).
23 UNESCO Convention (n12) Art. 7 [emphasis added].
24 R. v. Heller [1983] 27 Alberta Law Reports (2d) 346.
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concerned.25 As the prosecution failed to introduce evidence that the object 
had been exported from Nigeria after June 1978 when Canada became party to 
the Convention and Canada and Nigeria have not exercised the option under 
Article 15 concerning property acquired before the UNESCO Convention took 
efffect, the accused was acquitted.
The UNIDROIT Convention does not remedy this situation26 as it also ex-
plicitly includes a clause on non-retroactivity. Article 10 states that the UNI-
DROIT Convention: ‘[s]hall apply on in respect of a cultural object that is 
stolen after this Convention enters into force in respect of the State where the 
claim is brought… [and] shall apply only in respect of a cultural object that is 
illegally exported after this Convention enters into force for the requesting State 
as well as the State where the request is brought.’27 It does note in its preamble 
that this convention ‘in no way confers any approval or legitimacy upon illegal 
transactions whatever kind which may have taken place before the entry into 
force of this Convention’.28 Yet, such an admonition is of little use without the 
force of the law.
With such an obstacle, where has this left property at the center of the repa-
triation debate? In efffect, ‘because formal mechanisms for resolving property 
rights in cultural objects – particularly those expropriated during periods of 
colonial rule or military occupation – are limited, repatriation claims tend to 
rely more on political fervor, moral arguments and emotional appeals rather 
than on substantive law.’29 After all, ‘[h]eritage is both intensely personal and 
intensely political… as heritage is hotly contested because we each have our 
own views on what represents heritage, and what is worth conserving.’30 Con-
sequently, without any meaningful legal claim available via the international 
framework for the protection of  cultural property as a result of its explicit non-
retroactivity coupled with a desire to rely on more than simply political fervor 
25 R.K. Patterson, ‘Case Notes: Bolivian Textiles in Canada’ 2 International Journal of Cul-
tural Property 359, 361 (1993)[citations omitted]. 
26 Prott notes that ‘[f]rom the fĳirst meeting of the Study Group [for the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion] it was clear that, although there was a substantial amount of agreement among 
experts and States alike that something should be done to limit illicit trafffĳic for the future, 
a draft which tried to deal with past issues would have little hope of success.’ L.V. Prott, 
Commentary on The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen and Illegal Exported Cultural Objects 
(Institute of Art and Law 1997) 78. 
27 UNIDROIT Convention, (n 12) Arts. 10(1)-(2) [emphasis added]. 
28 UNIDROIT Convention, (n 12) Preamble.
29 J. Shuart, (n 22) 673. 
30 J. Watkins, (n14) 88 citing Graeme Aplin, Heritage Identifĳication, Conservation, and Man-
agements 358 (2002). 
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and emotional appeal, Indigenous Peoples have turned elsewhere to secure 
the restitution of their traditional cultural property; namely Article 11 of the 
UNDRIP. 
2 Linking Self-Determination and Cultural Property: 
The Cultural Penumbra of Self-Determination and the Dangers of 
a Maximizing Approach
A The Cultural Penumbra of Self-Determination
The UNDRIP provides for the separate regulation of cultural property inde-
pendent of self-determination. However, Indigenous Peoples and their ad-
vocates have consistently linked cultural property and self-determination; 
in general through the links between self-determination and culture and in 
particular through the links between self-determination and cultural property. 
Indeed, a key tenant of Cultural Indigenism, a new approach that advocates 
for indigenous values and perspectives in cultural property issues,31 focuses on 
links with self-determination.32 
Self-determination and  cultural property have been linked repeatedly by a 
variety of sources under IHRL. Broadly speaking, self-determination has been 
linked to all human rights with the  Human Rights Committee [ HRC]33 not-
ing in General Comment 12 that it is ‘apart and before all of the other rights’ 
34 in the ICCPR. Cassesse noted that self-determination is a ‘manifestation of 
the totality of rights embodied in the Covenant [ICCPR].’35 More specifĳically, 
international instruments link  self-determination with the concept of culture. 
The aforementioned CERD General Recommendation 21 which details inter-
31 Cultural Indigenism is a new approach that has emerged within the discourse of the in-
ternational framework for the protection of cultural property that has produced a surge 
of literature which advocates for indigenous values and perspectives in relation to cul-
tural property. Kuprecht identifĳies as prominent among these the writings of Elazar Bar-
kan, Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Catherine Bell and Robert K. Patterson who both constitute and 
defĳine this approach which has a ‘better understanding of indigenous cultures… [and] a 
newly defĳined respect for their diversity…’ ibid. 8-9.
32 Ibid. 18.
33 The HRC is the body charged with interpreting the rights included in the ICCPR when 
complaints are brought to it under the Optional Protocol.
34 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 12, Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/
GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 (1994) [herein after General Comment 12], at para. 1.
35 A. Cassesse, Self-Determination of Peoples (Cambridge University Press 1995) 35.
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nal  self-determination notes that it is ‘the rights of all peoples to pursue freely 
their economic, social and cultural development without interference.’36 More-
over, the abovementioned twin articles on self-determination [Article 1(3)] of 
the ICCPR and ICESCR as well as Article 3 in the Declaration also make the 
connection between self-determination and culture explicitly clear in refer-
ring to the fact that peoples and in the case of the later specifĳically Indigenous 
Peoples have the right to freely determine their cultural development. 
Consequently, it is unsurprising that  cultural rights have been linked to 
self-determination under IHRL through various decisions and instruments. 
Although the  HRC did not fĳind a violation of Article 27, in Diergaardt et al. 
v Namibia it noted that ‘the provisions of Article 1 [the right to self-determi-
nation] may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected by the 
Covenant, in particular article []… 27 [the right to enjoy one’s culture].’37 Fol-
lowing suit, in Mahuika38 the  HRC stressed once again the non-justiciability 
of self-determination but again offfered that ‘the provisions of Article 1 may be 
relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected by the Covenant, in par-
ticular Article 27.’39 Moreover, it is arguable that internal self-determination 
is also closely linked with Article 27 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights [UDHR]40 and Article 15 of the ICESCR41 as both have at their core the 
concept of  participation.
36 CERD, General Recommendation 21, (n6) para. 4 [emphasis added]. 
37 J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia, Com-
munication No. 760/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000) at para. 10.3. See also 
Mahuika v New Zealand, Communication No 547/1993, Human Rights Committee, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (27 October 2000) at para. 9.2 [hereinafter Mahuika].
38 Mahuika, (n 37).
39 Ibid. para. 9.2. Xanthaki notes that this link could be even further implicit recognition 
that Indigenous Peoples are benefĳiciaries of the right to self-determination. Xanthaki, 
(n 7) 134.
40 UDHR Article 27 reads: ‘(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural 
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientifĳic advancement and its 
benefĳits. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientifĳic, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.’ Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (1948), at Art. 27.
41 ICESCR Article 15(1) provides: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefĳits of scientifĳic 
progress and its applications; (c) To benefĳit from the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientifĳic, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author.’ ICESCR (n 5) Art. 15(1).
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The links between self-determination and culture have been especially 
encouraged in relation to Indigenous Peoples and their  cultural property. 
Thornberry notes, ‘[m]uch of the indigenous understanding and claiming 
on the issue [of cultural heritage] consists in spelling out the further impli-
cations of self-determination, indigenous peoples frequently link heritage to 
this fundamental concept.’42 Even prior to the Declaration, Indigenous Peoples 
themselves stressed the link between cultural property and self-determination 
noting that in exercising the right they must be ‘recognized as the exclusive 
owners of their cultural and  intellectual property.’43 Within the context of the 
Declaration, Indigenous Peoples continued to stress this link noting that ‘[t]
he Special Rapporteur on the protection of the cultural heritage of indigenous 
people had placed her study within the overall framework of self-determina-
tion and the working group should do the same.’44 Specifĳically, in her Study on 
the protection of the cultural and  intellectual property of indigenous peoples45 
Special Rapporteur Daes noted that:
The protection of cultural and  intellectual property is connected funda-
mentally with the realization of the territorial rights and  self-determina-
tion of indigenous peoples. Traditional knowledge of values,  autonomy 
or  self-government, social organization, managing ecosystems, maintain-
ing harmony among peoples and respecting the land is embedded in the 
arts, songs, poetry and literature which must be learned and renewed by 
each succeeding generation of indigenous children. These rich and var-
ied expressions of the specifĳic identity of each indigenous people provide 
the required information for maintaining, developing and, if necessary, 
restoring indigenous societies in all of their aspects.46 
42 Thornberry (n 8) 392.
43 The Mataatua Declaration (n 21).
44 Mr. José Urrutia, Report of the working group established in accordance with Commis-
sion on Human Rights resolution 1995/32, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/102 (1997) at para. 89. 
45 The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities en-
dorsed a study regarding the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of Indig-
enous Peoples by Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes. See Erica-Irene Daes, Study 
on the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous peoples, by Erica-
Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28(1993). 
46 Ibid. para. 4.
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Unsurprisingly, she concluded that the further erosion of their heritage will be 
destructive of their  self-determination and development.47 Daes emphasized 
this link throughout her studies on the cultural property of Indigenous Peo-
ples noting in the document following up the aforementioned study that ‘to 
be efffective, the protection of indigenous peoples’ heritage should be based 
broadly on the principle of self-determination, which includes the right and 
the duty of indigenous peoples to develop their own cultures and knowledge 
systems.’48 In her fĳinal report, Daes maintained this link adding only ‘to de-
velop their own [indigenous] cultures and knowledge systems, and forms of 
social organization.’49 
Ultimately, the logic of this link between self-determination and cultural 
property has been summarized as follows: 
Cultural property/heritage and  cultural rights both aim – at least to some 
extent – at protecting human identity. Cultural identity in its individual 
dimensions of human identity is an aspect of human dignity. Thus, the 
protection of cultural property or heritage can be seen as protecting a 
human right. Cultural identity in its collective dimension may contribute 
to constituting a group and hence be one factor giving rise to the right to 
self-determination.50
In essence,  cultural rights and  cultural property are a pre-requisite to self-de-
termination. Yet it also has been suggested that self-determination is a pre-req-
uisite to  cultural rights.51 The International Law Association noted in its 2010 
report that “[t]he recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples to determine 
their own identity and maintain and develop their cultures is deeply rooted 
47 Ibid. para. 162.
48 Erica-Irene Daes, Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, sub-
mitted in conformity with Sub-Commission resolution 1993/44 and decision 1994/105 of the 
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.3/1994/31 (1994) at para. 2. 
49 Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People: Final Report of the Special 
Rapporteur, [Annex “Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indig-
enous People” paras. 21 and 22], U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26(1995) at para. 2. 
50 K. Ziegler, ‘Cultural Heritage and Human Rights’ Working Paper No 26/2007, University 
of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2007), at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1002620.
51 A. Cristescu, Special Study in the Right to Self-determination- Historical and Current De-
velopment on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N. Doc (E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1) 
(1981) at para. 641.
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in self-determination”52 Regardless, both approaches conceptualize this link 
as one with its roots in the cultural aspect of self-determination. Ultimately, 
linking the right of self-determination with  cultural property in such a fashion 
follows a maximizing approach to self-determination. 
B The Dangers of a Maximizing Approach to Self-Determination
There are two principal approaches to self-determination in terms of its scope: 
a minimalist and a maximalist approach.53 A minimalist approach advocates 
that self-determination be viewed only as independence and has been fa-
vored by many states. Xanthaki argues that an examination of international 
documents regarding self-determination indicates that this is too restrictive 
of an understanding.54 On the other hand, a maximalist approach to self-de-
termination views it as a broad umbrella right encompassing economic and/
or cultural aspects.55 In turn, as an umbrella right, self-determination casts a 
shadow or penumbra which encompasses other aspects and their conceptual 
components; the penumbra of self-determination.56 Xanthaki notes that this 
understanding as an umbrella right is entrenched in claims: 
… for democracy and political rights; distinct political and judicial sys-
tems; territorial integrity; political independence and non-intervention; 
or concerning the name of a country and border adjustments; religious 
freedom; and educational provisions. In its distorted form, nationalism, 
fundamentalism, racism and even ethnic cleansing have all been justifĳies 
in the name of self- determination.57 
52 International Law Association, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, The Hague Conference 
(2010) 16.
53 See generally Xanthaki, (n 7)146-55.
54 Ibid. 146. 
55 Ibid. 152.
56 The expression the ‘penumbra of self-determination’ reflects that in use in U.S. Consti-
tutional law of a ‘penumbra of rights’ which refers to a group of implied rights derived 
from those explicitly laid out in the Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court offfers: ‘specifĳic 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guar-
antees that help give them life and substance.’ Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 384 
(1965). Here, I develop this term to reflect the idea that in deploying self-determination 
as an umbrella right it casts shadows or a penumbra that has the potential to incorporate 
other aspects such as cultural, economic, social and remedial aspects which in essence 
function as its implied powers. 
57 Xanthaki, (n 7)152 [citation omitted].
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In turn, many indigenous advocates follow a maximalist approach and it ap-
pears to be supported by the language of the twin article of 1(3) located in 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR which understand self-determination as a people’s 
pursuit of their ‘economic, cultural and social development.’58 
Although the maximalist approach does have its benefĳits, including view-
ing self-determination as an evolving concept which can respond to current 
international needs, there are serious issues with such an approach.59 First, to 
use self-determination as an umbrella right risks distorting its meaning and 
scope and so serves as a poor and irresponsible legislative method.60 To make 
self-determination all things to all peoples risks that it will be nothing to no 
one. In turn, this downside focuses on the risks that a maximalist approach 
to self-determination has for the right itself. However, of greater signifĳicance 
is the concern that is generated by linking self-determination to other claims. 
Xanthaki describes this as a poor tactic: 
[c]laims that are justifĳied by loose links with established rights, and even 
more so with a right as controversial as self-determination, are not con-
vincing. Very often, other human rights can serve as a legitimate basis for 
these claims, but the use of self-determination obscures this.61 
In fact, Xanthaki specifĳically highlights this danger in relation to the cultural 
aspect of the right to self- determination as an area of particular risk:
[a]dding a cultural aspect to the right of self-determination fails to pro-
vide a solid basis for culture-related claims and adds nothing to the hu-
man rights cannon; on the contrary, it practically disempowers a series 
of  cultural rights by drawing attention away from them and hinders their 
further interpretation and evolution.62 
For instance, in relation to Article 11 of the UNDRIP regarding  cultural prop-
erty:
If the right […] contained in Article 11… simply elaborate[s] upon the ap-
plication of Article 27 of the ICCPR to indigenous peoples, then the revi-
58 Ibid. 152-3.
59 Ibid. 153.
60 Ibid. 153 [citation omitted].
61 Ibid. 154 [citation omitted].
62 Ibid. 154. 
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sion [of Article 11]63 makes a signifĳicant diffference.  Restitution is no long-
er an intrinsic element of the right to enjoy culture;64 nor is it required 
as part of the cessation of an ongoing wrongful act. Instead, restitution 
becomes a possible remedy for the violation of this right.65 
However, what is novel under discussion here is that the link between  cultural 
property and self-determination does not raise these concerns, as surprisingly, 
it is not rooted in the cultural aspect of the penumbra of self-determination. 
Rather, this link approaches claims for restitution of cultural property as part 
of the remedial nature of both self-determination and cultural restitution. In-
deed, both self-determination on the one hand and cultural property in rela-
tion to the issue of its restitution on the other have remedial features that are 
ripe for analysis.
3 Under the Umbrella: The Remedial Penumbra of Self-
Determination 
The less explored penumbra of self-determination, this remedial aspect, has 
been articulated by Anaya. Specifĳically, he details two diffferent aspects of self-
determination: substantive and remedial.66 As regards the former, Anaya pro-
vides that it consists of two normative strains: constitutive self- determination 
63 Originally Article 11 was not penned as it now stands. Draft Article 12 which preceded it 
offfered: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural tra-
ditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, 
present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical 
sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and lit-
erature, as well as the right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual 
property taken without their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws, tradi-
tions and customs.’ 1994/45 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/1994/56 (1994) [emphasis added].
64 Article 27 is part of the norm of cultural integrity. As such, in theory remedial measures 
are intrinsic to this cultural right in broader IHRL although this has not played out in 
practice. See Mr. Jarle Jonassen v. Norway, Communication No. 942/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/76/D/881/1999 (2002) (casting doubt on the ability of Article 27 to remedy historical 
injustices against Indigenous Peoples; denying restitution to Indigenous Peoples in rela-
tion to their historical lands). 
65 A. F. Vrdoljack, ‘Reparations for Cultural Loss’ in F. Lenzerini (ed), Reparations for Indig-
enous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford 2008) 214. 
66 J. S. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2004) 104. 
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and on-going self-determination. Constitutive self-determination ‘requires 
that the governing institutional order be substantially the creation of pro-
cesses guided by the will of the people, or peoples, governed.’67 In turn, con-
stitutive self-determination does not specify the outcome of such processes 
but stipulates that where they occur ‘ participation and consent such that the 
end-result in the political order can be said to reflect the collective will of the 
people, or peoples concerned.’68 The on-going aspect of substantive self-deter-
mination ‘requires that the governing institutional order, independently of the 
processes leading to its creation or alteration, be one under which people may 
live and develop freely on a continuous basis.’69 In turn, this requires that both 
individuals and groups can make meaningful decisions regarding all aspects of 
their lives.70 Collectively then, substantive self-determination fuelled opposi-
tion to and the demise of colonization. 
On the other hand, remedial self-determination deals with situations that 
stray from the substantive elements of self-determination to provide for pre-
scriptions; hence in the context of colonization the remedial aspect was de-
colonization.71 Specifĳically, remedial self-determination
… is identifĳied as a universe of human rights precepts concerned broadly 
with peoples, including indigenous peoples, and grounded in the idea 
that all are equally entitled to control their own destinies. Self-determina-
tion gives rise to remedies that tear at the legacies of empire, discrimina-
tion, suppression of democratic participation, and cultural sufffocation.72
Anaya is not alone in recognizing and emphasizing a remedial aspect to self-
determination. Special Rapporteur Daes understands self- determination in a 
remedial fashion by focusing on its ability to serve as a mechanism for belated 
state-building ‘through which indigenous peoples are able to join with all the 





71 Ibid. 107. 
72 Ibid. 98. He supports such a view by suggesting that self-determination is a framework 
complemented by other human rights norms that work together to comprise a govern-
ment institutional order. Specifĳically, he argues that self-determination stands on the two 
pillars of the norms of non-discrimination and cultural integrity; norms by their nature 
which require special measures. ibid. 99. 
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many years of isolation and exclusion.’73 Further, Xanthaki understands Ben-
edict Kingsbury’s relational approach to self-determination – which focuses 
on a constructive relationship between the state and Indigenous Peoples – as 
remedial noting that it is triggered by a disruption in the relationship between 
these two groups.74
On Anaya’s understanding of remedial self-determination, it is easy to 
discern how linking this aspect of self-determination with cultural property 
requires the restitution of the latter. Indeed a few have identifĳied the rela-
tionship between self-determination and the restitution of cultural property. 
Rebecca Clements75 argues that the restitution of cultural property is the fĳirst 
step towards self-determination. Her work builds on the work of Berman.76 He 
argues that the ‘self ’ in self-determination has both a subjective and objective 
understanding. The subjective understanding is ‘constituted primarily by the 
aspirations and effforts of a people to achieve self-determination’ and results 
in the political concept of nationality, while the objective self is defĳined in 
terms of group characteristics.77 Berman considers the latter undesirable, as it 
creates the possibility that outsiders can impose identity on the group. How-
ever, Clements notes that the subjective and the objective will overlap in stable 
communities as people both identify themselves by both their group belong-
ing in the same way that they identify the other. At the root of this identity 
is tradition which changes over time as culture is constantly in a process of 
renewal and reafffĳirmation; therefore the fĳirst step towards self-determination 
is the restitution of  cultural property.78 Yet, as aforementioned it also has been 
73 Special Rapporteur Eric-Irene Daes, Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1 (1993).
74 Xanthaki, (n 7) 150. See also B. Kingsbury, ‘Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relation-
al Approach’ in P. Aikio and M. Scheinin (eds.), Operationalizing Self-Determination (Åbo 
Akademi University 2000) 24. 
75 R. Clements, ‘Misconceptions of Culture: Native Peoples and Cultural Property under Ca-
nadian Law’ 49 University of Toronto Faculty Law Review 4, 24 (1991).
76 N. Berman, ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law’ 7 Wis-
consin International Law Journal 51, 52 (1988).
77 Clements (n 75) 4.
78 Ibid. See also ibid. (n 50) (discussing how cultural property helps to fulfĳill self-determina-
tion through the conceptual link of cultural identity which in its “collective dimension 
may contribute to constituting a group and hence be one factor giving rise to the right of 
self-determination.”) ibid. Therefore, the restitution of cultural property plays a central 
role in this process of identity and so group formation for self-determination. This does 
not suggest that Indigenous Peoples do not have the right of self-determination without 
the restitution of their cultural property; rather the point is that they enjoy the right to 
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suggested that self-determination is a pre-requisite to  cultural rights.79 It also 
has been proposed that self-determination is a pre-requisite more specifĳically 
for the restitution of cultural property. Vrdoljak suggests that ‘[t]he continuing 
denial or limitation on the exercise of the right to self-determination is clearly 
manifest in respect of enjoyment and development of culture.’80 As a corollary 
then, the full right to the enjoyment of cultural property requires self-deter-
mination. In turn, Vrdoljak continues and identifĳies the right to self-determi-
nation as one of three bases for claims of cultural loss.81 Indeed, she explores 
that in fact many national initiatives for the restitution of human remains are 
based on the enjoyment of human rights and the right to self-determination.82 
Yet regardless of this causality dilemma, cultural property and its restitution 
have been linked to self-determination and it is to the importance of this link 
that this chapter now turns.
4 Paving the Way for Retroactivity?: The Importance of the 
Remedial Penumbra of Self-Determination and Cultural Property
Undoubtedly, self-determination has been linked with the cultural property 
of Indigenous Peoples.83 However, what is novel here is the link between self-
determination and the restitution of cultural property rooted in the remedial 
nature of both concepts84 and which potentially presents a signifĳicant devel-
opment in securing the restitution of the traditional cultural property of Indig-
enous Peoples. In turn, limited attention has been paid to the signifĳicance of 
remedial self-determination in relation to the restitution of cultural property 
to Indigenous Peoples. Specifĳically, linking remedial self- determination with 
restitution has the potential to pave the way for the application of the princi-
ple of retroactivity as it alters the doctrine of inter-temporal law; an alteration 
self-determination more fully where they are in possession of the past and present mani-
festations of their cultural property which form their group identity. As Steinbeck notes: 
“[h]ow can we live without our lives? How will we know it’s us without our past?” J. Stein-
beck, The Grapes of Wrath 114 (1976) reprinted in J. H. Merryman, ‘The Public Interest in 
Cultural Property’ in J. H. Merryman Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical Essays on 
Cultural Property, Art and Law (Cambridge University Press 2000) 94.
79 A. Cristescu, (n51) para. 641.
80 Vrdoljack (n 65) 198. 
81 Ibid. 203.
82 Vrdoljack (n 65) 217.
83 See ibid. Section II.
84 See ibid. Section III.
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which is crucial to the restitution of cultural property given the non-retroac-
tive nature of the repatriation debate.
A Overcoming Non-Retroactivity and Inter-Temporality
As aforementioned, the repatriation debate is characterized by its non-retroac-
tivity and is the main limitation regarding the restitution of cultural property 
to Indigenous Peoples under the current international legal framework for the 
protection of cultural property.85 Its contextualization in the Declaration does 
not automatically overcome this limitation.86 As Allen observes, the Declara-
tion is prospective on a literal reading of the text and not retroactive.87 Further, 
human rights law is not by its nature retroactive. For instance, the  HRC is pre-
cluded ratione temporis from adjudicating cases if the facts complained of date 
to a period prior to that on which the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR entered 
into force with respect to the state party concerned. Ultimately, linking self- de-
termination in its remedial aspect with the restitution of cultural property can 
pave the way for retroactivity, as it alters the doctrine of inter-temporal law. 
This principle of non-retroactivity is rooted in international law in the well-
established principle of inter-temporality.88 As Judge Huber of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration noted in the 1928 Island of Palmas Case, ‘a juridical fact 
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of 
the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to 
be settled.’89 The International Court of Justice more recently confĳirmed this 
principle in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory, noting that ‘the validity 
of a treaty concluded as long ago as the last quarter of the eighteenth century, 
in the conditions then prevailing… should not be judged upon the basis of 
practices and procedure which have since developed only gradually.’90 In turn, 
85 See ibid. Section I(D).
86 A priori, the Declaration as a soft law instrument is not enforceable rendering the issue 
of non-retroactivity moot. However, this does not detract from the merit of this line of 
inquiry and conclusion given the potential for the Declaration to crystallize on its own 
into customary international law or to serve as the basis for a future treaty. 
87 S. Allen, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Limits of the 
International Legal Project’ in S. Allen and A. Xanthaki (eds.), Reflections on the UN Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart 2011) 240 (highlighting this in relation to 
the restitution of land under Article 28 but with equal applicability to Article 11). 
88 See generally T.O. Elias, ‘The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law’ 74 American Journal of Inter-
national Law 285 (1980). See generally also F. Lenzerini (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous 
Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2008).
89 U.S. v Neth., 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 845 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 1928).
90 Port. v. India, 1960 I.C.J. 6, 37 (Apr. 12).
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non-retroactivity requires events to be judged in light of law contemporaneous 
with the claim.
Therefore, success depends on both the act complained of and when the 
act complained of took place to establish its legality or illegality. As Merryman 
notes in relation to the Elgin or Parthenon Marbles, a case with analogies with 
Indigenous Peoples’ claims for the restitution of their cultural property:
[i]n international law, however, as in domestic law, the rule is that the le-
gal efffects of a transaction depend on the law in force at the time. The jus-
tice, as well as the practical necessity of such a principle is obvious. It is 
both fair and practically advantageous that people be able to rely on the 
existing law to determine the legality of their actions. The most obvious 
applications of this principle occur in our own constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws and in our legal system’s bias against retroactive 
legislation. Thus if the removal of the marbles was proper under the then 
applicable international law, as it seems to have been, then the British are 
legally entitled to keep them.91
Indeed, the time and the historical circumstances surrounding the removal of 
the bulk of Indigenous Peoples’ cultural property often deemed such removal 
legitimate. Frequently, these wrongs emerged as a result of early adventures 
in anthropology and/or  archaeology when these disciplines fĳirst explored cul-
tural property ‘outside of the civilized world’92 and then embarked upon an 
unprecedented campaign of collection and removal often as a result of mixed 
motives which ranged from the mercenary ‘fortune and glory kid, fortune and 
glory’93 to the paternalistic and even the outright egregious. This was especially 
true in the case of the collection of  human remains at the hands of archaeolo-
gists, anthropologists and government offfĳicials often working in conjunction 
in the name of pseudo-scientifĳic research to confĳirm the intellectual, racial 
and overall inferiority of Indigenous Peoples and their culture as a means to 
justify their subjugation if not elimination. Commonly referred to as Cultural 
Darwinism,94 ultimately these wrongs were part of the broader historical pat-
tern of  colonialism and nation-building that required either the assimilation 
or destruction of indigenous culture which was supported and deemed legiti-
91 Merryman (n 20) 1900. 
92 M. Lindsay, ‘The Recovery of Cultural Artifacts: The Legacy of our Archaeological Herit-
age’ 22 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 165, 167 (1990).
93 Indiana Jones and The Temple of Doom (Paramount Pictures 1984). 
94 Kuprecht (n 17) 12. 
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mate by the government, public policy and contemporaneous law and subse-
quently enforced by the courts.95 
Therefore as aforementioned, linking self-determination in its remedial 
aspect with the restitution of cultural property is particularly vital to the ef-
forts of Indigenous Peoples to secure such restitution, as it paves the way for 
retroactive application by altering the doctrine of inter-temporal law which 
characterizes the repatriation debate.
The modern international law of self-determination, however, forges 
exceptions to or alters the doctrine [] of … intertemporal law. Pursuant 
to the principle of self-determination the international community has 
deemed illegitimate historical patterns giving rise to colonial rule and has 
promoted corresponding remedial measures… notwithstanding the law 
contemporaneous with the historical colonial patterns. Decolonization 
demonstrates that constitutional process may be judged retroactively in 
light of self-determination values – notwithstanding… contemporaneous 
legal doctrine – where such processes remain relevant to the legitimacy 
of governmental authority or otherwise manifest themselves in contem-
porary inequities.96 
B The Dangers of Remedial Self-Determination? 
However, as with the maximizing approach to self-determination, there are 
issues with the remedial approach to self-determination that may not deem it 
a fĳit tool to secure the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples. 
Specifĳically, remedial self-determination which comes in the form of secession 
or independence is not a rule of international law outside of decolonization. 
Some scholars have suggested that aside from colonization, external self-de-
termination can be exercised in the face of gross violations of human rights 
where peoples are so severely persecuted or mistreated that it is necessary to 
preserve their existence. Thornberry is a leading proponent of such a position 
which he has gleaned from Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire, though he 
notes it is by no means completely clear.97 In addition, numerous other schol-
ars support this view of remedial secession.98 In turn, the external variant of 
95 See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823). 
96 Anaya, (n 66) 107.
97 Thornberry (n 8) 257. Thornberry also relies on the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law to support this theorem concerning the relationship between misgovernment 
and self-determination. Ibid. 95.
98 See Xanthaki, (n 7) 141-3 (detailing scholars that support this view). 
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self-determination starts to look more like a remedy; a remedy which began as 
a measure to rectify colonization and now has been extended to gross viola-
tions of human rights. However, as Xanthaki notes, this approach necessarily 
raises the issue of the interpretation: who decides what sufffĳices as grounds for 
remedial secession and what constitutes a gross violation of human rights?99 
Moreover, Xanthaki also points out that it is by no means guaranteed that this 
relationship between self-determination and remedial secession for gross vio-
lations of human rights exists under international law.100 
To a certain extent, this calls into question the strength of the argument 
here for using the remedial aspect of self-determination to secure the resti-
tution of cultural property. First, this situation of the restitution of cultural 
property is outside of the established context of colonization for remedial self-
determination. Second, arguably the matter of securing the restitution of cul-
tural property to Indigenous Peoples is also beyond the less well-established 
context of remedial self-determination as a remedy for gross violations of 
human rights.101 However, two counterpoints should be noted. First, the hu-
man rights violation under discussion here of the removal of cultural property 
as part and parcel of the incidents of  colonialism very closely approximates 
the situation of  colonialism where remedial external self-determination has 
been deemed acceptable as a rule of IHRL. Second, the remedy here in the 
context of this violation of human rights [the removal of cultural property] is 
not that of secession or independence under the more controversial aspect of 
external self-determination but a remedy that would fall under internal self-
determination:102 the restitution of cultural  property in the form of the  owner-
99 Ibid. 143-5. Ultimately, she argues that the interpretation must be on an ad hoc basis and 
the interpreter must be the international community in the form of the U.N. General As-
sembly. Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Although, it does remain difffĳicult to see how the wholesale removal of cultural property 
– often forcibly – from Indigenous Peoples during colonialism is not a gross violation of 
human rights. This is a direct example of the issue of interpretation raised by Xanthaki. 
See Xanthaki, (n 99) and accompanying text. However, this removal is a violation of hu-
man rights. Yet regardless, the issue remains that use of remedial self-determination for 
gross violations of human rights is not an established principle of international law.
102 Note, Anaya proposes this dichotomy between constitutive and remedial self-determi-
nation as an alternative to the internal/external divide prevalent in IHRL. See ibid. Sec-
tion I(A)(discussing internal and external modalities of self-determination). He rejects 
this traditional dichotomy on the grounds that it is premised on an untenable position: 
a world comprised of a limited number of ‘peoples’ in mutually exclusive communities 
– i.e. states. Anaya (n 66) 105. Alternatively, he proposes this dichotomy as it recognizes 
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ship,  possession and control of such property. In turn, this similarity regarding 
 colonialism and this diffference regarding internal self-determination militates 
against the criticisms leveled at the concept of remedial self-determination 
as a mechanism to secure the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous 
Peoples. Nonetheless, it is necessary to ask: are there any alternative avenues 
even better equipped to secure retroactivity than the remedial facet of the pe-
numbra of self-determination?
5 Alternative Avenues? International Humanitarian Law and 
Continuing Violations
It is arguable that retroactivity could be achieved without resorting to any of 
the aspects of self-determination via importing precedent developed in Inter-
national Humanitarian Law (IHL) and/or the concept in IHRL of continuing 
violations. However, each of these alternatives face serious issues. 
A International Humanitarian Law
The precedent from IHL stems from the aftermath of the Second World War. 
It concerns the Allied program of restitution for cultural  property confĳiscated 
by the Nazis in Germany since 1933 in the Declaration of the Allied Nations 
against Dispossession Committed in Territories under enemy Occupation or 
Control (London Declaration) of 1943,103 which has been described as ‘an act 
of humanitarian intervention by the international community in the domestic 
activities of a state’.104 It was so far reaching that it was suggested that this pro-
gram represented new principles of international law.105 In this regime, there 
are a number of signifĳicant features that could prove helpful for indigenous ef-
the reality that of today’s world that there are multiple human associations ‘including but 
not exclusively those organized around the state, [and so] it is distorting to attempt to or-
ganize self-determination precepts into discrete internal versus external spheres defĳined 
by reference to presumptively mutually exclusive peoples.’ Ibid. In turn, presumably for 
Anaya such a statement/criticism that there is no guarantee of a relationship between 
external self-determination and remedial session for human rights violations does not 
resonate with his notion of self-determination. 
103 5 January 1943, 8 Dep’t St. Bull. (1943) 21. See generally A. F. Vrdoljak, ‘Genocide and Restitu-
tion: Ensuring Each Group’s Contribution to Humanity’ 22 European Journal of Interna-
tional Law 17, 25-28 (2011)(discussing the London Declaration generally). 
104 Vrdoljak (n 103) 25 [citation omitted].
105 Ibid. 27 [citation omitted].
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forts to achieve the restitution of cultural property in general and in particular 
to overcome the hurdle of inter-temporal law. 
In general, it could help flesh out the details and provide clarity to any resti-
tution of cultural property that occurs under Article 11 which is left open on its 
face. Under this IHL regime, restitution applied to transactions ‘even when they 
purported to be voluntary in efffect.’106 In essence, a presumption was made in 
favor of the claimant that any transaction during the period of National So-
cialism constituted a confĳiscation, if the individual from whom the property 
was confĳiscated was a member of a group subject to persecution because of 
race,  religion, nationality, ideology or political opposition to National Social-
ism, or because of any threats or duress, by government act or abuse of such 
act, and as the result of measures taken by the Nazi regime and its afffĳiliates.107 
The possessor carried the burden of proof that the cultural  property had been 
acquired through a ‘normal transaction’ and proof of payment was not suf-
fĳicient to overcome this burden.108 When assessing claims for restitution, due 
recognition was to be given to the difffĳiculties faced by claimants especially in 
relation to the production of evidence through the loss of documents, death or 
unavailability of the witnesses or their residence abroad.109 Finally, there was 
no time limit attached to this restitution scheme.110 Many of the transactions 
under  colonialism regarding the transfer of cultural property from Indigenous 
Peoples also generate signifĳicant evidentiary problems because of the time 
that has passed and also their nature as colonial suggests dubious transfers. 
These presumptions in IHL in favor of claimants would work to the benefĳit 
of Indigenous Peoples in relation to the restitution of their cultural property 
if applied to IHRL to flesh out the details of Article 11 and/or any future treaty 
right. 
Beyond this, this IHL model of restitution may also be helpful in overcom-
ing the hurdle of inter-temporal law without resort to the remedial aspect of 
self-determination. By its very nature this IHL regime was both retroactive111 
106 Dep’t St. Bull. (n 103) 65.
107 Vrdoljak, (n 103) 26 [citation omitted].
108 Ibid. 26 [citations omitted].
109 Ibid. 26-7 [citations omitted].
110 Ibid. 27 [citations omitted].
111 This is not the only example of a retroactive application of the law in IHL in relation 
to the restitution of cultural property. UN Security Council Resolution 1483 which was 
passed in response to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 required member states to return cul-
tural property illegally removed from Iraq not only from 2003 onwards but since 6 August 
1990, the date of the fĳirst invasion of Iraq. See Security Council Resolution 1483, P7, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003). 
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and applied to transfers regardless of the apparent legality of the transaction 
at the time. Specifĳically, in creating this restitution scheme Allied governments 
recognized that the confĳiscation of property was part and parcel of the pro-
gram of persecution of groups and incorporated into domestic law as a mean 
of legitimization. Therefore, regardless of the lex loci, it was not permissible ‘to 
plead that an act was not wrongful or contra bonos mores because it conformed 
with a prevailing ideology concerning discrimination against individuals’ be-
longing to particular groups.’112 
Hence, these principles of this post-Second World War scheme for the res-
titution of cultural  property could prove signifĳicant for Indigenous Peoples 
claims under Article 11 of the Declaration. In general, the IHL principles could 
help flesh out details and provide clarity to any restitution that occurs under 
Article 11 which is left open by its language. In particular, these principles could 
also prove important in overcoming the hurdle of non-retroactivity and the 
related issue of inter-temporal law faced by Indigenous Peoples in their quest 
for restitution under IHRL without resort to any link with remedial self-deter-
mination .113 However, the issue with this approach lies in the fact that these 
principles, however helpful, are precedents that exist within the context of IHL 
rather than IHRL and that the removal of indigenous cultural property under 
discussion herein has not usually occurred in the situation of armed conflict.
B Continuing Violations
The concept of the doctrine of continuing violations in IHRL serves as an ex-
ception to the rule of non-retroactivity by allowing the admission of claims 
otherwise inadmissible ratione temporis. This doctrine also could potentially 
overcome the hurdle of inter-temporal law without resort to the remedial 
penumbra of self-determination. Arguably the doctrine of continuing viola-
tions has its roots in an evolutionary approach to inter-temporality. In the 
aforementioned Island of Palmas Case, Judge Huber of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration noted that ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of 
the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a 
dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.’114 Yet, he continued to note 
that sovereignty over the Palmas Islands was at the time based upon the rule of 
discovery but that the maintenance of sovereignty depended on how the law 
112 Vrdoljak (n 103) 26 [citations omitted].
113 See ibid. Section I(D) and Section IV.(A) discussing the issue of non-retroactivity and the 
related issue of inter-temporality as the main problem for Indigenous Peoples in securing 
the restitution of cultural property).
114 U.S. v Neth. (n 89) 845.
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and fact evolved. In essence, he took an evolutionary approach to the rule of 
inter-temporality allowing in this particular case for the original title to divest 
based on legal developments.115 
Despite some suggestion that this “extension” of the rule of inter-temporal-
ity has not been followed,116 this evolutionary approach was also taken in sub-
sequent cases such as Advisory Opinion on Namibia.117 Further, the Institute de 
Droit International adopted a resolution in 1975 which provides that the legal-
ity or the illegality of an historical act must be judged according to the law in 
force at the time but that the continuing efffects of these events can be judged 
by more recent standards.118 In turn, continuing violations operate in a situa-
tion where the alleged violation of a right took place before the relevant treaty 
entered into force. Continuing violations allow for consideration of the alleged 
violation where it has or continues to have efffects after the treaty enters into 
force thereby overcoming its non-retroactivity. 
Indeed, Indigenous Peoples and their advocates have highlighted the need 
for the concept of continuing violations in light of the non-retroactivity of 
IHRL and have made use of it to their benefĳit. In The Case of the Moiwana Vs. 
Suriname Community,119 the concept of continuing violations had to be uti-
lized as Suriname did not recognize the jurisdiction of the  Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights [ IACtHR] until November 1987 and the alleged inci-
dent under consideration took place in November 1986. At issue was a mili-
tary operation carried out by the State in the village of the Moiwana where 
thirty-nine unarmed members of the community were killed. The  IACtHR held 
that it did not have jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the events of this 
armed attack in November 1986 but that it did possess jurisdiction through 
the concept of continuing violations to examine just that; the efffects which 
continued to exist in the community of the Moiwana and of course events 
which occurred after Suriname recognized jurisdiction.120 Specifĳically, the 
115 See Dinah Shelton, ‘The Present Value of Past Wrongs’ in F. Lenzerini (ed.), Reparations for 
Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press 
2008) 62. 
116 See Anthony D’Amato, International Law, ‘Intertemporal Problems’ in Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law 1236 (1992).
117 Legal Consequence for the States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opin-
ion, (1971) ICJ Rep. 16 reprinted in Shelton (n 115) 63.
118 Shelton, (n 115) 63.
119 Caso de la Comunidad Moiwana v. Suriname. Execepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Repara-
ciones y Costas. Judgment of June 15, 2005.
120 Ibid. para. 39.
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court found that the forced displacement of the community from their lands 
was a continuing violation as they could not return and in turn linked this 
internal displacement with violations of the  American Convention on Human 
Rights [ ACHR] including the right to personal integrity, the right to private 
property, freedom of movement and residence, the right to a fair trial and the 
right to judicial protection.121 Therefore, the concept of continuing violations 
was the key to fĳinding state liability. Further, within the specifĳic context of the 
restitution of the cultural  property and human remains, Indigenous Peoples 
have highlighted the need for the concept of continuing violations in light of 
the non-retroactivity of human rights law. Prior to the adoption of the Human 
Tissue Act 2004 in the UK, which is legislation that is explicitly retroactive that 
allows for [but does not compel] the restitution of  human remains to Indige-
nous Peoples,122 it was recognized by indigenous advocates that under existing 
human rights law such as the Human Rights Act that the date of acquisition 
of human remains was a highly unlikely route to follow since museums would 
have had such remains in their collection for many years. In turn, Kevin Cham-
berlain and the Working Group on Human Remains argued that the retention 
of human remains at a  museum is an offfense which continued to violate the 
community’s right every day that the remains are kept from their rightful rest-
ing place. In essence, the retention of human remains presents a continuing 
violation and so time would begin to run when a request for return is made and 
refused thereby overcoming the issue of non-retroactivity.123 
However, the concept of continuing violations does not provide a secure 
method to overcome non-retroactivity. In particular, continuing violations 
would be on shaky grounds in securing retroactivity in relation to cases of 
restitution rooted in cultural renewal. Yet, even beyond situations regarding 
renewal, continuing violations remain a tenuous tool as the jurisprudence of 
the  HRC in relation to continuing violations demonstrates that it is unclear. 
In J.L. v Australia,124 the complainant was a solicitor who refused to pay the 
annual fee required by the Law Institute of Victoria on the grounds that he 
121 Mauricio Iván Del Toro Huerta, ‘The Contributions of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights to the Confĳiguration of Collective Property Rights of Indig-
enous People’s’ 10 at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/sela/Del_Toro.pdf.
122 Section 47 allows a select group of nine museums to de-accession human remains from 
their collections provided that they are less than 1,000 years old when the legislation 
comes into force. However, it does not require this return. See Human Tissue Act 2004, c. 
30 Part 3 Miscellaneous Section 47. 
123 K. Chamberlain, We Need to Lay Our Ancestors to Rest – The Repatriation of Indigenous 
Human Remains and the Human Rights Act, at 337.
124 J.L. v. Australia, Communication No. 491/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/45/D/491/1992 (1994). 
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considered recent fee increases invalid. Yet, he continued to practice law with-
out a certifĳicate denied to him by the Institute on the grounds of this refusal of 
payment. Further, at the request of the Institute the Supreme Court of Victoria 
fĳined him, struck him of the roll of barristers and solicitors and ordered that he 
be imprisoned for contempt of court. The complainant alleged a violation of 
Article 14 proceedings before an independent and impartial tribunal; though 
the alleged violations took place before entry into force of the Optional Proto-
col for Australia in 1991 he argued that they had continuing efffects. The  HRC 
agreed and noted that although the denial of an impartial and fair hearing 
took place before 1991 ‘the efffects of the decision taken by the Supreme Court 
continue until the present time. Accordingly, complaints about violations of 
the author’s rights allegedly ensuing from these decisions are not in principle 
excluded.’125 
By contrast, in Kurowski v Poland 126 the  HRC found that the complaint was 
inadmissible ratione temporis. Here, the complainant alleged a violation of Ar-
ticle 25 of the ICCPR which offfers the right to have access on terms of equality 
to public services in the country of the individual. Specifĳically, the complainant 
was dismissed from his public service position allegedly on the grounds of po-
litical persecution as a result of his afffĳiliation with the Polish United Workers’ 
Party and leftist views but as the dismissal took place in 1990 before entry into 
force of the Optional Protocol for Poland in 1991, the  HRC found it inadmis-
sible. As the ICCPR Commentary notes, it is difffĳicult to discern the distinction 
between these two cases where in the former striking offf the roll of solicitors 
was considered admissible as a continuing violation and in the later dismissal 
as a public servant was not considered as such; at best it is suggested that strik-
ing offf continues to deny an individual access to their livelihood whereas dis-
missal from a public service job does not preclude an individual from seeking 
another public service job.127 
However, if this is splitting hairs, then in the following cases the diffference 
on which side of the line the decisions fall in relation to continuing violations 
is almost imperceptible. In contrast to Kurowski, in Aduayom et al v Tongo,128 
the complaint was considered admissible despite the factual similarity. Here, 
125 Ibid. para. 4.2.
126 Mr. Eugeniusz Kurowski v. Poland, Communication No. 872/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/77/D/872/1999 (2003).
127 S. Joseph et al., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, 
and Commentary (2nd ed. Oxford University Pres 2005) 62.
128 Aduayom et al. v. Togo, Communications Nos. 422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990 (1996).
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the complainants like Kurowski also alleged that their dismissal from civil ser-
vice was the result of political persecution and again, the alleged violation took 
place before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol respectively 1985 and 
1988. Yet the  HRC, unlike Kurowski, found the case admissible noting that 
… the alleged violations had continuing efffect after the entry into force of 
the Optional Protocol for Togo, in that the authors were denied reinstate-
ment in their posts until… 1991… and that no payment of salary arrears or 
other forms of  compensation had been afffected. The Committee consid-
ered that these continuing efffects could be seen as an afffĳirmation of the 
previous violations allegedly committed by the State party. It therefore 
concluded that it was not precluded ratione temporis from examining the 
communications… 
As the ICCPR Commentary notes, it is extremely difffĳicult to locate a distinction 
between these two cases which deems the former inadmissible and the later 
admissible; it is offfered that a possible diffference could lie in that the alleged 
political persecution in the later was more clear but the perceived merits of 
a complaint are not the grounds on which it is deemed inadmissible ratione 
temporis.129 
In sum, after Kurowski the line between continuing and non-continuing vio-
lations is ambiguous at best. With the murky waters of continuing violations, 
the stretch into IHL and at least questions surrounding the promise of the con-
cept of remedial self-determination, where does this leave Indigenous Peoples 
in their quest for the restitution of their traditional cultural  property? 
Some Conclusions: General vs. Specifĳic Rights Regarding the 
 Restitution of Cultural Property to Indigenous Peoples 
Indigenous Peoples stress that the restitution of cultural property is integral 
to the maintenance, development and renewal of their culture and identities 
as they emerge from the shadows of imperialism and  colonialism. Indeed, 
past centuries saw the removal of much of their cultural property as part and 
parcel of the process of marginalization and assimilation that they sufffered 
at the hands of the dominate state. In turn, ‘[i]n the context of indigenous 
claims for reparations, restitution is the most unsettling for states because it 
often involves a direct confrontation with colonial and assimilation policies 
129 S. Joseph et al. (n 127) 63.
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and practices.’130 Yet Indigenous Peoples view restitution as vital to building, 
maintaining and developing their culture, overcoming these injustices and 
even their survival in the 21st century. Dodson, an indigenous activist notes: 
‘[a]s indigenous peoples, we are acutely aware that our survival as peoples de-
pends on the vitality of our culture. The deepest wound that colonization has 
inflicted has come from a process of stripping us of our distinct identities and 
cultures.’131 The link between cultural property and restitution and self-deter-
mination  becomes more evident because the restitution of cultural property is 
a victory, even if partial, over assimilationist policies as it can lead to cultural 
development and renewal. 
Claims for the restitution of cultural property are not simply cultural claims 
but are also remedial claims aimed at rectifying the disastrous impacts of colo-
nization. This chapter argued that both cultural claims and remedial claims 
exist in the multi-faceted penumbra of self-determination; respectively the 
cultural and remedial aspects of self-determination. While the linkages be-
tween self-determination and cultural property rooted in the cultural aspect 
of self-determination have been explored, less attention has been paid to the 
remedial aspect of self-determination. Yet this remedial aspect of self-determi-
nation provides a conceptual link to cultural property and its restitution and is 
of profound signifĳicance as a tool in relation to the restitution of cultural prop-
erty. This chapter has sought to rectify this lacuna by exploring the relationship 
between self-determination and cultural property and its restitution at the in-
tersection of their remedial aspects. It demonstrated that aside from some lim-
ited concerns with the conceptualization of self-determination as remedial, 
this facet of self-determination is crucial to the continuing effforts to secure 
the restitution of cultural  property to Indigenous Peoples by overcoming the 
non-retroactivity at the heart of the repatriation debate. Finally, in light of the 
limited concerns with remedial self-determination this chapter has explored 
alternative avenues to secure retroactivity ultimately concluding that these al-
ternatives pale in comparison with the remedial aspect of self-determination.
130 Vrdoljak (n 65) 213. 
131 M. Dodson, Cultural Rights and Educational Responsibilities, The Frank Archibald Memo-
rial Lecture, University of New England, 5 September 1994 cited in Moira Simpson, ‘Mu-
seums and restorative justice: heritage, repatriation and cultural education’ 61 Museum 
International 121, 123 (2009). Simpson details evidence that suggests that cultural renewal 
has a positive efffect on the survival of Indigenous Peoples who have endured colonial and 
post-colonial trauma. 
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Yet one obvious objection remains: what if the UNDRIP has already over-
come non-retroactivity. In contrast to Allen,132 Vrdoljak starts from the posi-
tion that the UNDRIP by its nature is retroactive.133 Indeed, this is a viable ap-
proach given that the Declaration is part of a specifĳic category of rights, i.e.  sui 
generis rights for Indigenous Peoples.134 Sui generis rights are not rights derived 
from a positive legal system but rather in the case of Indigenous Peoples ‘arise 
sui generis from the historical condition of indigenous peoples as distinctive 
societies with the aspiration to survive as such.’135 Difffering from broader IHRL 
which is non-retroactive, its sui generis nature opens up the possibility that it 
is not bound by the same principles given the focus of sui generis rights not on 
the positive legal system but on social consequences. 
However, this objection is not fatal to the signifĳicance of this inquiry into 
the remedial penumbra of self-determination  as a means to secure the restitu-
tion of cultural  property by breaking the bonds of non-retroactivity. As Gilbert 
notes in what is essentially part of the general versus specifĳic rights debate:
… the choice might not be of one versus another. Rather, an adequate 
level of protection for indigenous peoples might be based on both paths. 
On the one hand, general human rights norms of non-discrimination and 
equality are flexible enough to include some protection for indigenous 
peoples, but on the other hand, such flexibility relies on a parallel devel-
opment of a specifĳic regime of protection… Hence, the development of 
jurisprudence from the UN human rights treaty bodies… on the rights 
of indigenous peoples does not preclude the development of a specifĳic 
regime. Quite the opposite; these developments indicate that ‘the evolu-
tion of the times’ supports the emergence of a specifĳic focus on the pro-
tection of indigenous peoples.136
In turn this opens up the further possibility that when considered in tandem, 
despite their varying degree of issues, remedial self-determination, precedent 
132 Allen (n 87) 40.
133 Vrdoljak, (n 65) 214.
134 Interestingly, Indigenous Peoples deny the sui generis nature of the Declaration. However, 
this seems borne more from clever political advocacy and strategy rather than reality. See 
generally Allen, (n 87). 
135 H. Berman, ‘Are Indigenous Populations Entitled to International Juridical Personality?’ 
79 American Society of International Law Proc. (1989)193 reprinted in J. Gilbert, ‘Indig-
enous Rights in the Making: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of indigenous 
Peoples’ International Journal on Minority and Groups Rights 14 (2007)207, 210. 
136 Gilbert (n 135)211.
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from IHL and continuing violations present a bulk of evidence suggesting the 
nascent development of retroactivity for the restitution of cultural  property to 
Indigenous Peoples in broader IHRL that indeed complements any retroactiv-
ity in the  sui generis scheme of the soft law Declaration.
Reparations for Wrongs against Indigenous 
Peoples’ Cultural Heritage
Federico Lenzerini
1 Introduction: The Signifĳicance of Cultural Heritage for 
Indigenous Peoples
“Heritage is everything that defĳines our distinct identities as peoples. It is be-
stowed on us by our ancestors and endowed to us by nature. It includes our 
socio-political, cultural and economic systems and institutions; our worldview, 
belief systems, ethics and moral values; our customary laws and norms […] 
It includes  traditional knowledge, which is the creative production of human 
thought and craftsmanship, language, cultural expressions which are created, 
acquired and inspired, such as songs, dances, stories, ceremonies, symbols 
and designs, poetry, artworks; scientifĳic, agricultural, technical and  ecological 
knowledge and the skills required to implement this knowledge and technolo-
gies. Heritage includes human genetic material and ancestral  human remains. 
It includes what we inherited from nature such as the  natural features in our 
territories and  landscapes, biodiversity which consists of plants and animals, 
cultigens, micro-organisms and the various ecosystems which we have nur-
tured and sustained. It includes our sacred cites, sites of historical signifĳicance, 
burial sites. It also includes all documentation of us on fĳilm, photographs, vid-
eotapes and audiotapes, scientifĳic and ethnographic research reports, books 
and papers. Our heritage cannot be separated into component parts. It should 
be regarded as a single integrated, interdependent whole. We do not award 
diffferent values to diffferent aspects of our heritage […] We do not diffferenti-
ate levels of protection to the diffferent aspects of our heritage. All aspects are 
equal and require equal respect, safeguarding and protection. In the same vein, 
we do not see protection of our rights to our cultures as separate from territo-
rial rights and our right of  self-determination”.1
As epitomized by the quote above, the concept of indigenous cultural herit-
age is a very complex one. It goes much beyond the idea of cultural heritage 
prevailing in the Western world and adopted by most pertinent international 
legal instruments. Its existence and characterization are determined by the ho-
1 Mililani Trask, Leader of the Indigenous World Association. Taken from <www.galdu.org/
web/index.php?odas=3366&giella1=eng> accessed 21 July 2015.
© 2017 Federico Lenzerini. isbn 978-90-04-34218-7. pp. 327-346
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listic and spiritual vision of life of indigenous peoples themselves. Its compo-
nents cannot be separated from each other, because it would be tantamount 
to separating the components of a living body and pretending that such a body 
would live and work properly. In the majority of cases its signifĳicance and val-
ue cannot be measured on the basis of objective criteria – like, e.g., economic, 
artistic, or architectural worth – but rather on the basis of its ethnological 
meaning, i.e. how signifĳicant and valuable a given element of cultural heritage 
is perceived to be by its holders and bearers. An indigenous community fĳinds 
its reason for existence in its own cultural heritage, through establishing with 
it a process of symbiosis, which reaches the point of leading the community to 
coincide with its own heritage itself.
In attempting to provide a defĳinition of indigenous cultural heritage, one 
might refer to the one offfered by the UNESCO Mexico City Declaration on 
Cultural Policies of 1982, according to which the cultural heritage of a people 
“includes the works of its artists, architects, musicians, writers and scientists 
and also the work of anonymous artists, expressions of the people’s spiritual-
ity, and the body of values which give meaning to life. It includes both  tan-
gible and  intangible works through which the creativity of that people fĳinds 
expression: languages, rites, beliefs, historic places and monuments, literature, 
works of art, archives and libraries”.2 This defĳinition is, however, too narrow. 
Indeed, for indigenous peoples cultural heritage includes not only the tangible 
and intangible products created by the community and/or its members, but 
also the  natural “background” in which they are located – i.e. land and  natural 
resources – as well as the animate and inanimate components of the human 
person, including genetic materials and mortal remains. In addition, as previ-
ously mentioned, indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage represents a complex 
reality in the context of which all elements – including tangible properties and 
intangible heritage – are holistically intertwined as essential elements of the 
cultural identity of indigenous communities themselves, being therefore in-
separable from each other. This is a common feature of all elements of indig-
enous existence, including human rights as well as all animate and inanimate 
beings existing in the world.
The purpose of the present contribution is to explain the decisive role of 
 reparation in the event of wrongs sufffered by indigenous peoples relating to 
their cultural heritage, as well as to ascertain the present status of internation-
al law in the fĳield, in light of the pertinent rules and relevant practice. Also, 
attention will be devoted to the critical factors which in some cases can make 
2 See <http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/fĳiles/12762/11295421661mexico_en.pdf/mexico_
en.pdf> accessed 6 September 2015, 23.
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it hard to translate existing rules into concrete practice, and to the steps which 
should be taken to increase the efffective realization of the right of indigenous 
peoples to  reparation for cultural-heritage-related wrongs.
2 The Role of Reparations and the Status of the Right to Redress in 
International Law, with Special Regard to Indigenous Peoples
Reparation represents the necessary therapy for the “pathological phase” of 
human rights.
In a sense, enjoyment of human rights is like living life. Sometimes human 
beings are lucky enough to live their lives without serious impediments and 
without experiencing any signifĳicant threat to their health until they get very 
old. In many cases, however, during the course of their life individuals have to 
experience serious diseases or other dangers threatening their life and, when 
this happens, they need to have access to all possible remedies which are likely 
to solve the problem. When no such remedy is available, the resulting loss – i.e. 
the life of the person – is irreplaceable. Similar considerations may be devel-
oped with respect to human rights. At present, legal rules proclaiming human 
rights exist virtually everywhere in the world, and it is possible to assume that 
human beings are automatically protected by virtue of those rules. It may be 
possible that, during the whole course of her life, a person will not experience 
any violation of her legally recognized rights. Conversely, in most cases people 
are not so lucky. When a breach of human rights takes place, one of the funda-
mental cornerstones of human societies is infringed – as the very foundations 
of human co-existence and its social basis are offfended – and some action to 
remedy such breach is therefore indispensable. In this respect, the necessary 
ultimate treatment to remedy human rights breaches is indeed reparation. It 
follows that human rights cannot be efffective if appropriate reparation is not 
ensured in the event of a violation. Such an essential role of reparation in the 
dynamics of human rights is symbolized by the words of the  Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights ( IACtHR), according to which the obligation to repair 
human rights breaches represents “a customary norm that constitutes one of 
the basic principles of contemporary international law on State responsibility”.3
Once the signifĳicance of reparation in the general context of human rights is 
properly understood, further considerations are needed to appropriately com-
prehend its particular importance when indigenous peoples are concerned. In 
3 See Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Series C No. 116, Judg-
ment of 19 November 2004, 52.
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fact, the efffects of violations of human rights may be drastically diffferent, de-
pending on their overall impact on the life of the victim(s). Needless to say that 
the more such an impact is signifĳicant, the more  reparation is indispensable. 
With respect to indigenous peoples, in many cases the wrongs they are forced 
to sufffer as a result of the violation of their rights reach the point of disrupting 
the whole life of the community, sometimes even having an intergenerational 
dimension. This is due to the previously noted holistic and spiritual vision of 
life characterizing most such communities, in the context of which all human 
rights have a communal dimension and are interdependent. Consequently, 
most wrongs do not afffect one right only, or the rights of certain members 
of the community only, but reverberate on the whole existence and stability 
of the community itself. To illustrate the point, let us assume that a violation 
of indigenous peoples’ land rights is committed: such violation also implies 
the impossibility for the community concerned to properly enjoy its right to 
 self-determination and  autonomy as well as its  cultural rights, because all such 
rights fĳind their own raison-d’être and concrete realization on the ancestral ter-
ritories traditionally occupied by the community. Similarly, the killing of mem-
bers of the community usually afffects not only the families of the victims, but 
also the community as a whole. Similar considerations apply to violations af-
fecting the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples, understood in accordance 
with the broad understanding described above.
Concrete examples of the inter-link just explained are, once again, offfered 
by the practice of the  IACtHR. One of its judgments, in particular, offfers a for-
midable description of the complexity as well as of the collective characteriza-
tion of reparation for wrongs sufffered by indigenous peoples. The case con-
cerned a massacre perpetrated in 1986 by the army of Suriname in the ancestral 
territories of the Moiwana community, when their village was also razed to the 
ground and many survivors of the massacre were forced to flee. Among the 
various aspects of the case considered by the Court, the fact that the victims 
did not have any access to judicial guarantees and judicial protection attains 
particular signifĳicance for our purposes. In this respect, the  IACtHR went be-
yond its previous jurisprudence,4 according to which, in general terms, “a long-
standing absence of efffective remedies is typically considered by the Court as 
a source of sufffering and anguish for victims and their family members”.5 In 
fact, the Court stressed that, in light of the specifĳic cultural views and beliefs of 
4 See Case of the Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C 
No. 120, Judgment of 1 March 2005, 113-115.
5 See Case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Series C No. 124, Judgment of 15 June 2005, 94. 
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the community concerned, “the ongoing impunity [had caused] a particularly 
severe impact upon the Moiwana villagers, as a N’djuka people […] [because] 
justice and collective responsibility are central precepts within traditional 
N’djuka society”.6 As a consequence, in determining reparation for the moral 
damages sufffered by the members of the Moiwana community, the  IACtHR 
took into account “their inability, despite persistent effforts, to obtain justice for 
the attack on their village, particularly in light of the N’djuka emphasis upon 
punishing offfenses in a proper manner […]. Such long-standing impunity […] 
humiliates and infuriates the community members, as much as it fĳills them 
with dread that offfended spirits will seek revenge upon them”.7 Furthermore, 
the Court also considered the “deep anguish and despair” sufffered by the 
members of the community surviving the massacre, as they were impeded to 
honour and bury their loved ones in accordance with the fundamental norms 
of their own culture. Indeed, since the community had been prevented from 
performing its various death rituals according to its culture, “the community 
members fear “spiritually-caused illnesses,” which they believe can afffect the 
entire natural lineage and, if reconciliation is not achieved, will persist through 
generations”.8 Last but not least, the  IACtHR included among the moral dam-
ages to be repaired the forced displacement of the Moiwana community 
members from the community’s traditional land, which had “devastated them 
emotionally, spiritually, culturally, and economically”, on account of the “vital 
spiritual, cultural and material importance” of their relationship with their an-
cestral territory.9
The latter point was very signifĳicantly reiterated in a later judgment, in 
which the Court, in determining  reparation for non-pecuniary damage suf-
fered by an indigenous community relocated from its ancestral lands, declared 
that it was going to “assess the special meaning that land has for indigenous 
peoples […] This means that any denial of the enjoyment or exercise of prop-
erty rights harms values that are very signifĳicant to the members of those peo-
ples, who run the risk of losing or sufffering irreparable harm to their life and 
identity and to the cultural heritage to be passed on to future generations”.10 
In this respect, the Court did not miss the opportunity to emphasize the inher-
ent collective nature of the ancestral relationship between indigenous com-
6 Ibid. 95.
7 Ibid. 195 a).
8 Ibid. 195 b).
9 Ibid. 195 c).
10 See Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Series C No. 214, Judgment of 24 August 2010, 321.
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munities and their traditional lands. In fact, “the sorrow that [the individuals 
concerned] and the other members of the Community feel owing to the failure 
to restore their traditional lands, the gradual loss of their culture [...] give rise 
to sufffering that necessarily violate the mental and moral integrity of all the 
members of the Community”.11
Following the same line of reasoning, in an earlier case concerning the mas-
sacre of members of the Maya community in Guatemala, the Court found that 
the death of the women and elders had “produced a cultural vacuum, [as] [t]he 
orphans did not receive the traditional education handed down from their 
ancestors”.12 This was connected to the fact that “[t]raditions,  rites and cus-
toms have an essential place in [the] community life [of Mayan people]. Their 
spirituality is reflected in the close relationship between the living and the 
dead, and is expressed, based on burial rites, as a form of permanent contact 
and solidarity with their ancestors. The transmission of culture and knowledge 
is one of the roles assigned to the elders and the women”.13 Consequently, the 
 IACtHR concluded that  reparation granted “to the members of the community 
as a whole” was essential.14
It follows that – in general terms – when programmes of reparations are 
established in favour of indigenous peoples, it is to be ensured that the collec-
tive dimension of the vision of life of the peoples concerned, which in its turn 
translates into a communal perception of the wrongs sufffered by their mem-
bers, is taken as the main parameter to be used for structuring the forms and 
modalities of the specifĳic measures of redress to be allocated. Hence, “the indi-
vidual reparations to be awarded must be supplemented by communal meas-
ures; said reparations [are to be] be granted to the community as a whole”.15
What has just been described is only part of the picture. As previously 
stressed, in order to ensure efffectiveness of human rights, reparation must be 
appropriate, meaning that it must be concretely suitable to fully restore the 
wrongs sufffered by the victim according to his/her own perspective. In other 
words, a reparatory process would be void if and to the extent that it would not 
produce the efffect of leading the victim to feel fully restored. It is evident that 
such an outcome may only be fulfĳilled through taking into proper considera-
tion the social and cultural specifĳicity of the victim, as well as his/her specifĳic 
11 Ibid. 244.
12 See Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Series C No. 116, Judg-
ment of 19 November 2004, 49(12).
13 Ibid. 85.
14 Ibid. 86.
15 See Case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname (n 5) 194.
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needs existing in the context of the situation determined by the wrong done. 
In concrete terms, this translates into a requirement of tailoring the specifĳic 
forms of  reparation to be established on the basis of the said needs. “ Repara-
tions consist in those measures necessary to make the efffects of the committed 
violations disappear. The nature and amount of the reparations depend on the 
harm caused at both the material and moral levels”.16
In principle, “[t]he reparation of harm caused by a violation of an inter-
national obligation requires, whenever possible, full restitution (restitutio in 
integrum), which consists in restoring the situation that existed before the 
violation occurred. When this is not possible […] [it is necessary] to order the 
adoption of a series of measures that, in addition to guaranteeing respect for 
the rights violated, will ensure that the damage resulting from the infractions 
is repaired, by way, inter alia, of payment of an indemnity as  compensation 
for the harm caused”.17 Depending on the circumstances characterizing any 
specifĳic situation, certain forms of redress, which in a given case are fully ap-
propriate to repair the wrong sufffered by the victim concerned, may not be 
enough, or even be inappropriate, when a diffferent victim, bearing diffferent 
needs, is concerned. Again, this is particularly true as far as indigenous peoples 
are concerned. Indeed, as previously noted, violations of the rights of those 
peoples usually produce collective implications going much beyond the suf-
fering caused to their individual members. At the same time, the wrongs suf-
fered by indigenous peoples, as perceived by them both individually and col-
lectively, do not limit their impact to the material side of their life, but usually 
pierce the deeper dimension of their spiritual existence, therefore assuming 
an intergenerational connotation. It follows that a reparatory process aimed 
at redressing a wrong sufffered by an indigenous community must address all 
such elements and put in practice all necessary measures to provide appropri-
ate redress for them all. For indigenous peoples, reparation not only redresses 
a specifĳic wrong, but in many cases allows the community to recover its whole 
existence and the harmony of the life of the community for the centuries to 
come. This implies, among other things, that the form of reparation prevail-
ing within the Western context – i.e. monetary  compensation – is usually not 
adequate, or at least not sufffĳicient, to ensure efffective redress for the pain suf-
fered by indigenous communities.
Once again, formidable practical examples of the argument just put forward 
may be found in the context of the practice of the  IACtHR. For instance, in 
establishing reparations in the case of the Moiwana community in Suriname 
16 See, inter alia, ibid. 171.
17 Ibid. 170.
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explained above, the Court did not limit itself to establishing monetary  com-
pensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, but added a signifĳi-
cant amount of other reparatory measures which were considered necessary 
for properly restoring the damage sufffered by the community concerned ac-
cording to its own perspective. Those measures included the obligation by the 
respondent government to investigate and punish the responsible parties in 
the instant case;18 to “employ all technical and scientifĳic means possible […] 
to recover promptly the remains of the Moiwana community members killed 
during the 1986 attack […] [and to] deliver them as soon as possible thereafter 
to the surviving community members so that the deceased may be honored 
according to the rituals of N’djuka culture”;19 to “adopt such legislative, admin-
istrative and other measures as are necessary to ensure the property rights of 
the members of the Moiwana community in relation to the traditional territo-
ries from which they were expelled, and provide for their use and enjoyment 
of those territories […] includ[ing] the creation of an efffective mechanism for 
the delimitation, demarcation and titling of said traditional territories”;20 to 
establish a developmental fund “directed to health, housing and educational 
programs for the Moiwana community members”;21 to organize a public cer-
emony to recognize “its international responsibility for the facts of the instant 
case and issue an apology to the Moiwana community members”;22 to estab-
lish a monument – having a design and location to be decided upon in  consul-
tation with the victims’ representatives – serving as a reminder to the whole 
nation of what happened in the Moiwana Village and preventing that it may 
be repeated in the future.23
The considerations developed in the present section involve to a notable 
degree indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage. It is sufffĳicient to think, among 
the examples just provided, of the following: the mortal remains of the dead 
members of the Moiwana community in Suriname; the traditions,  rites and 
customs of Mayan people in Guatemala; the traditional lands – including  natu-
ral resources located therein – of all indigenous communities, which are part 
of their own cultural heritage on account of the spiritual and (more generally) 
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The right of indigenous peoples to reparation for the wrongs sufffered is to-
day recognized by a number of provisions included in the international legal 
instruments concerning those peoples, particularly the 2007 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).24 Indeed, nine of 
the forty-six articles of the latter – i.e. articles 8(2), 10, 11(2), 12(2), 20(2), 28, 
29(3), 32(3) and 40 – include provisions relating to the matter of reparation.25 
The cultural aspect represents the rationale and the cornerstone with respect 
to most of them. Some of them are even devoted to the right to reparation for 
loss of cultural heritage. In particular, Article 11(2) UNDRIP establishes that 
“States shall provide redress through efffective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to 
their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their 
 free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and 
customs”. More specifĳically, Article 12(2) deals with ceremonial objects and  hu-
man remains, with respect to which States “shall seek to enable the  access and/
or repatriation […] through fair, transparent and efffective mechanisms devel-
oped in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned”.
The provisions concerning  reparation for violations of indigenous peoples’ 
land rights are also especially pertinent to the present investigation, for the 
reasons explained above. Among them, Article 28 is of particular signifĳicance, 
stating that “Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can 
include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable  com-
pensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confĳiscated, taken, 
occupied, used or damaged without their  free, prior and informed consent”. 
The same article continues by establishing that “[u]nless otherwise freely 
agreed upon by the peoples concerned,  compensation shall take the form of 
lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of mon-
24 UN GA Res. 61/295, 13 September 2007.
25 For a more comprehensive assessment of the right of indigenous peoples to reparation 
under the UNDRIP see F Lenzerini, “Reparations, Restitution and Redress”, in M Weller 
and J Hohmann (eds.), The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A Commen-
tary (Oxford University Press 2017), forthcoming. See also, more in general, F Lenzerini 
(ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples. International and Comparative Perspectives (Ox-
ford University Press 2008); among the contributions included in this volume see, with 
particular respect to cultural heritage, A Vrdoljak, “Reparation for Cultural Loss”, 197fff; of 
the same author see also International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) 228fff. On the specifĳic subject of the present chapter 
see K Kuprecht, Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Property Claims. Repatriation and Beyond 
(Springer 2014).
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etary  compensation or other appropriate redress”. The use of the term “appro-
priate” shows that, whatever kind of  reparation is selected, it must be adequate 
to efffectively restore the damage sufffered by the community concerned.
The UNDRIP is not the only existing international legal instrument recog-
nizing the right of indigenous peoples to reparation for breaches of their land 
rights. The same rule is, in fact, established by the 1989 ILO Convention con-
cerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.26 In particu-
lar, Article 15(2) states that indigenous peoples shall receive fair  compensa-
tion for any damages, which they may sustain as a result of programmes for 
the exploration or exploitation of  natural resources located in their traditional 
lands. Also, Article 16 establishes that, in the event of relocation of indigenous 
communities from their ancestral lands with respect to which return is not 
feasible, those communities are entitled to reparation which, when possible, 
should take the form of “lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that 
of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present 
needs and future development”.
In general terms, as authoritatively afffĳirmed by the International Law As-
sociation (ILA)’s Resolution No. 5/2012,
States must comply with their obligations – under customary and appli-
cable conventional international law – to recognise and fulfĳil the rights 
of indigenous peoples to reparation and redress for wrongs they have suf-
fered, including right relating to lands taken or damaged without their 
 free, prior and informed consent. Efffective mechanisms for redress – es-
tablished in conjunction with the peoples concerned – must be available 
and accessible in favour of indigenous peoples. Reparation must be ad-
equate and efffective, and, according to the perspective of the indigenous 
communities concerned, actually capable of repairing the wrongs they 
have sufffered.27
This statement confĳirms that, beyond treaty law, the right of indigenous peo-
ples to reparation for the wrongs sufffered has today crystallized into a princi-
ple of customary international law. This conclusion is also evident from the 
perspective of legal logic; in fact, once it has been established that reparation 
is an essential element for guaranteeing the efffectiveness of human rights, the 
provisions of customary international law which protect such rights (including 
26 See <www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C
169> accessed 6 September 2015.
27 See <www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024> accessed 6 September 2015.
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those protecting the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples) must neces-
sarily embrace the right of access to reparation that is adequate to restore the 
wrong sufffered.
3 International Practice of Reparation for Wrongs Perpetrated 
against Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Heritage: Successful Cases 
and Critical Factors
In the event of loss by indigenous peoples of their cultural heritage, interna-
tional law – as noted in the previous section – prescribes that the peoples con-
cerned should be ensured adequate and efffective reparation for the wrongs 
sufffered due to the said loss. In principle, as previously emphasized, the spe-
cifĳic form to be taken by a reparation for it to be adequate and efffective is to be 
established on a case-by-case basis. This said, with respect to the case in point 
we may assume that the most – if not the only – satisfactory form of reparation 
that is practicable in order to efffectively restore the wrongs sufffered by an in-
digenous community for being deprived of its cultural heritage is represented, 
when feasible, by restitutio in integrum. At the same time, it is to be consid-
ered that, for indigenous peoples, loss of cultural heritage may occur in very 
heterogeneous ways, which include not only deprivation of  tangible objects, 
but also taking of lands and/or  natural resources, prevention of the possibility 
of practising and living in accordance with their cultural traditions, includ-
ing religious rituals, hunting and fĳishing, traditional medicine, etc. Indeed, any 
aspect of the life of indigenous peoples has a cultural connotation. In other 
words, consistent with the concept of indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage as 
described in the quote at the beginning of this chapter,28 every wrong sufffered 
by indigenous peoples involves damage of such heritage. It follows that any 
process of reparation in favour of indigenous peoples entails some measure 
of redress for loss of cultural heritage. In each diffferent situation,  reparation 
should assume diffferent forms depending on the specifĳicity of the case, rang-
ing from the return of movable heritage to the community concerned, to the 
reintegration of indigenous peoples’ spiritual relationship with their ances-
tral territories and the resources located therein, or to the reconstruction of 
the connection between present and past generations.29 Having this in mind, 
28 See text corresponding to n 1 above. 
29 A very interesting case is represented by a collection of photographs of Aboriginal Aus-
tralians held by the Berndt Museum of Anthropology located in Perth, Australia, with 
respect to which the need was emphasized that the members of the “Stolen Generation” 
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in the present section particular attention will be devoted to  reparation for 
wrongs consisting in deprivation of  tangible movable cultural heritage of in-
digenous peoples, a topic which epitomizes the recent evolution of interna-
tional law towards recognizing the right of such peoples to obtain redress for 
loss or damage of their cultural heritage.
The existence of the right of indigenous peoples to restitution of their  cul-
tural property is supported – in addition to the general legal framework de-
scribed in the previous section – by instruments of international law specifĳi-
cally devoted to movable cultural heritage. For example, the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects30 establishes, at 
Article 5(3)(d), that, in the context of the return of illegally exported cultural 
objects, the court or other competent authority of the State party to which 
return of a cultural object has been requested must order that such a return 
is ensured, if it is established that the removal of the object concerned has 
signifĳicantly impaired “the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or 
indigenous community”. Similarly, the Principles & Guidelines for the Protec-
tion of the Heritage of Indigenous People, also adopted in 1995,31 request gov-
ernments and international organizations to “assist indigenous peoples and 
communities in recovering control and  possession of their moveable cultural 
property and other heritage”.32 In addition, they stress that  human remains 
and associated funeral objects “must be returned to their descendants and ter-
ritories in a culturally appropriate manner, as determined by the indigenous 
peoples concerned”,33 while moveable cultural property “should be returned 
– victims of the infamous policy carried out by the Australian government in the XXth 
Century resulting in the removal of children of Aboriginals and Torre Strait Islanders from 
their families – were allowed to have access to the photographs. Indeed, the latter might 
help in assisting them “to cope better with their profound sense of loss and disorienta-
tion”, as those images might allow them “to reconnect to their families, even if it is only in 
the form of a photograph […] Not only is it important for the older generations to identify 
their family history, but it is also crucial that this information be passed to the younger 
generations, which is imperative for reclaiming and forming identity”. See JE Stanton, 
“Snapshots on the Dreaming: Photographs of the past and present”, in LV Prott (ed.), Wit-
nesses to History – Documents and Writings on the Return of Cultural Objects (UNESCO 
2009), 242, 248-249.
30 See <www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural-property/1995-convention> accessed 19 Sep-
tember 2015.
31 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26, 21 June 1995, available at <http://ankn.uaf.edu/IKS/
protect.html> accessed 19 September 2015.
32 See Principle 19.
33 See Principle 21.
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wherever possible to its traditional owners, particularly if shown to be of sig-
nifĳicant cultural, religious or historical value to them”.34
In sum, international law provides a sound legal basis for the  reparation 
campaigns developed in the last few decades at various levels, by indigenous 
peoples and their supporters, in order to recover their lost  cultural property 
and obtain  compensation for the cultural loss sufffered as a result of wrongs 
perpetrated against their cultural heritage.
One of the most renowned of the said campaigns has been the one aimed 
at obtaining the return to New Zealand of the Māori Mokomokai – mummifĳied 
heads of Māori people of high lineage, decorated by traditional tattooing – 
either to be returned to their relatives or, when the latter are unknown, to the 
Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, in Wellington. In 2007, ruling on 
the decision of the  museum of natural history of its town to return one of those 
heads to New Zealand, a French tribunal emphasized that such a return would 
have represented an unjustifĳied damage to French national heritage.35 The ra-
tionale of the decision of the French tribunal was reinforced by the fact that, 
once returned to their relatives, the Mokomokai were to be buried according to 
the Māori tradition; hence, the whole of humanity (including future genera-
tions) would be deprived forever of the possibility of enjoying such pieces of 
cultural heritage. This argument, however, even coupled with the one accord-
ing to which the Mokomokai concerned had to be considered as part of French 
cultural heritage, was eventually not enough to overcome the awareness of the 
fundamental importance of returning to the Māori community an essential 
piece of their own cultural and spiritual heritage. Therefore, the decision of 
the Tribunal was de facto reversed by the French National Assembly, which on 
4 May 2010 passed a bill ordering French museums to return to New Zealand 
all Māori mummifĳied heads still in their  possession.36 The new law was given 
proper operation in the following years. For example, twenty Mokomokai were 
returned from France to their respective tribes in New Zealand, to be given 
a proper burial, in January 2012.37 The behaviour of the French government 
34 See Principle 22.
35 The decision was released by the Administrative Tribunal of Rouen in October 2007; see 
“France stops Maori mummy’s return”, BBC News, 25 October 2007, <http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/7061724.stm> accessed 11 September 2015.
36 See Loi no 2010-501 du 18 mai 2010 visant à autoriser la restitution par la France des têtes mao-
ries à la Nouvelle-Zélande et relative à la gestion des collections, <http://legifrance.gouv.fr/
afffĳichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022227321> accessed 11 September 2015.
37 See “France returns 20 mummifĳied Maori heads to New Zealand”, BBC News, 24 January 
2012, <www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16695330> accessed 11 September 2015.
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was part of a wider practice developed by a number of countries – including 
Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and other European States 
– pursuant to which hundreds of Mokomokai held in museums and private 
collections around the world were returned to New Zealand.38
Human remains represent the category of indigenous peoples’ cultural her-
itage with respect to which  reparation has been practised more frequently in 
recent times. For example, in Argentina, in 1994, the remains of the Mapuche 
Chief Inakayal, previously kept in the La Plata  museum since his death in 1888, 
were returned to his homeland, Patagonia, where they were buried by indig-
enous descendants.39 Also, in June 2005, all known human remains belonging 
to ancestors of the Haida Nation (an indigenous nation of the Pacifĳic North-
West coast of North America) located in North America were repatriated and 
reburied,40 while some problems were experienced when trying to recover the 
Haida remains held by European institutions.41 In fact, “many European in-
stitutions remain apprehensive about the process [of repatriation], to some 
extent because there is a sense of pride and national identity tied up in hous-
ing these collections”.42 However, for example, in 2010 the remains previously 
held at the Pitt Rivers Museum, at the University of Oxford, were returned to 
the Haida Nation and subsequently reburied in the community’s traditional 
territory.43
In 2003, a Joint Statement was released by the prime ministers of the United 
Kingdom and Australia. In that document they agreed to “increase effforts to 
repatriate human remains to Australian indigenous communities” and rec-
ognized “the special connection that indigenous peoples have with ancestral 
remains”. Furthermore, they endorsed “the repatriation of indigenous  human 
remains wherever possible and appropriate from both public and private col-
38 For a more comprehensive assessment of the case of the Māori Mokomokai see F Lenzer-
ini, “The Tension between Communities’ Cultural Rights and Global Interests: The Case 
of the Māori Mokomokai”, in S Borelli and F Lenzerini (eds.), Cultural Heritage, Cultural 
Rights, Cultural Diversity: New Developments in International Law (Brill-Nijhofff, 2012), 
157fff.
39 See ML Endere, “The Return of Inakayal to Patagonia”, in Prott (n 29) 283fff.
40 See Skidegate Repatriation & Cultural Committee, “End of Mourning Ceremony”, <www.
repatriation.ca/Pages/End%20of%20Mourning.html> accessed 15 September 2015; see 
also M Simpson, “The Repatriation of Haida Ancestors”, in Prott (n 29) 260fff.
41 See L Bourgon, “Grave Injustice. The Haida Nation’s quest to repatriate the stolen bodies 
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lections”. Last but not least, they praised the British institutions that had al-
ready negotiated agreements with indigenous communities for the release of 
remains, particularly the Edinburgh University, which had “completed repa-
triation requests of a large collection of remains”.44 
One further example of return of human remains to indigenous peoples oc-
curred in May 2007, when the Natural History Museum in London returned 17 
Aboriginal mortal remains to Tasmania, Australia, on the condition that some 
of them, instead of being buried, would be preserved in Tasmania under the 
joint control of the Museum and the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre.45
More generally with respect to the return of  cultural property to indigenous 
communities, in the United States the  Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act ( NAGPRA)46 was passed in 1990; since then, according to the 
most recently updated statistics available at the time of this writing, the fol-
lowing Native American human remains and cultural items have been repatri-
ated: 50,518 individuals’  human remains; 1,185,948 associated funerary objects; 
219,956 unassociated funerary objects; 4,914 sacred objects; 8,118 objects of cul-
tural patrimony; 1,624 objects that are both sacred and patrimonial.47 One of 
the most famous cases of successful application of the  NAGPRA is represented 
by the repatriation of the Ahayu:da – twin gods of war – to the Zuni com-
munity. The process of repatriation, although starting in the late 1970s, well 
before the  NAGPRA, notably increased after its entry into force, leading to the 
outcome of allowing repatriation of virtually all known Ahayu:da existing in 
North America.48
44 Joint Statement by Prime Minister Blair (United Kingdom) and Prime Minister Howard (Aus-
tralia) on the Repatriation of Human Remains, 2003, in Prott (n 29) 268-269.
45 See AL Bandle, A Chechi, M André Renold, “Case 17 Tasmanian Human Remains – Tas-
manian Aboriginal Centre and Natural History Museum London”, Platform ArThemis, 
Art Law Centre, University of Geneva, March 2012, <https://plone.unige.ch/art-adr/cases-
afffaires/17-tasmanian-human-remains-2013-tasmanian-aboriginal-centre-and-natural-
history-museum-london/case-note-17-tasmanian-human-remains> accessed 20 Septem-
ber 2015.
46 Pub. L. 101-601, 25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., 104 Stat. 3048.
47 See National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, “National NAGPRA Frequently 
Asked Questions”, <http://www.nps.gov/nagpra/FAQ/INDEX.HTM> accessed 20 Septem-
ber 2015; the available statistics were updated at 30 September 2014.
48 On the case of the Ahayu:da see, inter alia, WL Merrill, EJ Ladd, TJ Ferguson, “The Re-
turn of the Ahayu:da. Lessons for Repatriation from Zuni Pueblo and the Smithsonian 
Institution”, (1993) 34 Current Anthropology 523fff.; VV AA, “The Return of the Ahayu:da to 
Zuni Pueblo”, in Prott (n 29) 255fff.; TJ Ferguson, ‘Repatriation of Ahayu:da: 20 Years Later’, 
(2010) 33 Museum Anthropology 194-195.
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Another very famous case of return of stolen  cultural property to indige-
nous peoples is the one concerning the sacred Sioux ghost dance shirts. Those 
shirts were taken from the dead bodies of some of the Sioux massacred by the 
U.S. Army in Wounded Knee on 29 December 1890 and subsequently displayed 
at the National Museum of Natural History, at the Smithsonian Institution. 
The Institution had a total of twenty-nine objects taken from the bodies of the 
Sioux killed in Wounded Knee, including the shirts. All of them were returned 
to the descendants of the victims in 1988.49 Ten years later, in 1998, the Glasgow 
City Council’s Arts and Culture Committee decided to return another of those 
shirts, which was previously held by the Kelvingrove Museum, in Glasgow, to 
the Wounded Knee Survivors’ Association for display in Wounded Knee in a 
 museum built to commemorate the massacre.50
The examples provided so far refer to successful cases. However, as it may be 
easily imagined, other cases exist in which indigenous peoples encounter huge 
problems in obtaining return of the cultural heritage of which they have been 
deprived. Indeed, in some cases their effforts have proved unsuccessful, while 
other cases are still pending even after decades of struggle. For example, in 
the previously mentioned case of the return of the Ahayu:da to the Zuni peo-
ple, while it was characterized by huge success in the United States – mainly 
thanks to the  NAGPRA – so far it has been much less successful with respect to 
the Ahayu:da claimed from European museums and other institutions, includ-
ing the Musée du Quai Branly in Paris or the Ethnological Museum in Berlin.51 
European institutions fear that repatriation of those cultural objects would es-
tablish an unwelcome precedent that might encourage other people to claim 
other pieces included in their collections. Worse yet, in April 2013 a French 
judge even found that selling Katsina “friends” (which are among the most sa-
cred ritual objects of the Hopi Native American community) at an auction in 
Paris was fully legitimate, as “the claim that Hopi cultural patrimony is exclu-
sively their property has no legal basis according to French law”.52 Other cases 
have recently occurred in which indigenous peoples’ sacred objects have been 
49 See R Thornton, “Repatriation as Healing the Trauma of History”, in Prott (n 29) 239.
50 See M Simpson, “Posing a Challenge for the Future”, in Prott (n 29) 240-241.
51 See R Donadio, “Zuni Ask Europe to Return Sacred Art”, The New York Times, 8 April 2014, 
<www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/arts/design/zuni-petition-european-museums-to-re-
turn-sacred-objects.html?_r=1> accessed 20 September 2015.
52 See CR Ganteaume, “Respecting Non-Western Sacred Objects: An A:shiwi Ahayu:da (Zuni 
war god), the Museum of the American Indian–Heye Foundation, and the Museum of 
Modern Art”, The National Museum of the American Indian, 15 April 2013, <http://blog.
nmai.si.edu/main/2013/04/respecting-non-western-sacred-objects.html> accessed 20 
September 2015.
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sold at auctions; for instance, after the case of the Katsina “friends” just referred 
to, Native American tribes have failed to stop the sale of their own ceremonial 
objects in France at least another three times.53
The lack of success of the attempts to return certain indigenous cultural 
objects must not be taken as evidence contradicting the conclusion drawn in 
section 2 of this chapter, i.e. that, in addition to treaty law, the right of indig-
enous peoples to  reparation for the wrongs sufffered – including for the loss 
of their own cultural heritage – has today crystallized into a principle of cus-
tomary international law. On the contrary, this conclusion remains fully valid 
even in the presence of concrete cases with a fĳinal outcome which prima facie 
seems to challenge it. Indeed, it usually happens with respect to virtually any 
rule of international law that the distance between the recognition of a given 
obligation “on paper” and its full concrete implementation in the life of people 
may remain quite lengthy. In other words, violations or derogations happen 
every day throughout the world with respect to any existing legal rule. As em-
phasized by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, “[i]t is 
not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of [a rule of 
international law] should have been perfect, in the sense that States should 
have refrained, with complete consistency, from [behaviours inconsistent with 
it] […] The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as custom-
ary, the corresponding practice must be in absolute rigorous conformity with 
the rule”.54 More specifĳically with respect to the human rights fĳield, it is self-
evident that many States in the world have an awful human rights record – in 
spite of the many existing international obligations by which they are unques-
tionably bound – and even governments with a better reputation often try to 
circumvent their obligations through using very sophisticated legal arguments, 
including the need of balancing conflicting rights. With respect to movable 
cultural heritage of which indigenous peoples have been deprived, its return 
to the community that created and originally kept it is sometimes hindered 
for a number of reasons. Among the critical factors which in some cases make 
such return difffĳicult to achieve in practice, the fact that the heritage in point 
may be considered as part of the cultural heritage of the country concerned 
emerges, as well as the consideration that its return to the said community 
might factually deprive the rest of the world of the opportunity of enjoying 
53 See “Native Americans fail to halt artefact auction in France”, The Guardian, 10 June 2015, 
<www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/native-americans-artefact-auction-france> 
accessed 20 September 2015.
54 See Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara-
gua v. United States), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, (1986) ICJ Reports 186.
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such heritage, or the existence of conflicting property claims by private own-
ers. Not to mention other “less commendable” considerations, e.g. the above-
mentioned willingness (common to many European museums) to prevent a 
Pandora’s box from opening, scattering innumerable claims of restitution of 
 cultural property from all over the world. In any event, when such complex 
situations occur, they are not always treated in the proper way, i.e. according to 
the content and rationale of applicable international law. However, the case of 
the Māori Mokomokai described above indicates the way to be followed when 
dealing with cultural heritage of importance for indigenous peoples, even 
when other interests are at stake, notwithstanding the fact that also the lat-
ter are commendable. Indeed, in the Mokomokai case, the French government 
had no hesitation in passing a law establishing that those cultural objects had 
to be returned to their traditional owners, even at the price of impoverishing 
French cultural heritage and of depriving the whole world from having  access 
to them, the fate of which was to be buried. In fact, when cultural property is 
of special spiritual signifĳicance for indigenous peoples – as is the case with the 
Mokomokai – its return to the community to which the property concerned 
culturally belongs is an essential prerequisite for ensuring preservation of its 
cultural identity and integrity, as well as for guaranteeing proper enjoyment of 
fundamental human rights by its members.55
It is true that the practice concerning return to indigenous peoples of the 
cultural property of which they have been deprived is still not absolutely uni-
form. However, such practice, considered as a whole, denotes a progressively 
growing awareness by the international community that the actual realization 
of indigenous peoples’ internationally recognized human rights cannot pre-
scind from proper  reparation for the wrongs sufffered by those peoples in rela-
tion to their cultural heritage.
4 Conclusion: The Way Forward
In the previous sections we have ascertained that international law fully rec-
ognizes the right of indigenous peoples to “maintain, control, protect and de-
velop their cultural heritage,  traditional knowledge and  traditional cultural 
expressions”,56 and consistently prescribes their related right to reparation 
for wrongs sufffered for being deprived of their cultural heritage and, more in 
general, for the rupture of their spiritual relationship with the latter. We have 
55 See, more comprehensively on this point, Lenzerini (n 38) 165fff, particularly 173fff.
56 See Article 31 UNDRIP.
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also seen that such  reparation may take diffferent forms, which depend on the 
specifĳic element of indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage that is afffected, as 
well as on the characteristics of the violation sufffered. With respect to depri-
vation of movable  cultural property in particular, the most appropriate form 
of reparation is defĳinitely represented by return of such property to the com-
munity concerned. Finally, we have noted that in certain instances it may be 
quite complex to translate the rights just mentioned into concrete practice, 
due to a number of factors. Among those factors, a key one is that in many 
cases non-indigenous subjects – either individuals or private or public institu-
tions – may hold rights over cultural property of indigenous origin which are 
legally protected, usually taking the form of private property rights. Also, when 
a cultural property produced by, or originally belonging to, indigenous peo-
ples has remained in a given country for a long time, it may be considered as 
part of its national cultural heritage, which the country concerned has a legally 
protected interest to keep. Not to mention extra-legal arguments, particularly 
the fear by museums and other institutions that, if they agree to return certain 
items to indigenous peoples, they would encourage other persons or entities 
to claim restitution of other pieces included in their collections. It is there-
fore evident that indigenous peoples’ claims for recovering their own cultural 
property are sometimes unsuccessful not because their right to obtain return 
of such property is not protected by international law, but because diffferent 
legally-protected and other interests exist over the property concerned, mak-
ing it quite hard for the right claimed by indigenous peoples to prevail over the 
other interests at stake.
Generally speaking, one may not reasonably object to the consideration 
that, when diffferent legally-protected rights are involved which are incompat-
ible with each other, the decision concerning which one should prevail is to be 
taken on a case-by-case basis, after establishing a balance among the diffferent 
interests at stake. However, with respect to the case under discussion, particu-
lar weight is to be attributed to the fundamental signifĳicance of cultural herit-
age for indigenous peoples. Indeed, for those peoples the importance of such 
heritage usually goes much beyond the one determined by a mere property 
right, having a deep spiritual signifĳicance to the point of playing an essential 
role for ensuring the preservation of indigenous communities’ cultural iden-
tity and, a fortiori, for their very cultural and physical survival. Reparation for 
wrongs against indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage is consequently essential 
for ensuring respect of the basic and fundamental human rights of indigenous 
peoples, which in principle certainly take the lead over a “simple” right to prop-
erty held by private persons or institutions having the heritage concerned in 
their  possession (although the latter right is also protected by law).
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It emerges from the foregoing that it is essential that the necessary steps 
are taken for further improving the efffectiveness of reparatory processes 
concerning cultural-heritage-related wrongs sufffered by indigenous peoples. 
These steps should follow two parallel and related avenues. The fĳirst consists 
in increasing the amount of legal instruments and rules, at both international 
and domestic levels, prescribing the obligation to return cultural heritage of 
indigenous peoples to their original and legitimate owners, irrespective of the 
existence of any other property right over such heritage.57 At the same time, 
ratifĳication should be promoted of the instruments already existing proclaim-
ing or implicitly presupposing the said obligation, like the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention, which at the moment of this writing has been ratifĳied by 37 States 
only.58 The second avenue to pursue addresses the need to raise awareness – 
among competent bodies and institutions, as well as within the civil society 
as a whole – about the fundamental signifĳicance of cultural heritage for indig-
enous peoples, a signifĳicance which goes much beyond a mere perception of 
“property” and attains attributes of deep spirituality, playing a decisive role in 
shaping and preserving the identity of the communities concerned. With such 
awareness in mind, it will be plainly and automatically recognized that return 
to indigenous peoples of their own cultural heritage represents – in addition to 
a well-established legal obligation – an ethically due gesture, greatly facilitat-
ing its actual realization in practice. 
57 Examples of existing domestic legislation of the kind advocated in the text are repre-
sented by the NAGPRA (see n 46 and corresponding text) and French Loi no 2010-501 du 
18 mai 2010 (n 36).
58 See <www.unidroit.org/status-cp> accessed 22 September 2015.
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